1 Watts 322 | Pa. | 1833
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
This is an appeal from the decision of the circuit court, lately held at Harrisburgh, for Dauphin county. On the trial of the cause before his honour, Mr Justicé Rogers, the plaintiff offered to read in evidence an instrument of writing, purporting to be a con
Two questions have been raised upon the argument. First, Whether, in point of fact, a seal is not affixed to each of the certificates ? And second, If not, whether it be requisite, under our recording acts, that such certificate should be given under the seal of the officer taking the acknowledgement ?
The body of the conveyance, and the certificates, appeared all to have been drawn inthe same handwriting. The conveyance is written on parchment, in the margin of which, at the end of the name of each of the grantors, and of the officers respectively subscribed to the certificates of acknowledgement, incisions or slits are made, in an horizontal direction, apparently with a knife, and a blue riband weaved through them by the scrivener, who, no doubt, intended that the riband, which covered about five-eighths of an inch square of the parchment, at the end of each name, should, at the time of signing, have been been covered with a seal of wax, and by means thereof, have been attached to or incorporated with the parchment, which was neglected. In the conclusion of the conveyance, the words, “ we have set our hands and affixed our seals” are inserted ; and likewise in each of the certificates, it is stated to have been given “ under my hand and seal,” but no scroll, wax, wafer, or any thing more than the riband is used, as already mentioned, to denote a seal affixed to any of the signatures.
It has been contended that the riband inserted in the parchment, in the manner described, was sufficient in law to constitute a seal, if so intended by the party; and that it ought, therefore, to have been received in evidence, and submitted to the jury as a matter of fact to be decided on by them, whether the riband was used with that intent or not.
This argument may be ingenious, and, at first view, somewhat plausible; but a moment’s reflection will show, as it appears to me, that it is not solid, and cannot answer the design of the law in regard to seals. I apprehend that whether an instrument of writing be under seal or not, is a question of law to be solved by the court from the inspection of the instrument itself. It is highly important to the interests of society, that every man should be able to determine with
Every recorder of deeds and conveyances of land within the state, is bound to make a true and faithful record of all such as shall be handed to him for that purpose, after that they have been duly acknowledged or proved; but if the law is not to determine what shall constitute a seal—which is the distinguishing characteristic of a deed from other instrumentsof writings—without the intervention of a jury, how is the recorder to decide whether he shall record it as a deed or not ? that is, with the seal of the party affixed to it or without it ? It is obvious that unless the question, What shall be considered a seal? be referred to the law, to be settled by some fixed rule determining its precise character; that every recorder of deeds must be left to decide the matter according to what he might conjecture was the intention of the party or parties. It could, at most, be only conjecture, for he must necessarily decide without evidence, as he has no means of obtaining it; which would be productive of confusion and uncertainty. The same conveyance, for instance, includes several tracts of land, lying in different counties of this state, and the grantee, for his greater sécurity, has it recorded in each of the several counties; but the recorders entertaining different opinions in regard to its being a sealed instrument or not, some of them record it with a seal, and others record it without a seal. By some means the original happens to be lost, in which case the record must be resorted to, as the only existing evidence; but upon recourse being had to it, and it appearing to be without a seal of the grantor affixed to it, a grave question then arises, whether any title in the land has been transferred by it, inasmuch as it is not a deed ? Again, an exemplification of it, with a seal affixed to the name of the grantor, is produced from another county, which by our recording acts is made evidence of as high a nature as the original itself; which presents another question between these conflicting records, Which of them shall prevail ? And in the last place, I would ask, how the rule that is contended for here, that a jury shall decide whether a seal has been affixed or not, can be carried into effect, when an exemplification only is produced, and which will be produced in all cases where it is conceived that it will answer the purpose of the party better than the original,
An impression upon wax or something of the kind, or the wax itself, was the only kind of seal known to the common law of that country, whence we have derived our common law. 2 Bl. Com. 309, 310. In addition to this, we have, by immemorial use and custom, adopted as a seal a scroll made with ink. It is in such general use that there are but few, I think, who are not intimately acquainted with its character and appearance, and therefore well suited, to become part of our law on this subject; and to support the decisions recognizing it as such in M’Dill and Lee v. M’Dill, 1 Dall. 63, and Long v. Ramsay, 1 Serg. & Rawle 72. In using even a scroll for a seal, it would seem to be proper, or at least prudent, not to depart from the common form which is generally used in making it, so that no possible doubt may be raised of its having been intended for a seal; for, according to the principles laid down in Taylor v. Glaser, 2 Serg. & Rawle 502, unless a seal, such as is known to and recognized by the law, be affixed to the name of the party, it will not be considered a deed, although some other device may be substituted for a seal, and the words “ in witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal,” may be used in the attestation. It is said by the late Chief Justice, in that case, that without the seal, these words will not make a deed, though the seal will make it such without the words; which goes to show the importance and necessity of the seal being something that is known to every one to be used for that purpose. In Virginia it was thought that. the common law had defined what should be a seal with so much precision and certainty, that the legislature deemed it necessary to pass a statute to authorize a scroll to be used for that purpose. See 2 Tuck. Bl. 306, in note.
We are therefore decidedly of opinion that it belonged to the court to determine in this case, by an inspection óf the certificates of acknowledgement, whether they were given under the seals.of the respective officers or not, and that it was correct in deciding that they were not under seal.
I come now to the consideration of the next question: which is, Was it necessary that the certificates should have been given under seal, in order to make the conveyance admissible in evidence, accord-, ing to the provisions of our acts of assembly on this subject 1
The first act, and the only one which directs the manner in which the acknowledgements or probates of deeds and conveyances shall
From the express terms of this act, the certificate of the acknowledgement or probate must be under the hand and seal of the justice. At common law such acknowledgement or probate would hot have’ entitled the deed to be given in evidence, and it is only by means of this statute that it becomes admissible; which renders it indispensably necessary that the requirements of it should be fully observed and complied with, otherwise the deed can only be admitted after evidence has been given of its execution, according to the rules of the common law.
By the act of the 24th of February 1770, entitled “ an act for the better confirmation of the estates of persons holding or claiming under femes covert, and for establishing a mode by which husband and wife might thereafter convey their estates” (Purdon’s Dig. 196), the judges of the supreme court or any justice of the county court of common pleas of the county where the lands lie, are authorized to take the acknowledgement of deeds conveying lands by husband and wife, and to certify the same. Again, by the act of the 18th of March 1775, entitled “a supplement to the first act” (Pardon’s Dig. 198), power is given to the judges of the supreme court and the justices of the common pleas of the
The decision of the circuit court is affirmed.