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Duncan v. Children's National Medical Center
702 A.2d 207
D.C.
1997
Check Treatment

*1 $100,000, limiting Vaughan’s Mr. claim to less pursuant Disability

benefits received to the

Act. argues

Nationwide that Mr. and Mrs. together subject

Vaughan were

$100,000 pursuant limit in policy

language of the insurance contract. As ex-

plained pol- in their “The brief: Nationwide $100,000

icy provides ‘[b]odily injury’ limit (Mr. person’ Vaughan,

‘for one ‘bodily

‘person’ injury’) here who sustained legal by damages anyone’

‘for all claimed

(including bodily Vaughan) injury’ Mrs. ‘for

(Mr. claim) Vaughan’s ‘or loss services of (Mrs. claim) person’ Vaughan’s

one ‘as a (the motorcycle

result of one occurrence’ ac-

cident).” agree We with Nationwide language ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‍policy is clear and that Vaughans

the claims are considered one.18

to be

Affirmed.

Beverly DUNCAN, Appellant,

CHILDREN’S NATIONAL MEDICAL

CENTER, Appellee.

No. 96-CV-441. Appeals.

District of Columbia Court 4,

Argued 1997. June

Decided 1997. Nov. Whitney’s injury, ages” stemming from Mrs. 18. This outcome also consistent the D.C. person” Fetisoff, Sure- Circuit’s decision in GEICO v. to the “each limitation. U.S.App. ly ambiguous D.C. F.2d 1137 the word "all”—one the least interpreted very language—leaves English case the court simi- no room circuit language uncertainty lar insurance and found of Mr. Whit- as to inclusion ney's that: even if about the сlaim. And some doubt purview remain, person" Whitney’s clearly “each limitation "arises of” his Mr. claim out by injury; Whitney dependent clause it is removed wife’s Mr. have "including damages of ser- for care and loss claim for loss of under the insur- consortium vices,” consortium-type injury plainly suffered Mrs. refers to ance absent the Whitney policy. in an accident covered claims. result, claim, at Whitney’s Mr. like Id. at 958 F.2d As a "all dam- *2 Branch, DC, app for Washington, David A. ellant.* Damato,

Joseph with Russell H. R. whom brief, DC, Washington, Gore on the was appellee. SCHWELB, FARRELL

Before RUIZ, Judges. Associate PER CURIAM.** National Beverly Duncan sued Children’s (“CNMC”) ter- Medical Center of contraсt and mination on breach intentional in- public policy, and violation of appeals distress. She fliction of emotional her com- court’s dismissal of from the trial ** * III, II, opinion were au- Parts and IV of this represent Ms. Duncan Branch did Mr. RUIZ; Judge part V thored Associate court. trial Judge FARRELL. authored Associate 12(b)(6), delivery. pursuant cautionary measure until after plaint, Rule for failure a claim on could be placed to state which relief Duncan on ad- Subsequently, CNMC affirm. granted. We it conduct- pay ministrative leave while investigation into the matter. ed its own I.Facts inves- Following completion of its internal *3 gleaned complaint, frоm the As Duncan’s “numerous refused Duncan’s tigation, CNMC facts are as follows: In December “findings” the and “conclu- requests” for attempted to Duncan from CNMC transfer investigation. of CNMC’s sions” position Developmental her Methods E quoted complaint, Section As Technologist, position she had held since paragraph Pregnancy 3 of the and Radiation September position the Senior provides as follows: Technologist. position Plan Medical The latter required eight her to train for weeks Options Employee E. Bank, performing applications clinical above, consideration to the With using equipment radioisotoрes that utilized re- pregnant radiation worker will be Cesium, expose her to a continu- sponsible making of one the decision was ous emitter of radiation. who following options: time, pregnant feared the six months at the on staff and as- 1. Worker remains exposure might harmful in her radiation duties are sumes normal duties. These condition. above conditions. According the CNMC request can to be trans- 2. Worker Safety Emergency and Radiation to another within ferred Plan”) (“Pregnancy is a and Radiation hospital if available. policy implemented by governs CNMC that apply for a Leave of 3. Worker pregnant exposure emрloyees to radia- Absence. policy make requires tion. The CNMC resign her Worker pregnant exposed workers aware to radiation hospital. from potential exposure risks of radiation to radia- being exposed about Concerned appropriate protective and to take measures. tion, in the Blood Duncan refused to work Among things, policy requires requested transferred Bank and that she be to monitor on a exposure CNMC levels Dun- department. denied monthly by monitor- issuing basis a radiation instead, and, request request- transfer per- can’s ing badge employees while family use leave for that Dunсan or sick forming exposure duties in areas. ed Duncan “did alleges pregnancy. failed to follow the duration of by failing policy notify absence] her of the three [a not elect leave potential dangers hardship the radiation the financial that would because of policy failing ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‍further to follow its being from of work without have resulted out concerning monitoring badge even repeated requests pay.” response subjected though she was to direct radiation family or sick superiors she take exposure.1 leave, superiors her reason she told the family it using the was “because for not leave Rаdiation Safe- Duncan consulted CNMC’s expectant mother only used when the was Officer, suggested time ty she limit her who delivery, time that and at the was close Bank, personal her own in the Blood take the urging were her to superiors who, into the investigation after an physician, delivery.” ready for child, family leave she was not dangers to unborn potential Duncan’s at home During the time that Duncan was recom- physician wrote to CNMC. family of her refusal to use direct or “because she be mended that removed involuntarily leave,” pre- nevertheless exposure to as a constant the radiation monthly required. In either situa- itself аs the appears to contradict 1. Duncan’s monitoring point badge, alleging tion, complaint alleges at one as to the that no such having that CNMC badge supplied to her after was Pregnancy and Radiation to follow the failed badge supplied earlier that a Plan. tri-monthly than rather but to be checked discrimination, family leave, placed including pregnancy her on had and when she based leave, sick exhausted and/or and childbirth. D.C.Code 1-2505 terminated her. Hospital, 702 A.2d See Carl v. Children’s (D.C.1997) J., (Terry, concur 162-163 II. Standard of Review J., Farrell, J., joined by Wagner, ring, C. challenge sufficiency A of a J.) (“[T]he Ruiz, recognition any public 12(b)(6) presents quеs under Rule law, exception to the must and thus at-will doctrine tions of this court conducts de record, construing novo review of the solidly regulation on a statute light facts and inferences in most favor particular public policy to be that reflects the taking com able to (if appropriate) a constitutional applied, or plaint’s allegations as' true. See Atkins concretely applicable to the defen provision Ass’n, 660 Industrial Telecommunications 4-5, conduct.”); *4 dant’s id. at 163 nn. see cf. (D.C.1995). 885, A.2d 887 A (Steadman, J., dissenting, 2 id. at 197 n. also long “fairly puts sufficient so as it the defen J.) concurring joined by King, (acquiescing in against dant on notice of the claim [her].” (D.C. 177, Covington, Nelson v. A.2d 178 519 Rights plurality opinion). Yet the Human 1986). Accordingly, pleading rules of liberal af specifically requires Act that “[w]omen normally protect a from dismissal at or related fected childbirth pleading stage complaint can be when the same shall treated the medical conditions be to state a claim if all inferences are said ... as employment-related purposes for all plaintiffs Way drawn favor. See Bible persons similar not so affected but Our Church Lord Jesus Christ of ability inability to work....” their 419, Beards, 430 Apostolic Faith v. 680 A.2d l-2505(b). (D.C.1996). act not A not be dis does should D.C.Code plain a missed because court doubts that dispensation special pregnant for create a McBryde prevail tiff will on a claim. v. See women, only requires they not be but Co., (D.C.1979). 200, 404 203 Amoco Oil A.2d against em discriminated nor denied However, state a dismissal for failure to pregnancy. ployment opportunity due to may properly “ap granted claim where Union, rule is reflected in This International beyond plaintiff can pears doubt Controls, Auto., etc. v. 499 Johnson United prove support of facts claim [her] set 187, 1196, L.Ed.2d 158 111 S.Ct. 113 U.S. entitle Con [her] which would to relief.” See (1991), Gibson, 41, 45-46, in which Court held ley v. 355 U.S. 78 S.Ct. 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 against fer employer could not discriminate exposed to employeеs tile female who Policy III. Public Claim battery high during manufac levels of lead appeal, that her argues Duncan On opportuni by refusing allow ture them complaint contains a dis claim jobs poten ty may be to work certain of not charge “public in violation a dangerous reproductive tially to woman’s pregnant radiation.”2 exposing women to Instead, noted system or fetus. the Court identify the source of not that: However, public policy. be the asserted requires that our standard of review cause [Pregnancy the PDA Discrimination [w]ith plain in favor of the make all inferences we Act], the deci- Congress made clеar that “public refers to a tiff and pregnant become or to work while sion to has felici we must decide if Duncan policy,” being capable either of becom- public exception tously alleged indi- ing pregnant was reserved for each at-will doctrine. woman to make for herself.... vidual argument, Duncan’s counsel At oral future chil- Decisions about the welfare of policy al public source identified the parents who con- dren must be left Hu leged here as District Columbia ceive, bear, rather support, them prohibition against sex- and raise Rights Act’s man policy" "public dismiss. Duncan did not make a argument oрposition in her to CNMC’smotion

211 distress, liability employers imposed par- than to the who hire those mental ents. all causes mental distress. conduct which Thompson, 570 See District Columbia Id. at 111 at 1207.3 S.Ct. (citation (D.C.1990) omitted), A.2d In Armstrong Hosp., v. Flowers 33 F.3d (D.C.1991). Rather, modified, (11th Cir.1994), court, applying a claim for intentional infliction emotional Controls, Johnson reiterated that the deci- outrageous in contemplates distress acts “so particular job sion whether to continue in a character, degree, go and so extreme pregnant employee rests with the and not beyond decency.” Id. possible bounds of “generally the employer, prohibited who is (citations omitted). The trial found court deciding pregnant employee for a what rise to the conduct course best for her.” of action is Id. at 1316. as a required outrageousness matter level of Instead, may choose to “[s]he continue work- agree. law. We ing, to seek a situation with strin- work less gent requirements, determining or leave the whether the con workforce. In cases, outrageous may, question these in- duct in is extreme and some alternatives deed, law, present appli a matter court a difficult choice.” Id. at 1315. as considers standards, community Duncan faced with such a difficult choice cablе the nature of the activity issue, relationship to work in the Bank. at between the chose not parties, particular judicially cogni- has not identified and the environment *5 public imposes place. King zable the took See v. upon that CNMC which conduct (D.C.1993). Kidd, 656, duty 640 The position transfer Duncan to A.2d 668 to new activity in in question to accommodate her this case CNMC’s otherwise concerns. to staffing To the decision transfer extent that has identified the administrative public policy prohibiting required to which discrimination on Duncan a new against exposure the it radiation while she was basis of militates some to and, foregoing, pregnant subsequently, the to terminate cause. Given we hold that our employment. fails to state a claim that Duncan’s While cases rec Duncan’s ognize outrageous for failure to work in that “extreme and dismissal the Blood public policy. Bank character conduct arise from the violates of the peculiarly knowledge actor’s that the other Intentional Infliction IV. of distress, by susceptible reason to emotional Emotional Distress physical pecu of condition or some or mental liarity,” A.2d complaint alleges Drejza, supra, that 650 at 1314 Duncan’s intentionally (quoting (Second) CNMC inflicted dis emotional ToRts Restatement (1965)), by forсing § f that Duncan tress on Duncan her to to 46 cmt. to the extent continue Bank, distress, it was not as a either in the Blood where her suffered emotional work radiation, part exposed to result of intentional conduct fetus would be or to job. had a choice to work “[to] lose her In order succeed on a CNMC. Duncan Although that choice and claim intentional infliction of emotional Blood Bank. (1) distress, consequences may plaintiff must show have been onerous extreme time, unappealing Duncan at the outrageous part conduct on the to (2) in a intentionally her to remain situation or reckless force dеfendant (3) exposed to she radiation. ly severe emotional where causes Vaccaro, 1308, Thus, impute intentionality it Drejza is difficult to distress.” Further, (D.C.1994) (citations omitted). our cases 1312 There is recklessness to CNMC. that, employer-employee general duty causing generally, to show no of care avoid pregnan- job of her language Pregnancy because functions of 3. The Discrimination Act, 2000e(k) (1994), § cy-related to 42 U.S.C. is identical in the same manner as condition Rights quoted language of the Human Act employees.” temporarily disabled treats other prohibition above. latter adds that 1—2505(b). The argue Duncan does not D.C.Codе against pregnancy-related in- discrimination tempo- vis á that she discrimination vis suffered requirement employer cludes that an must "a rarily workers. disabled employee temporarily perform treat unable to an 212 outrageous dispute level There is

conflicts do not rise to the CNMC terminat- See, e.g., Thompson, question supra, employment. conduct.4 570 ed (D.C.1990) (holding A.2d pat at 290 that a she a claim that it has stated did so misrepresentation tern employment policies of criticism and cou in violation of written pled alleged employee assault of (specifically Radiation Plan) subsequent not constitute of her pаrt that were or became con- conduct); Best, outrageous Howard Univ. v. employment tract of On with CNMC. (D.C.1984) (stating 484 point—whether A.2d latter the Plan conferred professional responsibilities agree interference with rights contractual on Duncan—we does not constitute intentional infliction of that the case resolved on a motion cannot be distress); Hogan see also wrong- emotional v. For to dismiss. the issue becomes So Co., syth Country N.C.App. Club 340 fulness or her termination. not of (1986) ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‍(finding S.E.2d that a refusal depends question answer to grant permission pregnancy go leave or Plan, which, squarely on E of the section cursing pregnant employ hospital and “the recited leaves ee, improper, did not outra while constitute responsible making ... radiation worker law). geous as a matter of The facts conduct following options” the decision of one alleged are insufficient perceives when she herself at risk undue impute outrageousness recklessness or job: staffing implementing its internal 1. Worker remains on staff assumes changes. Nor can CNMC’s actions be said are normal duties. These duties go beyond the bounds established well the above conditions.5 community re standards request to 2. Worker can be transferred lationship. Because conduct hospital within the underlying Duncan’s claim for inten if available. tional infliction of emotional distress is not *6 apply for a Leave of 3. Worker can Ab- “outrageous” as a sufficiently matter of law sence. action, to the cause of we affirm the sustain

trial of Duncan’s claim for court’s dismissal resign position 4. Worker from of emotional intentional infliction distress. hospital. fairly alleges that complaint If Duncan’s she Employment Contract

V. options, three given none of the first was that her then she has a claim termi- stated reject Finally, Duncan’s claim of we wrongful. nation was based on wrongful termination a claim that she agreement. Duncan has not stated employment an We breach of to wrongfully denied a transfer another emphasize that this a cause of was at the outset is in explicit saying department. The Plan is wrongful termination. However action for transfer, may request such complaint may otherwise that worker unclear Duncan’s in if a another be, stating that an which will honored explicit in is “[t]his it is n Nothing in is available. ... to relief the unlawful action obtain inference complaint counters the obvious employment.” It is not termination from this rested within business or that decision damages, either to Duncan herself suit for útero, Duncan judgment of Nor does even to radia CNMC. then in child was allege that of a transfer un- the denial CNMC’s Blood tion while she worked sup- of a arbitrary, in violation Thus, in fact reasonable or not CNMC Bank. whether or fair posed implicit duty good faith deal- safety precautions governing failed to follow ing part. CNMC’s at issue in case. exposure is not this radiation "conditions,” alleged, include moni- suggest 5. Those as that there can never be a not This does insuring toring exposure records dis- infliction of claim for intentional emotional ionizing permissible radiation to dose of arising employer-employee rela- from an tress embryo/fetus exposed is not exceed- which the is tionship. ed. hand, instead, of her in the words On the other Duncan’s concession out of hand dismiss, “attempt- complaint that to the motion opposition “remain[ ] she refused to to by request- on staff [in assume[] [CNMC’s Plan] to Bank] ed adhere 1) sufficient, (option normal duties” not until ing transferred to another location to be itself, option pregnancy,” request to defeat her That claim. of her the end “subject expressly obliged made condi employer grant. to the above was not supra, is, tions,” see note to CNMC’s must, course, read We taking measures stated earlier present pur- liberally in favor of Duncan for expo Plan to monitor control radiation nothing in the even so poses, but there complaint alleges sure. The that CNMC her disavow- complaint sufficient overcome Dun implement protections failed those available to having pursued an al of can’s case. present in her her if she declined continue if Duncan Yet even not satisfied with were duties. implementation safety mea- CNMC’s Affirmed. sures, did not leave her with (the resignation equivalent choice but RUIZ, part: Judge, dissenting in Associate termination). Option says that a worker majority affirms of Duncan’s A dismissal may “apply for a Leave of Absence.” based on claim for termination say the leave I employment agreement. an dis- breach of paid although permitted unpaid, was we model agree. although not a may assume it was of both a combination clarity, out a claim on breach sets (depending on how annual much sick and meet employment an contract sufficient accumulated). leave a worker had If requirements pleading. the minimal of notice request if it option, refused to even Further, allegations if the pay period, meant leave without limited for a inferences are construed therefrom discharge then CNMC’s it deter- of her once Duncan, they light most favorable to placement mined that no other available be, a claim that the must states and she refused to continue her “normal Pregnancy and Radiation Plan constituted duties,” wrongful. have been agreement and Duncan and between CNMC pay Leave without would still be was in breach of CNMC, not termination. obligations Duncan under CNMC’s expressly in the states employment agreement. *7 option she three complaint that “did not elect alleg- count hardship of the that would because financial Preg- failed es that CNMC to adhere being from without have resulted out of work Plan, copy which nancy Radiation a pay.” paragraph again In 46 she states that provided, governed situations she was telephone invita- she “declined endless may exposed pregnant employees be family superi- tions to use leave made her quotes The from the complaint radiation. specific a that she ors.” That is concession places. in a number The option avail herself 3. The com- did not poli- general the Plan alleges that declared allege plaint goes on to that she was involun- cy: anyway, tarily placed family leave Hospital Na- policy ex- of Children’s discharged after she “had It is the that she was (or leave).” to ensure that all family But her sick tional Medical Center hausted ensure measures are taken to allege practical that she re- nowhere ionizing radia- permissible dose of of absence quested and was denied leave embryo/fetus exceeded permitted is not have her to remain tion to that would gestation. ruing period after the entire employer [sic] to work with the and return Further, to- rejected option it is the of CHNMC delivery. the leave She species Absence” Although say presumably a of "Leave of does not 6. sepa- family paid unpaid meaning leave was if taken within leave, rately annual from accumulаted sick or apply for a Leave of Ab- 3. Worker inform female radiation workers exposrue to ion- sence. [sic] risks associated with

izing uring preg- involved [sic] radiation may resign her 4. Worker nancy options ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‍and of their to continue em- hospital addition, ployment. ... employee by preventing

should assist the According Duncan re- unnecessary presure conflict or quested [sic] a transfer family. (the prvacy “refused to option), [sic] but CNMC second request.” Duncan could not comply with the added.) (Emphasis option, continuing with her choose the first policy, complaint al- Pursuant to that Bank, in the Blood because normаl duties requires to take leges that the Plan by “unknown danger and stress caused preventive specific measures: exposure,” as regarding the radiation factors noti- supervisor has received 1.Once monthly monitoring of the lack of a result pregnancy, of a worker’s fication radiation inform Duncan of the refusal to CNMC’s Ra- will be started. The pregnancy file investigation. Dun- results of its internal Office, Safety along with the indi- diation explains that she did not complaint also can’s review the historical radiation vidual will option, applying for a the third leave choose radiation work- records of the absence, hardshiр of the financial because er.... family if she and because it would cause she early leave had taken Safety and the 3. The Radiation Office medical her available would have exceeded monthly closely supervisor will monitor terminated as a family leave and been this individ- exposure records for that, in- alleges that result. they . minimal and insure that are ual to deed, termi- what occurred when CNMC stays below that the cumulative her available leave ex- Duncan once nated period. during gestation 125 mrem involuntarily placed had pired after CNMC her on leave. a TLD monitor- The worker will be issued discharged “аt employee An at-will all times at badge at ing [sic] work reason, for no reason any time and apron, in addition to level under the waist Co., all,” George & at Adams v. W. Cochran during per- duties regular badge, film their (D.C.1991), “subject, exposure areas. in direct formed course, employer may that an to the caveat “ig- complaint alleges that CNMC a reason that discharge employee an Specifical- safety precautions. nored” these specifi by a statute has been made unlawful alleges Duncan was not ly, the re cally applicable employer-employee expo- “badge” to monitor her

provided with a 159, 162 Carl, A.2d n. lationship.” supra, 702 monthly radiation and instead sure to recognizes that 1. The District of Columbia exposure, monitoring of Duncan’s radiation the lan may arise from “implied contract exposure was to be moni- required, her *8 manual.” employee handbook or guage of an intervals. only in three-month tored Co., 620 A.2d Labor Ins. v. Union Smith Life alleges further that under complaint The also, (D.C.1993); v. GSA Sisco 269 see preg- Plan a Pregnancy and Radiation the Union, 689 A.2d Capital Fed. Nat’l Credit exposed to radiation “will be employee nant (D.C.1997). Interpretation of a con of making of responsible the decision for one deрen it is law unless question a tract is following options”: the credibility or the evidence dent on extrinsic and assumes remains on staff 1. Potomac As Worker See 1010 of extrinsic evidence. Inc., to duties are duties. These Grocery normal America sociates Mfrs. (D.C.1984). the above conditions. Concomitant interpreted writing “must be ly, a contractual transferred request to be 2. can Worker reasonable, lawful, whole, and giving a hospital as a the department within to another Id.; Re- terms.” meaning to all its effective if available. 202(2) Blood radiation in the unlimited levels of (SECOND) STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS reassigned. had been to which she employee In the context Bаnk action, turn, handbook, to decision this court “both the That led CNMC’s looks to and sick of its Duncan once terms the manual and the manner to terminate expired. help interpret and deter- leave had distribution” to it presumption mine the at-will whether concludes, majority on the of the basis The Sisco, jury presented. overcome and a issue excerpts in the that limited supra, 689 A.2d at 55. obli- satisfied whatever contractual CNMC to long as Duncan was able gations it had so provides complaint filed this case options out first three set exercise one the excerpts Pregnancy limited of the and Radia- job, requesting a (staying Plan оn the the and, according complaint's tion Plan the to absence). transfer, requesting a leave of count, “failed to CNMC chose, option respect Duncan With adhere to terms and the conditions majority department, the transfer Pregnancy Policy and Plan” in Radiation the summarily got that Duncan concludes dealing ex- with Duncan’s concerns over her to re- gave a chance make a contract her: posure pregnant, to and as to radiation while an- quest. Because Duncan did exercise majority subsequent termination. theAs absence, the option, taking a leave recognizes, excerрts Pregnancy the from the majority that concludes that she cannot claim provided complaint and Radiation Plan in the ante at breached the contract. See CNMC conclude, as are insufficient for this court to law, a matter of not create Plan did obligations on part contractual the of CNMC majority’s con- interpretation of the Having favorably Duncan. assumed allegations from the tract and inferences existed, Duncan a contract the that complaint significant are flawed in majority opposite reaches the conclusion with First, that had respects. conclude CNMC respect quеstion ‍​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​​​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‍Duncan’s employee provide option one the termination was in breach of the express language al- goes against the agreement. similarly impossi- I believe employee it is leged complaint that ble to conclude on the basis of the making “responsibility who has alone that Duncan’s termination did language among options. That decision” contract, therefore, that, and breach the who strongly suggests employee that it is To the claim should be dismissed. among options, alternative is to have choice contrary, reading a whole concludes, not, majority as the Dun- drawing all favorable infеrences employee’s options. may restrict can, alleg- can be construed as minimum, language ambiguous At a ing that a result of Duncan’s termination was which, in reading requires contextual CNMC’s of its contract breach case, expressed policy includes the Plan’s embodied safety workers to “ensure” the Plan, obliges “to en- Radiation Further, consideration exposed to radiation. ionizing permissible sure dose how has as to of extrinsic evidence embryo/fetus is not exceed- radiation to the implemented the Plan interpreted and failure breach of its ed.” CNMC’s consisted interpretation of required before a sound so as Duncan’s radiation to monitor reached. the contract safety continuing in assure Second, alleges provide op- another Bank and requested that, Plan, second in the words of the exercised

tion unnecessary respect to that contractual With by preventing transfer. [Duncan] “assist *9 although majority concludes that prvacy option, in presure [sic] conflict or [sic] “request,” right to compelled Duncan had the family.” CNMC’s breach request. obligation grant de- had no request her transfer after course, right is at all nied, expos- right request, of in stay at home order to avoid are hardly of which contrаcts apparently the stuff ing herself to unmonitored and light allegation, inference majority’s interpretation is of that made. The odd have favorable to Duncan is that she would vacuum, in a without reference to reached request- similarly terminated if she had been broadly-stated policy, without hav- the Plan’s having of absence without the sick ed a leave entirety, ing contract in its seen necessary family leave to cover the entire any knowledge and without of how CNMC Otherwise, terminating period. instead may interpreted implemented have up, as Duncan once her leave was used al- obligations employ- in whеre other situations involuntarily leged, have CNMC would Instead, requested have a transfer. ees leave, just placed unpaid as it had her on majority simply makes the “obvious infer- involuntarily placed family her on previously ence” that the decision whether to transfer leave. judg- Duncan “vested within the business by Dun- put on notice CNMC had been contrary ment of That inference is CNMC.” complaint of the nature of her contract- can’s charge in to our to make inferences favor of claim. Constru- Duncan’s claim. ing light in most favorable all inferences allegations assuming all her to Duncan Third, on the reason silent true, it cannot be sаid that request for for CNMC’s denial of Duncan’s support of her prove could no set of facts transfer, simply “re- but states discovery claim. It be that after some comply.” majority fused to As the acknowl- submissions, undisputed and additional edges, complaint does not state whether summary support facts would a motion grant request CNMC’s refusal to the com- judgment CNMC. To dismiss reason, no reason or was for business preliminary stage, plaint at this majority order to force Duncan out. The opportunity to deprive of an unfavorably silence—again infers from part prove her claim. I reverse to Duncan’s claim—that CNMC’s refusal of Duncan’s trial court’s dismissal good-faith must have been for a business proceedings to determine and remand for reason. Radiation Plan whether the contract, if constitutes an Finally, majority’s conclusion that so, obligations of its whether CNMC’s breach Duncan “conceded” that she did not avail Duncan under that contract resulted to take a leave of ab- herself her termination. Dun- complaint. sence contradicted specifically alleges that she did not have family enough sick and leave to see available through pregnancy. of her the remainder though Duncan not choose to take

Even

family during or sick leave involuntarily placed her on and, according to the termi-

leave expired time

nated Duncan once her leave absent without leave.

because she was

Case Details

Case Name: Duncan v. Children's National Medical Center
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Nov 13, 1997
Citation: 702 A.2d 207
Docket Number: 96-CV-441
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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