Dullenty v. Rocky Mountain Fire & Casualty Co.

prejudiced thereby. delay fact or giving Want of notice shall proceedings notice not be a under bar law if employer, agent shown representative the his or occupational disease, knowledge injury had of or or employer prejudiced has delay not been such or want of notice. 72-706, SECTION Code, 21. be, That Section Idaho and hereby same is amended read follows: 72-706. LIMITATION ON TIME ON APPLICATION FOR HEARING. (1)When compensation no paid. compensation thereon, When claim for has been made compensation and paid been has claimant, unless prejudice misled employer surety, (1) shall year have one making from the date of claim within to make and file with commission an application requesting a hearing and an award under claim. (2) compensation When payments discontinued. When compensation discontinued, have been made and thereafter (5) claimant shall years have five from the date causing accident injury or date first manifestation or, compensation occupational disease, of an discon- (5) years tinued more than five date acci- causing injury dent first date manisfestatioñ occupational disease, (1) an one within from the year payment compensation, date last within make and application requesting file with commission hearing compensation further and award. (3) application Relief barred. In the event provided, made filed in this section relief such claim shall be forever barred. 72-224, 72-324, SECTION 22. That Sections 72-420 72-421, Code, be, repealed. Idaho hereby same 28, 1978. Approved March

721 P.2d DULLENTY, L.

Donald

Plaintiff-Appellant, AND FIRE MOUNTAIN

ROCKY COMPANY, CASUALTY

Defendant-Respondent.

No. 15889. Idaho.

Supreme 4, 1986.

June 11, 1986. July

Rehearing Denied d’Alene, Verbillis, Coeur attor-

Michael J. plaintiff-appellant. ney for Hosack, d’Alene, for W. Coeur Charles defendant-respondent. d’Alene, Howard, Jr., B. Coeur

Kenneth Lawyers Trial curiae Idaho for amicus Assn. G. Allyn Dingel, Jr. Lawrence

M. Boise, Sirhall, (argued), for amicus curi- Jr. Ins. Farm Mut. Auto. Co. State ae SHEPARD, Justice. a decision of

This is review reversed a summa- Appeals court granted by the district ry judgment Dullenty. Dul- plaintiff-appellant an action lenty brought had provisions of under carrier relating to uninsured an automobile reverse the Court coverage. We Appeals summary and reinstate The district court found that judgment granted by district court. the Rocky Mountain unambiguous was clear and and that no stipulated The facts are we are coverage was afforded thereunder to Dul presented solely with a of law. lenty under instant circumstances. We Dullenty vehicles, three motor agree. portion In that dealing truck, 1966 International a 1974 Chevrolet with coverage, a num Blazer, Only and a 1979 Subaru. the Inter- ber appear, of exclusions of pro one which by national truck insured respondent was vides: Rocky Compa- Mountain Fire and Casualty supplement “This motorist [uninsured ny. The Blazer and the Subaru were in- coverage] does not apply: by sured Pacific United Reliance Insurance Company. policy The automobile liability “(c) automobile by Rocky issued Mountain Fire and Casual- by or regular owned furnished for use to ty Company contained an motor- uninsured the named insured and while resident of coverage ist supplement. The automobile household, the same spouse and rela- covering policy the Blazer and the either____” tives of by Subaru issued United Pacific Reliance We affirm decision of district court Company Insurance also contained unin- language that such excludes uninsured mo- sured motorist Dullenty injured when is Dullenty operating While was the Chev- occupying by while a vehicle owned or fur- injured rolet was Blazer he in a collision regular Dullenty, nished for the use of but with an operated by automobile owned and which is described in the declaration motorist. Dullenty uninsured filed a policy. undisputed section of the It is Mountain, claim Rocky asserting with ben- driving Blazer Dullenty Chevrolet was efits supple- under the uninsured motorist question at the time of the accident in was policy by ment to the Rocky issued Moun- in described the declaration section of tain. exclusionary language Based on con- Rocky policy, Mountain and was owned n Rocky tained in policy, denied Mountain by Dullenty. Under the somewhat inart- Dullenty’s Dullenty claim. then filed suit fully language policy, drawn it is in district court. district court held arguable Dullenty was insured unambiguous the exclusion was damage by caused an uninsured motorist judgment against entered summary Dullen- he, occupant Dullenty, while was an ty. by motor vehicle owned someone outside household, Dullenty Dullenty was appealed

That was decision to the Idaho Dullenty pedestrian, or while was reversed, Appeals holding Court of who However, porch. Rocky his front exclusionary language by relied on policy unambiguously Mountain excludes Rocky public policy. Mountain violated while Dullen- uninsured This granted Court review the decision ty by a vehicle him and Appeals. of the Court of Mu- State Farm policy. not described tual Company Automobile Insurance was granted appear curiae. leave to amicus Appeals, The decision of the Court presented sole as whether Rocky Fire and Dullenty Mountain by Appeals, specific held the Court Company, Casualty Idaho upon by Rocky exclusion (1984), relied Mountain focused on its view that P.2d 1209 in policy “repug- denies these circum- was Rocky Mountain stances, public as public expressed void our nant” to purported We hold statutes because public not inconsistent with limit its uninsured motorist excluding injuries sustained at the hands of hence reverse the decision of the Court Appeals. motorist while an uninsured occupants the in- in either of their occupying vehicles owned mons as ve- was hicles, pedestrians, not covered other cir- sured’s household but they injury cumstance where suffer caused Rocky policy. Therein the Court Mountain Thus, heavily on an uninsured motorist.” Appeals relied its decision Appeals Group, Court of held that consistent with v. Farmers Insurance Hammon Puckett, Sloviaczek Estate (1984), 98 Idaho issued 107 Idaho (1977), 565 P.2d 564 that the decision Dul- days its but a few before policies both could be lenty. thereby and the Hammons recov- “stacked” Hammon, Appeals In policies. er under both following presented with the circumstanc- granted review Ham- vehicles, This Court also es. The Hammons owned two separate mon and reversed the decision of the Court were insured both of which held, of Appeals. This Court “Because we policies issued Farmers physical requirement hold that the contact policy Group. Each contained uninsured contrary void to the Idaho unin- not as Each contained statute, sured we find it unneces- a “hit and requirement a there was sary stacking to address the issue.” type of and an unidentified run” accident Hence, Hammon tortfeasor, decision in physical Court’s there have a must been provides guidance present- on the issue provi- for the uninsured motorist contact case, i.e., ed in the instant whether the Secondly, sion to be effective. each policy provision excluding that, here, uninsured motor- provided as the uninsured mo- coverage occupying ist while insured not would be effective family by vehicle owned the household but occupying while the a vehicle insured was in household, not described as a covered vehicle by owned the Hammon but not against public policy is or void particu- in listed as described vehicle in by Appeals as held the Court of its was policy. lar Dullenty. decisions Hammon in injured The Hammons were when their Appeals in The decision Court allegedly by was forced off the road question the instant indicated that the case physical another but there was no virtually in presented is identical to Therefore, question to contact. the first in Hammon Appeals’ the Court decision by Appeals decided the Court of was supra, Company, v. Farmers Insurance requirement physical whether the con- set forth Ham- in and that the reasons tact was valid restriction on the other- mon, Appeals reversed the Court coverage, wise uninsured motorist or instant case. As summary judgment requirement whether void as was noted, the deci- this Court reversed above against public policy. Ap- Court Hammon, Appeals in sion of the Court peals require- held physical that the contact validity however the resolution of public policy ment was as enun- by here was found exclusion at issue Only ciated I.C. 41-2502. thereafter § in its decision Ham- in Supreme Court Appeals necessary find did the Court of necessary mon to be resolved. coverage question consider the issue case, i.e., policy language in the instant decision Ham- Appeals’ The Court of excluding among uninsured motorist split the various mon indicated a occupying a vehicle question presented, when the insured jurisdictions on family but not household of cases from the numerical agreed with jurisdictions described in the have other adopted by Appeals. Court view The court held that such restrictions held, in Hammon Appeals otherwise uninsured motorist The Court of stating, coverages both repugnant 41-2502 “The “The uninsured motorist protect coverages poli- policies must be deemed both occupants in of their Hammons as either protect cies must be deemed to the Ham- vehicles, pedestrians, any or in protecting other owner-operator against fi- they circumstance injury where suffer nancial operative loss was protecting caused an uninsured motorist.” We persons regardless third of what motor ve- today need not decide whether the Court of damaged person might hicle the third have Appeals’ decision was correct the above occupying, been or whether or not the third broad statement. We are not concerned party pedestrian, was any or in here with the of whether an unin- circumstance when the third policy provides coverage sured motorist in injured by operation of the insured insured, the event that a named while a motor vehicle. With that assertion there pedestrian, is struck an uninsured mo- quarrel can be no since such was the torist; poli- whether the uninsured motorist legislative and the obvious intent. cy language covers an insured who was Appeals The Court of any held that at- porch on his front is struck tempt by an insurance carrier to exclude motorist; or whether the unin- coverage if owning-operating policy language sured motorist affords cov- named motor operator vehicle the struck a erage to an insured while he is pedestrian, house, crashed into a motor vehicle which is not owned involving operation other circumstance regular furnished for the use of he or a of the named motor vehicle would be void. Arguably member of his household. the Again agree. Appeals we policy language interpreted. can be so then held that uninsured motorist However, question presented today the sole “reciprocates” liability coverage and hence policy is whether the uninsured motorist “by parity reasoning” uninsured mo- language provides coverage to an insured statutorily mandated he is while a vehicle which he also afford to an insured whenev- owns, but is not described in the injured by er and wherever the insured is by is struck an uninsured motorist. Even disagree. an uninsured vehicle. We pointedly more the becomes legislative We deem the intent the whether under such circumstances the field of automobile insurance to be relative- policy purporting clause in the to exclude ly public policy clear. It is the of this state against public is void as operator that owner or of a motor vehicle, excep- with certain self-insured Appeals’

In the Court of decision tions, purchase liability automobile insur- Hammon, liability it is asserted that the contemplated ance. Therein it is that portion policy of an insurance automobile damage party suffers reason of third protects persons damage third caused vehicle, specific operation of that motor driving an insured a named motor operator the owner or of the vehicle is is, course, vehicle. That over assertion against loss reason of a recov- insured ly party “protect broad. The third party. ery by injured third While obvi- liability policy it is ed” but rather contemplates ously such a scheme insur- owner-operator the tortfeasor of the named against monetary a risk of such loss ance protected against vehicle who is financial part operator the owner or damaged party and if third vehicle, loss when carries out a further a claim insured owner- makes providing protection some public operator. merely That distinction is public may injured general to the who semantics, one of albeit it is clear that operation of the a result of the named legislative require vehicle, intention was to a motor providing motor assured only operated vehicle to be when its owner- general fund from which a member of the liability operator possessed insurance part of his public recover for at least least a minimum amount. damage. provisions Appeals’ Further decision provide potential in- scheme when a liability

then asserted that such

103 purchasing v. contemplates State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. sured Co., carrier, (Miss.1973); carrier Shepherd from a 285 surance So.2d 767 Co., potential an addi- v. American Ins. must insured as States 671 S.W.2d offer supplement liability policy to the v. Implement (Mo.1984); tion to or Jacobson 777 Co., specific 542, motor uninsured Mut. on Dealers Ins. 196 640 Mont. i.e., coverage, (1982); Farm Auto State Mutual P.2d 908 damage Hinkel, risk of insured caused 478, mobile Ins. Co. v. 87 488 Nev. party uninsured by a third tortfeasor. (1971); v. Fernandez Selected P.2d 1151 41-2502. Co., 270, Risks Ins. N.J.Super. 394 163 v. Farm (1978); Chavez State A.2d 877 provided pur- is further It Co., 327, Ins. Mutual Automobile N.M. 87 protection purchase for those pose of who (1975); Bankes v. Farm 100 State insurance, policies must be automobile Co., Mutual Ins. Automobile 216 Pa.Su content, in form and must be uniform 162, Hogan (1970); per. 264 197 A.2d approved Department the director of the Home Insurance S.C. in the of Insurance. There is indication (1973); Federated American S.E.2d case that at issue does instant Raynes, Ins. Co. 88 Wash.2d strictures, above not conform to the (1977). A P.2d 815 smaller number of in a hence we assume that result. See courts have reached approved by form and content the commis- Exchange, Holcomb v. Farmers Insurance sioner of insurance. MFA (1973); 254 Ark. 495 S.W.2d Although Appeals held the Court Whitlock, Companies v. otherwise, nothing legisla we find Beliveau v. Norfolk (Ky.1978); S.W.2d 856 language that mandates that when a tive Ins., Fire & Dedham Mut. 120 N.H. offers uninsured carrier 411 A.2d 1101 insured, potential to a that it must do so jur- decisions Sheer numbers of of other all which covers the insured way isdictions one other on circumstances wherein insured suffers controlling given question are of course not damage at of an mo the hands Court, per- and the decisions are torist, policy language or that at only they analysis as contain suasive to less than tempts to limit the reasoning which recommends itself to legis all circumstances is void as Court. public policy. lative is, course, Unfortunately, opinions few of respectable authority

There the is- large holding courts which have addressed jurisdictions in a other number reached, sue, result con- respect regardless contrary. to the Likewise there is in-depth authority, perceive any able albeit lesser number tain what we decisions, analysis reasoning. opin- re Most agrees. which have We opinions exclusionary clauses of other ions which hold that viewed courts jurisdictions deal issue to otherwise uninsured motorist with the statutory public poli- presented in The clear void as a the ease bar. fact, i.e., merely “every- as a cy, numerical of such have state that courts enacting legislature in one knows” that the reached same result the Court the instant case. See State Appeals in uninsured motorist statutes intended v. Co. injured by when Farm Automobile an insured covered Reaves, circumstances, (1974); in all 218, 292 Ala. 292 So.2d 95 riding v. be in the named Mullis State Farm Mutual Automobile whether vehicle, Co., v. (Fla.1971); in an but Ins. Kau unnamed owned 252 229 So.2d Co., Ins. vehicle not Farm Mut. Auto. Hawaii while a State 58 household, Nygaard v. 49, (1977); pedestrian, while State while 564 443 Co., porch, riding a Farm Automobile Ins. 301 on his front camel Mutual Lowery 10, (1974); horse, bouncing pogo on or while stick. Minn. 221 151 N.W.2d 104 hand, opinions holding

theOn of realism. Ady v. West American Ins. such exclusionary clauses to valid most often Co., 593, 69 Ohio St.2d 433 N.E.2d 547 inequity allowing person refer to the (1981); Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. who insures one vehicle with an insurance Co., 623, 157 W.Va. 207 S.E.2d 147 by thereby carrier to a “free ride” obtain however, For part, our own we deem it obtaining coverage by that same carrier on necessary to statutory examine our scheme one, two, upon or a fleet of vehicles insurance, of automobile attempt to discern paid premium he has to the carrier. legislative purpose, its and decide if the upholding validity Some courts of such exclusionary clause the instant opine rewarding clauses contrary purpose spirit. to that plaintiff operating who himself is require Our statutes owners of motor legislative uninsured vehicle is provide liability vehicles to motor vehicle insurance I.C. 49-233. Such § presenting For cases the various view liability policy” “motor vehicle and its ex- Company see Aetna Insurance v. points, pressed, permitted implied provisions, Hurst, 1067, Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. 2 83 156 together with minimum amounts of cover- (1969); State Farm Mutual Automobile age are contained in I.C. 49-1521. Prior § Robertson, 149, Ins. Co. v. Ind.App. 156 registration any to the motor vehicle an (1973); Bradley v. Mid- 295 N.E.2d 626 applicant certify must the existence of such (Farmers), Mich.App. Century Ins. Co. 78 liability insurance and thereafter maintain (1977); Nygaard 67, 259 N.W.2d 378 Operating such insurance. I.C. 49-234. § Co., State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. a motor in this state without such 10, (1974); Low 221 301 Minn. N.W.2d 151 liability is a 49- crime. I.C. § ery v. Farm Mutual State Automobile liability 235. Proof of such insurance must Co., Her (Miss.1973); Ins. 285 So.2d 767 operated be carried in motor vehicle Co., 202 Liberty rick v. Mut. Fire Ins. request displayed Idaho and be 116, (1979); Chavez v. 274 147 Neb. N.W.2d officer, peace and failure to do so is also Co., State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. criminal. 49-245. A made I.C. § (1975); Ady 327, N.M. 100 violation of the above statutes who is Co., WestAmerican Ins. Ohio St.2d suspen- volved in an accident suffer (1981); Cothren v. Emcas 433 N.E.2d 547 operating and vehicle sion of license Company, co Insurance P.2d 1037 registration. (Okla.1976); 49-1505. Bankes v. State Farm Mutu Co., al Automobile Ins. Pa.Super. clearly Our scheme mandates (1970); Federated American 264 A.2d 197 liability opera- insurance in the obtention of Raynes, Ins. Co. v. Wash.2d noted, As before tion of a motor vehicle. (1977); Bell v. State Farm Mut. P.2d 815 is couched in terms Auto. Ins. 157 W.Va. 207 S.E.2d of a ve- protecting owner-operator of damage by hicle from claims of suffered courts, holding that an exclusion- Some injured by opera- who have been others ary clause to uninsured motorist otherwise clearly intent of tion of the but coverage against public policy, is void as legislature provide a source of our was to acknowledge freely the risk to that since damaged by person funds from which a enhanced, thereby and there is carriers is operation the motor vehicle could obtain of lunch,” holdings no “free will that such recourse. premium in increased costs to all result nothing in our findWe suggested operators. motor It is vehicle the “motor which mandates scheme by is a desirable those courts that such in liability policy” shall cover the vehicle damage result since it tends to alleviate he be regardless of what vehicle individual, sured spread impact upon any in the named or not operating, whether segment of socie- cost thereof over a broad Rather, only re- 49-1521 policy. ty. approach That at least has the virtue § quires policy designate the vehicle rejected coverage named insured had covered and in addi- or.vehicles in policy previously connection with a person shall insure tion “... named as by issued to him the same insurer. insured therein loss from the liabili- above, As noted statute re ty imposed upon by damages him law for quires offering an insurance carrier a “mo arising by out the use any him of liability policy” tor vehicle to offer unin not motor vehicle owned him,____” provi “under sured coverage added.) (Emphasis interpret We that statu- approved by sions the director the de tory language require liability coverage partment insurance ...” Such offer driving the named insured while he be coverage uninsured motorist part designated any motor vehicle in the supplemental or to a “motor vehicle liabili him, any and owned or other vehicle not ty policy,” may rejected by the insured. require owned him. It does Hence, liability poli unlike “motor vehicle coverage operating while he be a vehicle cy,” coverage uninsured motorist is not designated him but not statutorily required as Hence, regis a condition of policy. could, an insurance carrier operation tration or compliance statute, of a motor with the vehicle. specifically coverage exclude while the insured was legislature has made obvious that a driving non-designated an owned but ve- liability policy motor mandatory, hicle. specified coverage and has that the extends The issue of this case focuses on I.C. beyond operation of speci- the vehicles 41-2502. That statute has not been fied in the but has specifically also changed substance since coverage indicated that need not be states: operation extended to the of a motor ve- 41-2502. Uninsured motorist cover- hicle owned the insured but de- age poli- for automobile insurance. —No hand, policy. scribed in the On the other cy insuring against resulting loss from we find no in the uninsured mo- liability imposed by bodily injury law for coverage torist specifically statute which or death suffered natural requires to extend arising out of the ownership, mainte- against damage from an uninsured motor- nance or use of a motor vehicle shall be ist while the insured is outside the vehicle delivered or delivery issued for in this policy. described Neither does the respect state with motor vehicle specif- uninsured motorist statute registered principally garaged or in this ically permit exclusion of uninsured mo- provided state unless therein while the outside thereto, supplemental or in limits for Hence, policy. the vehicle described bodily injury or death as set forth legislative way we find no intent one 49-1505, Code, section Idaho as amended specific question other on the involved in time, time to provisions ap- under i.e., case, the instant the exclusion from proved by department the director of the when the in- insurance, protection per- operating sured is an owned motor vehicle sons insured legally thereunder who are not described in the entitled to damages recover from owners We then look to the operators conclusions that we of uninsured motor vehicles perceive legitimately can be drawn either bodily injury, because of sickness or dis- ease, legislative language including death, from the or resulting from the there- from; legislative provided, however, language. lack of An insurance named is, course, required insured shall carrier to right reject have the to do such coverage, rejection which business in the state of may be Idaho and must writing; provided further, in and such decline to do so. If an insurance carrier coverage provided Idaho, need not in do sup- be or does desire to in business it must plemental comply to a renewal applicable where the with our statutes and the regulations Department of Insur- instant uninsured motorist which expressly ance. Policies issued carriers must does not exclude under be Department approved of Insurance. such situations. at issue here has been We deem it that a is more obvious disapproved by the shown to have been likely occupying to be an owned vehicle Department of Insurance. occupying than he is to be a vehicle owned Hence, doing in by

An insurance carrier business someone else. an insurance in may engage may willing to certain carrier to Idaho decline be assume risks i.e., perceives relatively slight, types of insurance or decline to which it may being damaged It insure certain risk situations. de- an uninsured motorist vehicle, occupying cline certain owners of motor while a non-owned with- to insure vehicles, premium. might may or decline to insure certain out an in It be increase unwilling against per- In the field of life insur- to insure a risk it types vehicles. ance, high- may refuse to insure ceives as without an increase in a carrier substantial individuals, example premium. required If is to in- risk for those with an insured cancer, history, undesignated coronary drug abuse or sure a risk of an but or coverage only highly write owned or a different and more may such premiums. may, by dangerous type A ex- of vehicle of which it has inflated carrier clusions, knowledge, thereby required is exclude life insurance it unaware, engages in it is certain activi- insure risks which when an insured underwrite, aircraft, private charge unable to flying sky- ties in unable and such diving, activity. premium a therefor. or ultrahazardous place legislature of insurance as If the had desired to We view the business carriers, it relatively simple concept complex in such a burden on insurance but required insure purchases as a could have carriers to all detail. insurance its One poli- liability hedge against Thereby applicants risk is for motor vehicle risk. Clearly such a wholly rate. partly or to an insur- cies at uniform transferred very mandate would result substantial carrier. An insurance carrier will ance careful, low risk premium increases only remain business it able Likewise, legislature could reality mag- drivers. adequately and the assess required carriers to issue risk, under- have through nitude of the appli- charge all process premiums which uninsured writing many regardless of how at one rate adequately compensate the carrier for cants will might type applicant of vehicle If a carrier fails to or what the risks assumed. own, regardless many charge how adequately for the risks assess or might insure assumed, vehicles the carrier long will not be business. legislature adequately liability problems of assess- under While the risk, requirement, and if risk, underwriting enacted such may has not ing and of so, undoubtedly single owners difficult, princi- it did complex the above be increases. sustain rate vehicle would ples the same. remain sum, nothing in our In find arguable risk we principal It spe- mo- scheme automobile damage caused an uninsured cifically requires an insurance carrier occupying when the insured is torist exists coverage to an insured being injured extend vehicle. The risk a motor is not an insured an owned vehicle motorist while by an uninsured stick, camel, under a motor vehicle horse, pogo the carrier riding a public policy implicit in find no policy. We pedestrian on one’s front while a automobile insur- Hence, statutory scheme of may relatively slight. our porch, be require should such willing ance which to assume such addi- carrier clause pre- and thus invalidate slight an increased tional risk without speak to do not in the instant case. We Arguably case mium. specifically and the in majority reserve That pitiful became even more presented circumstance as is shortly overruling Hammon thereafter the of two insured where an under two or more motor upon of the cases which the ma- Arkansas liability policies, Mioreover, each issued the jority majority had relied. the carrier, same and each of which regrettably ignores insures a plain language of vehicle, separate poli- and in each of which Coverage Idaho’s Uninsured Motorist stat- cies issued the same carrier ute, the insured 41-2502, in a manner fundamen- § paid premium has elected to and for tally inconsistent with its treatment of case, Such a same statute Hammon v. In- Farmers course, of would then involve the of issue surance 109 Idaho stacking coverages under each (1985). Hammon, of As in the beneficiaries policies issued the same carrier. Since opinion today’s misguided of are those today held we have companies surance dedicated to the of use policy clause in the instant cov- eliminates avoiding adhesion contracts as a means for erage is anoth- statutorily losers, required coverage. The er course, the same of are the people “insured” of Ida- carrier, and have held that such result, exclusion- ho. To reach this now majority ary against public clause is not void as precisely opposite takes tack was stacking we need not address the taken in Hammon. It seems that “in- issue instant case. lose, people sured” of Idaho are bound to required guarantee whatever the means to Judgment of the af- district court “just” unjustly their fate to be respondent. firmed. Costs to purchased. denied has been provision Hammon concerned DONALDSON, C.J., BAKES, J., and con- automobile insurance which excluded cur. injuries suffered at the hands BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting. of a hit-and-run driver where there nowas “physical contact” with victim. not, Our task in this case was as the provision held this was not in der- majority suggests, simply to determine ogation of I.C. 41-2502. The sole basis § specific “the upon whether exclusion relied holding following analysis: was the this by Rocky Mountain which denies circumstances, these requires void as 41-2502 I.C. §(cid:127) public policy,” but to determine in every whether be offered automobile legislature’s poli- void in the amount set forth cy as stated Idaho’s Uninsured protection persons Motorist statute “for the Statute, Coverage pur- legally I.C. 41-2502. In enti- insured thereunder who § supposed suit requirement damages of a judicial of a tled recover from owners protect companies operators ve- uninsured motor ____” having good make statutory urge on their hicles The Hammons obligations, contractual aof term “uninsured motor vehicle” should ignores necessity both the dictates of I.C. be construed include “unidentified reasoning However, 41-2502 of the over- motor vehicle.” it is funda- whelming majority of courts which have rule construction mental addressed the exact language issue. As Justice Fo- a statute be that the must gleman of the aptly given ordinary Arkansas Court so its common and mean- it, expressed See, regret “I ing. e.g., Sparks Flying see this court Florek align Service, Inc., pitifully minority itself with a small 83 Idaho jurisdictions] deciding such a case a stat- [of [as [WJhere Holcomb v. unambiguous, express Farmers Insurance ute the clear one].” Exchange, 495 (Fogleman, given S.W.2d must legislature intent J., dissenting). con- there is no occasion effect

108 Lawler, concerning

struction.” State v. 81 Idaho Court noted Supreme the same 171, 264, 175, 266 statutory language: “The statute does not clearly contemplate piecemeal whittling away An “uninsured” vehicle is the same protection injuries vehicle. caused “unidentified” The statute directs that be by uninsured motorists.” Calvert v. protection per- made available for the Co., 291, 144 Farmers Insurance Ariz. 697 legally sons insured thereunder who 684, (Ariz.1985) (citations 688 to nu- opera- entitled to recover from owners or omitted). merous cases accord tors uninsured motor vehicles. This majority purports The to find “no lan- language obviously contemplates that guage” requiring coverage in the statute proof identity of there is the own- where the insured is in an unlisted vehicle. vehicle; operator er or otherwise surprising This majority is not where the it could be ascertained that ve- conveniently attempting any analy- avoids Normally, when hicle was uninsured. language By so sis of the statute. automobile, vehicle is a hit-and-run confining itself the has been un- identity cannot be ascertained. phrase able to discover therein the “for the 288, Hammon, supra, 109 Idaho at 707 protection persons insured thereunder.” added; (emphasis 399 footnote P.2d at Clearly, to converse situation omitted). Hammon, majority’s it better suits Applying those same rules opinion ignore stat- result-oriented to yields to case construction the instant plain language express intent. ute’s degrees apart today’s ma result 180 thing In each case One is certain: jority decision. The common and ordi company has received the favor surance meaning “persons nary insured there speaks for the Court. beings insured under the under” human poli insured under the not vehicles Amazingly, majority need have cy. unambig The of the statute correct answer to looked no further for the companies to uously requires insurance of today’s question deci- than Hammon protection of fer for the hu justice majority the same three sion which beings being unambig man insured. they stat- Therein wrote: “The rendered. is that negative uous inference from this coverage made available ute directs that be companies may not exclude cov persons protection of thereunder for the beings occupy erage to these human recover from legally entitled to who are driving ing or a vehicle not listed operators of uninsured motor owners express intent behind The clear Hammon, 109 supra, Idaho at vehicles.” require 41-2502 is § added). (emphasis 399 P.2d at 707 persons short of its forbid recognized language clearly that the This perpetrated requirement such as protected persons, not vehicles. statute Accord, e.g., company. instant insurance necessarily rejects its Today’s majority Automobile Welch State Farm Mutual understanding of I.C. 41-2502 as own Co., 122 361 N.W.2d Wis.2d recorded Hammon. Howe, (1985); 680 Lindahl v. 345 N.W.2d permit legislature intended Had the 1984); (Iowa In Harvey v. Travelers 548 tying of uninsured motorist Co., 245, 449 A.2d 157 demnity 188 Conn. vehicles, easily have done so. In- could (1982); Mid-Century Insurance Bradley v. persons stead, legislature required that 141 Co., Mich.App. N.W.2d opportunity protect them- offered the Co., (1980); v. Farmers Insurance Otto hardships of the financial selves (Mo.App.1977);Nygaard v. 558 S.W.2d 713 through purchase irresponsible drivers Automobile Insur State Farm Mutual legis- 221 N.W.2d ance 301 Minn. did not restrict uninsured motorist Warren, lature (1975); Elledge So.2d per- coverage to where the circumstances Arizona (La.App.1972). As the unanimous injured liability coverage express son the same vehicle which but omitted such losses. See liability was insured permission in its Uninsured Motorist Cover- Calvert Farmers Insurance age strongly statute in- demonstrates its (“If (1985) Ariz. the very vehicle” “other the to allow tent not Legislature had intended to include addi- Ster- today. us concerns which exclusion exclusions, tional such as an ‘other vehicle’ P.2d Bloom, 111 Idaho ling v. deny coverage exclusion would to [which maxim, (reflecting the (1986) 755 n. 7 persons injured insured in vehicles other alterius). expressio unius est exclusio than by liability policy], those covered the (which majori- expression the This of intent so.”); id. expressly would have done ref- ty ignores), coupled the statute’s with Uninsured Motorist P.2d at 689 {“[OJur (a majority persons the erence to reference protection Act was created the ‘for ignores), convincing legislature is persons,’ protection and not for per- be offered intended for to to vehicle.” (Emphasis added.)); place as to prescription sons without Otto, Harvey, supra; Bradley, supra; su- persons As injured. where are when those pra. Calvert court observed: legislature knew how to tie That to vehicles rather than There nothing is in our uninsured mo- persons clearly to is evinced in Idaho’s lia- torist statute which limits coverage de- statute, bility insurance I.C. 49-233. § pending on the location or status of the requires liability coverage That statute for Thus, insured. our uninsured motorist injury, damages, resulting or death from protection portable. is The insured and the maintenance or use motor ve- family members insured are covered not hicles : only vehicle, when an insured Required 49-233. motor vehicle in- automobile, but also when another (a) Every owner aof motor surance. — foot, when on bicycle when aon or when registered operated vehicle porch. Calvert, sitting supra, on a in Idaho permis- owner or with his 689; accord, e.g., continuously provide Bradley, shall su- sion insur- pra; Welch, ance Elledge, supra; loss resulting supra. liability imposed by bodily law for or injury death damage or property suffered legislature good had reason to tie caused or maintenance use persons a motor vehicle or motor vehicles de- rather than to' vehicles. The insured indi- scribed therein in an amount less injured vidual who is mo- than required by 49-1521, section equally disadvantaged when Code, Idaho and shall demonstrate the jured street, walking whether down the existence of coverage required stick,” hopping majority’s “pogo or Code, title Idaho or a certificate of driving passenger in a vehicle listed self-insurance issued the department Id. Obviously, risk pursuant 49-1534, Code, section Idaho insured from uninsured motorists differs for registered. each motor vehicle to be risk liability from the (Emphasis added.) insurance concerns. The former risk one concedes, majority As the injury “person”; to one’s the latter is clearly permits the exclusion of causing the risk of injury arising others

for vehicles not “described therein [within out of the use one’s own For vehicle. the insurance policy.]” As the reason, legislature this obvious wrote concedes, also 41-2502 lacks such I.C. § separate basically different statutes language permitting an “other vehicle” ex- govern respective risks. Yet the ma- clusion. But as the refuses to acknowledge, jority legislature though treats 41-2502 as fact § expressly permitted wording exclusion to were identical to I.C. 49-233. smiling majority’s upon the Professor Alan Widiss noted some time “other ago: “Acquisition of open possibil- a second

vehicles” exclusion leaves therefore, relatively inexpensive; ity of various absurd results. As the ma- permitting the insurer to withhold out, jority points Rocky under his Mountain for the small return seems of dubious mer Dullenty passenger policy, had been Widiss, A. A it.” Guide to Uninsured pedestrian, else’s or a someone (1969) (revised Coverage Motorist 2.9§ porch had been on his front when he Second, Idaho, along infra). version cited injured an uninsured he was jurisdictions, virtually other with all has Thus, Dullenty have been insured. would place motorist uninsured statutes standing next his Blazer was in- while legislative policy contain no sured, stepped unprotected once he but was extending coverage persons insured un precluded legislature such ab- inside. The by happenstance who der requiring coverage “persons” surdity by injured in a vehicle other than the listed as Re- limitation to circumstances. without contrary, To the statutes vehicle. legislature’s is grettably, work now policies “persons” that insure mandate suspect highly opinion. court undone a they injury are from the risk of wherever empathizes majority with motorist, uninsured the hands of an risks related to weighing carriers’ its of the potential to all since the risk is threat which an the various circumstances under they “persons” and ar whoever wherever might injure “poli important, Third and most both these person. This makes toler- sured discussion espoused by majority arguments cy” interesting reading, wholly ably but irrel- perceptions spring rather from its own evant, legislature since the directed statute, legisla from the wherein the than in all cir- persons be insured the insured majority expressed. The ture’s evidently legislature cumstances. venerable ad do well to take some would weighed sufficiently great to re- the risk very unruly policy] ais vice: “[Public quire unexcepted horse, you get you it once astride and when carry It you. it never know where will Continuing empathy insur- in its for the It is may you from the sound law. decries, lead along industry, majority ance points argued at all but when never inequity “the “opinions,” other certain with Mellish, Bingham. 2 Richardson fail.” who insures one ve- allowing Here, (J. 229, (1824) Burrough). with 252 hicle with an insurance carrier obtain argument based plausible out obtaining coverage by thereby ‘free ride’ persuasive au language the statute one, two, or a fleet by that same carrier on polic its own thority, mounts pre- paid no upon which he has of vehicles 1 reckless ride on a y takes Idahoans and up- mium to the carrier.” “Some courts Idahoans, horse Sorry over a cliff. validity of holding the not listed. clauses,” “opine majority, observes the operat- lengthy prologue pri- rewarding plaintiff Curiously, who himself is Dunbar, leg- policy-making ing uninsured vehicle or to the rep- purportedly all, cases the “free cites twelve policy.” First of islative viewpoints” on resenting “the various majority re- philosophy to which the ride” Despite the “policy” credible, considerations. hardly the cost of add- these fers is plural reference to “various majority’s slight. As vehicles is ing coverage to other statute, which con- the first bar find this not 1. The bench and now, Act which the Tort Claims statutory us as with Shepard lan- cerns confused time Justice has Dunbar, us in place concerned guage order to this Court and case law in enunciating than the "scintilla "determining far more position and and case law afford willing Shepard [legislative] policy.” intent” Justice v. United Steelworkers Dunbar 546, 21, 523, America, 602 P.2d 100 Idaho to concede. Id. Bloom, (1979), Sterling 111 Idaho overruled the un- the case of 723 P.2d 755 In “opinions” viewpoints” Legislature and to “some If our had pre- intended to holds, finally courts” which hold as it elev- vent an owner of two motor vehicles uniformly paying only en of the twelve cases cited insurance on one recovering held “other vehicle” injuries benefits for exclusions invalid. See, other, operating sustained while e.g., Chavez v. State Farm Mutual could legis- have followed the lead Co., Automobile Insurance 87 N.M. latures in some of jurisdictions the other (“other (1975) 533 P.2d vehicle” and limited by providing void; exclusionary policy coverage required 693.115(1) apply N.R.S. did not plaintiff’s injuries on unin- sustained bodily injury suffered the insured motorcycle); Federated American sured a motor vehicle owned Raynes, Insurance Co. v. 88 Wash.2d him, occupied unless the vehicle was (same (1977) holding); Co- an insured motor vehicle. Such thren v. Emcasco prerogative amendment would (Okla.1976) (same holding). For ex- responsibility legislature and not ample, rejected very the Ohio Court the function of this court. State Farm argument now makes: Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Appellant argues invalidating Hinkel, 87 Nev. exclusion would result in a “free ride” (1971); accord, Calvert, supra, Terry is, Ady. for That he could obtain at 689 and numerous citations therein. coverage, uninsured at addi- Widiss, Professor of author the definitive cost, policy. tional under his father’s Ini- insurance, treatise on uninsured motorist tially, important is Terry it to note that effectively possible justifi- rebuts all of the Ady paid premiums for uninsured motor- cations for this exclusion: coverage policy. Here, ist under his own explanation One for the is exclusion asking he coverage was for under his designed it is to the scope reduce policy only expenses father’s for above liability insured’s under the uninsured those covered his own policy. But for scope Since [the coverage____ exclusion, he qualify would for cover- uninsured motorist insurance is of] age under his policy. father’s mandated, little, statutorily there is if importantly, More the purpose of the any, justification allowing insureds for protect persons is to injured by statute coverage to include this exclusion in motorists, it does limit cov- potential liability. order to reduce their erage ato Ady v. West few situations. Once a state has decided it is American Insurance 69 Ohio St.2d public interest to assure a source of 433 N.E.2d persons are who in- indemnification event, In any majority simply what the jured by negligent uninsured motor- will grips not come to with is the fact that ists, ought then the to be insurance insured individuals like Dullenty bought person to an available insured all ” paid “person. their times, including when the insured is for Accord, e.g., id. buys A person who sever- a vehicle owned another insuring al such policies his or her is (A) insured, walking clause down a purchase. entitled to the benefits of the rocking street or in a chair. ... An insured obtains no “free ride” from family may member exclusion policies bought paid However, for. have been included in the uninsured mo- under majority’s holding Rocky Moun- family terms to induce all tain and companies all insurance are acquire liability members to insurance receiving now the ones lunch a —hav- for each automobile owned members free household____ ing sold the insured uninsured motorist is doubtful [I]t affording but now immunized from whether the exclusion fact much has policy. impact under the fulfilling objectives pro- The Nevada [the Supreme aptly moting observed: the sale of insurance and the

public having acquire type owners nores the character interest true of this transaction____ be- all insurance vehicles] purchasers probably most un- cause plausible The most for the rationale impact on aware of the exclusion and its family may member exclusion be that it coverage____ designed ... reduce the number standpoint From the the insurance multiple instances which the cover- company, the exclusion is desirable age by eliminating can arise encourages acquisition occupies for an insured who a by family for all vehicles owned surance a member the in- together from sin- members who reside family sured’s when the vehicles However, company. most gle insurance the same In other little, any, companies make words, an additional exclusion pur- this fact known effort to make avoiding means of claims under more chasers, unlikely thus it is that this coverage____ than one insured motorist in either insurance significant factor many Suffice it observe here that marketing computations of actuarial provisions in unin- multiple coverage charged for the cov- premiums be sured motorist insurance have been void- ____ erage in a substantial number of states ed [the family member exclu- The household for which Professor Widiss dis- reason as a limited sion also intended Widiss, 1 Unin- A. cusses elsewhere]. immunity intrafamily tort form of Motorist In- sured and Underinsured preclude when claim would 1985) (2d (emphasis surance 4.19 ed. family mem- negligence based added) (footnotes omitted; citations omit- ber____ Although compa- the insurance ted). ny’s liability the uninsured motor- under authority which has decided this is- depends negligence ist insurance today’s contrary to is the clear sue decision may in some instances person of a —who generally, A. See growing majority. family claim is be a member —the Widiss, supra. The Arizona Court com- company par- a first the insurance under Calvert, su- piled jurisdictions, a list 26 Accordingly, the ty contract. insurance 687-88, pra, we can to which 697 family by disrupting the possibility of supra, Ady, add Arizona and Ohio. now members, among family litigation also, Farmers 433 N.E.2d at 551. See important justifica- one of the most Call, Exchange 231 v. Insurance intra-family immunity, does tions for context____ 1985) (invalidated (Utah “household” exclu- exist in this sion). majority’s cavalier Contrary to the has occa- Enforcement of the exclusion assertion, opin- these and undocumented so urged on the basis that sionally been carefully thoroughly typically are ions long coverage provisions are as the Calvert, See, supra; e.g., reasoned. mo- the state’s uninsured conflict with Lindahl, Welch, supra; Elledge, supra; legislation, policy terms torist insurance supra; supra; Bradley, supra; Harvey, agreement be- should be treated Otto, yield to the supra. These courts parties____ [However,] tween [m]ost plain language and clear legislature’s barely the unin- aware of purchasers are contrast, cited the four cases tent. In They nei- are sured motorist v. both. Holcomb ignore they of nor do understand ther aware Exchange, 254 Ark. Farmers Insurance provision such intricacies of (fails analyze (1973) to 155 495 S.W.2d exclu- family member as the household Insurance sion____ language); MFA statutory of informed There is lack Whitlock, v. 856 Companies 572 S.W.2d purchasers assent (a along with its (Ky.1978) opinion, brief cov- provisions the uninsured motorist predecessor, State Farm equally cursory enforceability of erage. predicate To Company Insurance ig- Mutual Automobile assent presumed the exclusion

H3 Christian, hand, v. (Ky.1977), opinions holding 555 S.W.2d 571 “On other quote which fails examine even clauses to be valid Liberty Herrick v. language); most often refer the inequity of allow Mutual, 202 Neb. 274 N.W.2d 147 ing a who insures one vehicle (Neb.1979) (a opinion judi brief based on with an carrier obtain cially perceived policy rather than on statu by thereby ride’ obtaining coverage ‘free v. tory language); Beliveau & one, two, that same carrier on or a Norfolk Insurance, Dedham Mutual Fire 120 N.H. upon paid fleet vehicles which he has (fails (1980) A.2d 411 1101 to distin premium to the carrier. courts Some guish liability and mo between upholding validity of such exclusion coverage). The fourth case relied ary opine rewarding plain clauses Beliveau, upon by majority, involved tiff who operating himself is an unin exclusion of a relative legislative sured vehicle is living in the insured’s household rather presenting For cases the various himself; than consequently, viewpoints, see v. Aetna Hurst Cal. [2 Beliveau, point. not on su this case App.3d 1067], Cal.Rptr. (Ct.App. 83 156 pra, A.2d at 1103. 411 1969); State Farm Mutual v. Robertson Ind.App. 149], (Ct. While sheer N.E.2d 626 numbers decisions [156 Bradley Century v. App.Ind.1973); Mid controlling, weight not be when the is as Insurance scale, Mich.App. 67], on one end it is 259 N.W.2d extreme [78 Nygaard State here, (Mich.App.1977); evinces the sheer v. numbers” “sheer Farm folly adopting 10], pervasive- a rule law so Minn. N.W.2d [301 Farm, (Minn.1974); ly Lowrey State shunned courts. (Miss.1974); the majority Herrick v. Liber position Even as takes the So.2d exclusion, Mutual, upholding jurisdictions (Neb.1979); ty 274 N.W.2d 147 formerly position v. State held are Chavez Farm Mutual [87 N.M. recognizing fallacious, it to be Ady 327], (N.M.1975); and hence 533 P.2d 100 Calvert, supra abandoning Company See it. West American (Arizona); Ady, supra (Ohio); Richards v. (Ohio 593], Ohio St.2d 433 N.E.2d 547 [69 State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, Insur- 1981); Cothren v. Emcasco Co., 172, ance 122 Wis.2d 361 680 N.W.2d (Okla.1976); Bankes P.2d 1037 555 (Wisc.1985); Shepard v. American States Farm 162], State Mutual [216 Pa.Super. Co., (Mo.1984). 671 777 S.W.2d Federated (Pa.Super.1970); A.2d 197 264 majority today The for rea- unfathomable Raynes American Insurance [88 sons takes an ill-charted course without (Wash.1977); 439], 563 P.2d 815 Wash.2d any regard to the and language, Bell v. State Farm 623], 207 W.Va. [157 wholly overwhelming per- at odds with and (W.Va.1974).” 147 S.E.2d authority. suasive is, The fact that of cited, the twelve cases HUNTLEY, J., concurs. one, case, supports the the only Nebraska dissenting. Justice, HUNTLEY, case, Her position; even that and majority Mutual, 116, Liberty rick v. 202 274 Neb. doing and in so respectfully dissent I must (Neb.1979), explained 147 can be as N.W.2d the bench bar the attention of and so invite being poorly reasoned. holdings of eleven appreciation to an by majority opinion cases cited of twelve ignores plain The Herrick majority 203 pages 103 and P.2d at pages at 721 language of Nebraska’s Uninsured Motor- representing of the various view- and 204 as Coverage Statute, holding its ist that from points. overriding public perspective, policy “[a]n owner-operator inex- cases, protecting an who The there cites twelve bodily cusably applicable has no supposedly support posi- its some of which tion, coverage presently is not discernible.” introducing with the follow- them Herrick, (quoting Ship- ing N.W.2d statement: Co., ley v. American Standard Insurance attempt sion an constitutes invalid FAI (1968)). 183 Neb. In N.W.2d 238 to erode the amount of uninsured motorist the Herrick process, majority, like coverage respondent to which is entitled. herein, acknowledge refuses Respondent may combine the two unin- policy as in Nebraska’s established coverages sured motorist so as to have dissenting justices statute. two ac- $30,000 in uninsured un- Shipley knowledged “wrongly de- Federated der with FAI.” “supported by an ever- which view cided” Raynes, American Ins. Co. v. 88 Wash.2d lessening states and number of holding Nebras- once with number states (3) “Provision of uninsured motorist position and re- their ka re-examined have bodily excluding injury clause for themselves, as Arizona and versed [such highway sustained while ve This has as we should do.” Illinois] hicle owned the named insured but opportunity an avoid Nebraska listed was void was mistake, we do so. Court’s and should hence, public policy; clause could not be of the eleven cases which are exem- Four deny coverage injuries used to for sus plary holdings of the other eleven stepson, who tained named insured’s majority are: cases cited same was a resident of the household (1) invalid “The exclusion clause here is riding passen injured who was while intent of because it is not the the statute ger motorcycle, the title to which was particu- insured to limit an stepfather his mother but either particular or a vehicle. As lar location not listed as an insured vehicle.” which was Ap- pointed out the Louisiana Court v. Emcasco Insur Cothren Headnote peals in construing a statute identical to (Okl.1976). ance P.2d 1037 ours: (4) clause in an “An uninsured motorist statute requirement ‘There conforms to relation, at the have insured statute, family all members of insures he any vehicle accident, with time ex- without a named insured’s household insur- with is insured owns bodily injury results ception whenever protection motorists uninsured er. motor- with uninsured from accident family mem- covers motorist would ist in which the uninsured vehicles, riding in uninsured while bers required legally liable. Within vehicles, while commercial riding in while are no there front rocking pedestrians an owned but regard to distinctions with ” porch.’ motor not insured motor occupancy of ‘a applies to use or Chavez v. State Farm Mutual Insurance ” Co., or otherwise.’ 100, 103 (1975). 87 N.M. (2) limits-of-liability “... We believe therefore,

provision conflicts with the “An coverage.” providing purpose spreading seeks to defeat entitled to vision ber of insured. Because ber of “We hold that the number of ^[*] premiums policies FAI’s coverages rely ^[*] is determined under which paid ^[*] on which an insured purports limits-of-liability pro- and not ^[*] the cars are ^[*] to limit cov- the num- the num- ^[*] the burden age by limiting erwise, A Guide to Uninsured Section 29: with statute. repugnant approval the insurance underwriter’s In this of loss or through regard the uninsured motorist following Motorist exclusions or oth- benefits the Court notes from Widess. Coverage, cover- growing trend of ‘There seems policies erage is- based on the number taken have decisions in which courts sued to an insured and not number insured, restrictions provi- position that such premiums paid [exclu- sionary upon clauses]

against public policy and therefore void. following

One case ... elicited re-

sponse speaks [of ‘Thus, generally: clauses] ap-

the uninsured was

plicable sustaining injury time occupying

... named insured was

Ford described his

foot or on horseback or while rocking porch chair on his front a non-owned automobile ” regular furnished for his use.’

Bell State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 147, 149, 150 (1974). 207 S.E.2d

W.Va. overwhelming justices judges throughout this land have de-

cided to the herein after

analyzing depth all the considerations

which face this court in the instant case. entirely possible

It is that “our three” are

right wrong and the “rest” are is there —or possibility? another

BISTLINE, J., concurs.

721 P.2d 215 Easley,

Donald EASLEY and David

Plaintiffs-Appellants, Lee, LEE

R.W. and Irene husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 15525.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

June 1986.

Case Details

Case Name: Dullenty v. Rocky Mountain Fire & Casualty Co.

Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court

Date Published: Jun 4, 1986

Citation: 721 P.2d 198

Docket Number: 15889

Court Abbreviation: Idaho