*1 IN THE SUPREME COURT University of manner in which made inten- approve the belated the State Carson, Sr., tion to use statement known to the we defendant say trial cannot that court’s failure sanctions was impose an abuse discretion.
Carson, Sr. did have advance notice that the statement of Carson, used That did not Jr. would be as evidence. statement dif- Carson, Sr. significantly pretrial fer statement made himself, which also introduced as evidence and has not been Therefore, of error on subject assignment appeal. made Carson, probability impact the statement of Jr. in all had little Carson, Sr. the State’s This we are being case say the trial apply unable court’s decision not to sanctions the State could not have been the result of reasoned We trial court did not abuse its discre- decision. conclude This without apply assignment tion sanctions. failing and is merit overruled. from prejudicial a fair free
The defendant received error.
No error. STAINBACK, STAINBACK, ELIZABETH v. ROBERT L. DUKE UNIVERSITY COMPANY INSURANCE INVESTOR’S CONSOLIDATED No. 76A87 1987) (Filed July plead limitations recovery statute Estoppel § 4.7— of medical costs— limitations in an ac- pleading the Defendant was defend- care rendered to of medical costs tion recover defendant, through his and statements minor where the actions ant’s son payment for reasonably that would receive attorney, misled company insurance and an once a case between services rendered forego pursuing its concluded, reasonably Duke to such belief remedy against legal defendant. dissenting. Justice Mitchell dissenting opinion. joins in this
Justice Webb THE IN SUPREME COURT University v. Stainback *2 Appeal L. pursuant by defendant Robert 7A-30(2) panel of a divided from the decision N.C.G.S. § S.E. 806 84 351 2d App. N.C. Appeals, reported Court of J., (1987), Bowen, 1 filed October judgment which affirmed the Court, County. Supreme Durham Heard in the 1985 in Superior 8 June 1987. Court Embree, Allen, E. L. III and by Bryan & Edward
Moore Van Lessley, plaintiff-appellee. for W. defendant-appellant. Rogers for
MARTIN, Justice. by the facts found appeal
The sole issue on this whether the conclusion of law that defendant Rob- judge support the trial L. was the statute of limita- pleading ert We Duke in this action. hold that the conclusion of tions and, therefore, law was affirm the decision of properly supported of Appeals. the Court
I. Jr., Stainback, nine-year-old boy, L. a was Robert admitted to May injuries Duke for treatment of sustained Hospital on bicycle he was riding in a collision and an automo- between father, Stainback, L. His was legally bile. defendant Robert expenses, medical and he a sponsible signed for son’s also personal responsibility agreement accepting written for these $42,812.90. The medical totalled expenses crediting costs. After $2,000 $8,584.95 by by an insurance and paid company paid Stain- back, $32,227.95 a there remained balance of which has been paid. by was insured also Investors Consolidated In- (Investors),
surance Company coverage but it denied of Stain- Stainback, by attorney Bobby back’s claim. W. represented and Rogers, judgment instituted suit Investors for $39,606.90 13 May 1982. entered favor of Stainback on Duke been Although had notified of the suit between Stainback joined neither nor intervened the case. This judgment satisfied check payable to Stainback and Rog- ers, attorney. as his Thereafter, this 18 November instituted answered, applicable pleading Defendant Stainback. judge case was heard without of limitations. of fact conclu- was entered with
jury, judgment $32,227.95. law, awarding sions of II. fact: findings of following pertinent made judge Duke’s bills for received some “bene- Jr. which bills indicated that treatment such bill was submitted The last assigned. had been fits” *3 20, 1977. on October Duke to Investors Duke in W. attorney, Bobby Rogers, told 12. Stainback’s Investors attempting get was to 1978 that he summer of Duke keep informed bill and would balance of the pay to situation. of the 2, 1978, In- against filed suit
13. August On IN- County Superior (Stainback Vance Court vestors vs. 222) seeking to County File No. CVS Vance VESTORS, in- expenses medical policy the under the Investors recover University Duke Jr. at the for treatment curred Center. Medical (Mrs. Lamb, 11, 1978, Miriam Com- Duke August
15. On Diagnostic Liability Private Officer for the pensation Center) (PDC) wrote to University Medical Duke of the Clinic “status” of as to the information requesting Mr. Rogers letter also Duke PDC. This bill outstanding to the Stainback’s Hospital. bill outstanding of his notified Stainback (Mrs. 1978, 15, Mr. wrote Rogers August 17. On Lamb) Investors. against filed been suit had it that informing lawsuit of Stainback’s aware was 18. Duke therefore however, in- join effort made no case. tervene Investors vs. came on for 20. lawsuit Investors Stainback’s at- 1981. Stainback’s prior Just to trial (a on December Dunn Duke Mrs. torney spoke Mr. with Rogers balance on outstanding of the informed Hospital) Mrs. Dunn bills. provided copies unpaid Duke’s bill and be and vol- aware the case about to tried was made testify concerning the to Henderson to unteered to come necessary. if identify bills these bills these amounts of otherwise Duke made no effort to intervene or again, Once protect join Stainback’s (Duke’s) interests. 23. Carolina Court Subsequent ruling to the the North 1983) (on spoke a Duke representative October Mr. refused telephone pay with who Duke bill as been rendered. it has Judgment Duke was made aware of the obtained telephone because call from Investors at- torney, David Neal. law: judge following
The trial made the relevant conclusion of *4 Stainback, Duke’s claim regard With to however, justifiably by Duke was induced representations attorney and of and his particularly conduct Stainback refrain from bringing to suit Stainback to col- lect the bill for his son’s Duke and believe treatment at to any recovery be paid proceeds that it would out of the of County vs. the Vance action and Stain- back is therefore estopped plead to the statute of limitations in this action. the we majority opin- At outset note that the dissent to the ion of the Court of does not raise an issue of whether the are findings supported of fact the evidence. We have before us the issue of whether findings support the of fact the law is conclusion of that defendant the defense estopped plead to of the statute of limitations. IN THE SUPREME 341 COURT University v. invoked, may be in a to bar a proper
Equitable
of
relying upon
the statute
limitations. Nowell v.
(1959).
575,
Co.,
889
250
108 S.E. 2d
Tea
N.C.
The
of
is
equitable estoppel
applica-
doctrine
based
an
to
of
It
everyday
tion of the
rule
the
affairs men.
golden
as,
equity
good
that one should do unto others
quires
him,
conscience,
if
posi-
he would have them do unto
their
of
compulsion
play.
were
...
Its
is one
fair
tions
reversed.
(1937)
114,
Walters,
112, 113, 189 S.E.
211 N.C.
McNeely v.
(citations omitted).
fraud,
faith, or
intent
Actual
bad
to mislead
to
equitable
is
essential
invoke the
.doctrine of
or deceive
not
Lines,
132,
Applying conclusion support are sufficient facts found as a defense. limitations plead of conduct a course indicate factual and state- Duke. actions misled attorney, which through reasonably attorney ments of Stainback’s once the for rendered services payment its would receive concluded, such Investors was between Stainback case legal pursuing foregoing Duke to reasonably caused belief of Stain- statements actions and Stainback. The remedy against has security. Defendant into a false sense lulled back entry justifying play, and fair rule the golden breached Walters, 211 N.C. v. injustice. McNeely prevent equity *5 S.E. IN THE SUPREME COURT decision of the Court
The
Affirmed. dissenting.
Justice Mitchell majority I that the before us is agree question with the findings support the trial court’s fact its conclusions of whether they I law. would hold that do not. merely court’s the findings trial indicate that attorney Duke aware through Rogers, made of the that, had brought
fact that he an action Investors and time, he them from time to The informed of the of that status action. any are findings devoid of statement or Rogers expressing implying any damages might intent which possibly be recovered in suit against would ever be paid part whole or in to Duke.
I do burden was upon not that the Stainback to act affirmatively notify he pay any Duke that would not it out of Investors, damages he recovered prevent from in order to equitable doctrine of being applied him and Instead, in Duke’s favor. be place would more reasonable to burden upon the functionaries Duke’s compensation and liabil- ity have section asked Stainback or simple ques- you plan tion: any money you may “Do to use of the recover to your pay bill with us?” of the trial court did not any reveal question such was ever asked of Stainback or of Rogers. It to me majority seems that the trial court and the in this that,
Court have concluded absent express notice the defend- ant did pay any that he not intend recovery Duke from he might receive in his suit against the defendant equitably estopped raising the statute as a of limitations defense in Duke’s him. A comparison of the conclu- court, here, sions of the opinion majority or the with the trial court’s findings simply supports view. no other There- fore, I must dissent. I am quite sure to what extent majority applies that, Golden Rule in this case. It to me occurs if the Golden Rule *6 University v. Stainback Duke would be present in the truly applied to be were it for the treatment Stainback owed the debt forgive quired child, of equitable to invoke the doctrine seeking than rather fail to its own negligence him where estoppel against run. limitations had the statute of before this action bring I dissent. respectfully dissenting opinion. in this joins Webb
Justice