History
  • No items yet
midpage
Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. National Park Service
112 F.3d 1283
5th Cir.
1997
Check Treatment

*1 Bowman, 1192, v. States 783 F.2d tation. United The evidence is sufficient on all counts, Cir.1986).12 (5th sufficiency Perez’s ar gument to count 12 fails as well. as AFFIRMED complain

The Cisneroses that their entirely upon

convictions were based the un testimony

corroborated of a number co-

conspirators who had made deals with the resulting

Government and that the convic they

tions are so unreliable cannot stand. argument quantity

Their focuses not on the DUNN-McCAMPBELL ROYALTY IN quality of the evidence rather the but the TEREST, INC., Corporation; a Texas evidence. Corporation, Dunn-Padre a Texas Cor The law in this is that a circuit conviction poration; McCampbell Minerals, Inc., may be sustained on the uncorroborated tes Plaintiffs-Appellants, timony accomplice person of an or of a who plea bargain has entered into a with the SERVICE, Agency NATIONAL PARK Osum, Government. United States v. Department of the United States of Inte (5th Cir.1991). 1394, 1405 Although F.2d the rior; Farabee, Butch in his official ca acknowledge prece Cisneros brothers our pacity Superintendent for the Padre dent, they persist in nevertheless their Seashore, Island National Defendants- They present nothing claims. to indicate Appellees. apply that Osum should not to this case. Moreover, telephone records and the tes No. 95-40770. timony regarding of law enforcement officers containing drugs seizures vehicles circum United Appeals, States Court of stantially supported coconspirator testi Fifth Circuit.

mony. The Cisneroses elicited details of May arrangement each witnesses’ with the Gov ernment on cross-examination in front of the

jury; required. no more is See United Jaras, (5th

States v. 387-88

Cir.1996).13

Regarding money laundering

count, upon the Government relies the Cisne cash, purchase

ros brothers’ of a truck for name, titling of that truck another’s drug transpor-

and the use of that truck for challenges sufficiency 12. Perez conspiracy beyond also a reasonable doubt. United conspiracy Morris, evidence on count count. Cir.), States v. cert. argues charges Perez that the indictment him — -, conspiring with with a dozen individuals to traf- marijuana, only fick in but that at trial the con- spirator he was ever linked to was Amoldo Bel- suggest 13. The further Cisneroses that the dis- montes. Perez claims that the did Government instructing jury trict court erred not that prove alleged, conspiracy but rather coconspirators’ testimony corroboration of the proved conspiracies, only several smaller one of jury was needed. The court did instruct the which included him but of which all contained great ingredient accomplice the common of Amoldo should consider with care the Belmontes. assertion, Contrary event, viewing testimony. light to Perez’s prece- the evi- of our light govern- dence in dent, most favorable to the the Cisneroses have not shown that ment, the evidence was not such that it would court district erred. preclude jurors finding single reasonable *2 GARZA, Judge:

EMILIO M. Circuit Dunn-MeCampbell Plaintiffs Royalty In- terest, Corporation, Dunn-Padre (collectively Minerals “Dunn- McCampbell”) appeal the district court’s *3 grant summary judgment of in compa- challenging regulatory nies’ action au- thority of the National Park Service. I P.F. Dunn once owned both the land and rights long mineral to a stretch of barrier Texas, islands in collectively now known Padre Island. In Dunn severed the estates, conveying two the surface estate to parties reserving third and the subsurface rights mineral conveyed himself. Dunn plaintiffs the mineral estate Dunn- McCampbell, leased the exploration mineral estate for and develop- ment, primarily Company. to the Sun Oil Pursuant to the Padre Island National Enabling Legislation, Seashore 16 U.S.C. seq., 459d et § the National Park Service acquired seventy-mile stretch of the barrier island surface estate and established the Pa- (“PINS”), dre Island National Seashore longest undeveloped stretch of ocean beach in the United States. the National Watt, Houston, TX, Dick Richard John Park Service issued its Non-Federal Oil and Heymann, Gordon, IV, Clare Charles W. Mi- (“9B Rights regulations, § Gas 36 C.F.R. 9B Sullivan, Porter, Rogers, chael J. Dahlman & regulations”), which “control all activities Gordon, Christi, TX, Corpus for Plaintiffs- any System within unit of the National Park Appellants. rights gas the exercise of to oil and owned the United States where access is Justice, Mergen, Dept, Andrew C. U.S. of on, through federally across or owned or Section, DC, Appellate Washington, Charles controlled lands or waters.” 36 C.F.R. Wendlandt, Jr., Christi, TX, Corpus William regulations apply 9.30 These to all Stahr, Klarquist, Thompson Robert L. John rights through mineral that must be accessed Justice, Dept, DC, Washington, U.S. of Lar- parks, including Dunn-McCamp- national ry Marcy, Office, Houston, Attorney’s C. U.S. TX, bell’s mineral estate under Padre Island. Ferrell, Justice, Dept, Brian L. of Div., Environment & Resources Natural Among things, other Section, DC, Litigation Washington, General require developers that mineral submit a Defendants-Appellees. plan operations of to the National Park Ser- approval extracting

vice for before subsur- face minerals. Since took 1979, Dunn-McCampbell’s effect in lessees JONES, fifty-two plans operations Before have DUHÉ EMILIO M. submitted of GARZA, Service, Judges. Circuit the Park Service approved plan. each

has The Park and that companies’ substantive claims plan operations denied a never there. were without merit. We review the district grant summary judgment court’s of a motion 1989, Dunn-McCamp- Between 1986 and Attorney de novo. Nose v. General bell releases of most of secured Sun Oil’s States, Cir.), United Dunn-McCamp- interests on Padre Island. reh’g 998 F.2d 1015 Sum sought regained bell to exercise has never its mary judgment appropriate is when “there is rights mineral and has never submitted a genuine no issue as to material fact and plan operations to the Park Service. moving ... party judg entitled to a affidavit, has declared ment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. severity regula- that of the 9B 56(c). ruling summary judgment When on leasing tions has deterred oil motions, we credit the evidence of the non rights. They these mineral contend justifiable movant and draw all inferences chilling such is remediable in this court. *4 Inc., his favor. Liberty Lobby, Anderson v. Dunn-McCampbell brought this action on 242, 255, 2505, 2513, 477 U.S. 91 8, 1994, asserting March both facial and “as (1986). However, L.Ed.2d 202 we must af applied” challenges 9B summary firm judgment if there is no need question jur- The claimed federal for trial. O’Hare v. Global Natural Re 1331, § isdiction under 28 U.S.C. as well as sources, Inc., 1015, (5th 898 F.2d 1017 Cir. jurisdiction Act, under the Mandamus 28 1990). 1361, § U.S.C. and the Administrative Proce- (“APA”) § dure Act Specifical- 5 U.S.C. 704. preliminary matter, As a we note (1) ly, Dunn-McCampbell contended that that neither the National Park Service or law, Texas under which the mineral estate is ganic statute, § seq., 16 1 U.S.C. et nor the estate, precludes dominant to the surface Padre Island Enabling National Seashore regulating from blocking Legislation, 459d, § provides 16 U.S.C. di (2) development, mineral the National Park judicial review, rectly for and neither creates Service has exceeded its constitutional and private right a of action. Federal courts are statutory authority passing regula- the 9B jurisdiction, courts of they may limited (3)

tions, amounted to jurisdiction not hear claims without con uncompensated taking an under the Fifth ferred statute. Veldhoen v. United States Amendment. Guard, T.A, (5th Coast 225 Cir.1994). However, statutory even absent a granted The district court the Park Ser- action, cause of Dunn-McCampbell may chal summary judgment, vice’s motion for holding lenge agency’s authority under the APA. that, although Dunn-McCampbell had stand- § See 5 (“Agency U.S.C. 704 action made sue, ing pursue failed to reviewable agency statute and final action applied challenges their facial and within the for which there is no adequate remedy other six-year applied statute of limitations to civil review.”). subject judicial a court are 2401(a). § claims under 28 U.S.C. The dis- Dunn-McCampbell may therefore trict court also addressed and dismissed the National Park Service’s 9B Dunn-McCampbell’s substantive claims as APA, under the and this court will have being Finally, without merit. the court sev- question jurisdiction federal under 28 U.S.C. ered Dunn-McCampbell’s takings claim and Veldhoen, § 1331. 35 F.3d at 225. it transferred to the Court of Federal Claims. timely filed this Accordingly, Dunn-McCampbell’s appeal. APA challenge governed by is general statute of provision limitations of 28 U.S.C.

II 2401(a), provides which every civil The district court held that Dunn action the United States is barred McCampbell’s challenges were time brought years barred unless within six of accrual.1 Although proceeding seeking administrative is not a review of an administrative decision is. action, complaint States, civil Mining Corp. filed in federal court Wind River v. United 946

1287 principles sovereign established im its statutory authority. Under constitutional or To munity, challenge, the United States is sustain such a immune the claim- consents, and the terms of direct, suit unless its ant must show some agency final ac- jurisdiction. consent circumscribe our Unit involving particular tion plaintiff within Dalm, 596, 608, ed 494 States 110 filing Circuit, six suit. The Ninth 1361, 1368, S.Ct. 108 L.Ed.2d 548 example, challenger may held that a applicable statute of limitations is one agency contest an exceeding decision as con- consent, such term of and failure to sue the statutory stitutional or authority after the period United States within the limitations period, only by limitations petitioning but merely operates a waivable defense. It agency to review application regu- deprive jurisdiction. federal courts of particular lation to that challenger. Wind Sisseton-Wahpeton Tribe Sioux v. United Mining States, River Corp. v. United States, Cir.), (9th Cir.1991). cert. F.2d Although 498 U.S. S.Ct. River explicitly, Wind Court never said so agency’s court treated the denial of that petition “final action” sufficient

A to create a new cause of action under the APA. Dunn-McCampbell asserts both fa applied challenges cial and to the Park Ser Similarly, in Public Citizen v. Nuclear *5 regulations. vice assert that Commission, Regulatory the D.C. Circuit regulations exceeded National Park Ser jurisdiction held that it had to hear a sub authority vice under the Padre Island Na challenge stantive after period the limitations Act, § tional Seashore 16 seq. U.S.C. 459d et 147, (D.C.Cir.), had run. 901 F.2d 152 cert.

We need not reach the merits of that claim denied, 992, 536, 498 111 S.Ct. 112 challenge regulation, here. a facial On to a (1990). case, L.Ed.2d 546 In that the claim period begins the limitations to run when the petition ant agency filed a with the to rescind agency publishes regulation in the Feder regulations, challenged agency’s then de Register. al Crop Corp. Federal Ins. v. Mer petition nial of the in federal court. Id. rill, 380, 384, 1, 3, 332 U.S. 68 92 S.Ct. L.Ed. Indeed, we agency have held that when an (1947); Drug 10 Nutt v. Ad Enforcement rule, applies a period running the limitations ministration, (5th 202, 916 F.2d 203 Cir. publication from the rule’s will not bar a 1990); Railroad, Friends Sierra Inc. v. of challenging claimant agency’s statu Comm’n, 663, Interstate Commerce 881 F.2d States, tory authority. Texas v. United 749 (9th Cir.1989), denied, 667-68 cert. 493 U.S. 1144, (5th Cir.), denied, reh’g F.2d 1146 cert. 1093, 1166, 110 S.Ct. 107 L.Ed.2d 1069 denied, 1032, 3513, 472 U.S. 105 S.Ct. 87 (1990); (filing § see also 44 U.S.C. a Register document in the Federal is suffi exception These cases do not create an give cient to any notice of contents to general it). from the rule that the limitations subject person to or affected Dunn period begins publica- to run from the of date McCampbell failed to mount a facial chal Register. They merely tion in the Federal lenge regulations to the within six of proposition agency’s stand for the that an 1979, publication their companies’ party new, of a application rule to a creates a cause of action falls outside the limitations six-year challenge cause of action to to the period for civil actions the United agency’s 2401(a). statutory authority. constitutional or §in States possible, challenge It is Dunn-McCampbell point to a If were able to to regulation period here, after application the limitations such an expired, provided ground they petitioned for if had the National Park issuing agency is that change exceeded (9th Cir.1991); (D.C.Cir.1963). Philips’

F.2d N.V. 316 F.2d 405-06 Comm’n, Gloeilampenfabrieken Energy v. Atomic denied, might jurisdic- been this court have III tion to that case. hear question jurisdiction, In addition to federal showing. has failed to make such a Accord- jurisdiction Dunn-McCampbell has asserted applicable ingly, we hold that the statute of under the Mandamus Act. This statute re- Dunn-McCampbell’s limitations facial bars quires exceptional showings that Dunn- challenge to the 9B pro- has not met. The statute vides that: “The district courts shall have B original jurisdiction action in the na- applied” challenge An “as must rest compel ture of mandamus to an officer or agency on final action under the APA. 5 employee any agency of the United States or (“Agency § U.S.C. action made reviewa perform duty plain- a thereof owed to the agency action ble statute and final tiff.” 28 U.S.C. remedy which is no in a court there are extraordinary Mandamus is an review.”). subject judicial But absent remedy, only government available where of action, provide some “final” APA will not clearly perform ficials have failed to nondis challenge agency a cause of action to deci cretionary Group duties. Pittston Coal v. Lujan sions. v. National Federa Wildlife Sebben, 105, 121, 414, 424, 488 U.S. 109 S.Ct. tion, 871, 882, 3177, 3185, 497 U.S. 110 S.Ct. (1988); Seamans, 102 L.Ed.2d 408 Carter v. (1990); Veldhoen, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 35 F.3d at Cir.1969), cert. Supreme 225. The Court has identified four 397 U.S. 25 L.Ed.2d 121 determining factors for when action issue, In order for mandamus (1) challenged is final: whether the action is Dunn-McCampbell must demonstrate that a agency’s posi definitive statement government officer owes the (2) tion, whether the action has the status of legal duty specific, act, that is a ministerial (3) penalties noncompliance, law with judgment devoid the exercise of or discre impact plaintiff whether the on the is direct States, tion. Richardson United *6 (4) immediate, and whether the (3d Cir.1972), 849 rev’d on other expects compliance. immediate Abbott Labo grounds, 418 U.S. 41 S.Ct. Gardner, 136, 149-53, v. ratories 387 U.S. legal duty The must be 1507, 1516-17, (1967), S.Ct. 18 L.Ed.2d 681 statute, out in by set the Constitution or grounds, overruled on other v. Califano Chandler, Giddings Sanders, 99, 105, 980, 984, 430 U.S. (5th Cir.1992), performance and its must be 51 L.Ed.2d 192 positively plainly pre commanded and so standard, this Under Dunn scribed as to be free from doubt. Id. McCampbell arguably might challenge Dunn-McCampbell has established Park proposed plan Service denial of a none of the above. The have not operations. Dunn-McCampbell might even duty they They identified which are owed. challenge be able to action that the Park pointed statutory have not ato or constitu companies’ Service took to block the access any duty. tional basis for We therefore can to their mineral estate. We need not reach not, not, and need decide such a whether here, however, questions those since it is duty mandatory discretionary. would be undisputed that neither of these events has Dunn-McCampbell’s general agen claims of occurred. The National Park Service has cy overreaching simply are insufficient to against Dunn-McCampbell taken no action duty legal create a under the Mandamus Act. compliance. that demands immediate It is a tautology may that Dunn-McCampbell not IV challenge regulations applied until sum, applies regulations the Park Service Dunn-McCampbell to is time barred Dunn-McCampbell.2 asserting challenge, from a facial Oil, Relatedly, regulation we need not decide whether Dunn- see Sun because the last such McCampbell standing would have to contest the occurred more than six before this action regulation companies’ Park Service’s of the les- filed. was Gas, 819(D) (3d ed.1991). yet applied regula- not It Park has fell to the lessee, Sun, may companies, Dunn-McCampbell so the rather than tions to the challenge regulations against 9B under the as lessor to maintain a lawsuit statutory They operator, have not identified a or Park Service while APA. Sun was but as noted, duty meriting produce relief under the such a constitutional lawsuit could immedi- monetary damages only ate Mandamus Act. for Sun. reasons, parties’ that the district Because of the state For these we hold law and con- positions, granting surely in the Park tractual which court was not error should not be summary judgment. ignored standing purposes, motion for Service’s Dunn- McCampbell Accordingly, AFFIRM. could not have sued we began reacquire

Service before it to its leases JONES, Judge, EDITH H. Circuit in 1986-89. Limitations on certain chal- dissenting: lenges to begin could not to against run Dunn-McCampbell until that respect my colleagues, I am due With time. that the statute of limitations not convinced then, against Dunn-McCampbell only legal question, run in this is what kind I and remand for fur- Dunn-McCampbell case. would reverse of claims could advance Service, proceedings that would elicit when ther after 1986-89 the Park when injured Dunn-McCampbell began acquired standing agree first be to sue. I with the compliance regula- majority with the cost of that the time standing, challenge tions. achieved it could not “procedural” basis for the Park Service’s important clarify, majority as the It is According terminology law, done, that under Texas Dunn- has not developed Circuit, “procedural” the D.C. ways prevented was in two challenges agency’s compliance, address the being able to the Park Service rulemaking requirements with such as notice simply it remained a les- while comment, challenges while “substantive” owner, sor/overriding royalty whose mineral regulation’s compliance attack the with statu- being developed by opera- interest was other tory authority or other substantive deficien- non-possessory was a in- tors. Its interest FLRA, cy. generally N.L.R.B. See Union v. possibility terest with a of reverter when the (D.C.Cir.1987). 195-97 Be- First, leases terminated. the holder of an imperative it is cause to the administrative overriding royalty portion in Texas bears no process procedural challenges posed be costs; production its interest is based *7 newly-promulgated regula- at onset of a the Hence, gross production from the on wells. tion, agency very a number of statutes set Dunn-McCampbell could not have been deadlines, e.g. days, initiating on short charged operating increased costs See, e.g., such claims. id. The Park Service by regulations Park and caused the organic statutory protection, lacks such how- injury standing no that could confer suffered ever, six-year general so the federal limita- Additionally, government. to the sue the governs procedural challenges tions statute operator responsible in Texas is lease ease, party, including in this and no Dunn- prudently developing maintaining and the McCampbell, pursue challenges could these lease, responsibility xnineral a which includes after 1985. obligation pursue to administrative reme- settled, equally It that if dies to benefit the lease. Amoco Production is well (Tex. Alexander, by agency regulation an is not authorized its Co. v. 622 S.W.2d 1981); statute,3 Hemingway, governing party injured by appli- R. Texas Law & a Oil of confusing. challenge nearly necessarily 3. While all the courts that have decided A "facial” basis, analytically procedure, questions distinguished attack the these be- could substantive governing "procedural” regulation’s tween and "substantive” chal- or the statute, subservience to its done, law, lenges, majority prevailing only and under the first as I have identifies absolutely only applied” challenges type "facial” and “as to the of is barred within regulations. majority's terminology periods promul- un- fixed after the statute has been The regulation may cation raise jurisdiction. of the the issue never transferred to federal If statutory correct, period; limitations outside the a this claim is Service has not regulation initially by jurisdiction unauthorized regulate statute had to at all. Dunn pas cannot become authorized McCampbell poses straightforward, mere a albeit sage point legal The complex, readily judi time. divides the issue amenable to majority particular and me is their insistence that the cial review. Under the facts of agency’s statutory case, authority lack of could perverse majority be this it is for the to by Dunn-McCampbell only in require raised defense Dunn-McCampbell spend to a lot of agency an money enforcement action or if time petitioning agency and to company petitions to rescind or authority amend reconsider its simply lay regulations predicate the Park Service and receives for a future lawsuit.5 If Dunn majority McCampbell adverse decision. I differ with the years has sued within six of the “injury” leases, over what kind of from began effectively “ac dates it reacquiring necessary precipitate tion” is the claim. I go would allow this suit to forward. my view, require it is waste time prerequisite to suit that “agency petitioning action” manufacture regulations

the Park Service to revoke its suffering possibly some time —at

remote future —the inevitable rebuff. Dunn

McCampbell claims that the existence of Park Service it renders uneco ESTATE OF Golda E. Rixon operators nomic for new even to bid on KOKERNOT, Deceased, reinstituting production from its Padre Is rights.4 company land mineral seeks Mary LACY, Executrix, Ann Kokernot declaratory judgment regula relief Petitioner-Appellant, may tion’s may onerous effect. This claim well-founded, definitely not be alleges but action, injury by agency occasioned consist COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL ing REVENUE, overlay of numerous Park Service Respondent- Appellee. constantly changing unpredictable thus nature of the No. 96-60057. Consequently, Dunn-McCampbell if filed suit effectively reacquired within six after it Appeals, United States Court of leases, timely. its its action is Fifth Circuit. We must recall the essence Dunn- May

McCampbell’s legal claim—that when Padre Island Park was transferred to the federal

government, right reg- Texas reserved the gas production

ulate oil and from Dunn- *8 interests,

McCampbell’s mineral which were gated. stances, Despite majority's Duim-McCampbell's failure to ripe conform claim distinction, analytical to the more common I do adjudication. opinion disagree not understand their with those cases. Regulatory See Public v. Nuclear Citizen Comm'n, (D.C.Cir.1990) reason, 4. For this it is not material that Dunn- ("were we to hold in this case that Public Citi- approached has not the Park Ser- zen’s to the lawfulness of the NRC's plans develop According vice with the leases. untimely, action was Public Citizen could file allegations, require to its to do so would petition rulemaking and then raise its claim operator to invest resources in mak- considerable ing good-faith unlawfulness when the Commission denied the opera- estimate of the costs of its petition. requirement tions and Such a would the hindrances caused be a waste resources.”) simply everyone's all this would be done time and —and precipitate a lawsuit. Under these circum-

Case Details

Case Name: Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. National Park Service
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Jun 16, 1997
Citation: 112 F.3d 1283
Docket Number: 95-40770
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.