Thomas Dugan et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Franklin County Board of Revision et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14AP-351 (BTA No. 2011-673)
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
October 9, 2014
[Cite as Dugan v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2014-Ohio-4491.]
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Rendered on October 9, 2014
Thomas Dugan and Doris Dugan, pro se.
Ron O‘Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and William J. Stehle, for appellees.
APPEAL from the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
SADLER, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellants, Thomas Dugan and Doris Dugan, pro se, appeal from a decision and order of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA“) affirming a decision of appellee, Franklin County Board of Revision (“BOR“), which dismissed appellants’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} Appellants, age 65, owned and occupied a residence in Upper Arlington on January 1, 2007. In May 2007, appellants purchased and moved into a newly built condominium home in Hilliard. The Hilliard parcel had been subdivided on February 22, 2007 from a larger parcel owned by the condominium developer. There is no dispute that the Hilliard parcel did not exist as a stand-alone parcel on January 1, 2007. In May 2007,
{¶ 3} In October 2007, the Franklin County Auditor (“auditor“) denied appellants’ application for homestead exemption because the “Applicant‘s name [was] not on [the] deed [for the Hilliard parcel] as of January 1, 2007.” (Oct. 16, 2007 Certificate of Denial.) Appellants appealed the denial through the filing of a complaint at the BOR. Following a hearing, the BOR dismissed appellants’ complaint for want of jurisdiction because “[the Hilliard parcel] did not appear on the tax list and duplicate for tax lien date January 1, 2007.” (Mar. 8, 2011 BOR decision.) Appellants appealed to the BTA, and, following a hearing, the BTA affirmed the BOR‘s dismissal of appellants’ complaint, stating:
Upon review of the record, we are constrained to conclude that the BOR properly dismissed the appellants’ complaint because the subject property did not exist on the January 1, 2007 tax lien. The record before us establishes that the subject property did not exist on January 1, 2007 because it was part of a single, larger parcel under residential development at the time. The statutory transcript demonstrates that parcel number 450-283717, i.e., the subject property, was not created until February 22, 2007, which further supports a finding that the subject property did not exist on January 1, 2007. Although the appellants correctly noted that the homestead exemption statute was silent as to a date on which the subject property had to exist, as Episcopal School of Cincinnati [v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008-Ohio-939,] makes clear, “the general proposition [is that] the taxable or exempt status of property should be determined as of the tax lien date, which is January 1 of whatever tax year is at issue.” Id. Therefore, we conclude that the BOR properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the complaint.
(Footnote omitted.) (BTA Decision and Order, 3-4.)
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶ 4} In a timely appeal, appellants assert the following six assignments of error:
- Appellees erred in ruling that the Franklin County Board of Revision had no jurisdiction to entertain Appellants’ appeal
from an adverse determination denying an award of tax reduction. - Appellees erred in requiring that Appellants have owned a residence both on the date of their application and on the tax lien date for their parcel as a prerequisite for tax relief.
- Appellees erred in identifying January 1, 2007 as the tax lien date for their parcel in 2007, the year of their application.
- Appellees erred in adopting a severely restrictive interpretation of the legislative scheme to afford remedial tax relief to elderly and disabled taxpayers.
- Appellees erred when, after having (incorrectly) determined that Appellants were not entitled to tax reduction in 2007 because they had not resided in the same residence on January 1, 2007 as on the date of their application, they did not evaluate Appellants’ entitlement on the basis of the residence in which Appellants did reside on that date.
- The Board of Tax [A]ppeals erred in construing the testimony of Appellant Thomas Dugan at the hearing before the Board of Revision to mean that he “filed the exemption application for the subject property, i.e[.], the newly built home in Columbus.”
(Emphasis sic.)
III. DISCUSSION
{¶ 5} An appellate court reviews a decision of the BTA to determine if it is reasonable and lawful. Piepho v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-818, 2014-Ohio-2908, ¶ 4, citing Gesler v. Worthington Income Tax Bd. of Appeals, 138 Ohio St.3d 76, 2013-Ohio-4986, ¶ 10. An appellate court will not disturb a BTA decision ” ’ “unless it affirmatively appears from the record that such decision is unreasonable or unlawful.” ’ ” Id., quoting Hilliard City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 139 Ohio St.3d 1, 2014-Ohio-853, ¶ 48, quoting EOP-BP Tower, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-3096, ¶ 17.
{¶ 6} ” ‘The BTA‘s findings of fact are to be affirmed if supported by reliable and probative evidence, and the BTA‘s determination of the credibility of witnesses and its weighing of the evidence are subject to a highly deferential abuse-of-discretion review on
{¶ 7} A brief history of the enactment and expansion of the homestead exemption, as set forth by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Gilman v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 127 Ohio St.3d 154, 2010-Ohio-4992, is in order. Commencing in 1971, the General Assembly provided real property tax relief to residential property owned and occupied by persons 65 and over. Id. at ¶ 9. This tax relief, referred to as the homestead exemption, took the form of a credit against real property taxes that was tied to the income of the owner-occupants of the property. Id., citing Am.Sub.H.B. No. 475, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1485, 1490-1494. The tax reduction was originally available only because of the age of the owner-occupants; however, in 1975, the General Assembly expanded the tax reduction to permanently and totally disabled homeowners. Id., citing Am.Sub.H.B. No. 23, 136 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1409-1413. Subsequently, in 1991, the General Assembly extended the benefit to certain surviving spouses who did not independently qualify for the reduction. Id., citing Am.Sub.H.B. No. 66, 144 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2877.
{¶ 8} In 1999, the General Assembly extended the tax credit to mobile and manufactured homes, and in 2001, the tax break was broadened to encompass units in a housing cooperative. Id. at ¶ 10, citing Am.Sub.S.B. No. 142, 147 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7986, 8002; Am.Sub.H.B. No. 595, 148 Ohio Laws, Part III, 6422. Finally, in 2007, the General Assembly broadened the availability of the tax credit by eliminating the income test as a restriction on its availability. Id. With this modification, the homestead exemption now affords tax relief on $25,000 of a property‘s value whenever the owner-occupants satisfy the age or disability criteria. Id., citing
{¶ 9} Because appellants’ contentions call for examination of the statutory scheme governing the homestead exemption, such presents an issue of law that we determine de novo on appeal. Akron City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 139 Ohio St.3d 92, 2014-Ohio-1588, ¶ 10 (“Statutory construction presents a question of law that we determine de novo.“).
{¶ 10} In interpreting statutes, a court‘s principle concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statutes. Carnes v. Kemp, 104 Ohio St.3d 629, 2004-Ohio-7107, ¶ 16. To determine that intent, a court must first look at the words of the statutes themselves. Id. We are also mindful that all statutes relating to the same general subject matter must be read in pari materia. Id. In construing statutes together, a court must give them ” ‘a reasonable construction as to give proper force and effect to each and all such statutes.’ ” State v. Patterson, 81 Ohio St.3d 524, 525-26 (1998), quoting Johnson‘s Markets, Inc. v. New Carlisle Dept. of Health, 58 Ohio St.3d 28, 35 (1991), citing Maxfield v. Brooks, 110 Ohio St. 566 (1924). The interpretation and application of statutes must be viewed in a manner to carry out the legislative intent of the sections. Johnson‘s Markets at 35. “All provisions of the Revised Code bearing upon the same subject matter should be construed harmoniously. * * * This court in the interpretation of related and co-existing statutes must harmonize and give full application to all such statutes unless they are irreconcilable and in hopeless conflict.” Id. We now apply these precepts to the statutory scheme governing the homestead exemption found, as relevant here, in
{¶ 11} The tax relief at issue applies to real property taxes imposed on a “homestead,” which is defined as various types of dwellings together with whatever surrounding land “not exceeding one acre, as is reasonably necessary for the use of the dwelling or unit as a home.”
{¶ 12}
{¶ 13}
{¶ 14}
{¶ 15} Regarding denial,
{¶ 16} In their first assignment of error, appellants contend that in dismissing their complaint for lack of jurisdiction, the BOR and the BTA disregarded the statutory duty set forth in
{¶ 17} Appellants’ second through fifth assignments of error are interrelated and, thus, will be considered together. In them, appellants contend the BTA erred in affirming the BOR‘s dismissal of their complaint for lack of jurisdiction on grounds that the Hilliard parcel did not exist on the tax lien date of January 1, 2007. Appellants challenge the BTA‘s reliance on Episcopal School of Cincinnati v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 412, 2008-Ohio-939, for the proposition that ” ‘‘the taxable or exempt status of property should be determined as of the tax lien date, which is January 1 of whatever tax year is at issue.’ ”
{¶ 18}
{¶ 19} The accompanying instructions reinforce this requirement. Under the section entitled “Qualifications for the Homestead Exemption for Real Property,” the instructions state that the applicant must “own and have occupied your home as your principal place of residence on Jan. 1 of the year in which you file the application. A person only has one principal place of residence; your principal place of residence determines, among other things, where you are registered to vote and where you declare residency for income tax purposes.” (Emphasis sic.) Although appellants’ application for the homestead exemption is not part of the record, appellants attached a sample DTE 105A application to their brief, and both parties refer to the sample application in their briefs. Further, appellants do not dispute that they completed and signed a DTE 105A application form.
{¶ 20} Secondly,
{¶ 21} Similarly, the statutory scheme governing administration of the homestead exemption program belies appellants’ contention that the General Assembly intended the exemption as a personal benefit to qualifying applicants without regard to a particular homestead. We note initially that “[r]eal estate taxes are upon the land itself and not upon persons owning it.” Howard v. Dor El Realty Co., 20 Ohio App.2d 191, 193 (7th Dist.1969), citing S. Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Bolce, 165 Ohio St. 201 (1956).
{¶ 22} Further,
{¶ 23}
{¶ 24} As noted above, appellants’ application for the homestead exemption is not part of the record. However, other record evidence establishes that appellants sought the tax reduction on the Hilliard parcel. For example, the auditor‘s certificate of denial lists the tax district, parcel number, and address of the Hilliard parcel, and both the BOR hearing worksheet and dismissal letter reference the parcel number of the Hilliard parcel. In addition, appellants’ notice of appeal from the BOR to the BTA indicates that the appeal concerns the Hilliard parcel, and Mr. Dugan admitted at the BOR and BTA hearings that the application form sought the homestead exemption for the Hilliard parcel. Thus, appellants’ contention that they were entitled to the homestead exemption
{¶ 25} Appellants’ contention that the January 1 tax lien date is inapplicable to the Hilliard parcel is similarly without merit. Appellants maintain that, pursuant to
{¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, appellants’ second, third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 27} In their sixth and final assignment of error, appellants contend the BTA misconstrued Mr. Dugan‘s testimony before the BOR and the BTA to mean that he filed the homestead exemption application for the Hilliard parcel. We note initially that the BTA‘s decision does not specifically state that Mr. Dugan testified that he filed the application for the Hilliard parcel. Rather, the decision states that “Mr. Dugan filed the exemption application for the subject property, i.e., the newly built home in Columbus.” (Emphasis added.) (BTA Decision and Order, 1-2.) As noted above, the BTA‘s statement in this regard is supported by the record. Further, a review of the BTA hearing transcript reveals that Mr. Dugan testified that he filed the application for the Hilliard parcel rather than the Upper Arlington parcel: “My actual residence, strictly speaking, would have been the condominium in [Hilliard] because we were literally there and had been there for two or three or four days on the day that I mailed in the application, but we still owned the
IV. CONCLUSION
{¶ 28} For the reasons set forth above, we conclude the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully when it affirmed the determination of the BOR dismissing appellants’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, having overruled appellants’ six assignments of error, we affirm the decision of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
CONNOR and O‘GRADY, JJ., concur.