267 S.W. 567 | Ark. | 1924
There is no presumption in favor of the validity of judgments of a justice court. At least, if the fact of jurisdiction is denied, the burden of proof is on the party relying on the judgment. 15 R.C.L., p. 880-882; 29 C.J., p. 166; Cooley Const. Lim., 5th ed. 503; Church on Habeas Corpus, 268;
The court decided that appellee was entitled to his discharge on several grounds, all of which we need not discuss if any ground at all can be found upon which the judgment can be sustained.
The documentary evidence shows the amount of fines and costs adjudged against appellee and the items thereof and the length of time which has elapsed since his commitment. It shows that the fines and costs in all three of the cases aggregated the sum of $83, which included three fees of $10 each in favor of the prosecuting attorney, and that 118 days have elapsed since appellee was committed to the custody of the contractors. The record of convictions before the justice of the peace also shows that appellee entered a plea of guilty in each case.
The first question presented is whether or not the prosecuting attorney is entitled to a fee. The court has no right on habeas corpus to discharge from custody on account of any irregularity in the judgments of conviction, if the court acted within its jurisdiction. Ex parte Byles,
The case of Brown v. Welch,
In determining whether or not the time during which an accused may be legally detained has expired, the court may determine from the face of the proceedings the amount of the fine and costs chargeable against the convict. In so doing it is found that the fees of the prosecuting attorney should be deducted, which leaves only the amount of $53.50 chargeable against appellee. It also appears from the commitment that the accused has been in custody 118 days, which, at seventy-five cents a day, as allowed by statute (Crawford Moses' Digest, 2071), is more than sufficient to extinguish the fines and costs. The statute cited above, as originally enacted, fixed the amount allowed convicts at the rate of fifty cents per day, but the act of 1899, amending certain sections of the original statute, provides, in one of the sections, that "the convict defendant shall receive seventy-five cents per day, including Sunday, for which be is so hired out to such contractor, in excess of any liability for care or sickness." There was originally some doubt as to *18
whether this change in the amount of credit to be allowed a convict applied to those hired out as well as those working on the roads, but that doubt has been resolved by the decision of this court in the case of Ex parte Brady,
We do not deem it necessary to discuss the other grounds upon which the court held that appellee should be discharged.
The judgment is therefore affirmed, for the reasons herein stated.