291 S.W. 539 | Tex. Crim. App. | 1927
Section 11, Article 4 of the constitution contains the following language with reference to the power of the Governor to grant pardons:
"In all criminal cases, except treason and impeachment, he shall have power after conviction, to grant reprieves, commutations of punishment and pardons; and under such rules as the legislature may prescribe, he shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures."
Concerning the meaning of the term "conviction," much is to be found in the law books. According to the weight of the precedents, it seems, in its relation to the power to pardon, that the term "conviction" refers to a verdict of "guilty" by a jury and *156 is not restricted to a final judgment on each verdict. Ruling Case Law, Vol. 20, p. 539.
In Art. 773, C. C. P., 1925, touching the sentence, and the reasons that may be interposed against the sentence, it is said:
"That the defendant has received a pardon from the proper authority, on the presentation of which, legally authenticated, he shall be discharged."
The appeal is a voluntary matter, and the accused has the right to abandon his appeal. The withdrawal of the motion for rehearing is in effect an abandonment of the appeal, leaving the judgment, in its legal effect as though no appeal had been prosecuted. If, after the withdrawal of the motion and the dismissal of the appeal, the appellant should be taken into custody on the theory that the pardon was invalid, the legal question might be presented upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus, but as the matter now stands before this court, the validity of the pardon is not involved. Therefore the judgment of affirmance is withdrawn, as well as the motion for rehearing, and the appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.