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Dupree v. United States
583 A.2d 1000
D.C.
1990
Check Treatment

*1 judicial as bailee under the law the officer Id. DUPREE, ordinary negligence. Appellant,

is liable for A. Sabrina As custodian of automobiles under v. however, law, impoundment vehicle STATES, Appellee. UNITED position in the of a bailee for District is not preserving property for cus- purpose Nos. 89-446. impoundment law tody and sale. temporary storage by merely authorizes Appeals. Court of District of Columbia purpose enforcing the District for the Sept. 1990. Submitted view, Thus, my in parking laws. Decided Dec. applicable care to sheriffs standard of property and sell others authorized to seize apply judgments

in does satisfaction required to im- government officers public pound necessary for the cars when safety. of Columbia

I note that in the District applies by gross negligence standard police and property seized statute to De- Metropolitan Police impounded Property partment Clerk. sup- I argued, It could failure to enact a pose, that the Council’s police im- similar statute the case that it intended poundment of cars shows context. apply lesser standard not without Although argument force, me is the significant much more difficulty, impossibility, if not

conceptual two exercises distinguishing between the caretaking function. police think, con- finally, that we must be consequences of a practical cerned parks illegally, and who rule that safety (certainly at endangers so hour), reasonably require the Dis- can rush ordinary lapses from against insure trict to It process. impoundment in the care “un- care means care that reasonable true (which presumably der the circumstances” like), rush hour and would include rights of the owner who as between duty parking, violates the law prevent to clear the streets police accidents, of ordi- that a standard I believe too low a balance nary negligence strikes en- to effective as a disincentive and acts parking laws. forcement

BELSON, Judge: Associate Dupree appeals Sabrina imposi- from the tion of a mandatory-minimum sentence imprisonment of not less than years four and no years pursuant more than twelve 33-541(c)(l)(A)(1988) D.C.Code after she § plea guilty entered a to distribution of dilaudid in violation the D.C. Uniform Act, Controlled Substances 33-541(a)(l). sentencing hearing, At the § the trial judge Dupree found that an “addict” and concluded that for that Dupree reason failed to for the addict exception require- mandatory-minimum ment of a sentence.1 Dupree contends judge erred in finding that she was not an addict. We agree, and therefore reverse and remand for proceedings. further

I.

At sentencing hearing, Dupree testi- fied in her own behalf about her addiction cocaine, marijuana, and heroin. She tes- marijuana tified that she daily had used past years fifteen and that she had used past cocaine and heroin for the ten years. Dupree that her stated habit cost her approximately per day, that $200 stop could not using and that she help problem. needed with the She also testified that she had worked at the Veter- Hospital ans secretary as a ward arrest, years preceding receiving biweekly paycheck.2 past $450 For the Bonner, appointed by Leonard J. testified, years, two Dupree she had been court, appellant. filed a brief for selling drugs solely habit. As further evidence of her addic- Jay Stephens, Atty., B. U.S. John R. up her sleeves rolled so the Tourish, Jr., Fisher Thomas J. Asst. judge could see needle marks in Attys., appellee. filed U.S. a brief arms the intravenous caused SCHWELB, BELSON, Before heroin. testified that also she had WAGNER, Judges. Associate outpatient pro- been treatment exception permits According unchallenged The addict the trial 2. statement of mandatory-minimum court, waive sentence when presen- counsel to the person previous drug who has report, tence the trial took no- manufacturing or distribution convictions if tice, disclosed that lost this person was an at the time of the problems. of absences and other primary purpose and the offense of the offense towas enable that to obtain narcotic personal for his or her own use. D.C. (c)(2) (1988). Code incarceration,

gram “hang- during had left followed when she started again, got wrong in the streets probation treatment. again using drugs crowd and ... started

again.” *3 II. Dupree’s counsel called one other wit- exception, To for the addict testimony support Dupree’s ness to that judge notify the defendant must the trial addict, liaison officer she was an a court that be sentenced under the she seeks to Agency for the D.C. Pretrial Service Adult prove and she must her addict testified, Drug The with ref- Unit. witness eligibility v. to be so sentenced. Grant drug kept by Dupree’s erence to record (D.C. States, 509 A.2d United agency, positive for Dupree that had tested 1986). question There that defense is no drugs times over a six out of counsel in this case satisfied the first of approximately year of and a half. On all by notifying requirements these occasions, Dupree positive six had tested plea proceeding Dupree that judge at the occasions, for cocaine. of those On two under the ad would seek to be sentenced positive phencycli- she also had for exception. inquiry dict The focus of our occasion, (PCP) and, dine on another judge’s will be on the trial determination positive opiates. also had tested The Dupree eligible excep not that government offered no evidence to rebut tion. Dupree the evidence that was an addict. prove eligibility, To the defendant point proceedings, At that proffer must evidence “that has no [s]he judge findings upon made her the evidence convictions, disqualifying was an ‘ad by [s]he presented the defense to offense, dict’ at the time of the ... Dupree was an addict. The contention that primary purpose for addiction was the judge pointed out that use of [her] the commission of offense.” Id. drugs any way impaired “in had not [her] noting contain “information about ability” society, to function Dupree required fact that held a “which the defendant’s addiction and the nature of offense,” hospital in a relationship meticulous control of records and not its to [her] safety patients of the where the health and conclusory mere statements. just consist of performing.” Du- are at risk she is not However, the defendant’s burden Id. success, pree’s attempted, counsel without proof “insurmountable or tanta cannot be persuade judge that the use of the trial repeal exception.” mount to impaired Dupree’s ability by drugs had that she Id. at 1156. In order to establish that, presentenee pointing to the fact as the bring must her is an the defendant showed, Dupree investigation report had applicable of ad self within the definition very job due to absenteeism lost set forth dict which is judge The trial also noted problems. other (1988) 33-501(24) as follows: presented of illness as that no evidence was [A]ny habitually uses individual who withdrawal, or other evidence the result of drug so as to endan- narcotic or abusive patterns, and that there was of withdrawal morals, health, safety, or ger public showing dependency pattern or welfare, so far is or has been or who per- of an addictive anything else indicative narcotic addicted to the use of such sonality. Assuming, apparently, that all drug as to have lost or abusive true, proffered by Dupree was the evidence reference to his ad- self-control judge then ruled that the trial diction. purposes of the addict not an addict exception, eligible thus not for sentenc- III. pursuant exception. to the Somewhat case, In the trial seems inconsistently, the trial determined portion on the latter nevertheless, to have focused needed Dupree, definition, illustrated foregoing as is rec- as evidenced not demonstrated finding had Dupree receive ommendation symptoms, “impaired withdrawal or an must relate habitual ability” employment. To maintain limit endangerment the definition of addict to those who dem- loss of self-control with reference to her physical onstrate a addiction would be to 33-501(24); addiction. See D.C.Code § cf. misconstrue the definition as well Wheeler, supra, at 725. With prior applying excep- cases mind, we this in review tion. In we observed that the Con- finding failed meet the defi- trolled Act does prescribe Substances nition an addict. standards for whether the defen- testimony Dupree’s unrebutted that she dant is an or whether commission *4 year history marijuana, had a ten of use of the manufacturing offense or of distribut- cocaine, heroin, expensive an habit that primary purpose narcotics was for the income, disposable far exceeded her supporting drug of addic- the defendant’s drug that had failed in she a guid- tion. 509 A.2d at 1151. We found provides program, strong for her ance in provisions Nar- Federal judge gave claim of addiction. The trial (NARA), cotic Addict Rehabilitation Act 18 Dupree’s indication she did not credit seq. (1982), repealed by U.S.C. 4251 et §§ testimony. contrary, To the she stated 2027, Pub.L. No. 98 Stat. 2031 would deal with the record as the she (1984), judicial and in interpretation of put it defense before her.4 fact that provisions. those NARA Adopting the negative standards, two out of we indicated that the addict re- quirement prove defen- times for narcotics does not that she would satisfied dant shows an especially habitual narcotic when one prove even if physical she cannot addiction. were apparently considers those tests Grant, supra, A.2d at As an 509 1152-53. under administered while she was court example, we cited Wheeler v. United avoid the order to use of narcotics. We are States, (D.C.1971) 722 (involving 276 A.2d agreement not in which, Drug the Dangerous Control Act as ability suggestion Dupree’s to main- Grant, we supra, noted at 1152 A.2d negate employment tain tends to a 8, NARA), n. is similar an It that she was addict. cannot be as- defendant, regularly who used heroin three gets person sumed that addicted who daily, to four times satisfied requires of the amount narcotics she can- requirement though even he “had not sto- Furthermore, job. in a not function money len to obtain narcotics and had not apparent reliance on the ab- any suffered symptoms serious withdrawal symptoms sence of withdrawal seems mis- hospital ... when he was committed to a A placed. any defendant would not suffer Grant, after his supra, arrest.” 509 A.2d symptoms unless she has had withdrawal Wheeler, (quoting supra, at 1153 drug go drug or substi- without 724-25). at We stressed in how- sum, tute, In as methadone. as to such ever, proof that the defendant’s burden of of self control with refer- loss of greater that she is is an addict under addiction, Dupree has ence to made a Dangerous exception than under the showing significantly strong is Drug or NARA Control Act undermined the fact that maintained acts, differing purposes emphasizing negative the fact that she tested or that the addict was not intended drug tests. on two loophole “as a users are also who Dupree’s testimony par- Grant, supra, aspect of sellers.” 509 A.2d at 1153.3 One proof, relevant to the alternative means ticularly To meet her burden the defendant transcript whether the 3. We defen- not clear from the also noted another reason that the It is greater showing eligibility judge's dant's burden of under NARA, to the whole of statement referred under the Controlled Substances Act than only appellant’s appellant’s presentation or NARA, viz, that unlike the CSA does not testimony employment. about her provisional evalua- authorize a commitment for tion. 1986), denied, 108 S.Ct. by the cert. 484 U.S. establishing addiction afforded remand, ap 98 L.Ed.2d 483 On spent that she statute. She testified narcotics, permit the trial court should day proximately on $200 any proposal such include only every two paycheck earned a $450 exercise of its discretion prior to the court’s enough additional mon weeks. She raised excep application ey purchases of narcotics to finance her it proffer, such a will be tion. Without Testimony selling herself. con narcotics in her succeed unlikely that will conduct, if cerning pattern such a be exception. for the addict effort lieved, the defini bring one within “who habitual tion of an addict as Reversed and remanded. abusive ly uses narcotic or morals, health, SCHWELB, endanger Judge, so as Associate safety, concurring: welfare.” 33-501(24) (1988). It also tends to estab opinion for join Judge Belson’s charged the offense lish the nexus between however, to ar- separately, court. I write Brandon v. addiction. See proper thoughts some about ticulate *5 (D.C. States, 640, 643-44 United mandatory minimum construction of 1989). exception. These and the addict statute Judge implicit in record, thoughts may be what in Considering entire and written, they my in view Belson has but light interpretation of of this court’s expression. explicit more addict, merit supra, definition of an see presented hold that the evidence we sentencing law mandatory minimum The believed, to estab- appellant, if is sufficient sentenc- a trial traditional restricts According- an addict.5 lish that comparatively It mandates ing discretion. remand the case to ly, we reverse and greater a mea- punishment where harsh Du- instructions to vacate trial court with permissible. mercy previously sure of remand, hearing At a on pree’s sentence. authority to differenti- It limits the should reconsider its the trial court profiteer and the big drug ate between and, if the Dupree was not an criminal It is a guy little on the street. is an exercise its court finds she statute, one to boot. and an inflexible ex- apply to the addict discretion whether must, course, give effect We mandatory- ception as an alternative to was, intent, in substantial which legislative minimum sentence. measure, gloves when take off the kid to note, finally, Dupree apparently We and armed of- dealing drug dealers sentencing States, at the failed to evidence 564 Lemon v. fenders. See United drug rehabilitation hearing suggests 1368, (D.C.1989). Neverthe- A.2d 1379-81 likely complete less, applies only she is to not to program lenity1 the rule to the man- successfully an alternative ambit interpretations of the substantive penal- held in sentence.6 We also to datory-minimum proscriptions criminal but seeking impose. v. United they that a defendant ties Grant Bifulco 2247, 381, 387, States, 100 program such a 447 S.Ct. propose U.S. (1980). Accordingly, 2252, make the inclu- L.Ed.2d 205 did not 65 proffer, in her stat- mandatory minimum absolutely reach of the proposal mandato- of such a sion expanded be- artificially 1154; should not be Banks v. ute ry. A.2d at see also 509 requires. language plainly 524, (D.C. its yond what States, A.2d 516 United penal laws are to be construed majority not 1. "The rule do other members of 5. The con thoughts expressed strictly perhaps less old than disagree in the con- not much Washing curring opinion. Riggs Nat'l Bank itself.” struction 1229, Columbia, ton, A.2d 581 D.C. v. District of "apparently" use the word 6. We (D.C.1990) (quoting States v. Wilt United 1262 record, part report presentence is not a (18 U.S.) 5 L.Ed. 37 berger, Wheat it recommended a know whether and we do not (1820)). program. particular rehabilitation States, 169, 178, Ladner v. United 358 U.S. so required that the would to be 209, 214, 79 S.Ct. 3 L.Ed.2d 199 four-year sentence mandatory her to min- Conversely, exception” while the “addict imprisonment, imum term of would severe- designed to leniency assure to ly punish attempts at abstinence which sellers who also use it should not be encouragement, merit certainty not the grudging accorded a construction which Indeed, years jail. a rule such would few if any impor addicts can It is meet. provide an but compelling insidious motive recognize tant eligibility to give perverse to an to addict exception require does not compulsion try use and not to impose mandatory less than the mini fight message statutory it. The would mum; merely permits it or her him to do order, stay clean,2 obey be: the court so in appropriate case. spend years prison; at least four dis- regard eligible probation! it be background, Given I think it this would this, say The Council did and cannot adopt be most unfortunate to a construc- perverse unjust believe that such a tion of the word “addict” which would ex- by any- scheme intended who, clude Dupree, a defendant like Ms. one. retaining succeeded for some time in responsible job. Judge As Belson has ex- sure, exception” To be the “addict itself plained, is nothing there in the that, eases, contemplates in some those language compel which would that result. may who use more treated merci- practical consequence of such a fully than those who do not. It is unneces- cramped reading of the term be to however, sary, carry proposition provide a like Dupree, user Ms. who has *6 extremes. The definition with drugs allegedly sold addic- dealing which we is somewhat are here try with an to keep incentive not to circular; who, alia, an addict is one inter

job, ability because the to continue to work has “lost the of self-control with necessarily long prison mean that a reference his addiction.” D.C.Code Surely legisla- term would assured. (1988) added). 33-501(24) (emphasis encourage tive intent not to addicts to compel These words do not us to restrict give up ability day’s their to earn honest to those who have wage, perhaps spend and even more of given up fight, jobs, lost their and selling their juggling time on street every “dirty” single time. Courts poisonous their purpose wares for the should not divest themselves re- obtaining another fix. maining by giving legislation discretion token, By the same Ms. should so destructive construction. ineligible be deemed addict ex- ception because she had “clean” two (out eight) being

tests while monitored Agency. the Pretrial Services Presum- ably, she under at the time court order subject not to use unlawful contempt penalties other unfa- of court consequences disobeyed if vorable directive. -1330 See §§ ability that her to muster To hold stay illness and strength to combat her drug-free of time even a brief ineligible excep- made her negative again. disqualify them from more lenient 2. Even tests had occurred when To order, they stay clean tried Ms. was not under court permit provide would nence, a counter-incentive absti- statute not be so construed as to negating good potentially advice disqualify all the them to progress, her. Well-motivated addicts floor, get try want the habit.” regress, from those who them to "kick off the

Case Details

Case Name: Dupree v. United States
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Dec 14, 1990
Citation: 583 A.2d 1000
Docket Number: 89-373, 89-446
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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