92 F. 806 | 2d Cir. | 1899
John 'H. Duggan, of Waterbury, Conn., a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, who had never married, died on November 10, 1895, leaving a last will and testament, which was duly proved, and was approved by the probate court for the district of Waterbury. In this will he gave two legacies for religious or charitable purposes, and the residue of his property in the manner following:
“Fourth. All the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, both real and personal, and wheresoever situated, I give, devise, and bequeath to my executors hereinafter named, in trust, however, for the following purposes, viz.: One-half to be used for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a library and reading room in connection with St. Patrick’s parish, in said Waterbury, or in whatever part of said Waterbury may be deemed by my said executors most suitable and convenient for the general public; and one-half for the purpose of establishing or maintaining a Roman Catholic pro-tectory for boys, in said diocese of Hartford; it being my will that the personal estáte and the rents accruing from any real estate of which X may die possessed be invested in safe securities for a term of ton years or more, at the discretion of my said executors. X also will that the management and disposal of my real estate be at the discretion of my said executors.
“Fifth. I name and appoint the Rt. Rev. Michael Tierney, of Hartford, Conn., and Hon. William G. Robinson, of New Haven, Conn., executors of this, my last will and testament.”
Bishop Tierney and Mr. Robinson declined the executorship, whereupon Rev. William J. Slocum, of Waterbury, was appointed administrator with the will annexed.
The statute of Connecticut in regard to charitable uses was passed in 1684, but did not appear in the printed statutes until the Revision of 1702, and therefore has been generally called “the Statutes of 1702.” Adye v. Smith, 44 Conn. 60. It has been uniformly regarded by the courts of that state as a statute of importance, because, inasmuch as it declared the fixed purpose of the state to preserve estates for charitable uses in accordance with the intent of the grantor, it was an instruction to the courts to enforce such gifts accordingly. It is as follows:
“Sec. 2951. All estates fcliat have been or shall be granted for the maintenance of the ministry of the gospel, or of schools of learning, or for the relief of the poor, or for the preservation, eare, and maintenance of any cemetery, cemetery lot, or of the monuments thereon, or for any other public and charitable use, shall forever remain to the uses to which they have been or shall he granted, according to the true intent and meaning of the grantor, and to no other use whatever.”
The statute which had existed in Connecticut in regard to per-petuities was repealed before the testator’s death, and no statute now exists on the subject. The rale of the common law, which limits the inalienabilty of an estate to a life or lives in being at the death of the testator and 21 years afterwards, is now the rale in that state.
The special demurrer raises a number of legal questions in regard to the jurisdiction of a federal court over a decedent’s estate at this stage in its progress of settlement in the probate court which are-worthy of consideration, but we shall only look at the vital questions arising under the fourth clause of the will, which are whether its provisions are void either because the beneficial enjoyment of the charities may be postponed for a period which is styled “'remoteness,” or because the objects of the charities and the'beneficiaries, are too indefinitely stated. By the residuary clause an immediate: and unconditional gift of the estate is made to trustees, to be usea by them in the establishment and maintenance of two distinct charities. Their title is burdened with no conditions. They are not to hold it until some other person appears, who may wish to establish
The complainants rely upon Jocelyn v. Nott, 44 Conn. 55, which they think státes a different rule. In that case two pieces of real estate were devised to trustees to be conveyed to an ecclesiastical society of the Congregational faith, if application should be made by said society to erect a church on one of the two pieces, and the
It is next claimed by the complainants that the residuary clause is void by reason of its indefiniteness in regard to the charities, or the persons to be selected. The charities to be established are a library and a Roman Catholic protectory, or asylum, for boys, each of which is a public charity. There is a manifest distinction between the definiteness required in a charitable bequest for the benefit or relief of particular individuals, such as "indigent students,” or "poor persons,” and in a gift to a public charity for a library, or a hospital, or an asylum. In the latter case the selection of the persons to be benefited is from a very large class, and is to be made under general rules established by the managers of the public charity, and minuteness by the testator in regard to the manner in which the library or the asylum was to be used would probably paralyze the usefulness of each. In this case the charities are of a well-known and widely-spread character. The trustees are to manage and appropriate the principal and income,'and, as a matter of course, are to make the rules by which each charity is to be governed. • A like objection in ¡regard to the indefiniteness of a gift of land for a hospital for foundlings was regarded in Ould v. Washington Hospital, supra, as without force, and other cases on the subject to the same effect are abundant. Russell v. Allen, supra; Woodruff v. Marsh, supra. The decree of the circuit court is affirmed, with costs of this court.
I entirely concur in the opinion of the majority, but think it was unnecessary to enter upon so exhaustive •a discussion of the questions presented, since it is the duty of federal courts, when construing a will, to administer the law of the particular state where the property affected is located and the trusts created. The reported decisions of the courts of Connecticut clearly indicate how this case would be decided if brought before them. Indeed, it seems quite apparent that complainants adopted the extraordinary and somewhat questionable course of suing in the federal court only because they were advised that their, contentions would be disposed of adversely in the state tribunals.