152 A. 757 | Pa. | 1930
In this action of ejectment, plaintiffs and defendant agreed that their respective titles were derived through a deed which was offered in evidence. This was conclusive of the title to that date: Clark v. Trindle,
Instead of resting at this point, however, plaintiffs, though not required so to do, called a witness to prove that the deeds in their chain of title were duly registered. He so testified in his examination in chief, and, on cross-examination, further said that the deeds in defendant's title were also so registered, and the entire registration of the property was then offered in evidence. This showed that certain papers, possibly of the character of those specified in defendant's abstract of title, had been duly registered, but it did not even tend to show that they, or any of them, operated to pass a valid title to the property in dispute. The court below erroneously held that it did, however, and ruled that, because of this, plaintiffs were required to show that their title was better than the one which those papers, if offered in evidence, might have disclosed; and entered a nonsuit because plaintiffs had produced no proof on the point. In doing this, he overlooked the rule that a prima facie right is always sufficient to entitle plaintiff to recover, until and unless a better title is shown to exist in favor of the adverse party. The court in banc subsequently refused to set aside the nonsuit, and this appeal, by plaintiffs, was then taken.
The exact point being considered is expressly decided in Jones v. Bland,
There are two other considerations leading to the same conclusion. In Page v. Simpson,
It must be reversed for the further reason, first pointed out by RICE, P. J., in Tucker v. McMenamin,
It may not be inappropriate to add that the genesis of these statutes is a rule of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, sustained by us in Lehman v. Howley,
The nonsuit entered in the court below is set aside and a procedendo is awarded. *190