66 Md. 120 | Md. | 1886
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellant purchased of the appellee, a railroad transporting passengers for reward, a ticket from Elkton to Stanton, when a train was approaching and going toward “Stanton.” He boarded that train and found, that, hy the company’s regulations, that train could not and would not stop at “Stanton;” so that he was required, either, to stop at “Newark” and wait for a train which would stop at Stanton, or, to pay the additional fare of ten cents, for the distance from Stanton to Newport, (a station beyond “ Stanton ” at which the train he boarded did stop,) and then walk back to Stanton, a distance of about three miles. He chose to do neither; but stopped at 'Newark and finished his journey to Stanton on foot, and has sued the railroad company for selling him a ticket by a train, which, he claims, was represented to him as then about to proceed from Elkton to Stanton, “to deliver passengers at the latter station.” He does not claim, nor attempt to prove that the ticket agent, or any officer of the company or train, expressly represented to him, either voluntarily or in response to inquiry from him, or other person in his presence, that the train then approaching and which he took, was his right train, and would stop at Stanton. If he had so proved, a very different question would have been presented, and one of more seriousness upon which we design hereby to intimate no opinion. He made no inquiry; but he claims the sale of the ticket,
The Circuit Court did not think the evidence legally sufficient to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff, and accordingly so instructed the jury; and the verdict and judgment being for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed.
We fully agree with the Circuit Court, and think there was no error in taking the case from the jury.
It is well settled law, that railroad companies from the nature and necessities of their business, must have the power to make reasonable rules and regulations as to the manner of performing their duties as public carriers; that is to say, as to the hour and schedule time for starting and running their trains, and as to the places, on the route, at which particular trains shall stop in transit. Schedule posters informing the public of the time of departure from particular places, and the destination of the several trains are placed in the ticket offices, station houses and public places in view of the public, and time tables are always on hand for distribution, that passengers may he well informed of the hour at which, and train hy which they may reach any desired destination on the line of the road. Being thus informed or afforded the means of information, persons desiring tickets of travel are expected to inform themselves as to the train they wish and must take for their destination; and if they do not understand or see the notices, it is their duty in law to inquire and learn what train they should take to reach the point they wish; and if a mistake is made, not induced hy the railroad company, against which ordinary diligence as to inquiry would have protected, no redress against the
In the present case it is admitted, that a large printed schedule of the trains and their time of respective departure from Elkton, and where they would severally stop, was conspicuously posted in the Elkton ticket office, where the appellant purchased his ticket. By that poster it appears, as it does also by other evidence, that there were five trains which left Elkton, at that time, daily, going northward, four of which stopped at Stanton, where the appellant wanted to go, and only one of those trains did not stop at Stanton; and that was the one appellant selected for his trip and boarded. The appellant lays his mistake, and consequent disappointment at the door of the appellee, and bases his claim for damages on the contention, that he took the train he did because of the conduct of the agent in selling him a ticket as the train ivas about to arrive, which act of the agent, according to his understanding of the agent’s custom amounted to a representation to him that that train would stop at Stanton.
A custom or usage which will control the interpretation of a contract mustbe one which is of such general acceptance and prevalence in a community that all contracts are presumed to have been made with the knowledge of and with reference to such custom or usage. Anson on Contracts, 244-5; Johnson vs. Railroad, 46 N. H., 220-1; Foley and Woodside vs. Mason & Son, 6 Md., 48. Whether, therefore, this be a suit for violation of a contract by the Company, or for misrepresentation, it is clear that the
Finally, it was contended that the ticket being marked “ for this day and train only,” this was of itself a representation. Clearly it was not. Had it been marked “good for train No. 26 only,” which train he took, the contention would he plausible ; but it was not so marked. Being a first-class ticket the evidence is all one way, that it was good till used. And if it were not, it was good for that ivhole day and any train going to Stanton that day ; so that he could have taken another train. The ticket’s statement could certainly not deceive. As, in our opinion, the evidence offered, under no state of the pleading, would be legally sufficient to warrant a finding for the plaintiff, we have not found it necessary to consider the questions raised by demurrer.
Judgment affirmed.