Dunn v. PateDunn v. Pate
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- Before:
- Frye
This, case presents the question of whether noncompliance with the private examination requirements set forth in
Plaintiffs instituted this action on 12 February 1989, seeking to have a 1962 deed to real property in Cumberland County set aside for failure to comply with the private examination requirements then in effect. The property in question was previously owned by Mary A. Jackson. On 22 October 1951, she conveyed title to the land to her son Fairley J. Jackson and his wife, Mary Elizabeth Jackson, as tenants by the entirety. In 1962 Fairley J. and Mary Elizabeth Jackson conveyed the property to Fairley J. Jackson individually. At that time the former
In 1976 Fairley J. Jackson died testate, devising the property in question to his wife (Mary Elizabeth) for life, with the remainder in equal shares to each of his living children and to his sister-in-law, Willard J. Pate. By codicil the share to his sister-in-law was devised to her for life, with the remainder in the children of Bobbie Lou Jackson Grimes (Fairley’s grandchildren). Mary Elizabeth Jackson died intestate in 1980, leaving five living children from her marriage to Fairley J. Jackson as heirs. Four of Fairley and Mary Elizabeth’s five children and their spouses are the plaintiffs in this action. Willard J. Pate, Bobbie Lou Jackson Grimes (Fairley and Mary Elizabeth’s other child) and Bobbie Lou Jackson Grimes’ children and spouses are the defendants in this action.
In the present action, plaintiffs challenge the 1962 deed as ineffective to convey the property to Fairley J. Jackson individually due to noncompliance with the private examination statutes and allege that title to the property continued in both Fairley J. and Mary Elizabeth Jackson as tenants by the entirety. They contend that upon Fairley’s death the property passed to Mary Elizabeth Jackson individually by operation of law. In such case, the property descended upon Mary Elizabeth’s death by virtue of her intestacy ‘to the five children in five equal shares rather than passing in six shares as directed by Fairley’s Will and Codicil. Defendants originally argued that failure to comply with the private examination statutes in effect in 1962 could not be a basis upon which the deed could be set aside since the legislature enacted curative statutes after the repeal of the examination statutes and since the examination statutes are unconstitutional. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted defendants’ motion. Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed on state substantive law grounds and remanded to the superior court. Dunn v. Pate, 98 N.C. App. 351, 390 S.E.2d 712 (1990).
We observe initially that the Court of Appeals correctly stated the law of stare decisis in its decision below. As the Court of Appeals noted, it has “no authority to overrule decisions of [the] Supreme Court and [has] the responsibility to follow those decisions ‘until otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court.’ ” Dunn v. Pate, 106 N.C. App. at 60, 415 S.E.2d at 104 (quoting Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985)). However, we conclude that Butler, 169 N.C. 584, 86 S.E. 507, the decision relied upon by the Court of Appeals, does not control the question in this case. See Spencer v. Spencer, 37 N.C. App. 481, 487-88, 246 S.E.2d 805, 809 (Chief Judge Morris observed that drastic changes have occurred in society since 1915 when a woman could not vote, was denied educational opportunities, was excluded from most legal and commercial matters and was generally occupied in the home), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 106, 249 S.E.2d 804 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 958, 60 L. Ed. 2d 1062 (1979).
The statutes in question,
Before addressing the constitutionality of the statutes in question, we must address plaintiffs’ argument that defendants have not shown an injury in fact and therefore do not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the private examination statutes. Plaintiffs rely on Murphy v. Davis, 61 N.C. App. 597, 599, 300 S.E.2d 871, 873, cert. denied & appeal dismissed, 309 N.C. 192, 305 S.E.2d 735 (1983), and In re Appeal of Martin, 286 N.C. 66, 209 S.E.2d 766 (1974), to support this contention. We are not persuaded by plaintiffs’ argument.
A general rule of standing is that only persons “who have been injuriously affected . . . in their persons, property or constitutional rights” may challenge the validity of a statute.
Canteen Service v. Johnson, Comr. of Revenue,
256 N.C. 155, 166, 123 S.E.2d 582, 589 (1962);
see also Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962). Defendants in this case have alleged that they will be injured in fact by operation of
In
Murphy,
on facts very similar to the facts in the present case, the Court of Appeals held that the petitioner had no
However, the Court of Appeals may have reached the conclusion that petitioner in Murphy had no standing because one must “belong] ] to the class which is prejudiced by the statute.” Martin, 286 N.C. at 75, 209 S.E.2d at 773. Plaintiffs in this case argue that this rule also prevents defendants from challenging the constitutionality of the statute. However, we believe the recognized exception that “allows an affected party to allege discrimination when no member of a class subject to the alleged discrimination is in a position to raise the constitutional question,” id., applies in this case. Both parties to the 1962 deed are now deceased. Defendants are challenging the statute on the basis that enforcement of the statute would work to deprive them of their interest in the property which they received after the 1962 conveyance to Fairley Jackson individually. There is no other party that could appropriately challenge the statute on these facts.
The “gist of the question of standing” is whether the party seeking relief has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentations of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99, 20 L. Ed. 2d 947, 961, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952 (1968).
Stanley, Edwards, Henderson v. Dept. of Conservation & Development, 284 N.C. 15, 27, 199 S.E.2d 641, 650 (1973). We are quite satisfied that defendants in this case have a great enough “stake in the outcome of the controversy” to ensure “concrete adverseness.” Thus, we hold that defendants have standing to challenge the statutes in question.
In reviewing the constitutionality of the statutes at issue, plaintiffs urge the Court to limit its review to the law as it existed in 1962. Plaintiffs do not contend that the private examination statutes at issue would be constitutional if they were in force today. Rather, plaintiffs argue that the Court should continue to enforce the examination statutes as they relate to deeds executed during that period. We decline to do so.
In
Butler v. Butler,
169 N.C. 584, 86 S.E. 507, decided in 1915, this Court held that the private examination statute at issue was a “constitutional exercise of legislative power.”
Butler,
169 N.C. at 588, 86 S.E. at 509. The Court has not revisited the issue since that opinion was rendered. However, the North Carolina Constitution has been amended twice since
Butler
in order to provide greater equality under the law.
See
This Court has recognized that the concept of equal protection under the law was inherent in our State Constitution even before the Fourteenth Amendment was explicitly incorporated into it by amendment in 1970.
S.S. Kresge v. Davis,
277 N.C. 654, 660, 178 S.E.2d 382, 385 (1971) (citing
State v. Glidden Co.,
228 N.C. 664, 46 S.E.2d 860 (1948);
State v. Fowler,
193 N.C. 290, 136 S.E. 709 (1927)). The fact
In 1987 the Texas Supreme Court held that a repealed statute that required a husband to join his wife in a conveyance of her separate property and required acknowledgement by the wife “privily and apart from her husband” was unconstitutional under current constitutional standards. Wessely Energy, 736 S.W.2d at 626-27. Thus, a wife’s failure to comply with the statute in 1954, prior to its repeal, did not invalidate the conveyance made at that time. Id. at 628. The Texas Supreme Court observed that the “Texas Equal Rights Amendment was not passed until 1972” and “the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not extended to gender-based discrimination until 1971.” Id. at 627. Nonetheless, the court stated that
[although this equal protection analysis was not yet recognized in 1954, we think the wiser course mandates review under standards as we understand them today .... By limiting our review to current constitutional analysis, we can resolve constitutional issues without speculating as to the application of constitutional principles or basing a decision of grave importance on conjecture.
Id. We are persuaded that this is the best approach in the present case.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution has generally been interpreted to prohibit unequal application of the law between the sexes. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 60 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 59 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 43 L. Ed. 2d 688 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 30 L. Ed. 2d 225 (1971). Gender-based distinctions in the law must “serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives” in order to satisfy the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197, 50 L. Ed. 2d 397, 407 (1976). Since 1970 the principle of equal protection of the law has been expressly incorporated in Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. S.S. Kresge, 277 N.C. at 660, 178 S.E.2d at 385.
The examination statutes in effect in 1962 required certification by the clerk of court that the conveyance was neither unreasonable nor injurious to the wife. Without the proper certification, the deed was unenforceable. When enacted, the private examination statutes conferred upon women the right to enter into separation agreements, a right which until that time they had been denied.
See Spencer v. Spencer,
37 N.C. App. 481, 486, 246 S.E.2d 805, 809 (discussing the purpose and rationale of the examination requirements). The examination requirement allowed a wife to void a transaction into which she otherwise competently entered on the sole basis that the contract was not certified. The husband did not have this ability. While the examination statute conferred a new right upon the wife, it also restricted her exercise of that right. It did so for the purpose of protecting the wife from participating m conveyances which were not in her interest. While this may have been a worthy purpose at the time, it nonetheless had the effect of continuing the fiction that formed the basis for so many coverture laws — that a married woman lacked the ability to contract on her own. There was no requirement
Plaintiffs have offered no argument as to what significant governmental interests, if any, were served by this gender-based distinction in 1962 and we will not speculate as to what those interests may have been. Since the private examination statutes at issue required unequal application of the law while serving no clearly discernable important governmental interest, they were unconstitutional at the time the deed was executed and will not presently be enforced by this Court.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that failure of this Court to enforce
For the reasons stated above, we hold that the private examination statutes,
REVERSED.
Justice PARKER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Notes
. The former
(a) No contract between husband and wife made during their coverture shall be valid to affect or change any part of the real estate of the wife . . . unless such contract . . . is acknowledged before a certifying officer who shall make a private examination of the wife according to the requirements formerly prevailing for conveyance of land.
(b) The certifying officer examining the wife shall incorporate in his certificate a statement of his conclusions and findings of fact as to whether or not said contract is unreasonable or injurious to the wife ....
.