Lead Opinion
Plаintiff appeals, - and defendant cross appeals, from a judgment of the Court of Claims awarding damages on plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge claim. We affirm.
Plaintiff was a registered nurse at the Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital from April 1981 through February 1983. At two different times in July 1982, plaintiff injured his shoulder while separating patients who were fighting. After the second incident, plaintiff reported the injury to his supervisor and was sent to the hospital. On November 22, 1982, plaintiff was working at the
On February 2, 1983, plaintiff contacted the personnel department to inform it that the documents were forthcoming. In addition, plaintiffs doctor contacted the personnel office on February 3, 1983, to inform it that the documents had been prepared. On February 16, 1983, defendant had still not received the documents and therefore discharged plaintiff for vacating his position without notice. On February 23, 1983, the Northville hospital received the documents from plaintiffs physician, but failed to reinstate plaintiff.
On May 17, 1984, plaintiff filed suit in the Wayne Circuit Court, alleging a violation of the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (hora), MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA 3.550(101) et seq. Pursuant to defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), Wayne Circuit Judge Helene White dismissed the claim. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging that defendant violated the hora and also that defendant discharged him in retaliation for his request for benefits under the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act. See MCL 418.301(11); MSA 17.237(301) (11). Defendant then moved for summary disposition of both counts of plaintiffs amended complaint.
On May 8, 1987, the circuit court again dismissed plaintiffs claim of violation of the hcra for failure to state a claim, although it allowed plaintiff to move for reconsideration of this ruling.
Thereafter, defendant moved to strike plaintiff’s demand for a jury trial, alleging that plaintiff was not entitled to a jury with regard to the retaliatory discharge claim because it was in the Court of Claims. See MCL 600.6443; MSA 27A.6443. Judge White reserved ruling on the motion to strike the jury demand and empaneled a jury. On December 11, 1987, the jury returned a verdict of no cause of action with respect to the hcra claim. However, the jury awarded plaintiff $477,000 in damages with resрect to the retaliatory discharge claim.
Following numerous posttrial motions by both parties, Judge White issued her first opinion and order on October 11, 1989, which incorporated her findings with respect to jurisdiction and plaintiff’s right to a jury, and also included her findings of fact and conclusions of law. The judge concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to a jury in regard to the retaliatory discharge claim because it was a claim for damages against the state. She also concluded that defendant’s termination of plaintiff was in retaliation for his having filed a petition for workers’ compensation benefits and awarded plaintiff $30,000 in mental anguish damages. Finally, she agreed with the jury that plaintiff failed to state a claim under the hcra.
On February 13, 1990, the judge issued a supple
On appeal, plaintiff аrgues that the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide his claim for retaliatory discharge because the Court of Claims Act expressly prevents it from exercising jurisdiction over claims for compensation under the wdca. We disagree.
The Court of Claims is created by statute and the' scope of its subject-matter jurisdiction is explicit. Lim v Dep’t of Transportation,
Plaintiff argues that the trial court clearly erred because it ignored MCL 600.6419(3)(a); MSA 27A.6419(3)(a). However, this section of the act does not divest the Court of Claims of subject-matter jurisdiction over this claim. MCL 600.6419(3); MSA 27A.6419(3) states as follows:
The court of claims shall not have jurisdiction ofany claim for compensation under the provisions of either of the following:
(a) The worker’s disability compensation act of 1969, Act No. 317 of the Public Acts of 1969, being sections 418.101 to 418.941 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
The question is whether an employee who is terminated in retaliation for filing a claim for benefits under the wdca states a claim for "compensation” within the meaning of the wdca. We conclude that the claim is not one for "compensation” under the WDCA.
In general terms, a wrongful discharge clаim against the State of Michigan must be filed in the Court of Claims. Doster v Dep’t of Mental Health,
Unfortunately, the Legislature has not shed any light on this issue because it. did not define "compensation” within the wdca. However, the primary goal of workers’ compensation legislation is to promptly deliver benefits to employees injured in the scope of their employment. Thompson v Ford Motor Co,
This Court recognized a claim for retaliatory discharge in connection with the act even before the Lеgislature codified the claim under MCL 418.301(11); MSA 17.237(301)(11). See Hrab v Hayes-Albion Corp,
We believe that the Legislature’s intent in adopting the section of the Court of Claims Act that precludes the Court of Claims from exercising jurisdiction over сlaims for compensation under the wdca (MCL 600.6419[3][a]; MSA 27A.6419[3][a]) was to prevent a conflict of jurisdictional authority between the Court of Claims and the administrative bodies created to carry out the provisions of the wdca. The Legislature wanted to make it clear that the bureau was not divested of jurisdiction to hear claims for compensation under the wdcа
Defendant argues in its cross appeal that the Court of Claims’ award of $35,000 for mental anguish damages was inapproрriate.
In Goins v Ford Motor Co,
In the more recent cases of Mourad v Auto Club Ins Ass’n,
We are cognizant of decisions by this Court holding that a plaintiff cannot recover under both a breach of contract claim and a retaliatory discharge claim where the breach of duty is indistinguishable from the breach of contract. Kostello, supra, 245; Mourad, supra. In the present case, however, plaintiff did not plead a wrongful discharge resulting from a breach of contract. Rather, plaintiff only pleaded that he was discharged in retaliation for having filed a workers’ compensation claim against defendant. Plaintiff was thus seeking to recover only under a tort theory.
Because plaintiff’s claim for retaliatory discharge sounds in tort, he is entitled to the damages awarded for mentаl distress and his loss of supplemental pay, which flowed from his improper discharge. The case was appropriately resolved in the Court of Claims.
Affirmed.
Notes
In fact, we opined that the bureau would be ill-equipped to handle pure retaliatory discharge claims because its expertise was limited to compensating employees for personal injuriеs suffered in the course of employment. See Delke, supra, 332.
In addition, defendant argues that the Court of Claims erred as a matter of law in awarding plaintiff damages for retaliatory discharge. We decline to address this issue because defendants neglect to challenge the findings of fact and conclusions of law made in the Court of Claims.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I agree with the majority’s analysis оf the issue of the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, I respectfully dissent from the holding that a retaliatory discharge claim sounds in tort and, therefore, mental anguish damages are appropriate. I would hold that a retaliatory discharge claim sounds in contract and, therefore, damages may not be recovered for mental anguish. Valentine v General American Credit, Inc,
The majority relies upon Goins v Ford Motor Co,
While the holding in Goins is at best suspect, there does exist firm precedent for the proposition that a claim of wrongful discharge sounds in contract, not tort. In Lopus v L & L Shop-Rite, Inc,
Similarly, in Mourad v Auto Club Ins Ass’n,
In the earlier case of Watassek, this Court considered the question whether the plaintiffs claim for retaliatory discharge was precluded by the doctrine of governmental immunity.
As the Supreme Court discussed in Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan,408 Mich 579 ;292 NW2d 880 (1980), reh den409 Mich 1101 (1980), cf., Valentine v General American Credit, Inc,420 Mich 256 ;362 NW2d 628 (1984), an actionfor wrongful discharge is one mainly ex contractu. An action claiming retaliatory discharge is an action asserting a specific type of wrongful discharge and thus constitutes a contract action. Although we are’ mindful of the case of Goins v Ford Motor Co, 131 Mich App 185 , 198;347 NW2d 184 (1983), lv gtd422 Mich 857 (1985), wherein this Court ruled that an action for retaliatory discharge was one in tort, we can find no rational basis to label one wrongful discharge a contract and the other a tort. Moreover, we find that the Goins panel’s reliance on Sventko, supra, is misplaced; that case did not in fact determine that the action was one in tort. Although the Goins panel also relied on Scott v Union Tank Car Co, 75 Ind App 150;402 NE2d 992 (1980), a case in which the Indiana Appeals court ruled, on facts similar to those in Sventko, that the claim sounded in tort, we note with approval the lengthy dissent which reasons that the claim is better characterized as one in contract. Finally the Trombetta [v Detroit, T & I R Co,81 Mich App 489 ;265 NW2d 385 (1978)] and Sventko, supra, cases consider the issue of wrongful discharge in terms of an employment contract and nоt as a tort. [Watassek, supra at 564-565.]
Thus, there is sound precedent from both this Court and the Supreme Court holding that a wrongful discharge claim sounds in contract and that retaliatory discharge is a variety of wrongful discharge. Therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that retaliatory discharge claims also sound in contract, not tort.
The dissent argued that the cause of action does not even exist.
It should be noted that more rеcent cases have held that there is no cause of action for discharge in anticipation of filing a workers’ compensation claim. See, e.g., Griffey v Prestige Stamping, Inc,
It is interesting to note that the majority, while calling the claim in this case a tort, does not address the ramifications of that holding with respect to the doctrine of governmental immunity.
As for the majority’s theory that the statute, MCL 418.301(11); MSA 17.237(301X11), imposes a duty on an employer not to engage in retaliаtory discharge, and a breach of that duty sounds in tort, I am unpersuaded. First, "breach of duty” is a negligence concept and one intentionally, not negligently, terminates employment. Therefore, such termination would constitute an ultra vires act by a supervisor for which defendant would not be responsible. Second, the statute does not actually create а cause of action or set forth a remedy. It merely prohibits an employer from engaging in retaliatory discharge,