MEMORANDUM OPINION
Bеfore this Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”) filed by LVNV Funding, LLC (“LVNV”) and Resurgent Capital Services, L.P. (the “Defendants”) against William Steven Dunaway and Cynthia Ann Dunaway (the “Debtors”). Also before the Court is Debtors’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Both parties filed Suggestions in Support of their motions and Suggestions in Opposition to the opposing parties’ motions. The Plaintiff initiated the adversary proceeding seeking a right to recover actual and statutory damages, costs and attorney’s fees from Defendants for violation of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (the “FDCPA”). In accordance with Rule 7056 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and for the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the Defendants’ Motion and denies Debtors’ Motion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are undisputed. Debtors filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy on March 31, 2014. LVNV was listed on Debtors’ Schedule F and creditor matrix. On July 25, 2014, Defendants filed a proоf of claim on behalf of LVNV. The Claim lists an unsecured amount of $6,206.92. The attachment to the Claim lists First USA Bank, N.A. as the creditor from whom LVNV purchased the account. The attachment also states that the account was charged off by the original creditor on 05/05/2000, the last payment date was 8/19/1999, and the last transaction date was 8/19/1999. On October 14, 2014, Debtors filed an objection to the Claim. On October 16, Debtors amended the objection and filed an adversary proceeding against Defendants. On November 19, 2014, the Court granted the amended objection to the Claim.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Standard for Summary Judgment
Bankruptcy Rule 7056, applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), provides that summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Celotex v. Catrett,
B. Allegation of Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Act
Debtors allege in their adversary complaint that filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt is a violation of the FDCPA. Debtors urge the Court to adopt and apply the 11th Circuit’s holding in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC,
Debtors argue that filing a time-barred proof of claim violates the FDCPA. First, Debtors assert that filing a proof of claim is akin to collecting a debt and analogous to the filing of a complaint in a civil action. Citing In re Brimmage,
Defendants of course disagree. They contend that the FDCPA protections are inapplicable in the bankruptcy context because the Code has its own set of procedures and protections. Defendants assert that the FDCPA is not implicatеd by filing a proof of claim, even if invalid, because the Code gives an interested party the right to object to an invalid claim, which includes a claim that is barred by the statute of limitations. In fact, Debtors have in fact done just that in this case and objected to the claim filed by Defendants and the objection was granted and the claim disallowed.
Defendants further argue that filing a proof of claim does not constitute an attempt to cоllect a debt from a consumer as required by the FDCPA. Rather, they argue, a debtor’s bankruptcy estate is not a consumer. Defendants contend that filing a proof of claim is not a collection activity but rather an attempt to be involved in the distribution of estate proceeds. They further assert that if filing a proof of claim was an attempt to collect a debt that it would be a violation of the automatic stay. Finally, Defendants contend that even if filing a proof of claim is a debt collection activity, it is not an abusive or deceptive practice as required by the FDCPA.
C. Analysis
1. Whether the Bankruptcy Code precludes FDCPA actions.
When two federal statutes have inconsistent provisions, a court may find that one of the statutes precludes application of the other. See, e.g., Simon v. FIA Card Ser., N.A.,
Determining whether the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code regarding the filing and allowance of claims preclude the application of the FDCPA requires consideration of both the appropriate standard for judging preclusion generally and the specific context in which the question is being asked. In Randolph v. IMBS, Inc.,
If the standard is one of irreconcilable conflict, the Court might find it difficult to determine that the application of the FDCPA is precluded even in this context. If there is any lower threshold, the Court would likely conclude the Bankruptcy Code precludes application of the FDCPA in the specific context of the filing and allowance of proofs of claim. The Court finds persuasive the extensive analysis by the court in Chaussee regarding the inconsistencies between the process of filing claims and adjudicating objections and the principles of the FDCPA, specifically debt validation requirements. Chaussee,
2. Filing a proof of claim is an action to collect a debt.
The liability under the FDCPA asserted in Debtors’ complaint can only arise from actions taken “in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. The Defendants’ second point in their motion is that the action of filing a proof of
A proof of claim, of course, is intended to result in some recovery for the creditor on the debt set out in the proof of claim, and so filing a proof of claim would be within the ordinary meaning of “debt collection.” See In re LaGrone,
This analysis is not persuasive. There is no contradiction between a proof of claim being an action to collect a debt and the automatic stay. The automatic stay does indeed prohibit debt collection activity, and filing a proof of claim is an action to collect a debt, but it is well established that the automatic stay does not prohibit actions taken in the bankruptcy case itself. See Eger v. Eger (In re Eger),
3. Filing a proof of claim subject to a limitations defense does not violate the FDCPA.
The first section of the FDCPA sets out a finding that “abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices” are employed by debt collectors against consumers, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and the Act goes on to prohibit a number of specific practices. Section 1262k provides for an award of damages against any debt collector who fails to comply with the Act’s provisions.
Debtors assert generally in their Complaint that the acts of Defendants in attempting to collect a time-barred debt are in ■ violation of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and that the filing of a proof of claim to collect a stale debt violates sections 1692d, 1692e and 1692f. Specifically, Debtors allege that the acts and omissions by Defendants constitute violations of the FDCPA, including, but not limited to, collecting or attemрting to collect amounts not permitted by law and by otherwise using unfair and deceptive methods in direct violation of 1692f(l). Defendants’ argue that filing a proof of claim on a debt subject to a limitation defense does not violate any of these provisions.
Section 1692d states: “A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connectiоn with the collection of a debt.” The section goes on to provide specific conduct that is a violation that includes the use or threat of use of violence or other criminal means to harm the physical person, reputation, or property of any person; the use of obscene
Section 1692e provides that “a debt collector mаy not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” That section also provides specific examples of such conduct As discussed above, the Court agrees that filing a proof of claim is an act to collect a debt. However, the Court does not agree that a proof of claim that accurately reflects information on thе debt, including the date of last payment, date the account was charged off by the original creditor and the last transaction date is false, deceptive or misleading on its face. Further, Debtors listed the debt on their schedules as unsecured indicating an intent to include it in any discharge that resulted from the bankruptcy. The argument that filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt mischaracter-izes the legal status of the debt also fails bеcause a debt that is legally unenforceable or uncollectible is not extinguished; the money is still owed and only the creditor’s remedies are regulated. See Donaldson, Case No. l:14-cv-01979, — F.Supp.3d —,
Section 1692f of the FDCPA, which generally prohibits “unfair or unconscionable” debt collection aсtivities, is an additional ground for relief asserted by Debtors. However, as with the other sections, there is nothing unconscionable or unfair about filing a proof of claim that contains truthful and accurate information on a debt that is known to debtors and their attorney. See, e.g., In re Claudio,
Numerous courts have held that an FDCPA claim “cannot be based on the filing of a proof of claim, regardless of the ultimate validity of the underlying claim.” In re Simpson,
In the Eighth Circuit case Freyermuth, a debtor alleged that a collection agency engaged in abusive practices in violation of the FDCPA by attempting to collect on a debt that was potentially time-barred. The court found that a creditor may attempt to collect on a claim barred by the statute of limitations and does not violate the FDCPA unless the creditor either threatens to or actually files a lawsuit on such a claim. See
First, Debtors in bankruptcy cases have the benefit of a trustee with a fiduciary duty to all parties to “examine proofs of claims and object to the allowance of any claim that is improper.” In re Andreas,
Second, a debtor in bankruptcy often has much less at stake in the allowance of a proof of claim than a defendant facing the prospect of an adverse judgment in a collection lawsuit. A proof of claim does
The Court recognizes that debtors, their counsel, bankruptcy trustees and the U.S. Trustee must be vigilant in reviewing proofs of claim, so that a distribution is not provided to those holding claims barred by the statute of limitations. Nonetheless, as other courts have observed, the present statute and. procedural rules do nоt preclude such filings by creditors. Until the Bankruptcy Code is amended (for example, by adding a provision in § 501 requiring creditors to have a good faith belief in the allowability of their claims), or the procedural rules modified to render such claims invalid, see Chaussee,
III. CONCLUSION
After reviewing the entire record, the Court finds that the Defendants have met their burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Debtors’ Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.