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Duncan v. Evans
653 S.W.2d 38
Tex. Crim. App.
1983
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*1 same default. To do so would be to legis-

late a beyond sanction that which the Leg-

islature expressly provided has for such con-

temptuous conduct.

Accordingly, applicant is entitled to relief

from the restraint and imposed detention 16,1983 the March holding him in

contempt for refusal to produce documents

before the grand jury, but not from pay-

ment of a fine in the of one amount hun-

dred dollars.6

Therefore, applicant discharged from

so much of the order contempt of that

commits him to the Williamson County Jail

“until he willing said produce docu-

ments in compliance with the Order of the

Court and the said Jury subpoenas Grand

duces tecum” that are described therein. DUNCAN, Judge,

Honorable Jimmie

County Criminal Court Law at No. County, Applicant,

3 of Harris EVANS,

Honorable Frank G. Chief Jus-

tice, Appeals, Supreme First Houston, al.,

Judicial et District Re-

spondents.

No. 69113. Texas,

Court of

En Banc.

June 1983. corpus subpoena produc- In his habeas duces tecum whether he had applicant produced record, answered, “would show that he all ed “I have attorney’s pos- records in his and/or his produced everything [sic] that I have.” comply session and cannot further... but he However, respect disobeying to his with showing. has not made that Each motion to subpoena produce records of Grain Produc- quash subpoena duces tecum asserted that “the ers, Inc., express grave doubts that in the we requested longer posses- records are no registered capacity he has in which served — currently sion of the Defendant but are under agent corporation was even — care, custody, of his control attor- subpoena doing capable that which the de- ney. grand jury Appearing ..” before the manded. being described in a asked as each item

39 responsibili- to the appeals courts of enforce for an appellate counsel ty of appointed filing of an to insure the indigent appellant appellate brief? State, (Tex. 631 761

In Picard v. S.W.2d 1981), Ap- of App. Beaumont, the Court — peals stated: “Having accepted responsibility the Court, to we will delegated and this duty enforce- make use of such tools for the Duncan, Jimmie se. pro ment are available responsibility of the as Mattox, Tex., Jim of David R. Atty. Gen. State, page at supra, to us.” Picard Richards, and Atty. Executive Asst. Gen. 764. Keller, Gen., Austin, Mary Atty. P. Asst. exists as Because of the confusion which respondents. for available, are it is a concom- to what “tools” Huttash, Atty., Robert Alfred State’s of to deline- responsibility mitant the Court Walker, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the remove, possible, and if ate those “tools” State. due any may which have occurred confusion to our pronouncements. own of holdings the we must address Initially, (Tex. 119 Guillory v. OPINION to the their Cr.App.1977), applicability and McCORMICK, Judge. order In its promulgating instant issue. original prohi- herein, This for writ of on application respondent court relied Guil- the bition arises to Pro- the Stay from an “Order in to remove lory ordering of of and substitute ceedings” attorney appoint the First Court recalcitrant However, be read directing judge County Guillory the of the must counsel. proce at Law to County appellant Court No. 3 of Harris context of the within the attorney remove a in a case the its rendition. court-appointed dures existent at time of court, ap- fact, supra, before the and in the Court Picard Duncan, all point disposal another attorney. Applicant may noted that it not have at of the con- Judge county judge affected available a trial of the remedies to jurisdiction supra, tends that he has no to take the Guillory. Picard outlined action ordered by respondents. page 764, footnote at hurdle jurisdictional of the

Although appear it has been made to Because V.A.C.C.P., 44.11, when imposed in another cause Article number before this Court of is the Court respondent record filed in appellate the court has vacated its the authority order, court without Appeals, such is record the trial not reflected the except pursuant as to bond to act further showing, herein. Absent such affirmative 44.04, effect not Article V.A.C.C.P. The presume Compare we should mootness. Proceed Stay “Order to respondent court’s Garza Court ings” was to retain case do an Appeals, yet presented in this case is akin to The issue Thus, the authority do. he had no act in the recently others which have arisen re may Guillory “the option of courts of See Ex appeals. various a substitute attorney lieve the Gray, Courts to the is unavailable attorney” Ganne, (Tex.App. and In re Appeals. —Austin, 1982). into the formula- Distilled 44.- Article Likewise, argument that issue we must address tion of an which courts 37, V.A.C.C.P., allowing to the What is available authority this: to “make such orders as law CLINTON, J., nature joins the opinion may require,” authorizes except such paragraph second action grant must fail. This thereof. authority to courts juris- does not reinvest ONION, Presiding Judge, dissenting. diction in the trial court. This is an prohibi- for writ *3 tion seeking jurisdic- to invoke the original thereof, In lieu Appeals the Court of V, 5, tion of this court. Article Texas § may in this, a case such as where the right Constitution, as amended 1977. The appli- of an indigent defendant the to effective cant seeks writ prohibit respondents the assistance of counsel issue, on is in appeal from an enforcing Stay “Order to Proceed- abate the appeal and the instruct trial court ings” the directing applicant judge of as the to assure protection the right. of that By trial court to remove a court-appointed abating appeal, jurisdiction may be counsel in a case the Court before properly returned to the trial and the of Appeals, to appoint and another attor- trial court will have to it all available of the ney. Applicant county contends the options delineated in Guillory. “After re judge of which the duly he is elected has no ceipt court’s mandate of jurisdiction to take the action ordered by abatement, the trial court still has control respondents. The respondents order of the over the until the supplemental record for application attached to writ of again the appellate reaches court.” 26 Tex. prohibition. unsigned It an and uncerti- Jur., Law, 4195, page Section fied copy. following See the eases in which we said the It appears Hicks was Cleveland convicted abatement should be as if appeal treated no by a jury of criminal a Class B trespass, had been filed the appellate court: San misdemeanor, in County Criminal Court at State, chez v. 458 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.Cr.App. 3, Law punishment No. and his was as- 1970); State, v. Williams 458 S.W.2d 932 sessed days’ at 180 confinement in the Har-

(Tex.Cr.App.1970); State, v. Weeks 459 ris County jail. Notice of was appeal given S.W.2d 639 Akin (Tex.Cr.App.1970); and appointed by applicant Ben Durant was State, 652, 653 counsel on The appel- Hicks. 1971); Heiliger State, 471 S.W.2d 411 late record was filed in the of Ap- Court (Tex.Cr.App.1971); State, McKinney 477 peals. 4, brief Hicks’ was due November S.W.2d (Tex.Cr.App.1972); 295 Jordan v. by 1983. When no brief was February filed State, 479 667 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); S.W.2d 3, 1983, court ordered Durant Martinez (Tex.Cr. 488 77 S.W.2d 2, by to file a brief March 1983. Since App.1972); Lessing v. 509 S.W.2d 356 filed, brief the respondent was then Evans (Tex.Cr .App.1974). 21, 1983, on March entered an supposedly procedure, Absent such the Courts of Ap- staying proceedings in the peals have available the power contempt Appeals directing and trial applicant pursuant 1911a, See, to Article V.A.C.S. Durant judge remove as counsel Ganne, re supra; parte Gray, Ex supra, and 30, attorney. another March On Alvardo v. 634 41 (Tex.App.— S.W.2d 1983, prohibi- filed his writ 1982). Beaumont tion this court. we Accordingly, find that respondent Respondents, represented Attor- by court was not authorized to enter the order Texas, answered, have ney ques- General of complained of and that is entitled prohibition tioning use to the sought. relief We are confident that has complained already since the act respondent court will vacate order. The performed, calling been attention to writ will issue should compliance with this 6, April the fact Hicks filed a that on 1983 opinion forthcoming. not be request- motion Court of Appeals with the Moeller, A. to be Leta represented DAVIS, appeal. on J., who to be counsel TOM G. dissents. volunteered

41 The Court of (respondents) granted when the becomes moot the case is Hicks’ motion and vacated its earlier order Sanchez, dismissed. Ex 145 parte Tex. of March 21st directing trial court (ap- 48, Cr.R. 165 743 (Tex.Cr.App.1942); S.W.2d plicant) to remove appointed counsel and Marks, 561, Ex 144 parte Tex.Cr.R. appoint other counsel. 184 (Tex.Cr.App.1942); parte S.W.2d Ex 578,

Further Duncan, Spivey, in Hicks v. 144 Tex.Cr.R. 871 (Tex.App. 1983), Houston Strawn, Court of Ex Appeals stated in its opinion involving an 377, 175 (Tex.Cr.App. Tex.Cr.R. S.W.2d 417 application for writ of mandamus: rule, a general As neither this court “... April 1983, appellant Supreme nor the Court of Texas write ad [0]n

filed a motion with this court repre- to be visory opinions. Donahoo v. 162 Tex. Moeller, sented Leta J. as retained Cr.R. 285 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.Cr.App. counsel, and this court accordingly grant- Parr, 1955); (Tex.Cr. State v. *4 ed said vacated, moot, motion and Usener, Ex App.1956); parte 391 S.W.2d prior order to the trial court that it re- Conner, 735 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); Ex move Ben Durant and new coun- 350 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), and cases sel.” there cited. Firemen’s Insurance Company The Burch, action of the Court Appeals grant- (Tex. Newark v. 442 S.W.2d 331 ing writ of mandamus is now pending Sup.Ct.1968). See also In re Ivey, 534 review on petition for review discretionary S.W.2d 163 (Tex.Civ.App. 1976); —Austin in our Cause No. 407-83. The record in Winely (Tex.Civ. 556 S.W.2d 637 said cause is now before this court. 1977). App.—Austin First, questionable it is prohibition The majority, not totally unaware of the appropriate remedy. involved, mootness states that in although

In Gist, LeBlanc v. 841, 843 another before this court it is (Tex.Cr.App.1980), this court wrote: respondents revealed that the have vacated

“A prohibition very order and directions to the process appli by which a superior of, court prevents complained inferi- cant here that mootness can courts, tribunals, or officers, persons or presumed not be because this court cannot from usurping or exercising jurisdiction look to the other record and consider any with which they have not been vested. thing although therein it is clearly aware of State ex rel. Clawson, Vance v. 465 the same. The compare reader is asked to S.W.2d 164 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), cert. den. Garza v. S.W.2d 85 182; U.S. S.Ct. 30 L.Ed.2d C.J.S., 1, p. Prohibition 9. The writ § Garza was an unfortunate by decision of prohibition prevent issues to the com- majority then of this court. There two mission of a undo, future act and not to defendants, separately indicted, joint- were or nullify, review an act already per- ly tried by order of the trial court. On formed. It will not be granted when the original submission Garza’s conviction was sought act to be prevented is already reversed a panel because the court erred accomplished but will be when such act is in failing grant quash his motion to full, not a complete and accomplished act. Ferguson’s indictment. Co-defendant con- Clawson, State ex rel. Vance v. supra; viction was reversed for the same reason. Blackwell, State ex rel. Smith banc, en rehearing, majority On af- 97 73 C.J.S. firmed the conviction because Garza made 10c, Prohibition p. 30.” § no quash motion to as reflected question Aside from the appropri majority record in his cause and the would prohibition ateness of as a remedy, the or not look to record. Ferguson’s der involved has been vacated and the ques presented common, tion is moot. There is Joint trials are now and when pres not ently justiciable a controversy. Normally two or more appellants appeal, the records arrive in the appellate sometimes to- ed the purpose of having the gether, sometimes not. Frequently there is put into State the record the testimony only one statement of joint facts from the “judicially noticed.” also Bradley trial and in the record without a statement State, 608 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). S.W.2d 652 of facts reference is made to the case with laughable It is present then to see the the statement of facts. This court has had majority say that while another record difficulty using the same statement of shows the order in question in the instant facts in disposing of both including vacated, case has been that record can’t be challenges to the sufficiency evi- considered, and mootness will not be as- dence. sumed, or fail to take any action to seek Barrientez v. 500 S.W.2d 474 clarification from parties whether the (Tex.Cr.App.1973), the majority held that in order has in fact been vacated. probation revocation hearings the trial The majority undoubtedly is bent on tell judge could, objection, over “judicial take the Courts of are they misinter notice” of testimony prior a trial con preting Guillory 557 S.W.2d 118 ducted before him for the purpose sup (Tex.Cr.App.1977), and so obsessed with the porting the allegations of the revocation majority need to lecture the is going to This, course, motion. judicial is not no regardless write whether the tice by any stretch of the imagination, but before the court is moot or whether the is a judicially conceived notion transformed opinion will be or advisory only, even into fiat by written opinion. Bradley v. *5 prohibition properly whether lies as a reme 662 (Tex.Cr.App. dy. 1980) (Dissenting Opinion, Clinton, J.). Parr, supra, this court wrote: State Frequently these from revocation purpose accomplished, “The to be how- appellate orders arrive in the court without ever laudable and of what interest to the testimony “judicial which notice” public, cannot furnish a substitute for taken, was there is way assay legal authority jurisdiction or contentions appeal. raised on It is obvious proceeding.” Court over the in Barrientez and Green v. I can think of one which authority might 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), and others of support majority’s position: ilk, the Barrientez have majority “ word,’ through searched this I use a appellate Humpty Dump- court’s rec- ‘When tone, ords of trials ‘it resulting ty in convictions said in rather a scornful means which mean, were I choose it to independently appealed just to this what neither is,’ to see if there was ‘The Al- testimony question there to more or less.’ said sup- ice, can make mean port probation you the revocation of ‘whether words where the things.’ different ‘The testimony “judicially many noticed” was not in so is,’ Humpty ‘which is to be Dumpty, record of the said appeal from the ” Carroll, master, “Through that’s all.’ revoking probation. opinions These (Alice action, Looking Glass” in Wonder- are silent as to this but this is exact- land), Chpt. 6. ly Bradley what occurred. (Dissent- 657 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) I dissent. Onion, P.J.). Opinion, case,

Earlier in the first Bradley Bradley DAVIS, J., joins opinion. this W.C. 727 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), testimony of the case previously tried of “judicial which notice” was taken was not

in the record on from the revocation

and there was no other record to

turn to as the trial resulted in previous had majority

a mistrial. The of this court abat-

Case Details

Case Name: Duncan v. Evans
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Jun 29, 1983
Citation: 653 S.W.2d 38
Docket Number: 69113
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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