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Duhart v. State
668 S.W.2d 384
Tex. Crim. App.
1984
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*1 judgment of the Court reversing the fact that in the court below and the reversed cause remanded to that majority pretend does not even Court. appeals implicates of the court of Ultimately

reason for review. all it does is ONION, P.J., concurs the result. conclude, contrary to the appeals, court of that the evidence is suffi- CLINTON, Judge, dissenting. cient. That is not a valid reason under our attempted burglary The indictment for Tex.Cr.App. own rules. See Rule 302. alleged habitation amounting as the “act Adhering the view that “review” such as than mere preparation,” to more V.T.C.A. misapprehends assigned this the new role Code, 15.01(a), Penal to this Court constitutional amendment through “reach his hand a screen door of enactment, legislative respectfully the habitation ...” contended dissent. appeals agreed court of that “the beyond evidence at trial fails to show Flournoy

reasonable doubt that reached his through

hand the screen door of the vic-

tim’s mobile home.” Flournoy v. (Tex.App.—Fort majority Now the would find other-

wise. presented complaining The State wit- DUHART, Appellant, Rene Paris appellant and

ness to relate what she saw companion do and she did on the what question, majority opin- occasion and the Texas, Appellee. The STATE of testimony out much her as it ion sets No. 738-83. which, pertinent—in none of how- deems Texas, Appeals of ever, Court of Criminal complainant say that she does En Banc. actually his hand saw “reach 1 Thus, through a screen door.” resolution 15, 1984. Feb. sufficiency depends for the issue interprets part most on how one her “con-

clusory statements that this is what must happened, instead of statements that happen,” Flournoy

she saw

supra, at 525. view, judges my three of the court to, did, fully competent

appeals are record to find that “there was

review the allegation by the proof on this

failure of State, supra. See

State,” Flournoy v. Wil State, 654 S.W.2d 469-470

son v. (Clinton,J., dissenting). Veri

Cr.App.1983) Wilson, taken in policy position

ty of the instant cause in the

supra, is fortified thing.' Conley testified: ‘The screen door also majority relates: 1. The closed, trying to—going ... she then "Conley testified further door, trying get through the screen of the mo- to the front appellant return saw home, trying watching, kept ‘proceeded to un- I was as he main door.... bile hands, moving trying open like moving hands were the door ... his like he was lock trying a screwdriver some- into some- to—like he was door.” [front] get trying thing, like he was

OPINION ONION, Presiding Judge. appeal from a conviction for

This is an habitation, burglary of a by the court at 45 ment was assessed 9, September years’ imprisonment. On appellant entered Adju- offense. court to the said before the deferred and he dication of his was “probation” period for a placed on eight years, subject to certain conditions. 42.12, 3a, July V.A.C.C.P. On See Article petition filed a the State guilt, alleging ceed to probationary con- had violated committing aggravated ditions rob- beries, report failing to to his required, failing pay resti- officer as and tution and fine. court, 10, 1982, September after a

On proceeded petition, State’s adjudge guilt “probation”1 to revoke and burglary for the and assess years’ imprisonment. at 45 habitation 3d(b), article V.A.C.C.P. ap- in a sole of error On pellant the trial court erred contended proceeding and as- holding sessing punishment without first hearing. Appellant ar- separate penalty a violation of gued that such failure was law, Fifth and Fourteenth due Constitution, Amendments, United States I, of the law. Article and due course 19, Texas Constitution. Ap- Court of appeal the Fort Worth

On and affirmed peals rejected his contention Worth, Burns, appel- Fort for Danny D. State, 652 conviction. Duhart v. lant. (Tex.App.Ft.Worth—1983). We S.W.2d824 Atty. Mar- Curry, Dist. and C. Chris Tim petition for discretion- granted appellant’s Grant, H. shall, Eugene Jr. David M. the correctness of ary review to determine Worth, Attys., Fort Asst. Dist. Montague, holding. such Austin, Huttash, Atty., State’s Robert entering guilty plea Upon the State. court, waving carefully by the appellant was admonished sufficient The court found evidence insufficient the evidence court found 1. The aggravated allegation robbery aggravated appellant committed show one, he failed to robbery paragraph paragraph two. pay fine. restitution and report failed to testimony trial court in accordance with Article At the conclusion of the duly Y.A.C.C.P. admon- inquired party anything if either penalty ished that burglary closed further to offer. Both sides years habitation was for a term of presented arguments to the court. After ninety-nine, less than five nor more than revoking “probation” adjudicating *3 life, $10,- and that a fine not to exceed proceeded the to assess might 000.00 also be assessed. See V.T. inquired if ment. When the court there C.A., Code, Penal 30.02 and 12.32. Sees. any legal why sentence should was reason noted, And as the Court of the pronounced, appellant’s counsel an- not be appellant trial if court cautioned the swered, “No, was Your Honor.” Sentence plea bargain eight years’ of deferred imposed. appellant At then no time did accepted “proba- was but present to further evidence on revoked, granted tion” later he would was any ishment or other issue. He made no subject range punishment be to the full of evidence, proffer perfect nor did he of bill charged.2 Appellant for the offense stated object any exception. He did not range penalty understood the procedures nor contend to the trial unitary At the caution offered. on separate hearing court he was entitled to a guilty plea appellant took the witness on judicial and made a confession. At stand accepted the close of the trial the court appeal for the first time he contends On

plea bargain appellant and instructed process that due of law was violated when probationary again as to the condition and not, sponte, the trial court did sua offer appellant cautioned the as to the conse- separate hearing punishment. He him a on quences range of revocation and authority any does not cite punishment possible. then The contention, and even at this late date does accepted eight year adjudica- deferred on not tell us what evidence imposed. any tion which was He did not at present. unable to time ask to offer additional evidence on punishment.3 A similar contention to rejected advanced and Jackson v. petition At the on the State’s (Tex.App.—Beaumont— 119 guilt its evi- adjudicate the State offered ref’d.), 1981) court wrote at (pet. where the Thereafter the testified dence. p. fiancee’. 120: and then called his mother and his 37.07, (Tex.Cr. unitary plea trials. Article were

2. In McNew v. Rehearing), pleas App.1978) (Opinion the court at trials in of not for bifurcated p. unchanged guilty jury. 177 stated: The rule was before jury. practice guilty pleas before the court and "While it would be far better State, supra. as to court to admonish a defendant the trial Morales v. adjudication, consequences 37.07, deferred we was amended after its Article 26.13, V.A.C.C.P.,does held that Article now Section 3 thereof enactment 1965. require such admonishment.” part: reads in prior criminal record "Sec. 3. Evidence of (Tex.Cr. S.W.2d 403 Morales v. 3. guilty. cases after a in all criminal App.1967), this court wrote: “(a) Regardless plea and whether the obviously fact that "Appellant overlooks the assessed or the be 2(b), (V.A.C.C.P.), 37.07, supra Article may the state and be offered guilty only pleas before applicable of not as to the criminal record of the defense State, Tex.Cr.App., Rojas jury. defendant, general reputation and his [(1966)]. application It has no by jury character....” waives trial a defendant applies pleas provision in a as it guilty before the Court This insofar enters a 1.13, capital jury case. Articles felony guilty does not call for less than before a 1.14, 1.15, (Emphasis sup- V.A.C.C.P.” The statute trials in those situations. bifurcated 37.07, 2(a), (b) Sec. plied.) see Now applies pleas generally (c) as amended. jury. Criminal Procedure Code of to the 1965 Prior regardless jury before the court all trials “Appellant’s ground years adjudica- at ten of error confinement after Court assessing punish- erred in ‘[t]he tion of when it has assessed seven ment Appellant’s excess of deferred years ‘probation’ at the time of the de- adjudication period probation by re- adjudication. ferred This contention has fusing to separate hearing allow for a rejected and held not to be error. following the determination State, supra; McNewv. Walker guilt.’ As we understand this (Tex.Cr.App.1977).” error, appellant’s complaint is that a statute, that the We observe separate punishment hearing should be V.A.C.C.P., 3d(b), does not man following held separate punishment hearing, date a nor pursuant V.A.C.C.P., Art. can we conclude that due of law 3d(b). ground, in appel- as stated nor the due course of the law land is brief, actually complains lant’s separate hearing violated because such a *4 ‘refusal’ to separate allow for such hear- not accorded. Fairness dictate that ing. nothing We find in the record be- a defendant opportunity be accorded an to indicating fore us appellant request- that appropriate mitigation offer in evidence hearing ed such that such punishment after the “proba revocation of However, we refused. the record does adjudication guilt tion” and the and be separate hearing show that a fore the assessment of if such by ment was not held the court. already evidence has not been elicited dur “Appellant following contends that an ing proceedings, particularly if the de adjudication guilt original on the requests fendant opportunity. charge, a ‘normal system’ bifurcated trial should pun be followed and a Under the in circumstances the instant ishment shall be accordance with case, we held.in find no merit in V.A.C.C.P., Art. 37.07. over ground of error. The trial court did not err 37.07, looks 2(b) the fact that Article failing, in sponte, separate sua to conduct a applicable only pleas guilty to proceeding on the issue of before jury. a It application has no The of the Court of where a by jury defendant waives trial affirmed. plea and enters guilty before the court in felony capital less than case. MILLER, JJ., ODOM and in concur State, v. Morales 416 S.W.2d 403 result. State, Rojas v. (Tex.Cr.App.1967); 404 Thomas v. (Tex.Cr.App.1966); S.W.2d 30 CLINTON, Judge, concurring. State, 477 S.W.2d 881 (Tex.Cr.App.1 State, Morales 416 S.W.2d 403 972).4 Cr.App.1967) 37.07, construed Article “The contention that § 2(b), V.A.C.C.P., in context as it then proceedings in hearings mandatory are 37.07, supra, existed. Article was rewrit pursuant Art. 42.12 has conducted Acts, 1967, 659, by Leg., ten p. 60th ch. State, rejected in McNew v. 608 § August effective 1967—af- (Tex.Cr.App.1978), it is denied Morales rehearing ter had been in only hearing—that one which is held that opinion. without written Understandably 42.12, 3d(b)—is by nec- required Art. the Morales Court does not mention that right essary to afford his revision. process of due law. pertinent Morales v. by wording portion suggested,' “It State, supra, error, appellant’s ground appears in opin- note 3 of the assessing bar, erred in ion of the Court in the court case at (Tex.Cr.App. 4. See also Arismendez Thom v. (Tex.Cr.App.1980); However, need not be restated. to be em- dence that “substantiates the defendant’s phasized is guilt” deferring proceed- that the 1967 of Article revision “further § 2(b) origi- Thus, ings,” id., restructured at 173-174. there was no nally precisely enacted and then again need to hear evidence to § 2(b), what Morales said was not viz: adjudication guilt. When McNew held hearing—that “only required by one prior “Sec. 3. criminal Evidence of 3d(b)—isnecessary record in all criminal after a find- cases ing guilty afford the to due law,” id., cess of at 174 the Court was (a) Regardless and wheth- finding referring to a and no more. er be assessed may or the of- § be 42.12, 3d(a) contemplates that a fered the state and the defendant as may defer after criminal record of the de- contendere, receiving plea nolo fendant, general reputation and his evidence, that it character.” guilt. substantiates defendant’s is no evi- There indication whatsoever that On- this score the in Jackson v. respect dence will be reóeived with (Tex.App.—Beau- 1981), ignores 3(a), may ultimately ishment that be assessed. majori- mont and the Indeed, ty permits ought by quoting not to indicate it so subsection also an ac- § 2(b) fully, by referring whose has been opinion cused writing final Jackson touches the deferred move *5 problem addressing. we are that adjudication, now and it mandates in that proceed adju- event “the court shall to final brings That me to McNew dication as in all other cases.” Section (Tex.Cr.App.1978)—a in cause 3d(b) prescribed hearing “the limits the participate origi- I which not either on .did proceeds determination of whether it with rehearing. nal submission or on Jack- adjudication original the an of on reject the son Court read McNew conten- but, done, charge;” clear it also makes being by tion made Jackson: “that follow- including proceedings, “all assessment ing adjudication original an on sentence, punishment, pronouncement system’ a trial charge, ‘normal bifurcated granting probation, ap- defendant’s hearing and a on should be followed peal if continue as in ishment shall be held accordance with guilt had not deferred.” been Y.A.C.C.P., Art. 37.07.” McNew noth- sort, ing reading a will of the as careful surely a punishment Assessment § reveal. 37.07, 3(a) “proceeding,” per- for Article parties mits the to offer evidence of in is that was contended McNew What record, general reputation and criminal § 42.12, 3d(b), requires Y.A.C.C.P. § character, 3(d) requires that when hearings— punishment, “and judge assesses after held limited hearing a should be “first hearing hereinabove the evidence a the trial solely to determination for, shall announce forthwith proceed to an should judge of whether punishment to be his decision ... as hearing and then a second adjudication, Thus, punishment proceeding assessed.” guilt is deter- be held in which should ” timing. dictated—regardless of its mined. Accordingly, opined, the McNew Court is the conten- McNew, supra, 173. That at see no reason that once a essentially for the rejected, “[W]e tion the Court § 3d(a), held on the trial should that, whether required as reason already proceed heard evi- with an had the outset court at throughout by supplied cated. emphasis is 1. All indi- opinion unless otherwise this writer circumstances,

trial immediately appellant cannot ent continue set proceedings, with ‘all including assess- punishment to a been entitled hear- ment adjudi- if ... as ing, requested if even he had not cation of had not been deferred.” ment and also had failed make McNew, an objection to the failure the trial court Nothing at 174. find rehearing punishment hearing. mili- McNew conduct How- against tates ever, construction of the inter- has no where there been for a twining provisions of statutory the two punishment hearing, objection and no To contrary, closely schemes. when ever properly timely voiced to the lack read, appears page that which at 177 con- hearing, always this will firms it. complaint, cause such a that there was no written, however, hearing, From what has it be without merit. does not follow that is entitled as Rogers State, This Court 640 S.W.2d a matter of to more than what he (Tex.Cr.App.1981), Wright see also system” characterizes “some for State, (Tex.Cr.App.1982), presenting evidence on Re- recently held that the defendant could gardless labeled, posi- of what it is the law complain the first time tively “in affords all criminal cases after a failure of the trial court to hold a second guilty,” “[rjegardless cause, hearing. the trial court had plea” opportunity for both sides to offer conducted on the State’s motion prescribed by 37.07, 3(a). revoke the defendant’s The record here shows and the court of found that the defendant violated his appeals found had that kind of probation, but then deferred the matter. opportunity. Duhart v. later, Much and without second hear- (Tex.App.—Fort ing, objection voiced, to which no Accordingly, I concur in proba- ordered defendant’s the Court. appeal, tion revoked. On the defendant *6 complained of the failure of the trial court TEAGUE, Judge, concurring and dissent- hold and conduct a second be- ing. fore he ordered the defendant’s Duhart, Paris Rene appellant, concedes revoked. This rejected by contention was that at trial he not request a separate Court, majority of expressly which punishment hearing and object also did not held that before the defendant was entitled to the failure of the trial judge to conduct a complain appeal of the lack of a hearing on after the hearing, second necessary it was first adjudicated guilt. His type him to have made “some of due contention, that the failure of the trial objection, cess either at the time the separate punishment court to conduct a probation, continues the and/or or hearing violated the Fifth and Fourteenth at the time of actual at revocation or Amendments the United States Constitu- sentencing. time of Failure to make such tion, I, as Art. well Texas Con- an objection waives error.” stitution, presented rejected appeal. the first time on See Duhart v. princi- Because there is no difference in State, (Tex.App.—Ft. ple Rogers between v. Wright cause, and this simply would hold has majority holds: “Under circum- right waived his to complain case, stances the instant we find no about the hearing, absence appellant’s merit in of error.” either because he did [Emphasis I find one under- Added]. language scored leaves the reader with the because to object failed to the trial impression that, given another but differ- court’s failure to hold one.

Although the Ar majority is correct that 3d(b), V.A.C.C.P.,

ticle does

not mandate separate punishment that a held, must be after the trial court adjudicated

has the defendant’s

nevertheless, had appellant properly and

timely urged in the trial court the com

plaint appeal, he makes on I would hold process

that either due or due course of hearing,

law mandates such

have sustained contention. See

Daniels v. Dissenting Opin

Cr.App.1981) (Teague, J. McDougal

ion), (Teague, (Tex.Cr.App.1981) J. Con

curring Opinion). majority

Because the reaches the

result, I concur. nei- holding To its

ther due course of law nor due timely such a hearing,

mandates when a proper request objection has

made, I dissent. DANIEL,

Larry Ray Appellant, Texas, Appellee.

The STATE of

No. 65357. *7 Texas, of Criminal

Court

En Banc.

Feb. 1984.

Case Details

Case Name: Duhart v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Feb 15, 1984
Citation: 668 S.W.2d 384
Docket Number: 738-83
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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