MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Henry DuLaurence filed this action against Liberty Mutual, his one
L BACKGROUND
The factual background provided here is derived from DuLaurence’s Amended Complaint and incorporated documents. The procedural background is derived from the Amended Complaint and public records. Wilson v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc.,
Liberty Mutual is a Massachusetts corporation with a principal place of business in Boston, Massachusetts. Am. Compl. ¶ 16. DuLaurence worked for Liberty Mutual as an attorney and was terminated in April 1995. Id. ¶ 17. Telegen is a partner at the law firm Seyfarth Shaw. Id. ¶ 15.
A. First Superior Court Action: The Underlying Employment Action
DuLaurence brought an employment action in Suffolk Superior Court in July 1995 against Liberty Mutual and several of its employees alleging misconduct with respect to his termination Id. ¶ 17. Telegen represented Liberty Mutual and the individually named defendants throughout that action. DuLaurence brought claims in fourteen counts, thirteen of which were dismissed on summary judgment. Id. ¶ 20. DuLaurence contends that summary judgment was improperly granted as a result of unethical and criminal conduct by Telegen and Liberty Mutual. Id. ¶ 21. These allegations involve discovery-related conduct, including failing to respond to interrogatories, instructing witnesses not to answer questions in depositions, and refusing to produce deponents. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 21, 51, 52, 54, 55, 58. During the course of discovery, DuLaurence filed multiple-interlocutory appeals disputing the Superior Court’s discovery orders, all of which were denied by the Appeals Court. Id. ¶1¶20, 49. Sanctions were assessed against DuLaurence in one of these appeals. Id. ¶ 70.
A jury trial took place in August 2004 against three Liberty Mutual employees on the sole remaining count of tortious interference with an employment relationship. Id. ¶ 23. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of one of the defendants, and the jury returned verdicts in favor of the remaining two defendants. Id. IT 24— 25.
B. Second Superior Court Action: The State Collateral Action
DuLaurence filed a new complaint in the Superior Court in July 2010 against Liberty Mutual and Telegen. Id. ¶ 32. DuLau-rence alleged “tortious interference with the practice of law,” abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, fraud and deceit against Telegen and Liberty Mutual based on their conduct of the first Superior Court employment action. DuLaurence also sought to set aside the judgment in the employment action pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Telegen and Liberty Mutual filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6) and the Massachustts anti-SLAPP statute, Mass. Gen. Laws c. 231 § 59H. Id. ¶ 37. The Superior Court granted the Special Motion to Dismiss pursuant to anti-SLAPP and also granted the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, adopting the reasoning of the defendants without issuing a written opinion. Id. ¶ 30. The court denied DuLaurence’s motion for reconsideration. Telegen and Liberty Mutual filed a Request for Fees pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, and the Superior Court granted the request, awarding defendants $29,858.82. Id. ¶ 42. The court denied DuLaurence’s motion for reconsideration of this award.
The Appeals Court affirmed the Superi- or Court’s order as to the anti-SLAPP judgment, DuLaurence v. Telegen (Collateral Action Appeal),
C. Instant Federal Collateral Action
DuLaurence commenced this action by filing a complaint against Liberty Mutual and Telegen on June 3, 2014. He filed an
The complaint alleges eleven counts as to both of the defendants, Liberty Mutual and Telegen. Count one is for an alleged violation of civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Counts two to four are counts alleging violations of federal criminal statutes. Count two alleges obstruction of justice, under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) and (2), count three alleges conspiracy to obstruct justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) and § 371, and count four alleges obstruction of judicial proceedings, 18 U.S.C. § 1508.
Counts five to eight each seek to set aside the prior proceedings. Count five cites Rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal and Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, count six cites Rule 60(b)(4) for the employment action, count seven cites Rule 60(b)(4) for the collateral action, and count eight cites the residual clause, Rule 60(b)(6). Count nine requests costs for unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Count ten alleges intentional interference with the practice of law. Count eleven alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress. Each of these counts concerns the conduct of Tele-gen and Liberty Mutual during litigation of the earlier state court proceedings.
Telegen and Liberty Mutual filed a motion to dismiss DuLaurence’s amended complaint generally; the defendants also filed a special motion to dismiss pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws ch. 231, § 59H, the anti-SLAPP statute. In addition, the defendants filed a motion to enjoin vexatious litigation. For his part, DuLaurence has opposed each of these motions and also moved to strike the motion to enjoin vexatious litigation and for sanctions against Telegen and Liberty Mutual.
II. THE DUTY OF THE FEDERAJL COURT NOT TO INTERFERE WITH FINAL STATE COURT JUDGMENTS
The plaintiff in this case essentially seeks review and displacement of final state court judgments. Finding that I have an obligation not to do so: (A) because lower federal courts lack jurisdiction for such an-undertaking, and (B) because even if jurisdiction were granted to entertain this litigation, I am affirmatively obligated to give full faith and credit to the relevant state judgments,- I will dismiss this case without reaching the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claims.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Although neither party raised concerns about this court’s jurisdiction in this matter, I have an obligation to inquire sua sponte into my ability to exercise subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); McCulloch v. Velez,
While DuLaurence has framed his claims in this action as arising under federal statutes, which typically leads to federal question jurisdiction, closer examination of the claims themselves makes clear that I do not have jurisdiction over this action. Congress granted authority for a federal court to review a state court judgment solely to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). In two cases, District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is not simply preclusion by another name,” because it applies only in the limited circumstance “where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court.” Lance,
In Exxon, the Supreme Court noted that it has only found the Rooker-Feld-man doctrine applicable in the two cases that form its name. Id. at 287,
This action, which is a repackaging of the state court appeal, however, is precisely the type of case designed to fit within the narrow confines of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The doctrine applies only to (1) a party who lost in a state-court judgment that (2) was rendered before the federal action commenced, where (3) the party complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgment and (4) invites district court review and rejection of those judgments. See Silva v. Massachusetts,
First Circuit precedent is clear that a claim need not directly assert that it is attempting to appeal or attack a state court decision in order to fall within the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Rather, a plaintiffs claims may be “an effort to do an end run around the state court’s judgment.” Miller v. Nichols,
In this case, DuLaurence does not allege any violation or misconduct by the defendants that occurred outside of or separate from their conduct during the state court litigation. The only possible harm that DuLaurence suffered due to any discovery misconduct was as a result of the state court rulings based on that discovery. The relief requested by DuLaurence includes vacatur of the judgments in favor of defendants and entry of judgment for Du-Laurenee in the underlying actions. Throughout the complaint, in addition to attacking the conduct of the defendants and despite framing the counts as being directed to the two plaintiffs, DuLaurence also makes repeated allegations about unethical, criminal, and illegal conduct by the judges that presided over the case in state court. See, e.g., Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 115-32.
If “a plaintiff implicitly or explicitly seeks review and rejection of the state judgment, then a federal suit seeking an opposite result is an impermissible attempt to appeal the state judgment to the lower federal courts,” which the Rooker-Feld-man doctrine teaches means that the federal courts lack jurisdiction. Federación de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico,
Although the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a narrow one, the core of the doctrine is designed to address precisely these situations. DuLaurence asks me to act as a federal appellate court in these completed state proceedings. I do not have subject matter jurisdiction to do so.
B. Res Judicata
Even if I did have jurisdiction, I would be obligated to conclude that the final judgments in state court preclude-further review of the claims DuLaurence now makes. I give judgments the same res judicata effect they would receive in Massachusetts state court. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see also Isaac v. Schwartz,
Issue preclusion prevents re-litigation of the same issue in a later action based on a different claim. Id. To find issue preclusion, a court must find that “(1) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication; (2) the party against whom preclusion is asserted was a party (or in privity with a party) to the prior adjudication; and (3) the issue in the prior adjudication was identical to the issue in the current adjudication.” Id. Some of the allegations in this action are barred by both types of preclusion, but issue preclusion has the broader scope in this case.
Both doctrines require that there be a final judgment on the merits in the prior case, and DuLaurence contends that there has not been one here. While not every issue in this case has been determined by terms on the merits, the issues surrounding the conduct of discovery have been. During the first Superior Court action, three Superior Court judges issued discovery orders. DuLaurence took four interlocutory appeals to the Appeals Court, and his appeals were denied each time. After summary judgment and trial, DuLaurence again appealed the discovery rulings and violations he alleged below.
The Appeals Court in the employment action noted that it was “unnecessary to enter th[e] thicket” of the parties’ motions and allegations of misconduct because Du-Laurence had not identified any judicial ruling that showed an abuse of judicial discretion. DuLaurence,
The finality of that ruling was acknowledged by the Appeals Court again, in the appeal of the collateral action.
DuLaurence’s factual allegations in this action closely tracked those raised in his appeal from the adverse judgment. In that appeal, DuLaurence maintained that he was entitled to relief from the judgment based on the ‘egregious discovery violations that clearly prejudiced his case.’ According to DuLaurence, the defendants’ misconduct included violations of numerous court orders, withholding evidence, misleading judges, misrepresentation, the violation of ‘almost every disciplinary rule,’ and fraud on the court. DuLaurence’s argument regarding the discovery abuses did not meet proper appellate standards. He therefore failed to show prejudicial error or an abuse of discretion. See DuLau-rence v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 74 Mass. App.Ct. 1125 [2009 WL 2030646 ] (2009). The adverse judgment and the unfavorable discovery rulings are now final and not subject to collateral attack in this proceeding.
Similarly, in this action, DuLaurence seeks to re-litigate the underlying alleged discovery violations and related misconduct by both defendants and the trial court judge. His failure to challenge those rulings successfully on appeal in the employment action, however, precludes him from challenging them in any subsequent action.
The fact that DuLaurence has brought some claims in this case that differ by terms from those in the state actions does not affect this analysis. Identity of critical issues, for purposes of issue preclusion, need not have been asserted in identical claims, so long as there is sufficient overlap between the claims. Alba v. Raytheon,
The state court held that DuLaurence had not shown that the Superior Court judges abused their discretion in resolving discovery-related conflicts. Even though DuLaurence claims that the courts got it wrong in the prior action, he may not relitigate that proposition here. See Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips,
The Superior Court decision in the collateral action and the decision on appeal did, however, determine the merits of the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the activity was protected petitioning activity that warrants protection under the statute. That determination from the collateral action is therefore given preclusive effect as, of course, are the final determinations of the original state action. Accordingly, I conclude that even if I did have jurisdiction, the state actions resolved with finality against DuLaurenee the very issues and claims that DuLaurenee attempts to raise again here. He is precluded from relit-igating them.
III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO ENJOIN VEXATIOUS LITIGATION AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS
Because I lack jurisdiction to reach the merits of—or perhaps more accurately, the manifest lack of merit to—DeLaurence’s Complaint, I have considered it inappropriate to address those merits in connection with the defendants’ motions to dismiss. But the defendants, understandably apprehensive of DeLaurence’s prolonged pursuit of meritless claims, seek an injunction from this Court to protect them against future litigation by the plaintiff. Demonstrating the lack of self awareness and professional competence which has characterized his pursuit of this related litigation, DeLaurence for his part requests sanctions of his own against the defendants.
Telegen and Liberty Mutual move, pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the inherent powers of the court, for an order enjoining DuLaurenee from filing any further actions against defendants without my leave and until he has paid the attorneys’ fees and costs that they were awarded in the anti-SLAPP ruling of the collateral action by the state court.
Federal courts have discretionary powers to regulate the conduct of litigants, including “the ability to enjoin a party—even a pro se party—from filing frivolous and vexatious motions.” United States v. Gomez-Rosario,
This action is nearly identical to the collateral action brought and dismissed in state court prior to this suit. Both this action and the state court collateral action are primarily based on discovery violations and rulings that took place in the employment action, a case that previously resolved on the merits the same discovery and related issues that are at the heart of DuLaurence’s claims here. As in Castro v. United States, DuLaurenee has “made allegations in previous suits that are virtually identical to certain allegations made in the instant case,” and has demonstrated a “propensity to repeatedly file suit against the same defendants ... even in the face of adverse judgments.”
Yet DuLaurenee asks that the motion to enjoin vexatious litigation be stricken and that sanctions be ordered instead against Telegen and Liberty Mutual. The request to strike is without foundation, and the motion for sanctions against the defendants is denied as both procedurally and substantively insufficient. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(2).
The employment action was filed, litigated, tried to a jury, and appealed. DuLau-rence lost. His filing of the state court collateral action demonstrates his obdurate and heedless inclination to continue challenging, without good reason and without a procedurally valid mechanism for doing so, the judgment in the employment action, despite a final and valid judgment. For that exercise, he faces state court sanctions. He has now continued his meritless challenge to the underlying state court judgment in this court.
DuLaurence’s vitriolic language in this action, including personal attacks on the judges who have decided his cases in the past, suggest that he is unlikely to accept the decision in this case either. Nonetheless, the principal ground for dismissal was not one identified by the defendants in the motion to dismiss submissions and DeLau-rence himself appears without competence in federal litigation. Because DeLaurence might be considered unfamiliar with the legal principles which bar this case in this court, I will not now enter the injunction defendants seek. Further litigation on these matters in this court, however, will likely result in severe consequences about which DeLaurence, irrespective of his pri- or unfamiliarity with federal practice, is now on clear notice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth more fully above, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and Independent Action to Set Aside Superior Court Judgment (Doc. No. 14) is GRANTED;
2. Defendants’ Special Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint Pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 231, § 59H (Doc. No. 18) is treated as MOOT;
3. Defendants’ Motion to Enjoin Vexatious Litigation (Doc. No. 23) is DENIED;
4. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike and Request for Sanctions (Doc. No. 24) is DENIED.
Notes
. DuLaurence occasionally characterizes the jury verdict as having been in his favor, adding to his list of grievances his wrongful deprivation of damages pursuant to the jury’s verdict. The characterization is incorrect. The jury verdict was a special verdict. While the jury found that one of the defendants acted with malice, it also found that he acted
. DeLaurence is currently in inactive status as a member of the Massachusetts bar. His right of audience here is based on his pro se status to pursue personal claims and not as a member of the bar.