42 Ga. App. 345 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1930
The only question for determination in this case is whether or not the evidence supports the verdict finding Jack Durden guilty of living in a state of adultery with Mamie Durden.
The defendant was the second cousin of Murphey Durden, the husband of Mamie Durden. Jack was married and had “about ten
One witness testified that one day the defendant got him to tell Mrs. Mamie Durden not to come to the store, because the defendant’s wife was there. Another witness testified that one day Mamie Durden told her that “every woman ought to have a sweetheart, and, if she did, her husband would love her better.” Still another witness testified that one night she “saw Jack and Mamie in the backyard close together while Murphey was at the store,” but that she saw nothing wrong going on between them. One witness swore that one day he saw defendant and Mamie Durden standing close together behind the counter of Murphey’s store, talking — “too close together to look good.” A witness testified that she lived just across the street from Murphey’s house, and had been living there for four or five years, and that she had “never seen anything improper around there, and never thought anything about it.” After testifying that in his opinion Mamie Durden’s reputation was bad,
In this ease the State apparently undertook to overwhelm the defendant by proving by witness after witness that Mrs. Mamie Durden’s reputation was “bad.” We are aware of the potency of such proof where the evidence discloses that the parties were in a compromising situation, but we know of no case where such reputation, coupled with evidence as unsatisfactory as that in this case, was held sufficient to sustain a conviction of the offense of living in a state of adultery. The case of Lightner v. State, 126 Ga. 563 (55 S. E. 471), is infinitely stronger than the one at bar, yet the judgment was reversed for lack of evidence. The evidence in this case may raise a suspicion against the defendant, but, in our opinion, it is very weak, and falls far short of meeting the requirement of the Penal Code (1910), § 1010, that “it must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.”
Judgment reversed.