Lead Opinion
The question presented by these two cases is whether appeals that involve the proper interpretation of a trust provision come within this Court’s general appellate jurisdiction over “equity cases,” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. Ill (2), because the resolution of that legal issue will affect the administration of the trust. Consistent with our precedent on this question, we conclude that such cases do not come within our equity jurisdiction.
1. These cases arise from a declaratory judgment action filed by trustee William E. Callaway, Jr., seeking to determine the effect of an in terrorem clause in an express trust. The donor, Marjorie H. Durham, executed the inter vivos trust in 2000, naming herself as a beneficiary and her four children as residual beneficiaries. Mrs. Durham died in 2009. In 2010, the trustee filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against the four trust beneficiaries, seeking an order declaring that three of the beneficiaries, Wallace Durham, Hugh Durham, and Lucinda Durham Willard, had forfeited their respective interests in the trust estate under the in terrorem clause and that the entirety of the estate should therefore be distributed to the fourth beneficiary, Lawrence Durham.
Case No. S12A0537 is Lawrence’s appeal of the denial of his motion for summary judgment. After the trial court certified its ruling for immediate review, Lawrence filed an application for interlocutory appeal in the Court of Appeals, which transferred the application to this Court. We granted the application to address whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal as an “equity case” and, if so, whether the trial court erred in denying Lawrence’s motion for summary judgment. Case No. S12A0607 is
2. For more than two decades, this Court has consistently held that our appellate jurisdiction over “equity cases” is limited to cases in which a specific substantive issue raised on appeal involves equitable relief rather than questions of law.
Whether an action is an equity case for the purpose of determining jurisdiction on appeal depends upon the issue raised on appeal, not upon how the case is styled nor upon the kinds of relief which may be sought by the complaint. That is, “equity cases” are those in which a substantive issue on appeal involves the legality or propriety of equitable relief sought in the superior court — whether that relief was granted or denied. Cases in which the grant or denial of such relief was merely ancillary to underlying issues of law, or would have been a matter of routine once the underlying issues of law were resolved, are not “equity cases.”
Beauchamp v. Knight,
The parties and the dissent contend that because the resolution of these cases will affect the administration of Mrs. Durham’s trust by controlling how the trustee should distribute the trust property among the four beneficiaries, the cases come within our equity jurisdiction. The parties cite a statute which says that “[t]rusts are peculiarly subjects of equity jurisdiction” and that “[a]ctions concerning the construction, administration, or internal affairs of a trust shall be maintained in superior court,” OCGA § 53-12-6 (a), (b), and note that the Constitution gives superior courts exclusive jurisdiction in “equity cases.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. I. The dissent cites similar materials regarding the equitable nature of trusts and trust remedies. See Dis. Op. at 237.
However, in Warren v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia,
[A]s this Court’s precedent makes clear, it is not the relief requested, or any classification or treatment of the case in the court below, but the issue presented on appeal that controls [our jurisdiction]. The cases cited by the parties in support of the proposition that cases involving the administration of trusts are always considered to be equity cases, regardless of the appellate issues, were decided prior to the clarification of our jurisdiction in Pittman and Beau-champ. . . . The principles of Pittman and Beauchamp control; this Court’s equity jurisdiction is invoked when the primary issue raised on appeal is equitable.
Warren,
Thus, under our jurisdictional precedent, “[f]or a matter to come within this Court’s equity jurisdiction, the lower court must have rendered a judgment based upon equitable principles, and that decision must be the primary issue on appeal,” even if the case involves a trust. Warren,
Our jurisdictional treatment of trust cases is consistent with our treatment of other types of cases involving equity. For example, injunctions are the quintessential form of equitable relief, see OCGA § 9-5-1 (“Equity, by a writ of injunction, may restrain [certain proceedings and acts].”), and actions seeking an injunction must therefore be brought in superior court. See OCGA § 15-6-8 (2) (saying that superior courts have the authority “[t]o exercise the powers of a court of equity”); OCGA § 15-6-9 (3) (saying that superior courts have the authority “[t]o grant writs of injunction”); Lee v. Lee,
We recognize that this Court has decided a few trust-related cases. See Lewis v. Van Anda,
These trust-related decisions therefore do not support a result that is contrary to Warren and Reeves, in which we addressed the jurisdictional issue presented and squarely held that the fact that a case relates to the administration of a trust is insufficient to bring it within this Court’s “equity case” jurisdiction. The dissent is simply wrong in asserting that “[t]his Court has two competing lines of authority concerning the proper appellate court to hear appeals concerning express trusts.” Dis. Op. at 235-236. We have one line of authority on the jurisdictional issue; the cases the dissent would
Thus, in deciding whether this Court has jurisdiction over these appeals, it does not matter that “[t]he trustee sought a declaration from the superior court on how he should distribute the trust’s property among the four children” or that the relief the trustee sought was equitable in nature. Dis. Op. at 238. That just means the trustee was correct in filing his case in the superior court. Instead, the sole issue presented on appeal is how to interpret a specific provision of a legal document — the in terrorem clause of Mrs. Durham’s trust. That is a straightforward legal question, one that does not require “any analysis that could be termed an evaluation of equitable considerations.” Warren,
3. These appeals present no issue of equity, and there is no other apparent basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, we transfer Case No. S12A0537, which came to this Court directly from the trial court after our grant of the interlocutory application (which was transferred from the Court of Appeals), to the Court of Appeals, and we return Case No. S12A0607, which the Court of Appeals transferred to this Court, to the Court of Appeals.
Appeal transferred to the Court of Appeals in Case No. S12A0537. Appeal returned to the Court of Appeals in Case No. S12A0607.
Notes
The in terrorem clause provides that if any of the trust beneficiaries are “unsuccessful in [a] legal or equitable challenge” pertaining to the administration, management, or distribution of the trust, “then said child or children shall, as of said date that the challenge is determined adversely to said child or children, forfeit any right, title or interest in said Trust Estate.”
The dissent contends that our decision today improperly limits our equity jurisdiction over trust-related cases. See Dis. Op. at 238-239. However, those limits are not unique to trust cases; they stem from our decisions since Beauchamp that narrowly define our equity jurisdiction across the board, and the dissent does not question the Beauchamp approach. See Dis. Op. at 236.
Snook was decided before Beauchamp; the appeal raised the issue of whether the beneficiaries had violated the in terrorem clause of a trust, although the case was actually decided without interpreting that clause on the principle that “[a] beneficiary assuredly is empowered to enforce the provisions of a trust, no matter the terms of any in terrorem clause.”
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
While, as a matter of policy, I agree with the majority that “equity cases” should go to the Court of Appeals, I disagree that our precedent mandates that result in this case. This Court has two competing lines
Our State Constitution gives this Court appellate jurisdiction over all equity cases. See Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III (2). “Whether an action is an equity case for the purpose of determining jurisdiction on appeal depends upon the issue raised on appeal.” Beauchamp v. Knight,
Historically, this Court has retained appeals involving the administration and internal affairs of an express trust under our equity jurisdiction. See Snook v. Sessoms,
This jurisdiction is based on the long-standing principle of law that trusts “are peculiarly subjects of equity jurisdiction” and the “trustee is amenable to the court of equity for faithful administration of trust.” Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Dooley,
Our trust code has codified the principle that the remedies for trust beneficiaries are exclusively equitable. See OCGA § 53-12-6 (actions concerning the “construction, administration, or internal affairs of a trust shall be maintained in superior court”). Similarly, we have relied on the official comment, now codified at OCGA § 53-12-6, that “[c]auses of action that involve the ‘internal affairs’ of a trust are generally the subject of equity jurisdiction” to exercise appellate jurisdiction over cases involving express trusts. Consistent with this official comment, we have exercised jurisdiction in an appeal if the substantive issue on appeal involves the administration or internal affairs of an express trust. See Lewis v. Van Anda,
In this case, the issue in the trial court and on appeal is whether any of the residual beneficiaries are prohibited from recovering property under their mother’s trust due to their past actions in filing
Although the majority opinion is correct that we must interpret the in terrorem clause in light of the beneficiaries’ actions in filing the lawsuits in Evans and Tattnall Counties, our construction of that specific clause cannot be separated from the trustee’s request for guidance on the key question involving the trust — how to distribute the remaining trust property among the four children of donor Majorie Durham. To separate out the two issues, as the majority does, means that every case involving the propriety of the trustee’s actions in conducting the internal affairs of the trust will go to the Court of Appeals because the underlying issue on appeal will involve the interpretation of one or more specific provisions in the trust agreement. Unlike our decision in Warren, where we determined that standing to seek equitable relief is not a question within our equitable jurisdiction, the issues here involve the internal workings of the trust and propriety of the equitable relief sought to be granted the beneficiaries. See Ludwig,
While the majority opinion treats our equity jurisdiction as one straight, seamless line of authority, this Court has struggled over how to define our jurisdiction in equity cases. See, e.g., Kemp v. Neal,
Because express trusts are a creature of equity and by their nature involve equitable remedies, I would hold that we continue to have jurisdiction over appeals when the case involves the internal affairs of an express trust.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham and Justice Melton join in this dissent.