Duggar v. Quality Development Corp.Duggar v. Quality Development Corp.
This is an interlocutory appeal of an order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution filed by appellant, Rolfe D. Duggar (Duggar), under
In December 1974 suit was brought against appellee, Quality Development Corporation of Florida (Quality), by a condominium association, and as to those parties the action was settled by stipulation in December 1975. On October 29, 1975 Quality filed a third-party complaint against appellant and on October 30 a third-party complaint against appellee, Hilborn, Werner, Carter & Associates, Inc. (Hilborn). Various other counterclaims and cross-claims were filed by these parties. They included a cross-claim by Hilborn against Duggar and a counterclaim by Duggar against Hil-born. The last record activity among these parties was on March 10,1976 when Quality filed a response to Duggar’s affirmative defenses. More than one year later, on March 15, 1977, Duggar filed a motion to dismiss. Quality, within a short time thereafter, filed a response to the motion and a motion to set the case for trial. Hilborn failed to file either a response or a motion in opposition to appellant’s motion.
Appellees argue that allegations set out in Quality’s response to the motion to dismiss, that is that the attorney for Quality attempted to contact counsel for appellant by mail and telephone from time to time during the one-year period to ascertain from him the time necessary to set for trial, are sufficient to sustain the trial court’s ruling. Additionally, it is asserted that Quality’s attorney had prepared a motion to set the case for trial and left the time and date blank, although he did not mail or serve it upon appellant or file it in court until the motion to dismiss was filed. We think it pertinent to mention that when the motion to set the case for trial was filed the time estimated for trial was one-half a day.
Appellant contends the trial court erred and urges reversal of the court’s ruling on two alternative grounds. First,
[A]ny activity of record or non-record [sic] which results in contact by one party with the opposing party or the court and which moves the cause of action towards its ultimate resolution is sufficient prosecution under the hereinabove cited rule [Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.420(e) ].
Rapport v. Weisberg,
In our judgment the duty rested upon appellees to prosecute their respective actions and not upon appellant as is contended by appellees. Appellees’ nonrecord activity falls short of the standard. It cannot be said to hasten the action to judgment and does not demonstrate good cause to toll the running of the time period.
We reverse with directions to the trial court to vacate the order denying the motion to dismiss and to enter an order dismissing these actions.
REVERSED with directions.