719 N.E.2d 1029 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1998
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *230
[EDITORS' NOTE: THIS PAGE CONTAINS HEADNOTES. HEADNOTES ARE NOT AN OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] *231 Plaintiff-appellant, Larry K. Duncan, appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court granting a directed verdict in favor of defendants-appellees Bureau of Workers' Compensation and the Industrial Commission of Ohio (collectively referred to as the "Industrial Commission") on the basis that appellant's injuries were not sustained in the course and scope of his employment with Ohio Blow Pipe Company ("OBP").1 For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.
On March 13, 1996, appellant, a welder employed by OBP, was in California at the direction of his employer on a three-week installation assignment. As is customary in his position with this particular company, his assignments take him to several different cities for extended periods of time in furtherance of OBP's business. Equally customary is the undisputed fact that OBP pays not only for appellant's travel to these cities, but also for his lodging, meals, and rental transportation.
On that particular day, appellant finished working at the job site around 4:00 p.m. He drove to his hotel, showered, and eventually left for dinner at approximately 8:00 p.m. Upon returning from dinner at approximately 10:30 p.m., appellant was involved in an automobile accident in which he was injured. Attempts on his behalf to participate in the workers' compensation program as a result of these injuries were unsuccessful at the administrative level. In the appeal to the trial court that followed, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the Industrial Commission.
Appellant timely appeals and assigns the following error for our review:
"The trial court erred by granting defendant-appellee's motion for directed verdict because as a matter of law, plaintiff-appellant Larry Duncan introduced sufficient evidence that he was in the course and scope of his employment with Ohio Blow Pipe Company when his injury occurred." *233
In his sole assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court inappropriately directed a verdict in favor of the Industrial Commission where sufficient evidence was before the trial court demonstrating that appellant's injuries were sustained while in the course of, and arose from, his employment with OBP. Specifically, appellant claims that he was in California at the expense and direction of his employer, which included OBP's payment of his meals, and the injuries he sustained as he returned from his evening meal occurred in the course of and arose from his employment with OBP. Appellees, on the other hand, maintain that appellant's return from dinner was not in furtherance of the employer's business but rather a purely personal endeavor unrelated to his employment with OBP.
The standard to be applied by a trial court in considering a motion for a directed verdict is set forth in Civ. R. 50(A)(4), which provides:
"When a motion for directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a Verdict for the moving party as to that issue."
A motion for a directed verdict tests the legal sufficiency of the evidenced and therefore presents a question of law. Grau v.Kleinschmidt (1987),
An injury sustained by an employee is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act only if it was "received in the course of, and arising, out of, the injured employee's employment." R.C.
In order for an injury to be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, both prongs of the test set forth in R.C.
Until recently, much of the case law in this area has revolved around the employee's status as a fixed-situs employee as opposed to some version of a non fixed-situs employee. See Fletcher,
This distinction, however, was recently reconsidered in the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Ruckman v. Cubby Drilling, Inc.
(1998),
When questioned during oral argument about the applicability ofRuckman to the facts of this case, appellant maintained the two cases were distinguishable on the basis that the injured employees in Ruckman, though assigned by their employer to work at differing drilling sites, were traveling from their homes to the work site as opposed to the case sub judice, in which appellant was provided lodging in another city from which he traveled to and from the work site. We disagree. The Ruckman court stated:
"The focus remains the same even though the employee may be reassigned to a different work place monthly, weekly, or even daily. Despite periodic relocation of job sites, each particular job site may constitute a fixed place of employment."
The court concluded that although the work at each drilling site had limited duration, it was a fixed work site within the meaning of the coming-and-going rule. Id. at 120,
In the case sub judice, appellant was assigned to particular installation sites at the direction of his employer and had no duties to perform outside those assignments. Likewise, the day began and ended at each particular site, whether he was assigned to be at that site for a day, a week, or a month. Thus, appellant was a fixed-situs employee as that term has been interpreted by the Ruckman court.
This does not end the inquiry, however. If appellant can demonstrate that his injury was sustained in the course of and arising out of his employment with OBP, he then can avoid the force of the coming-and-going rule and participate in the State Insurance Fund.
The nature of appellant's employment with OBP required him to be at different sites to install equipment at OBP's customers' sites. While appellant relies heavily on the fact that OBP paid not only for appellant's travel to the various sites, in this case California, but also for appellant's rental car and his meals, this fact alone is no longer sufficient evidence in determining whether an employee was in the furtherance of his employer's business. See Ruckman,
The Fisher court reaffirmed a totality-of-the-circumstances test, first announced in Lord v. Daugherty (1981),
Applying these factors to the instant case does not support a causal connection between appellant's injury and his employment with OBP. The accident occurred anywhere from five to six miles from the plant site on a highway over which OBP *237
had no control. Although a semantic argument to the contrary can be made, an equally plausible argument can be made that OBP did not derive any benefit from appellant's presence at the scene of the accident. Nonetheless, the Ruckman court found that the inability to satisfy the Lord test did not foreclose recovery if the injured employee could demonstrate that the employment relationship exposed the employee to a risk quantitatively greater than the risks common to the public. Known as the "special hazard rule," this rule has a purpose similar to that of the coming-and-going rule. Ruckman at 123,
The same can be said of appellant in this case. Appellant, at the direction of his employer, traveled to an employment assignment in another state and stayed in a hotel for the duration of the assignment. OBP assumed that appellant would need to eat while there and provided not only a meal allowance for that purpose but also transportation. As a consequence, appellant's exposure to the risks associated with travel were quantitatively greater than that of the general public, who, most likely, would not be traveling to a restaurant for each of its daily meals. Since appellant's injuries were caused by a hazard of his employment, it necessarily follows that his injuries arose out of his employment.
Because we find substantial competent evidence that appellant's injuries occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment with OBP, the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of the Industrial Commission.
Accordingly, appellant's sole assignment of error is well taken and is sustained.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
O'DONNELL, P.J., and SPELLACY, J., concur.