68 W. Va. 293 | W. Va. | 1910
The case presents a single question: Is the statute which restricts appeals from judgments of justices to cases involving more than fifteen dollars a constitutional and valid one ?
It is submitted that the act limiting appeals to cases involving the amount named, Code 1906, chapter 50, section 163, is violative of the constitutional provision in relation to appeals from judgments of justices, which reads: “Appeals shall be allowed from judgments of justices of the peace in such manner as may be prescribed by law.” Const. Art. VIII, section 28. It is said that this provision of the constitution allows appeals from judgments of justices regardless of the amount involved in any case, and that the statute infringes on the right to appeal guaranteed by the constitution. So it is insisted that any case in which a justice has rendered a judgment may be appealed. The argument is made that the Legislature could only prescribe method in regard to taking appeals from justices — 'that the lawmaking body could do no more than prescribe a mode of procedure in regard to the allowance of such appeals. The word “manner” used in the provision of the constitution which we have quoted is pointed out to justify this view and construction.
And immediately following the adoption of the amendment came the Legislature of 1881, which re-enacted the very statute in relation to allowing these appeals that existed under the unamended constitution, with an amendment of the act, however, making the amount necessary for an appeal to exceed the sum of fifteen dollars instead of ten. Acts of 1881, chapter 8, section 163. This amendment of the statute shows that the legislative mind was specifically directed to the act. It shows that the law-makers recognized that it was within the legislative power, under the amendment just adopted, so to legislate. Here we see a direct contemporaneous legislative construction, of the constitutional provision that is involved in this case. Since that day the statute has remained the same as then reenacted. And the contemporaneous construction given the provision of the constitution by the people through their representatives in that Legislature has ever since that time been generally and acceptably recognized. Litigants have scarcely questioned that construction, and no court, so far as we are informed, has .refused to accept it. Throughout these years it seems to have been conceded that this provision gave the Legislature the power in relation to appeals which it exercised. It seems to have been conceded by the contemporaneous legislative construction, and by general practical construction which has followed, that the provision merely directed that there should be established by law that system of appeals from justices which the Legislature should deem proper. And such construction is by no means an unreasonable one.
The language of the provision is not opposed to the construction adopted and followed. The text is readily susceptible of that construction, as we shall show. It is surely a consideration of great weight that those who were familiar with the intention of the new provision gave it an interpretation of which it was susceptible. Even if the contrary meaning is also within the words used, we must in reason believe that those acting upon the provision at a time when its intents and purposes were best known gave it the force that was intended in its making. Their construction not being plainly against the letter, if the clause is of doubtful meaning, we must yield to the presumption that
The provision only says generally that appeals shall be allowed. It does not say that in all cases they shall be allowed. It merely pronounces that an appellate system shall exist in regard to judgments of justices. The mere expression “appeals shall be allowed from judgments of justices of the peace” does not command that such appeals be allowed in all cases — it does not command that no cases be rejected. For, though the statute prescribes only certain cases in which appeals shall be allowed, still it obeys the constitutional mandate, since it does allow appeals. The constitution does not define how many or what kind of appeals from justices shall be allowed. It only commands that there shall be appeals from judgments of justices. The command has been complied with in the making of the statute. An appellate system has been devised for cases from justices. The constitution does not prescribe that all eases shall be included in it. Appeals are allowed by statute. The constitutional command has been obeyed. Let us illustrate: A direction to a servant that he shall bring apples from the cellar, without naming the number or kind, is certainly complied with if he' brings up only the largest and leaves those that he deems fit to reject. By such direction he does not understand that he is to bring up all of the apples. He complies when he brings only the apples that he selects. And he is not restricted as to the selection that he shall make.
Now, since the constitution does not say that all cases shall be appealed, and does not define the character of cases that shall be appealed, what limitation or restriction has been placed on the Legislature in rejecting certain cases ? That law.-making body at all times has supreme power within the limits defined by the constitution. It has rejected small cases, but the con
Indeed, a most reasonable interpretation of the clause of the constitution under consideration is, simply, that the Legislature shall make provision for appeals from judgments of justices. Most evidently it was so understood by those who made it. They promptly gave it this meaning, and proceeded to carry out the mandate in that light. They construed the words “appeals shall be allowed from judgments of justices of the peace in such manner as may be prescribed by law” only mean that by law a process of appeal from justices should be prescribed. They did not see in the clause a limitation on the Legislature in prescribing that process. They saw nowhere-in the constitution a direction that in every case an appeal should lie. They were not limited in prescribing such appellate process.
The provision of the constitution directs tne allowance of appeals from justices “in such manner as may be prescribed by law.” Do not these words justify the exclusion of some cases from appeal? May not appeals be allowed in a manner that excludes eases involving less than fifteen dollars? The word “manner” is derived from the Latin manus, the hand. It literally means the handling of a thing. It, therefore, in this sense, implies more than method. Bridges v. Shallcross, 6 W. Va. 562; Pitcher v. Board of Trade, 20 Ill. App. 326. So it may be said that appeals from judgments of justices shall be allowed by such handling of the subject as may be prescribed by law. Cannot there be a handling of the allowance of appeals so as to exclude small cases? The Legislature has handled the subject in that way. It has dealt with the allowance of appeals in that manner. It has prescribed that manner by law. Thus it has obeyed the constitution.
We cannot overthrow a statute as contrary to the constitution tinless it is plainly violative of that instrument. Every doubt, all presumption must be held in favor of the act. Relative to overthrowing a statute, Judge Brooke once wrote: “I
The judgment of the circuit court refusing the petition for an appeal will be affirmed.
Affirmed.