98 Mass. 371 | Mass. | 1867
We are of opinion that the provisions of the U. S. St. of 1851, c. 43, § 2, on which the defendants rely in bar of these actions, do not apply to contracts entered into with masters or owners of vessels for the carriage by water of passengers with their luggage. The manifest design of the statute was to restrict the liability of common carriers by water of certain kinds of goods and merchandise. In regard to these it changes the rule of the common law. For this reason, its provisions are not to be extended by implication. Giving to the phraseology of the statute its fair and full meaning, without enlarging it by construction, it indicates quite clearly that its fram"rs intended to embrace only that class of contracts where goods are shipped and laden on board of vessels to be transported as freight, for which bills of lading are usually given by the carrier and received by the shipper, and form the evidence of the terms on which the contract of carriage is to be performed. The contracts on which the plaintiffs rely are not within the provisions of the statute. On this point the ruling at the trial was right.
On careful consideration of the instructions embraced in the defendants’ prayer and those given by the court to the jury, we are led to the conclusion that neither of them contained a correct statement of the rules of law applicable to the facts in proof. It was shown at the trial, and on this part of the case there was
In regard to carriers of passengers, there can be no doubt that persons who enter into contracts with them to transport themselves and their luggage, nothing being said as to the contents of the parcels which are delivered for carriage, and these being in the form of trunks or valises such as are commonly used for clothing and other personal effects, represent by implication to the carriers that they contain no articles or property not properly included within this class or description, and such as a traveller may carry with him as part of his luggage, and for which he can hold the carrier responsible under his contract. If other and different articles of greater value are contained in such trunks or valises, it is a disguise of their true nature and value, and operates as an unfair and fraudulent concealment of them which absolves the carriers from liability therefor in ease of loss. Nor is this all. In such a case, the owner can prove no contract for the transportation of any articles other than wearing apparel and other ordinary personal effects and an amount of money reasonably sufficient for the payment of travelling expenses. What is the contract into which the carrier enters when he receives a passenger ? It is only to transport him safely, to.
These principles are decisive of the rights of the parties to these actions. The only contracts into which the defendants are shown to have entered with the plaintiffs are for the carriage of one of them with his luggage, and of the other without any luggage. To the former they are liable only for the sum found by the jury to be the value of his wearing apparel and personal' effects, and for the sum of money contained in his valise necessary to defray his travelling expenses. To the other plaintiff they are not liable at all, because he is not shown to have made any contract with them to transport luggage. The money belonging to him in the valise of the first plaintiff cannot be
According to the views we have taken, neither of the verdicts rendered for the plaintiffs can be sustained. Stewart is not entitled to recover anything, and the verdict in his favor must be set aside. Dunlap is entitled to recover only the sum which the jury have found to be the amount necessary to defray his travelling expenses, and also the value of the valise and the other articles contained in it, as agreed upon by the parties; and, in accordance with the terms of the report on which the case was reserved, the verdict in his favor may be amended accordingly.