Duncan v. McDonoughDuncan v. McDonough
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Lampron
Absent such service, jurisdiction over the defendant on the basis of his domicile or residence in this state cannot be obtained by other process without a statute granting such authority. Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws, s. 79, comment b (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956). Such a statute in order to comply with the requirements of due process would have to provide for “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Schroeder v. New York, 371 U. S. 208, 211; Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457; 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 917.
We find no statute which grants judicial jurisdiction to our courts over an inhabitant, resident or domiciliary of this state who cannot be served in accordance with the provisions of
Plaintiffs rely also on
We are familiar with the change in the rule as to state jurisdiction over foreign corporations promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316, 317. For the former doctrines of consent and presence in a state as the basis for jurisdiction over foreign corporations, this case substituted “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, supra, 316. The extent to which this change from emphasis on territorial limitations of state courts to emphasis on the contacts approach in defining due process will be applied to nonresident individuals is still in a state of flux. Benson v. Brattleboro Retreat, 103 N. H. 28, 30; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U. S. 220, 222, 223; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U. S. 235, 250-253; 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 935.
We hold that service in this state on the liability insurance carrier of a nonresident whose car was registered here was not intended when
Plaintiffs claim that the defendant has waived his right to contest jurisdiction by filing on April 4, 1963, motions to dismiss because plaintiffs were not prosecuting their appeals to the granting of defendant’s motions to quash on September 6, 1960 and that the plaintiffs had brought other actions for the same cause in another jurisdiction. They further allege such a waiver by defendant’s responding to a motion for discovery filed by the plaintiffs seeking to determine the whereabouts of the defendant. *311 All of these actions by the defendant pertained to the jurisdictional issue and were in pursuance thereof. They did not relate to other issues and could not constitute a waiver of the defendant’s claim of no jurisdiction which had already been upheld by the Trial Court. Lyford, v. Academy, 97 N. H. 167; Rosenblum v. Company, 99 N. H. 267, 268.
Exceptions overruled.
All concurred.