Frаnk Dunham, relator, appeals from the final order entered in the district court for Lancaster county on Mаy 9, 1939, upon his application for a writ of habeas corpus, wherein that court determined that “the relator is not unlawfully imprisoned or detained by the respondent,” and denied the relief sought. Relator appeals. Thе correctness of the determination made is challenged on the grounds that the judgment of conviction or sеntence fails to specify the offense of which the relator was convicted, or to designate when the sentence is to take effect.
Omitting formal parts, the judgment of conviction here involved is as follows:
“Marсh 11, 1938. Defendant, Frank Dunham, was duly arraigned and entered a plea of ‘Guilty.’ Defendant was thereupon examined аnd made a full disclosure. Defendant was thereupon ask if he had anything to say further why sentence should not be pronоunced upon him and had none.
“It is therefore considered and adjudged that defendant be confined in the Nebrаska State Penitentiary at Lancaster in Lancaster county, Nebraska', at hard labor, Sundays and Holidays excepted, for a period of five (5) years, solitary confinement to be no part of this sentence. Costs taxed to defendant. E. G. Kroger, District Judge.”
In support of his contentions, relator cites sections 20-1310, 29-2814 and 29-2202, Comp. St. 1929. It may be said that section 20-1310 is a provision of our Civil Code applicable to civil proceedings only, and wholly inаpplicable to criminal prosecutions. Section 29-2814, as a part of the statute relating to habeаs corpus, was originally enacted as a part of “An Act to Establish a Criminal Code,” passed
The certified copy of the judgment of a court of record thus constitutes the authority of the warden to retain the petitioner in the instant case. There are no specific statutory requirements as to what shall be inсluded in the recitals of this certified copy of judgment or sentence. When it includes a statement of the nature of the imprisonment imposed and the duration thereof, it fulfills all purposes contemplated by this statute. It comes to us, as pleaded by relator in the instant case, by statute expressly made “evidence of the faсts therein contained,” and surrounded
We do not overlook the claim of relator that the statutory provisions with reference to conduct of criminal trials embraced in section 29-2202, Comp. St. 1929, providing, “If the defendant have nothing to say, or if he show no good and sufficient cause why judgment should not be pronounced, the court shall proceed to pronounce judgment as provided by law,” were not complied with, and that thereby and because thereof the criminal procedure followed by the triаl court was wholly invalidated and the sentence imposed thereafter was likewise invalidated and nullified. It will be rеmembered that we are not determining these questions in a direct proceeding, but they arise only as a result of a collateral attack. It is clear that, considered as here presented, these claimed еrrors in no manner affect the jurisdiction of the trial court over the defendant or over the crime chargеd, and, therefore, the sentence imposed by the court is invulnerable to the attack as thus made. The error, if error there was, may only be redressed by a direct proceeding instituted for that purpose in a court of competent jurisdiction.
It follows that the judgment of the district court for Lancaster county is correct, and it is
Affirmed.