In this direct appeal, Appellant Dunes West Golf Club, LLC, challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent Town of Mount Pleasant. We affirm.
I.
The Dunes West Development (“Development”) is located on 4,518 acres of land within Respondent Town of Mount Pleasant (“Town”). The principal of Appellant Dunes West Golf Club, LLC (“Appellant”), John Weiland, through other corporate entities, purchased the undeveloped residential lots and the master developer rights to the Development in 2002, and thereafter invested considerable sums repairing the Development’s infrastructure and updating its amenities. This appeal concerns only a small portion of the Development—
According to Weiland, at the time Appellant acquired the Golf Course Property, he believed the golf course was an important amenity for the Development
Weiland initially identified these developable portions of the Golf Course Property by instructing an employee to walk the property and make note of any undeveloped areas outside the out-of-bounds markers on the golf course.
As will be discussed below, as the matter proceeded to and through litigation, Appellant has presented widely varying projections as to precisely what part of the Golf Course Property was to be carved out for residential development. Nevertheless, all of the approaches had one thing in common — the alteration of the golf course, the filling of wetlands and the relocation of several easements which Appellant did not own.
In 2005, before Appellant took any formal steps in furtherance of residentially developing a portion of the Golf Course Property, a number of golf courses throughout the coastal area of South Carolina were converted for use as residential home sites. Local city and county councils became concerned about this increasing golf-course conversion trend, particularly where developers exploited flexible, planned development zoning provisions to level existing golf courses without any oversight from local government. Among those concerned municipalities was the Town. Believing a prompt, proactive approach was in the best interests of the Town and its residents, the Town examined the existing zoning designations and permitted uses for all golf course properties within its borders to determine whether and to what extent future development could be evaluated and controlled.
As a result, to “more effectively control the process of converting golf course property to other uses” and to “balance the interests of golf course property owners and golf course community residents with respect to such conversion of use,” the Town’s planning commission proposed implementing a new
Rezoning all [golf] courses to CR-0 or amending the PDs would not necessarily prevent future development of the golf course properties. It would provide that the owner of the course would be subject to the rezoning process including a public hearing should the owner desire to redevelop part or all of the golf course for some other type of development. Town Council approval would be required.
See Town of Mt. Pleasant Planning Comm’n Public Hearing (April 19, 2006) (statement of Christiane Farrell, Div. Chief, Mt. Pleasant Planning Dep’t).
During the public hearing process on the proposed CRO Ordinance, Appellant voiced its opposition to including the entirety of the Golf Course Property in the CRO designation, claiming a total of 60.4 acres was not “part of the golf course” and was suitable for residential development. Appellant contended this 60.4 acres should remain subject to the DWPD’s flexible floating zoning. However, no plat or survey of the proposed developable land existed at that time, and no graphic or other pictorial depiction of those areas was ever presented to the Town. The Town’s zoning administrator testified at deposition that:
[I]t would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for [the Town] to decide or to determine what was indeed — what the developer considered developable land, not a part of the golf course, unless they showed it to us. And to my knowledge, that didn’t occur until later on in the process [after the enactment of the CRO ordinance].
Following the public hearing process, the Mount Pleasant Town Council (“Council”) voted to amend the Town’s zoning
At Dunes West, the new CRO district was comprised solely of the 256-acre Golf Course Property. Following this amendment, the Golf Course Property was no longer subject to the flexible floating zoning of the DWPD. Instead, that land was subject to the use limitations of the CRO Ordinance, which did not permit residential development.
In 2008, Appellant submitted a rezoning petition seeking residential development of a portion of the Golf Course Property. This time, Appellant claimed that 17.93 noncontiguous acres located within the Golf Course Property were developable for residential lots. The location of the acreage sought to be rezoned fell within areas of play of the golf course and would have required extensive alterations to the course.
In April 2009, Appellant submitted another petition, this time seeking rezoning of 16.48 acres of noncontiguous land to permit residential development. Like the 2008 petition, the 2009 proposal included acreage within areas of play that would have required the filling of wetlands, the abandonment of easements it did not own, and many of the same extensive alterations to the golf course involved in the previous rezoning petition.
Appellant filed the underlying suit, claiming the Town’s actions in designating the entirety of the Golf Course Property as a CRO district and refusing its rezoning petition amounted to a taking of 60.4 acres of the Golf Course Property and violated Appellant’s substantive due process and equal protection rights. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town on each of Appellant’s claims, which Appellant now appeals.
A trial court properly grants summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c), SCRCP. “When opposing a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must do more than ‘simply show that there is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts but must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,
III.
A. Equal Protection
Appellant claims summary judgment on its equal protection claim was improperly granted because it presented evidence that the Town granted another substantially similar rezoning petition, and there was no rational basis for the Town’s disparate treatment of the two requests. We disagree.
The Equal Protection Clause provides “nor [shall any State] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Where an alleged equal protection violation does not implicate a suspect class or abridge a fundamental right, the rational basis test is used. Denene, Inc. v. City of Charleston,
Following the downzoning of all the golf courses within the Town, developers from another golf course, Snee Farm Country Club (“Snee Farm”), sought rezoning of a contiguous, twenty-acre portion of their property from CRO to a designation that would permit development of 58 single family homes. Snee Farm presented a comprehensive development proposal and a detailed impact assessment to Council in support of its request. Monies generated from sales were to be placed in a trust account and applied to specific recreational improvements, including reconstructing the clubhouse, improving existing tennis courts, and constructing a new events pavilion, pool, and practice green with an expanded driving range. Snee Farm’s rezoning petition involved virtually no alteration to golf course areas of play. Although community support for the Snee Farm rezoning proposal was divided, there was general support in favor of the proposal. Council granted Snee Farm’s request and rezoned approximately 20 acres of land to permit the proposed residential development.
Like the Snee Farm rezoning petition, Appellant’s petition requested rezoning of approximately 17 noncontiguous acres to develop 32 residential lots. However, unlike Snee Farm’s request, Appellant’s rezoning petition did not include an assessment of the potential effects on traffic, drainage, and other conditions in the surrounding area. Next, effectuating Appellant’s plan required filling some areas of wetlands, relocating existing easements, and extensive alterations to the golf course, as detailed above. See Whaley v. Dorchester Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Appeals,
The trial court correctly found there were significant differences between the two rezoning petitions, which demonstrated a rational basis for granting Snee Farm’s proposal and denying Appellant’s proposal. Specifically, the trial court found that, from a land-use perspective, “the Snee Farm proposal presented a compact, contiguous, unified site design that caused little alteration to the areas of play of the golf course. The Dunes West proposal contemplated spattering new lots throughout the Golf Course Property that caused multiple alterations to the areas of play.” We find the two rezoning petitions were not similarly situated as a matter of law because there were material differences between them, and those differences are rationally related to the purposes of the CRO Ordinance. Moreover, Appellant has failed to produce any evidence that the denial of its rezoning petition was motivated by discriminatory goals. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,
B. Substantive Due Process
Appellant claims the trial court applied incorrect legal standards in considering its substantive due process challenges
“The authority of a municipality to enact zoning ordinances, restricting the use of privately owned property is found in the police power.” McMaster v. Columbia Bd. of Zoning Appeals,
“In order to prove a denial of substantive due process, a party must show that he was arbitrarily and capriciously deprived of a cognizable property interest rooted in state law.” Harbit,
“A legislative body does not deny due process simply because it does not permit a landowner to make the most beneficial use of its property.” Harbit,
1. Facial Substantive Due Process
In its facial substantive due process challenge, Appellant argues the trial court erred by applying an “arbitrary and capricious” standard rather than the freestanding “substantially advances” standard test it claims was set forth in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
The purposes of the CRO ordinance as set forth therein are:
(A) Purpose of district. The purpose of this section is listed as follows:
(1) To provide for, and permit, an appropriate valuation by the tax assessor and/or land appraiser that reflects the conservation, recreation, and/or open space use of land.
(2) To ensure the preservation of conservation, recreation, and/or open space use of land against undesirable development.
(3) To lessen the hazards and loss of property, life, and the reduction of health and safety due to periodic inundation of flood waters, by restricting or prohibiting uses in those areas.
(4) To provide opportunities for improved public and/or private recreation activities.
(5) To provide for a community-wide network of open space, buffer zones, and recreation spaces.
Town of Mt. Pleasant, S.C., Code § 156.333(A).
Joel Foard, the director of the Town’s planning and development department, testified at deposition that, although he did not know of any studies conducted specifically with regard to drafting the CRO Ordinance, the Town “had a long history of trying to preserve open space.” Foard further testified that, since the mid-1980s, the Town extensively studied open space preservation through various master planning and comprehensive planning processes, including the creation of the Mount Pleasant Open Space Foundation to assess the need for and existence of open space areas within the Town on an ongoing basis.
“The burden of proving the invalidity of a zoning ordinance is on the party attacking it, and it is incumbent on respondent to show the arbitrary and capricious character of the ordinance through clear and convincing evidence.” Town, of Scranton v. Willoughby,
Appellant claims the trial court erred in analyzing its substantive due process claim under the “arbitrary and capricious” framework instead of pursuant to a “substantially advances” theory. We disagree.
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, the United States Supreme Court stated that regulation of private property “effects a taking if [it] does not substantially advance [a] legitimate state interes[t],” and concluded that, under the facts of that case, no taking occurred because the challenged zoning ordinances “substantially advance legitimate governmental goals.”
Twenty-five years later, in Lingle, the Supreme Court “corrected] course” and clarified that “the ‘substantially advances’
Appellant argues the United States Supreme Court’s Lingle decision establishes that the “substantially advances” theory is a new, freestanding due process test and that the trial court erred by applying the “arbitrary and capricious” due process framework in granting summary judgment. Although we acknowledge the potential relevance of a “substantially advances” inquiry within the due process analysis, we do not read the Lingle decision as abandoning the established “arbitrary and capricious” framework; rather, we view the “substantially advances” theory as embraced within the “arbitrary and capricious” analysis. See id. at 542,
We find the trial court did not err by considering Appellant’s substantive due process challenge under the “arbitrary and capricious” framework. See, e.g., Worsley Cos. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant,
Additionally, Appellant claims summary judgment was improper because it created a genuine issue of fact as to whether the CRO Ordinance is arbitrary and capricious because the Town lacked an adequate factual basis to support each of the purposes stated therein. We reject Appellant’s argument because Appellant fails to identify any specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial; rather, Appellant simply challenges the wisdom of the Town’s decision to enact the CRO Ordinance. It is not the function of the courts to pass upon the wisdom or folly of municipal ordinances or regulations. See McMaster,
Although a substantive due process claim is subject to a heightened burden of proof at the summary judgment stage, we find Appellant has failed to produce even a scintilla of evidence suggesting that the Town’s exercise of its police power in creating the CRO district was not rationally related to the Town’s legitimate long-term land-use goals. We further find Appellant has failed to present any evidence that the CRO Ordinance does not preserve existing recreational uses. To the contrary, the CRO Ordinance substantially advances those interests. In this regard, all of the evidence in the record shows the Town’s planning goals will be furthered by implementing some measure of control over future golf course
2. As-Applied Substantive Due Process
Appellant contends the Town arbitrarily and capriciously rezoned all of the Golf Course Property to a CRO designation. We disagree, for the rezoning represents a uniform plan applicable to all golf course developments and is, in no way, inherently arbitrary.
a. Protected Property Interest
As an initial matter, the trial court found Appellant failed to show that it possessed a vested interest in its right to construct houses on the Golf Course Property under either the common law or the Vested Rights Act.
Initially, we find Appellant’s argument is not procedurally appropriate.
b. Arbitrary and Capricious Rezoning
Appellant also argues that rezoning the entire area within the Golf Course Property, including the land it anticipated developing residentially, was unnecessary to further the stated purposes of the CRO Ordinance. The crux of Petitioner’s complaint is that the CRO zoning boundary is arbitrary because it sweeps too broadly.
We agree with the trial court that the Town’s zoning boundary decision in reliance on the tax map parcels to determine zoning boundaries was not unreasonable. Indeed, the rezoning of the Golf Course Property tracts was part of a unified plan which applied to all golf courses in the Town, and the Town’s use of tax map parcels as zoning district boundaries for each golf course is consistent with the stated tax-assessment purposes set forth in the CRO Ordinance. See Town of Mt. Pleasant, S.C., Code § 156.333(A)(1). Consequently, we reject Appellant’s argument that the Town’s actions in evaluating and targeting the Golf Course Property as the specific land to be rezoned were arbitrary or capricious in any way. See Berman,
We affirm the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the Town as to Appellant’s due process claims.
C. Takings
Appellant next claims the Town’s act of downzoning the Golf Course Property amounts to an unconstitutional taking under two alternative theories: a categorical or per se taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
1. Relevant Parcel
As an initial matter, Appellant claims the trial court erred in considering, for the purposes of its takings analysis, the relevant parcel to include all 256 acres of the Golf Course Property. Appellant argues that only the discrete portion it seeks to develop for residential use should be considered. The obstacle Appellant presents here concerning its “discrete portion” argument is that we cannot tell what that portion is. Before this lawsuit was filed Appellant presented varying acreage amounts as the affected areas of the Golf Course Property for residential development. Those varying acreage amounts ranged from 16.48 acres to 17.86 acres to 25 acres. In its complaint, Appellant asserted that “[approximately 60.4 acres of the Parcels is developable land outside the areas of play of the Golf Course.” Before the trial court, Appellant presented a figure of 25 acres. On appeal, Appellant’s brief contains inconsistent acreage representations, ranging from 25 to 60 acres.
Before determining whether a taking has occurred, a court must first determine what, precisely, is the property at issue. See Dist. Intown Props, v. District of Columbia,
Essentially, the question is whether a court should consider a regulation’s impact on only part of the property or whether a court must consider its impact upon the whole parcel. This difficult issue has been described as a “conceptual black hole.” See Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of Ownership and the Parcel As a Whole, 36 Vt. L. Rev 549, 564 (2012) (“The takings denominator problem is more than a ‘difficult, persisting question’ that the [United States] Supreme Court continues to avoid.”) (citing John E. Fee, The Takings Clause As a Comparative Right, 76 S. Cal. L.Rev. 1003,1032 (2003)).
The United States Supreme Court has indicated several times that “piecemealing” various property interests is not permitted. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
However, other United States Supreme Court decisions have implicitly acknowledged, though never explicitly held, that “conceptual severance” of a parcel can be appropriate under the particular facts presented.
Further, the United States Supreme Court on several occasions has emphasized that the concepts of “fairness and justice,” which form the basis of the takings clause, are best served by eschewing a “set formula” for determining when compensation is due. See Lingle,
We need not attempt to untangle this Gordian Knot today, for even if we were persuaded that it may be appropriate, under the proper circumstances, to consider the relevant parcel as something less than the whole, this is not such a case.
The trial court determined the relevant parcel included the entire area within the Golf Course Property. Specifically, the trial court found:
From their initial development, these parcels have been used as a unit, as a golf course. [Appellant] did not set out to purchase just the Claimed Developable Lands. It purchased all the tracts and created a separate corporate entity with a title having a golf emphasis, i.e. “Dunes West Golf Club, LLC,” to own them. It used the tracts as a golf course and did not ... pursue residential development on the tracts. It mortgaged the tracts as a unit. These facts compel but one conclusion: the relevant parcel [is] the six tracts [of 256 acres], not fragments of them.
Appellant’s moving-target approach and inability to consistently identify a discrete acreage for residential development precludes us from delineating with any precision the specific segments of land Appellant contends comprise the relevant parcel. Because of Appellant’s ever-changing approach as to the portion of the Golf Course Property it seeks to develop, we are left with no choice but to uphold the trial court’s parcel-as-a-whole approach. See United States v. Causby,
Further, even assuming Appellant had consistently identified a particular segment, Appellant has failed to posit any fact suggesting that a portion of the Golf Course Property would be appropriately viewed as a discrete segment, either under the factors other courts have considered or any other factor which might be fit to consider in this situation. To the contrary, everything in the record suggests the Golf Course Property is most appropriately viewed as a single unit.
In short, Appellant merely entreats this Court to conceptually subdivide the Golf Course Property and identify the relevant parcel in terms of the area of land it claims was taken by the CRO Ordinance. We are compelled to reject Appellant’s argument because the United States Supreme Court has consistently refused to separate an owner’s property into a portion which is impacted by the challenged regulation and a portion which is not, and define the relevant parcel as including only the former. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra,
We conclude the trial court did not err by finding the evidence supports but one reasonable inference — the entire 256-acre area within the Golf Course Property constitutes the relevant parcel in this analysis. Having established the parameters of the property at issue, we turn now to Appellant’s takings claim.
2. Takings
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const, amend. V. “The Fifth Amendment, which requires just compensation where private property is taken for public use, undertakes to redistribute certain economic losses inflicted by public improvements so that they will fall upon the public rather than wholly upon those who happen to lie in the path of the project.” United States v. Willow River Power Co.,
“As its text makes plain, the Takings Clause does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.” Lingle,
We acknowledge, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, that “[t]he question of what constitutes a ‘taking’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty.” Penn Central,
a. Categorical Taking
We first address the Lucas categorical taking. According to Appellant, because certain areas of the Golf Course Property could have been used for residential development prior to the 2006 rezoning, and by precluding that development, the rezoning eliminated all economically beneficial use of the claimed developable land. We disagree.
Government regulation effectuates a per se taking in two scenarios: (1) where an owner is required to suffer a permanent physical invasion of property, however minor, (finding a law requiring landlords to allow television cable companies to install equipment, which occupied only about 1.5 cubic feet of property, in their apartment buildings amounted to a taking); or (2) “where [a] regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.” See Lucas,
There is no dispute that this case does not involve a physical invasion of Appellant’s property. Thus, the only issue is whether the CRO Ordinance deprived Appellant of “all economically beneficial uses” of its land, and therefore, amounted to a taking. See id. at 1019,
Although we find no categorical taking has occurred, the law provides that where limitations on land fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a regulatory taking still may have occurred depending on a complex set of factors. Thus, we turn to Appellant’s regulatory taking claim and analyze each of the relevant factors in turn.
b. Penn Central Balancing Test
As noted above, in the regulatory taking context, the issue of whether a taking occurred is a question of law for the Court. See Carolina Chloride,
Aside from scenarios involving a permanent physical invasion or a Lucas-tyge categorical taking, “regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central.” Lingle,
Penn Central, as clarified by Lingle, provides a navigable framework for resolving regulatory takings claims distinct from the substantive due process inquiry. Noting that these constitutional challenges present “essentially ad hoc” inquiries which are largely dependent on the particular circumstances of each case, Penn Central identifies the appropriate factors to consider in determining whether a taking has occurred: the character of the government action, the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, and the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.
Concerning the character of the government action, “In answering [the takings] question, we must remain cognizant that ‘government regulation — by definition — involves the adjustment of rights for the public good’____” Lingle,
“ ‘Not all damages suffered by a private property owner at the hands of [a] governmental agency are compensable.’ ” Carolina Chloride,
“[W]hile most burdens consequent upon government action undertaken in the public interest must be borne by individual landowners as concomitants of ‘the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community,’ some are so substantial and unforeseeable, and can so easily be identified and redistributed, that ‘justice and fairness’ require that they be borne by the public as a whole.” Kirby Forest Indust. v. United States,
Here, in examining the character of the Town’s actions, the trial court found:
The CRO Ordinance is bottomed on legitimate, land use considerations. Preservation of open space and recreational opportunities, flood prevention and curbing ill effects of indiscriminate golf course conversions are all proper zoning considerations.
The CRO Ordinance was applied to all golf course properties in the Town. The Town has provided legitimate and substantial public purposes sought to be achieved by the enactment of the comprehensive CRO Ordinance, and the Town’s land-use ordinances permit a landowner to seek rezoning of a golf course, as was done here, in the event the landowner wishes to undertake residential development.
As noted above, the CRO Ordinance has not eliminated all development potential — there are still some (albeit a reduced number of) permitted uses which would allow further development under the CRO zoning designation. Nor did the Town
Furthermore, the CRO Ordinance is not a permanent and immutable prohibition against residential use; rather, the CRO Ordinance represents the implementation of a controlled process through which the Town may evaluate future use conversion and ensure existing recreational uses are not abrogated or converted in an inappropriate manner. As such, the CRO Ordinance provides a “clear reciprocity of advantage because it protects the interest of all affected landowners against immediate construction that might be inconsistent” with the Town’s land-use planning goals. Tahoe-Sierra,
In sum, it cannot be said that, by designating the Golf Course Property as a CRO district, the Town has taken or acquired Appellant’s property. Accordingly, we conclude this factor weighs in the Town’s favor.
As for the economic impact of the CRO Ordinance, United States Supreme Court decisions sustaining land-use regulations “uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a ‘taking,’ and that the ‘taking’ issue in these contexts is resolved by focusing on the uses the regulations permit.” Penn Central,
Lastly, the factor concerning Appellant’s investment backed expectations militates against Appellant. “[(Continuation of the existing use of the property is the property owner’s ‘primary expectation’ when considering an owner’s investment-backed expectations for the property.” See Carolina Chloride,
In acquiring the valuable Golf Course Property, Appellant only casually approached the idea of converting a portion of the property to residential development and never submitted any formal development plan or subdivision plat to the Town in furtherance of its abstract desire. Further, Weiland did not investigate, prior to purchase or anytime thereafter, the feasibility of the desired development — thus, it is clear Appellant’s unilateral development expectations did not take into account the wetlands, easements, or substantial changes to the golf course that would be required. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Town took any action or made any representation which served to increase Appellant’s expectations or led
Further, as to the investment-backed aspect, the record is devoid of any evidence showing Appellant substantially relied or materially altered its position based on the prior PD zoning or its desire to develop residentially a portion of the Golf Course Property. Although Appellant claims significant expenditures were made, none of those expenditures were in furtherance of residential development; rather, all of the evidence in the record shows money spent in furtherance of the existing recreational use of the Golf Course Property.
For government regulation to constitute a taking, the property owner must objectively demonstrate the existence investment-backed expectations. Therefore, Appellant’s effort to elevate its anticipated development prospects to the level of tangible, investment-backed expectations is unavailing. Appellant has failed to show any concrete steps taken in furtherance of prospective residential development. Rather, we are
In short, the 256-acre Golf Course Property remains a valuable property, not only as a golf course, but also for other, related uses permitted by the CRO designation. Appellant is essentially left to argue that its takings claim is founded upon only its inability to exploit certain portions of the Golf Course Property for residential development. As the Penn Central Court noted, “the submission that appellants may establish a taking simply by showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a property interest that they heretofore had believed was available for development is quite simply untenable.” Penn Central,
We reject Appellant’s regulatory taking claim. In sum, we find the Town was legitimately concerned about the possibility that golf courses could be converted to residential use without any land-use oversight, and in response to those concerns, the Town simply “adjust[ed] the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good” in a way that incidentally impacted Appellant’s ability to maximize the profit from the development of its land. Id. at 124,
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Town.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Appellant’s various proposals are best described as a moving-target approach, which we discuss fully in the body of this opinion. In essence, Appellant has failed to identify precisely what property is the subject of this lawsuit, as it has given widely varying representations, ranging from 16.48 acres to 17.86 acres to 25.16 acres to 60.4 acres.
. The Golf Course Property was previously severed from the Development and sold to a separate owner. Since initial construction in the early 1990s, the Golf Course Property has been used continuously for golf purposes with few, if any, changes.
. The DWPD is a site-specific development plan allowing considerable flexibility regarding land use. Essentially, the DWPD master land-use plan provides for mixed uses throughout the Development and sets forth amounts of land assigned for particular uses but in no particular locations. Accordingly, the location of a particular use is determined at the developer’s discretion and may be changed or shifted, essentially without Town oversight so long as minor development standards, such as setback requirements, are met and the overall density of the 4,518-acre development does not increase. For a detailed discussion regarding the characteristics of planned development districts in general, see Sinlder v. County of Charleston,
. Weiland also believed the golf course was an important recreational feature to attract future residents of the Development and that continuity of ownership between the Development and the golf course was desirable to protect his substantial investments in the 4,518 acre Development.
. According to Weiland’s deposition testimony, he has owned and developed several golf courses over his thirty-five year career and is
. The various recreational uses permitted in a CRO district include: golf courses, driving ranges, tennis courts, play fields, swimming pools and park land. Accessory uses, such as club houses, restroom and locker room facilities, snack bars, and parking areas, are also permitted. See Town of Mt. Pleasant, S.C., Code § 156.333(B).
. The 2008 proposal included relocation of the teeing areas of four different holes, which would result in the reduction of the ninth hole from a par-four to a par-three hole and the eleventh hole from a par-five to a par-four hole. Additionally, that proposal would have required the reconfiguration of the putting greens for two holes, clearing various wooded areas, and relocation of approximately 1,700 linear feet of cart path, partly to areas without existing cart-path easements. Appellant's desire to maximize development prompted it to propose adding various lots in such close proximity to the course that installation of almost 1,000 linear feet of safety netting would be required along the tenth hole and the practice range to protect nearby homes from errant golf shots.
. These necessary alterations include reconfiguration of the fairway of the tenth hole, shortening the ninth and eleventh holes, including reducing the eleventh hole from a par-five to a par-four hole, moving several tee boxes, and relocating the maintenance shed and numerous cart paths throughout the Golf Course Property.
. There was "no occasion to consider” that issue because the landowner had voluntarily dismissed its due process claim below and argued only a "substantially advances” theory in support of its takings claim on appeal.
. The Vested Rights Act is a set of statutory provisions under which a developer may seek to protect the right to undertake and complete the development of property. See S.C.Code Ann. §§ 6-29-1510 to -1560 (Supp.2011). Specifically, the trial court found Appellant failed to avail itself of the provisions of the Vested Rights Act. We do not hold that, at the time the CRO Ordinance was passed, Appellant definitively had a vested right in residential development through the Vested Rights Act. We merely observe that Appellant took no action to assert any rights under the Act. This lack of action is relevant in terms of assessing whether Appellant possessed a constitutionally protected property inter
. Appellant has abandoned its previous argument — namely, that it possessed a vested development right prior to the 2006 rezoning of its property. See Biales v. Young,
.
.
. The term "conceptual severance” is derived from "the modem notion that property is a bundle of rights made up of many strands.... [I]f you remove one or more strands from this bundle and treat them in the aggregate as a separate property interest, you are in effect conceptually severing these strands and then hypothetically or conceptually construing those strands as a separate and distinct property interest.” Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem, 27 Rutgers L.J. 663, 695 (1996) (internal quotations omitted) (describing the various types of conceptual severance as including vertical severance (division of subsurface, surface, and air rights); temporal severance (division of property based on the time regulation is in effect and not in effect — i.e. temporary takings); functional severance (division of property interests based on easements, rights of way, and servitudes); and horizontal severance (subdivision of a parcel into smaller lots)). "It consists of delineating a property interest consisting of just what the government action has removed from the owner, and then asserting that that particular whole thing has been permanently taken.” Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum. L.Rev. 1667, 1676 (1988).
. Indeed, this position is further supported by Keystone Bituminous, in which the United States Supreme Court found that, although the affected subsurface support estate could be recognized as a separate property interest under state law, "our takings jurisprudence forecloses reliance on such legalistic distinctions within a bundle of property rights____ Its value is merely a part of the entire bundle of rights possessed by the owner of either the coal or the surface.”
. In recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has declined to resolve the uncertainty and confusion involved in determining the relevant parcel based on the particular circumstances presented by each case. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
. However, other courts have found United States Supreme Court jurisprudence to be more nuanced and concluded that ‘‘[t]he effort should be to identify the parcel as realistically and fairly as possible, given the entire factual and regulatory environment.” Ciampitti v. United States,
. This evidence is the deposition testimony of Kevin Popson, Appellant's Rule 30(b)(6), SCRCP, witness as to general matters.
. This evidence is the deposition testimony of J.T. McMickle, Appellant’s Rule 30(b)(6), SCRCP, witness as to financial matters. Although the record also contains several appraisals valuing the Golf Course Property at $3,798,000, $3,840,000, and $4,900,000, our analysis is based on a valuation of $3,500,000, which is the lowest figure and the one most favorable to Appellant.
. The record includes an itemized list of Appellant's expenditures for the period of time between 2005 and 2009; however, none of these expenditures was in furtherance of residential development. Rather, the bulk of expenditures related to maintenance and renovation of the clubhouse (i.e. the installation of various new lighting fixtures and new tile and carpet) and acquisition of new equipment for golf course operations (i.e. the purchase of 77 golf carts and various pieces of landscaping equipment), with a small portion being devoted to purchasing office supplies (i.e. a Xerox copy machine and several computers).