DUNBAR v DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
Docket No. 128317
Submittеd June 3, 1992, at Detroit. Decided November 17, 1992, at 9:25 A.M.
November 17, 1992
197 MICH APP 1
Leave to appeal sought.
The Court of Appeals held:
1.
2. A claim of retaliatory discharge sounds in tort, not contract. Damages for mental anguish, which cannot be awarded in contract actions, may be awarded in tort actions.
Affirmed.
SAWYER, P.J., dissenting in part, stated that actions for
REFERENCES
Am Jur 2d, Wrongful Discharge §§ 220, 256.
See the ALR Index under Discharge From Employment or Office.
- MASTER AND SERVANT — WRONGFUL DISCHARGE — RETALIATORY DISCHARGE — COURT OF CLAIMS.
An action seeking damages for wrongful discharge by the state, alleged to be in retaliation for the filing of a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims (MCL 600.6419[1][a] ;MSA 27A.6419[1][a] ). - MASTER AND SERVANT — WRONGFUL DISCHARGE — RETALIATORY DISCHARGE — DAMAGES — MENTAL ANGUISH.
An action for wrongful discharge alleging retaliation for the filing of a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, sounds in tort, not contract; damages for mental anguish may be awarded in such an action.
Goodman, Eden, Millender & Bedrosian (by William H. Goodman), for the plaintiff.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Gary P. Gordon and Leo H. Friedman, Assistant Attorneys General, for the defendant.
Before: SAWYER, P.J., and MURPHY and L. P. BORRELLO,* JJ.
MURPHY, J. Plaintiff appeals, and defendant cross appeals, from a judgment of the Court of Claims awarding damages on plaintiff‘s retaliatory discharge claim. We affirm.
Plaintiff was a registered nurse at the Northville Regional Psychiatric Hospital from April 1981 through February 1983. At two different times in July 1982, plaintiff injured his shoulder while separating patients who were fighting. After the second incident, plaintiff reported the injury to his supervisor and was sent to the hospital. On November 22, 1982, plaintiff was working at the
On February 2, 1983, plaintiff contacted the personnel department to inform it that the documents were forthcoming. In addition, plaintiff‘s doctor contacted the personnel office on Februаry 3, 1983, to inform it that the documents had been prepared. On February 16, 1983, defendant had still not received the documents and therefore discharged plaintiff for vacating his position without notice. On February 23, 1983, the Northville hospital received the documents from plaintiff‘s physician, but failed to reinstate plaintiff.
On May 17, 1984, plaintiff filed suit in the Wayne Circuit Court, alleging a violation of the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (HCRA),
On May 8, 1987, the circuit court again dismissed plaintiff‘s claim of violation of the HCRA for failure to state a claim, although it allowed plaintiff to move for reconsideration of this ruling.
Thereafter, defendant moved to strike plaintiff‘s demand for a jury trial, alleging that plaintiff was not entitled to a jury with regard to the retaliatory discharge claim because it was in the Court of Claims. Sеe
Following numerous posttrial motions by both parties, Judge White issued her first opinion and order on October 11, 1989, which incorporated her findings with respect to jurisdiction and plaintiff‘s right to a jury, and also included her findings of fact and conclusions of law. The judge concluded that plaintiff was not entitled to a jury in regard to the retaliatory discharge claim because it was a claim for damages against the state. She also concluded that defendant‘s termination of plaintiff was in retaliation for his having filed a petition for workers’ compensation benefits and awarded plaintiff $30,000 in mental anguish damages. Finally, she agreed with the jury that plaintiff failed to state a claim under the HCRA.
On February 13, 1990, the judge issued a supple-
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide his claim for retaliatory discharge because the Court of Claims Act expressly prevents it from exercising jurisdiction over claims for compensation under the WDCA. We disagree.
The Court of Claims is created by statute and the scope of its subject-matter jurisdiction is explicit. Lim v Dep‘t of Transportation, 167 Mich App 751, 753; 423 NW2d 343 (1988). According to the provisions of the Court of Claims Act,
Plaintiff argues that the trial court clearly erred because it ignored
The court of claims shall not have jurisdiction of
any claim for compensation under the provisions of either of the following: (a) The worker‘s disability compensation act of 1969, Act No. 317 of the Public Acts of 1969, being sections 418.101 to 418.941 of the Michigan Cоmpiled Laws.
The question is whether an employee who is terminated in retaliation for filing a claim for benefits under the WDCA states a claim for “compensation” within the meaning of the WDCA. We conclude that the claim is not one for “compensation” under the WDCA.
In general terms, a wrongful discharge claim against the State of Michigan must be filed in the Court of Claims. Doster v Dep‘t of Mental Health, 161 Mich App 436, 442; 411 NW2d 725 (1987). This Court has recognized that an employee‘s claim оf discharge in retaliation for the filing of a petition for benefits under the WDCA is a type of wrongful discharge. Sventko v Kroger Co, 69 Mich App 644; 245 NW2d 151 (1976). In this case, plaintiff‘s claim that he was discharged in retaliation for his request for benefits under the WDCA is, therefore, a type of wrongful discharge.
Unfortunately, the Legislature has not shed any light on this issue because it did not define “compensation” within the WDCA. However, the primary goal of workers’ compensation legislаtion is to promptly deliver benefits to employees injured in the scope of their employment. Thompson v Ford Motor Co, 139 Mich App 177, 182; 362 NW2d 240 (1984). Pursuant to
This Court recognized a claim for retaliatory discharge in connection with the act even before the Legislature codified the claim under
We believe that the Legislature‘s intent in adopting the section of the Court of Claims Act that precludes the Court оf Claims from exercising jurisdiction over claims for compensation under the WDCA (
Defendant argues in its cross appeal that the Court of Claims’ award of $35,000 for mental anguish damages was inappropriate.2 As a general rule, employment relationships that are for an indefinitе period of time are terminable at will. Kostello v Rockwell Int‘l Corp, 189 Mich App 241, 244; 472 NW2d 71 (1991). However, this Court and the Legislature have developed exceptions to this general principle when the reason for termination is contrary to public policy. See
In Goins v Ford Motor Co, 131 Mich App 185, 198; 347 NW2d 184 (1983), a panel of this Court held that an action for wrongful discharge where discharge was in retaliation for having filed a workers’ compensation claim sounds in tort, not contract. In making its decision, the panel in Goins relied upon Sventko, supra, where a panel of this Court held that it is against public policy for an employer to discharge an employee in retaliation for the employee‘s filing of a workers’ compensation claim against the employer.
In the more recent cases of Mourad v Auto Club Ins Ass‘n, 186 Mich App 715, 727; 465 NW2d 395 (1991), Lopus v L & L Shop-Rite, Inc, 171 Mich App 486, 491; 430 NW2d 757 (1988), and Watassek v Dep‘t of Mental Health, 143 Mich App 556, 564-565; 372 NW2d 617 (1985), however, this Court held that an action claiming retaliatory discharge is an action asserting a specific type of wrongful discharge and thus constitutes a contract action. With regard to Lopus, Watassek, and Mourad, we first note that they are factually distinguishable from the case at bar. In Lopus, the plaintiff was allegedly fired because the defendant suspected that she would file a workers’ compensation claim against the defendant. However, the plaintiff in the present case, like the plaintiff in Goins and unlike the plaintiff in Lopus, had actually filed a workers’ compensation claim at the time of his discharge. In Watassek, no claim regarding workers’ compensation was ever raised. Rather, the plaintiff was allegedly fired in rеtaliation for attempting to stop abusive treatment of patients at a mental health center. Likewise in Mourad, no claim regarding workers’ compensation was ever
We are cognizant of decisions by this Court holding that a plaintiff cannot recover under both a breach of contract claim and a retaliatory discharge claim where the breach of duty is indistinguishable from the breach of contract. Kostello, supra, 245; Mourad, supra. In the present case, however, plaintiff did not plead a wrongful discharge resulting from a breach of contract. Rather, plaintiff only pleaded that hе was discharged in retaliation for having filed a workers’ compensation claim against defendant. Plaintiff was thus seeking to recover only under a tort theory.
Because plaintiff‘s claim for retaliatory discharge sounds in tort, he is entitled to the damages awarded for mental distress and his loss of supplemental pay, which flowed from his improper discharge. The case was appropriately resоlved in the Court of Claims.
Affirmed.
SAWYER, P.J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I agree with the majority‘s analysis of the issue of the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, I respectfully dissent from the holding that a retaliatory discharge claim sounds in tort and, therefore, mental anguish damages are appropriate. I would hold that a retaliatory discharge claim sounds in contract and, therefore, damages may not be recovered for mental anguish. Valentine v General American Credit, Inc, 420 Mich 256, 259; 362 NW2d 628 (1984).
The majority relies upon Goins v Ford Motor Co, 131 Mich App 185; 347 NW2d 184 (1983), for the proрosition that a retaliatory discharge claim sounds in tort. Goins does, in fact, state that a “wrongful discharge cause is one sounding in tort, not contract.” Id. at 198. In support of that proposition, Goins looked to Sventko v Kroger Co, 69 Mich App 644; 245 NW2d 151 (1976). However, a careful reading of Sventko reveals that it does not stand for the proposition that a wrongful discharge claim sounds in tort rather than contract. Rather, Sventko merely stands for the proposition that there exists a cause of action for retaliatory discharge for filing a workers’ comрensation claim. Nowhere in either the lead opinion or the concurring opinion does the Court state whether that cause of action sounds in tort or contract.1
While the holding in Goins is at best suspect, there does exist firm precedent for the proposition that a claim of wrongful discharge sounds in contract, not tort. In Lopus v L & L Shop-Rite, Inc, 171 Mich App 486; 430 NW2d 757 (1988), the plaintiff sued her former employer, alleging retaliatory discharge in that her employment was ter-
Similarly, in Mourad v Auto Club Ins Ass‘n, 186 Mich App 715; 465 NW2d 395 (1991), a case involving an alleged “retaliatory demotion,” this Court again held that retaliatory discharge claims sound in contract, not tort. Id. at 727, citing Lopus, supra, and Watassek, supra. I note that the majority doеs not address the fact that the conclusion in Mourad that retaliatory discharge is a variety of wrongful discharge and, therefore, sounds in contract represents a rule of law that must be followed under Administrative Order No. 1990-6, 436 Mich lxxxiv.
In the earlier case of Watassek, this Court considered the question whether the plaintiff‘s claim for retaliatory discharge was precluded by the doctrine of governmental immunity.3 This Court rejected the argument that the plaintiff‘s claim was barred by governmental immunity because a retaliatory discharge claim sounds in contract, not tort:
As the Supreme Court discussed in Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980), reh den 409 Mich 1101 (1980), cf., Valentine v General American Credit, Inc, 420 Mich 256; 362 NW2d 628 (1984), an action
for wrongful discharge is one mainly ex contractu. An action claiming retaliatory discharge is an action asserting a specific type of wrongful discharge and thus constitutes a contract action. Although we are mindful of the case of Goins v Ford Motor Co, 131 Mich App 185, 198; 347 NW2d 184 (1983), lv gtd 422 Mich 857 (1985), wherein this Court ruled that an action for retaliatory discharge was one in tort, we can find no rational basis to label one wrongful discharge a contract and the other a tort. Moreover, we find that the Goins panel‘s reliance on Sventko, supra, is misplaced; that case did not in fact determine that the action was one in tort. Although the Goins panel also relied on Scott v Union Tank Car Co, 75 Ind App 150; 402 NE2d 992 (1980), a case in which the Indiana Appeals court ruled, on facts similar to those in Sventko, that the claim sounded in tort, we note with approval the lengthy dissent which reasons that the claim is better characterized as one in contract. Finally the Trombetta [v Detroit, T & I R Co, 81 Mich App 489; 265 NW2d 385 (1978)] and Sventko, supra, cases consider the issue of wrongful discharge in terms of an employment contract and not as a tort. [Watassek, supra at 564-565.]
Thus, there is sound precedent from both this Court and the Supreme Court holding that a wrongful discharge claim sounds in contract and that retaliatory discharge is a variety of wrongful discharge. Therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that retaliatory discharge claims also sоund in contract, not tort.4
without indicating whether the appropriate remedy is an award of bаck pay, injunctive relief to reinstate the employee to his position, or the establishment of a claim in tort or contract. At best, the statute merely represents a codification of the rule set forth in Sventko. As discussed above, the stronger line of reasoning has established that retaliatory discharge is an action sounding in contract. There is certainly nothing in the statute that indicates an intent by the Legislaturе in codifying Sventko to transform a contract action into a tort action. As with the Watassek panel, I see no rational basis for classifying some forms of retaliatory discharge as torts, while classifying others as breaches of contract.