159 N.Y.S. 389 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1916
The respondent contends that her position fell within the provisions of section 1543 of the G-reater New York charter (Laws of 1901, chap. 466), and that she was entitled to a statement of the charges and an opportunity to explain, and that while charges were served and an opportunity to explain them was to some extent afforded, the charges were too indefinite and the opportunity for explanation was not sufficient; and she further claims that her case was prejudged, and that-the commissioner acted in bad faith and did not remove her .on the charges, but in consummation of his prior determination to remove her in any event.
In 1914 the commissioner, by an inspector, instituted an investigation with respect to the management of the institu
It thus appears that formal charges, which were sufficient in substance, were duly served and that respondent had an opportunity to explain them. The commissioner was authorized to act on his own knowledge and on information derived from any source (People ex rel. Keech v. Thompson, supra; People ex rel. Kennedy v. Brady, supra; Matter of McGuire, 151 App. Div. 351; affd., 209 N. Y. 597), and on that information, after her explanation, he has sustained the charges on six specifications and dismissed the respondent from the service, and has followed the procedure required by said section 1543 of the charter.
It has been held and is conceded that there is no review by certiorari or otherwise' with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the charges (People ex rel. Kennedy v. Brady, supra); but it is claimed that notwithstanding the fact that there is no authority to review the determination that the respondent was guilty of the charges, the action of the commissioner in dismissing her may be annulled or rendered ineffective, provided the jury find in this proceeding that he had prejudged her case and acted in bad faith in removing her, and that it will then become the duty of the court to reinstate her. That claim is predicated upon People ex rel. Mitchel v. La Grange (2 App. Div. 444; affd. on opinion below, 151 N. Y. 664), which is quoted with approval in Matter of Griffin v. Thompson (202 id. 104). In both of these cases, however, the court decided that the charges were insufficient, and what was therein said with respect to its being the duty of the official to act in good faith was not, I think, intended as a ruling that where the charges are sufficient and are sustained the determination may be annulled or rendered ineffective on account of the motive of the official. No adjudication with respect to a case of prejudice on the part of the official whose duty it is to prefer the charges and hear the explanation under this or a similar statute has been cited; but there are many cases where the official or employee against whom the charges are preferred was entitled to a trial, in which it has
I think, therefore, that the order should be reversed and motion denied.
Clarke, P. J., McLaughlin, Scott and Dowling, JJ., concurred.
Order reversed and motion denied.