80 P. 311 | Utah | 1905
Lead Opinion
The case having been stated, as above,
delivered the opinion of the court.
At the time of the submission of the case to the jury the defense, inter alia, requested the court to charge as follows: 1 ‘ The court charges you in this case that, as matter of law, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and your verdict should therefore be for the defendant.” This request was refused, and the action of the court in the premises has been assigned as error.
The appellant contends that the entire record presented a case involving the principle of assumed risk of the servant, and showed such a state of facts as made it the duty of the court to so charge the jury, and we are of the opinion that this contention is well founded. Upon careful examination of the evidence, the conclusion seems irresistible that the plaintiff has shown no right of recovery. We are unable to perceive, from the proof, wherein the company was guilty of actionable negligence. The plaintiff’s own testimony fails to. show it. The platform was hut a simple arrangement, constructed by the men who were to load the car, for their own convenience, out of material not furnished by the company for such purpose. It was only a temporary thing, of their own invention, to enable them to perform their work more easily. The company had furnished no appliances other than the car, and this could have been loaded in the ordinary way, without the platform. The injured knew this; had assisted in loading ties on a previous occasion; saw the platform, and how it was constructed; saw that it wa,s wet and muddy; must have known, or without inconvenience could have learned, that the planks were not nailed to the ties; and, without making any objection whatever to the contrivance, or the manner of loading the car, voluntarily, with the
We are aware of the general rule that, where a master employs a servant, he must exercise ordinary care to furnish the servant a reasonably safe place in which to perform the service, and a failure to do so will render the master liable for any injury to the servant resulting from such failure; but in this case we can perceive no violation of the rule that can avail the respondent, who, we have a right to assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, was a man of average understanding and knowledge of things about him. We cannot say from the proof that the place was not reasonably safe, but if it was not — if it was dangerous — the danger was open and obvious, and the employee could easily observe it, and had ample opportunity to discover it. Whatever hazard was connected with the loading of the ties was equally open and obvious to the employee as to the employer, if not more so; and, if there was anything unsafe about the platform, the exercise of ordinary care would have revealed it to the employe. He having voluntarily engaged in such service, concurring in the use of the contrivance, observing its construction
We are of the opinion that the court erred in refusing to charge the jury as requested, and, having concluded that no right of recovery exists in this case, it becomes unnecessary to decide the other questions presented.
The case is reversed, with costs, and remanded to the court below for further proceedings in accordance herewith. It is SO' ordered.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring). — Tbe vital question in this case is, did the master furnish respondent a reasonably- safe place in which to perform the work required of him? • The record shows that the platform, and the runway of planks leading to it, were suitable for the purposes for which they were designed. In carrying the ties from where they were ricked or piled on the ground to the car in which they were being loaded, the plaintiff and other employes who were loading ties with him would pass up the runway onto the platform, and then turn at right angles and place the ties onto the car. At the time the accident occurred, plaintiff was standing on the plank which formed the runway, ■and was in the act of pushing a tie into the car, when the plank slipped, and he fell partly on the platform and partly on the ground. Had he stepped off the runway onto the platform before loading the tie, the accident, in all probability, would not have happened. "While it is a. duty the master owes to his servant to furnish him with a reasonably safe place in which to perform his work, the master is not bound to anticipate and guard against every conceivable kind of accident or misfortune that might occur. The appellant in this case was only required to use that degree of care and diligence in the construction of the runway and platform that a reasonably cautious and prudent man, understanding the dangers and hazards of the employment, would use under the same or like circumstances. The master cannot be expected, nor is he required, to anticipate and guard against every conceivable kind of accident and misfortune that might happen to the servant in the performance of the work, yet, if the respondent can be permitted to recover in this case, it would be difficult to conceive of a set of circumstances under which a master would not be liable to his servant for injuries sustained because of an accident to1 the servant while in the performance of the work required of him, The platform and runway were simple devices, temporary in character, and plainly observable; and to me it is incompre-
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). — I cannot concur in the opinion of the Chief Justice. I do not agree with the statement in the opinion that the platform was constructed “by the men who were to load the car, for their own convenience, out of material not furnished by the company for said purpose. It was only a temporary thing of their own invention to enable them to perform their work more easily.” The record, without conflict, shows that the platform was constructed under the immediate and personal direction of appellant’s foreman, and for the purpose of enabling the men to load the ties. This foreman had charge of the crew, with which plaintiff was a member, had direct charge and supervision over the work then being prosecuted, directed and ■controlled the manner of its performance, and hired and discharged the men. His authority to do these things is not questioned. By reason of sections 1342, 1343, Rev. St. 1898, and the decisions of this court in Downey v. Min. Co., 24 Utah, 431, 68 Pac. 414, 91 Am.
The further question is did the plaintiff assume the risk? The effect of the opinion is that plaintiff assumed not only the usual and ordinary risks incident to his business or employment, and of plainly observable and obvious defects, but also those which he “could have learned without inconvenience,” and those which in the “exercise of ordinary care would have been revealed” to him. The lower court took substantially the same view, and so charged the jury. The trial court charged: “If, therefore, you find from the evidence in this case that the plaintiff’s injuries, if any, were occasioned as the result of an accident that was one of the ordinary risks of the business in which the plaintiff was engaged at the time and place of receiving such injury, or was the result of a risk or danger which was known to him, or which was open and obvious, or which by the exercise of ordinary care upon the part of the plaintiff
Stress is laid upon the fact that plaintiff knew of the existence of the platform, and that it was observed by him. Of course, that must be conceded; but the question is, was the fact that the planks were unnailed and unfastened plainly observable by him? While it is shown he observed and knew that one end of the planks rested upon the ground, and the other upon ties laid between the rails of the- railroad track, there is nothing in the evidence to show that he knew that the planks were unnailed or unfastened or loose, or that he knew they at any time swayed or gave way, prior to the accident, or that prior thereto he had any knowledge or notice whatsoever of the unfastened or loose condition of the planks. If we say plaintiff assumed the risk of such defect, we are obliged to say so not because he had any actual knowledge thereof, but solely because such fact was so open and so readily observed that we, as matter of law, should say that he is presumed to have known thereof, and therefore did know. When we do that, I think we are speculating with the facts, and are invading the province of the jury. For the proposition is not so clear to me whereby I can say that all reasonable minds, when considering the question, must come to the same conclusion. That the question of assumed risk in this ease was one- of fact is amply supported by the following authorities: Faulkner v. Mining Co., 23 Utah, 437; 66 Pac. 799 ; Hill v. Railroad, 23 Utah, 94, 63 Pac. 814; Pool v. Railroad, 20 Utah, 210, 58 Pac. 326 ; Miller v. Mining Co., 18 Utah, 358, 55 Pac. 58; Boyle v. Railroad, 25 Utah,
But still a further view might be taken of the matter. Supposing it might be said that the plaintiff knew that the planks were unnailed — he not being obliged to pass judgment upon the employer’s method of construction of the platform, but having the right to assume that reasonable care had been exercised in this regard — would he not have a right to conclude, though the planks were not nailed, nevertheless the platform was reasonably safe, and could be used with ordinary safety in the prosecution of the said work? The Chief Justice, in writing the opinion in the case of Mangum v. Mining Co., 15 Utah, 534, 50 Pac. 834, used the following language: “Where an employee has knowledge of defects in machinery used in his employment, and the defects are not so dangerous as to threaten immediate injury, or the danger is not such as to be reasonably apprehended by him, his continuance in the service will not defeat a recovery for injuries resulting from said defects. If, however, the defects are so obviously and immediately dangerous that a person of ordinary prudence and precaution would refuse to use the machinery, then, if the servant continues its use, he assumes the risk. We think it was a question for the jury to determine whether, under all the circumstances in evidence in this case, the employee by continuing in his employment with knowledge of the defects, assumed the risk of the injury which he sustained.” If we apply this principle of law to this case, I cannot see how it can be said that plaintiff assumed the risk here, as matter of law.
Much stress is laid in appellant’s brief, and some in the opinion, that the principal injury to plaintiff had no connection with, and was not caused by, the accident. Some evidence is quoted to show that the injury was a mere temporary one. I do not see under what assignment of error this matter can be reviewed. There was no objection made at all when the evidence
My conclusion is, therefore, that this judgment ought to be affirmed.