52 S.C. 244 | S.C. | 1898
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
This action, which was commenced on the day of June, 1889, was once before this Court on appeal from the order of reference made by Judge Hudson, and on that appeal this Court affirmed the order appealed from, on the ground that the issues raised herein were equitable. 33 S. C., 389. At the reference all parties to the action offered testimony, and it came on to be heard before his Honor, Judge Benet, on the pleadings and testiT mony.
A demurrer was interposed on the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This demurrer was overruled. Judge Benet, by his decree, adjudged that the deed which was alleged to be forged was a forgery, and ordered the same to be cancelled, with a direction to defendant, Mrs. DuBos, to deliver possession of a certain tract of land in St. Andrews Parish,
We will first consider those relating to the demurrer to the complaint, and this we conceive can be best done by first reproducing the complaint, which was as follows: “The plaintiff above named, complaining, &c., alleges: 1. That Thomas Bannister Seabrook, late of Edisto Island, in the State of South Carolina, departed this life on the day of April, 1839, leaving of force his last will and testament, which'was duly admitted to probate by the court of ordinary for Charleston District (now county), in State aforesaid, on the 2d day of May, A. D. 1839. That of said will he appointed his daughter, Elizabeth Clark Seabrook, executrix. That the said Elizabeth, after the making of said will, intermarried with one Andrew Milne, and under the name of Elizabeth Clark Seabrook Milne qualified as executrix of the said will, and undertook the burthen of the administration thereof. 2. That by the said will the said testator, Thomas Bannister Seabrook, devised to his said daughter (who will hereinafter be designated as Mrs. Milne) certain real estate, among which was the plantation in St. Andrews Parish and the house and lot in the city of Charleston, hereinafter more particularly described in fee conditional at the common law, that is to say: ‘to her and the lawful heirs of her body.’ ' 3. That the said Mrs. Milne died on the day of November, 1882, aged ninety-six years, without ever having had issue at any time. 4. That upon the death of the said Mrs. Milne, the plaintiff, Gilbert Geddes DuPont, was the sole heir at law of aforesaid testator,. Thomas Bannister Seabrook, in esse, and solely enti
The grounds of demurrer as presented to the compliant, which were passed upon by the Circuit Judge, were as follows: '■'■First. Because the complaint fails to state facts showing that plaintiff exercised his option to rescind, or declared his intention, or took steps, to rescind promptly after the discovery of the fraud. On the contrary, the complaint shows that the plaintiff delayed and kept silent for fourteen months before he took any steps to rescind, after the discovery of the alleged fraud. Second. The complaint fails to show that plaintiff exercised his option to rescind the contract in toto, and to put the parties in the same state as that in which they were before the deed sought to be cancelled was signed, and shows that plaintiff claims to rescind in part only a transaction which was entire, and consisted of two parts mutually dependent. Third. The complaint does not show that plaintiff has restored the pro
And these views dispose of the third ground of demurrer also. We must sustain the Circuit Judge in overruling the demurrer; but, in doing so, we mean our conclusion to cover only the grounds of the demurrer, and not by any means to control the decision of the interesting questions yet to be considered.
The answer of the defendant must now be regarded as raising the questions as to the merits. The answer of Mrs. DuBos is as follows: “I. That she admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 3, 6, 7, 9,12, and 13 of the complaint. II. That she denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 2,4,10,11, and 14 of the complaint. III. That as to allegations of the 5th paragraph, defendant admits the same as generally true, but denies that she and her sister were not adopted by Mr. and Mrs. Milne. IV. That as to the 8th paragraph of said complaint, this defendant alleges that at the time the suit referred to in paragraph 7 was pending, a similar suit at law was pending between the same parties in Berkeley County for the recovery of the plantation in St. Andrew’s Parish; and, further, a complaint in equity between the same parties was also pending in Charleston County relative to the several transactions, all of which will hereafter be more fully set forth. And she admits that during the pendency of the proceedings aforesaid, negotiations for the adjustment of the various claims in the several
This deed, known as the covenant, being a forgery, and being known as such to Mrs. DuBos, and she presenting it to her lawyer, General Rutledge, as a genuine paper, and the plaintiff here being induced to act upon it as a genuine paper, why should he be prevented from having his deed of conveyance cancelled? It is quite true that family settlements are upheld, but only when good faith is observed— never when such family settlements are induced by a forged paper being presented by a party to it as genuine, when such party knew it was forged.
We have thus passed upon the questions underlying this appeal, not in their language or in their order, but as the matter occurs. We fail to find reversible error in the decree of the Circuit Judge.
It is, therefore, the judgment of this Court, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.