*1
Young and Justices Supreme Mary Kelly Beth Zahra, held,-. Court properly The Little trailway Manistee Trail is classified as a within the Michigan’s distinct of that word in law, trailway highway,” but because it not a “on the it is not 691.1401(e) trailway covered under high- MCL and is thus not a way purposes highway exception governmental immunity liability. from tort governmental liability (GTLA), 1. The tort act MCL 691.1401 seq., governmental agency et liability shields from tort if the governmental agency engaged discharge in the exercise or of a governmental statutory exception applies. function unless a Under highway exception, 691.1402(1), governmental each agency having jurisdiction highway required over to maintain repair reasonably in reasonable so that it is safe and public convenient for travel. MCL defines public highway, road, as a or street that is travel Duffy Dep’t bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks, trailways, and includes and cul- highway.Accordingly, verts on the defendants have a repair maintain the Little Manistee Trail in reasonable if it falls “highway.” within the definition of 2. The Little Manistee Trail could fall within the definition of *2 “trailway.” Legislature as a “road” or as a the Because “trailway” highway exception, used “road” and both in the each given proper meaning precisely term must be its and the more pertinent applied. term must be The GTLA does not define the “trailway.” statutorily term aWhen nontechnical word is not defined, according it is construed and understood to the common approved usage language. and “trailway” of the Because is not dictionaries, general necessary defined in most it is to look outside meaning “trailway” Legisla- GTLAto discern the that the likely 324.72101(k), part ture intended. Michigan of the trailways act, defines as “a land corridor that features capable accommodating variety public broad trail recre- Legislature ation uses.” “trailways” When the added the word highway exception defining word, likely 1999 without it according intended the term already to be construed to the existing specifically definition in the one statute that is devoted to trailways. The Little Manistee Trail is a trail broad is primarily by vehicles, used recreational such as off-road vehicles snowmobiles, and squarely and therefore falls within this defini- tion trailways and within the broader ambit of the act. The GTLA “road,” does not define but its common is a leveled or paved traveling by Although surface made for motor vehicle. surface, Little primary Manistee Trail is a purpose leveled its vehicles, use is for recreational not motor vehicles. Because the Legislature "trailway” used both highway “road” and in the exception, once the trailway, trail has been classified as a which is term, the more limited it cannot be a road. 3. The bridges, definition of includes those sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, and culverts that are “on the highway.” rule, Under the last-antecedent the restrictive highway” solely clause immediately “on the is confined to the preceding clause something or last antecedent unless in the requires interpretation. case, statute a different In this the struc- 691.1401(e) ture and context of MCL indicate that a different interpretation required. is The context of the definition makes bridges, sidewalks, clear trailways, crosswalks, and culverts scope “highways” are considered they within the because all relationship highway, bear some by as indicated the modi- fying highway.” Accordingly, clause' “on the this clause must be Mich 198 [July- Thus, Legisla- in MCL applied all these terms. things highways: highways per se and two classes of ture created only they highway. highways if are on the that are included as away any highway, Trail, is miles from Little Manistee which highway. the definition of does not fall within therefore Affirmed. Cavanagh joined by Justices Justice Marilyn Kelly, judgment dissenting, of the have reversed the would
Hathaway, Appeals the Little Manistee Trail is a and held that Court of highway exception purposes because for road. designed Trail a leveled surface 1. The Little Manistee alerting by signs numerous users of travel. It is marked
vehicular traffic, traffic, weight limits, two-way truck and curves mixed-use by road, among things. It use all in the other is also Secretary matter of State. It does not vehicles licensed predominantly for whether the Little Manistee Trail is used purposes because MCL makes no distinc- recreational secondary primary uses. tion between always accessible to the 2. The Little Manistee Trail summer, open year-round. During spring, and fall because it is cars, trucks, months, vehicles, motorcycles, it is used off-road *3 months, vehicles, During sport utility it is and semi-trucks. winter characteristics, Given these the Little also used snowmobiles. public for travel under MCL Manistee Trail is a road that is 691.1401(e).Accordingly, duty maintain it in the state is under to repair. reasonable Highway — — Exception Trailways. Immunity 1. Governmental crosswalks, sidewalks, trailways, Bridges, included and culverts are purposes highway of the within the definition of exception governmental immunity only they if are “on the 691.1402[1]). (MCL highway” 691.1401[e], Highway — — — Exception Immunity Words and Phrases 2. Governmental Trailways. highway governmental “Trailway,” exception as used in the immunity, according to the definition of should be construed “trailway” provided trailways (part in act of the Natural Act), which defines Resources and Environmental Protection capable trail of as a land corridor that features a broad (MCL accommodating variety recreation uses 691.1402[1]). 324.72101[k], 691.1401[e], of Natural Resources Opinion of the Court Dawson, Boyer & EC. (by Boyer William G. Jr.), William G. Boyer, plaintiff. Schuette,
Bill Attorney General, Bursch, John J. General, Solicitor and Ann Sherman and C. Adam Purnell, General, Assistant Attorneys for defendants. Plaintiff, J. Beverly Duffy, injured was
MARKMAN, riding while an off-road vehicle on what is commonly (“the Trail”). known as the Little Manistee Trail Michigan Trail, state of owns the and the Department (DNR) maintains it. Plaintiff sued entities, both and throughout litigation this has set forth various theories to grant governmen- avoid the tal immunity provided to governmen- defendants (GTLA), tal tort act liability MCL 691.1401 et seq. In the courts, lower she argued that defendants had a duty to maintain the Trail repair pursuant reasonable generally what is referred ‘highway to as the exception’ to governmental immunity because the Trail is a “trail- way” that falls within the definition “high- 691.1402(1). way.” 691.1401(e); See MCL In this Court, plaintiff now contends that we should conclude that the Trail is either a “forest road” or a “road” for purposes GTLA and that defendants therefore a duty have to maintain this “road” pursuant to the highway exception.
Therefore, requires case us to determine whether the Little Manistee Trail is a “highway” for the purposes governmental immunity because the state has a to maintain the Trail in reasonable repair pursuant if exception is, fact, 691.1401(e). under MCL We note that this *4 is a question first in impression particular context of this case. For although Michigan courts are familiar with the highway exception to governmental 490 Mich
Opinion the Court in any person case which are unaware immunity; we on riding an off-road vehicle injured been while who has that the trail constitutes trail has claimed a state highway exception. of the purposes Trail not a under that the is We conclude 691.1401(e). as a properly The Trail is classified that the distinct word “trailway” within law, and this Michigan’s —which scope not within the away any highway from miles —is it not a “trail- because highway exception Furthermore, Id. because the highway.” ... on the way only trailways high- on the determined Legislature and because this Trail way highways, are deemed clearly highway, plaintiffs not a we refuse therefore and make the Trail into invitation to avoid the statute roads, summary, In all by calling it a road. roads, trails, trailways, highways this case forest plaintiffs lead to the conclusion that claim is barred we affirm the governmental immunity. Accordingly, Appeals. of the Court of judgment I. AND HISTORY PACTS Plaintiff, friends, her together with husband (ORVs) on the Little riding were off-road vehicles Trail, County. in Lake Just as plaintiff Manistee located turn, a left ran over some negotiate was about to she partially that had been buried. exposed wooden boards air, throwing into the This caused her ORV to bounce nearby resulting tree trunks and plaintiff against injuries. spinal serious uses,
The Trail serves mixed and the DNR has route,” an “ORV an “ORV designated variously as injured Plaintiff trail,” and a “snowmobile trail.” was an designated of the Trail “ORV portion on vehicle route,” signifies any licensed motor which *5 Duffy Dep’t 203 v Opinion of the Court The part on that of the Trail. Trail is operate part can trailways, system of recreational comprehensive obligated to maintain and by statute the DNR is which The See MCL 324.81123. manage off-road vehicles. Improvement through Trail Fund state funds ORV treasury, provide and the DNR is authorized to state government, nonprofit agencies, to local units of grants trails, routes, system to maintain this individuals Little Trail is main- and forest roads. The Manistee Association, a tained the Irons Area Tourist non- profit corporation. of the highway
Plaintiff sued defendants on basis to exception governmental immunity.1 Defendants moved that the Trail summary disposition, arguing “highway” and, result, they is not a as a had no duty to maintain it in repair pursuant reasonable motion, The trial court denied this exception. ruling that the Trail fits within the definition of a in MCL in- specifically which “trailways.” According court, cludes to the trial “there is no dispute trailway,” that the Little Manistee is a to hold proceeded that defendants were not exempt from the maintain the Trail. The Court of Appeals Resources, reversed. v Natural Duffy Dep’t of unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Ap- (Docket 289644). 9, March peals, issued 2010 No. Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that properly Trail classified a “trailway” and falls 691.1401(e). within the definition of in MCL According to the Court of Appeals, “[t]here can be no 1 separate arising incident, plaintiff In a action out of the same sued the policy carrier of her no-fault automobile for no-fault benefits. Grange Mich, unpublished opinion Appeals, Ins Co of the Court of (Docket 290198) September (reversing issued No. the trial granting summary disposition court’s order defendant-insurance remanding proceedings). carrier and for further Mich Opinion of the Court dispute However,
real
that this
3.
trailway...Id.
at
the panel concluded that the limited liability granted to
691.1402(1)
the state in MCL
applies
trailways.
to all
aAs
result, it ruled that the highway exception did not
apply
plaintiffs suit. Plaintiff then filed an application for leave
to appeal,
granted.
which this Court
Duffy v Dep’t of
(2010).
Resources,
Natural
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
*6
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on
a motion for summary disposition.
v
Ostroth Warren
GP,
Regency,
LLC,
III. HIGHWAY EXCEPTION TO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY The GTLA governmental shields a agency from tort liability “if governmental agency is in engaged exercise or discharge of a governmental function.”2 691.1407(1). MCL The existence and scope governmen- tal immunity solely was a creation of the courts until the Legislature enacted the GTLA in which codified exceptions several to governmental immunity that permit a plaintiff to pursue a claim against governmental agency. This case concerns the highway exception to governmental immunity, 691.1402(1), MCL which pro- in vides relevant part: governmental
[E]aeh agency having jurisdiction over a highway shall maintain repair in reasonable both defendants —the state and the DNR —are within the 691.1401(d). The agencies, GTLA. A governmental departments, state, agency [and] in turn, is “the state or a commissions____” includes “the political state of subdivision.” MCL 691.1401(c). Michigan provisions Thus, of the its Resources Natural Opinion Court reasonably public travel. it is safe and convenient so that bodily injury damage to his or her person A who sustains governmental agency property by reason of failure of a jurisdiction repair in keep highway under its reasonable may reasonably and fit for travel recover in a condition safe governmental damages suffered him or her from the remedy county agency. liability, procedure, as to The jurisdiction county roads under the of a road commission provided 224.21]. of the state [MCL shall be as county repair and the road commissions to and maintain highways, liability duty, and the for that extends portion highway designed improved of the for vehicular travel sidewalks, crosswalks, trailways, any and does not include improved portion of the other installation outside highway designed for vehicular travel. final “trailways”
The reference to
the fourth and
sentence was added
[as] used
this act:
(e) “Highway”
highway,road,
public
means a
or street that
sidewalks,
bridges,
travel and includes
crosswalks,
trailways,
highway.
and culverts on the
The term
*7
trees,
highway
alleys,
utility poles.
does not include
The
“trailways”
“high-
inclusion of
in the definition of
way”
also done in
Although
Court has never before considered the
case,
exact
in
presented
many
issues
this
it has on
See,
occasions
interpreted
highway exception.
e.g.,
1;
v City Lansing,
Robinson
486 Mich
First, recognized language this Court has that the highway exception Indeed, is not altogether clear. we the highway exception “problematic,” have described as Nawrocki, 24, Mich n at 167 and have noted that its reasons,” Suttles, language “confusing for several (citation omitted). Mich at 643 n 5 and quotation marks In Grimes, 78, 475 Mich at we identified a particular problem act,
in
is,
again today
which we encounter
—that
“[b]eyond
the term
defining
‘highway,’the GTLA does not
691.1401(e)].”
[the]
define
additional terms MCL
[in
statutory
absence of
definitions for
particu-
these terms is
larly
troublesome
this case because not
are “road”
GTLA,
undefined
but “trailway” is
undefined in many general dictionaries as
In
well.
deter-
whether
mining
defendants have a
to maintain the
Trail in reasonable repair because the Trail constitutes a
“highway,” we remain cognizant of the challenges pre-
sented
the drafting
exception
mindful that
“[c]onstrained
we are
to apply
language as best as possible
Nawrocki,
as written ....”
Second, as we recently explained Robinson, Mich at 8 n we know that MCL 691.1402 and MCL 691.1401 be together must read as a single law: elementary
“It is
pari
that statutes in
materia are to be
together
taken
ascertaining
legisla-
the intention of the
ture,
regard
and that
upon
courts will
all statutes
the same
general subject
part
system.”
matter
Twp
of 1
Dearborn
(1953).
Jones,
658, 662;
Clerk v
Accordingly, determining whether ex- ception governmental immunity applies facts 490 MICH 198 Opinion Court First, inquiry. is a in order for two-pronged
of this case *9 to maintain the Little Man- duty defendants to have fall repair, istee Trail in reasonable the Trail must the definition of set forth in MCL within “a . . . that again which road is trailways travel” and “includes . . . ... on the highway.” Second, if the Trail is a “highway,” defen- duty dants have a to maintain it in reasonable if the Trail is repair part included within the limited duty county of the state and road commis- 691.1402(1). Concerning sion. MCL the first prong, argues that the Trail plaintiff falls within the definition “road”; in MCL because it is a alternatively, in argues support she of the lower courts’ determinations that the Trail is a “trailway.” Concern- ing that, “road,” the second prong, plaintiff argues as a the Trail is not excluded from defendants’ duty by 691.1402(1) and, alternatively, the limitation on 691.1402(1) the state’s in MCL applies only to “trailways . . . outside of the improved portion of the travel,” highway designed for vehicular not to all trail- ways, as the Court Appeals concluded.
IV TRAIL NOT A “HIGHWAY” We question now address threshold whether the Little Manistee Trail is a “highway” under MCL 691.1401(e). party Neither contends that the Trail could fall highway exception anything within the other than a a “trailway.” Although plaintiff “road” or originally argued indisputably the Trail was “trailway,” and although both lower courts treated this Court, issue as in equally undisputed, appeal her this belatedly classification, she in- challenges arguing purposes stead that the Trail is a “road” for Dep’t of Resources Natural Opinion Court reject both of plaintiffs argu- GTLA.3We consider First, “trailway” ments. conclude that the Trail is a we Michigan’s within the distinct of that word Second, statutory law. we conclude that the Trail is not 691.1401(e). under MCL covered following information about the Trail is relevant its classification under the GTLA. As determining stated state, the Trail on land previously, owned maintained and under the jurisdiction of the DNR. The Little systems Manistee Trail is one of four trail Lake County, “Michigan’s within which bills itself as Outdoor and actively promotes Recreational Paradise” its than A trailways. witness, more 300 miles of DNR who in the specialized development maintenance of forest trails, provided roads and an affidavit that stated: *10 (also The Little Trail Manistee & Route Snowmobile #35) part Trail #344E and are located in of Newkirk and Cherry Valley Townships County in Lake in the State of Michigan. The Little Trail and Manistee Route is motorcycle passable throughout ORV and use when year. winter, 31, In the from December 1 March it is also trail, designated used snowmobile No. 344 and No. 35. primarily year The Trail and Route are used around for riding purposes. recreational vehicle Other wheeled ve- (Forest road) hicular use of the Route would be an allowed secondary but use. plaintiffs argument necessary Because consideration of new to the case, proper determination of this we will address this issue. Dation v Ford (1946) (“When Co, 152, 160-161;
Motor
314 Mich
Thus, DNR, according to the the Trail is both “trail” and a “route.” Plaintiffs accident occurred on the portion Furthermore, the Trail is considered a “route.” DNR, the Trail mixed according permits to the uses. used for recreational “primarily” riding Trail is vehicle end, are on all permitted and to that ORVs purposes, (the year-round passable of the Trail when Trail portions winter), is not in the and snowmobiles are plowed permit- use,” “secondary ted the winter. As a licensed four- permitted wheel conventional vehicles are on the “route” portion. Pictures included in index plaintiffs sig- show uses, these nage reflecting including sign various “Mixed Traffic” a weight-limit sign that permits than trucks with more one axle. These pictures show Trail unpaved shoulder, as an dirt that has path no directly forest, appears enough abuts dense wide one lane allow of conventional traffic.
A. TRAIL AS A “TRAILWAY” MCL 8.3a instructs that when a nontechnical word is defined, statutorily not be “shall construed under- stood according approved usage common and of the However, language....” construing the elusive word “trailway” according to its approved usage “common and language” proves difficult, to be a if not impossible, mentioned, task. As not not defined GTLA, but it not defined in general most dictionar- case, therefore, ies either.4 presents This the unusual situation in which there is apparently “commonly no approved” meaning of a word that the Legislature chose *11 statute, yet to in a the employ Legislature did not define the word in that statute. pertinent “trail,” The most definition available the is for word which is path overgrown rough by defined as “a or track made in terrain the
passage people College Dictionary of or animals.” Random House Webster’s (1997). of Natural Resources Opinion of the Court in necessary
It is thus to look outside the GTLA order “trailway” likely the of intended in discern 691.1401(e). do, MCL we find one be When we statute to Michigan trailways act, relevance: the particular seq., only Michigan MCL 324.72101 et the statute that explicitly “trailways” provides creates and that the law governing “trailways.” part The act was added as and Environmental Protection Act Natural Resources (NREPA) in provide system 1995 to for a statewide on “owned the trailways governmen- lands state or a agency,” 324.72103(l)(a), tal MCL public enjoy- “for ment, health, fitness; encourage [to] constructive activities; [and leisure-time . . . enhance the local to] economies,” and state MCL 324.72102. The act defines in as a “land corridor that part features broad trail capable accommodating variety 324.72101(k). recreation uses.” MCL We are persuaded Legislature when added “trailway” to the in highway exception 1999 without defining word, intended likely “trailway” to be according construed in already-existing definition specifically trailways. relying statute devoted to While on “an unrelated perilous statute to construe another is a courts,” Grimes, endeavor to be avoided our at this case does not us to simply allow avoid Michigan trailways act. Webelieve therefore that it is both necessary and proper to look the act’s definition of “trailway” because there is no alternative definition. Fur- thermore, chronology enactments, of relevant as well trailways as the act’s trailways, exclusive focus on leads us to believe that the Legislature must have intended that 324.72101(k) “trailways” definition of would law, to other apply trailways Michigan invocations of to that term as in the specifically used short, In exception. although invariably this Court will not borrow from one language meaning statute order *12 Opinion op the Court
provide meaning to another when those statutes are not materia, presents this case us with such an pari instance.
Accordingly, apply “trailways” we definition of in the act to MCL and provided trailways squarely conclude that the Little Manistee Trail falls definition; it “land within this is a corridor that features accommodating variety trail of of capable broad 324.72101(k). recreation uses.” MCL It is a public trail,” unpaved “broad an dirt trail that has no shoul- der, forest, directly appears abuts dense and wide one lane of enough to allow conventional traffic. And a defining characteristic of the Trail is its capacity a variety “accommodate] of recreation uses.” All types permitted year-round Trail, of ORVs are on the permitted Moreover, and snowmobiles are in the winter. the Little Manistee Trail falls within the broader ambit trailways act. It is located on state-owned land part system trailways of a statewide designed provide public enjoyment, health, fitness; “to encourage activities; constructive leisure-time . . . [and] economies,” enhance the local and state as is evident promotion the active of the Trail for recreation tourism. MCL 324.72102.
It is unclear whether and the plaintiff dissent would disagree with conclusion that the Little Manistee Trail “trailway” falls within definition of part NREPA, for both to have overlooked appear this Indeed, definition. the dissent never even attempts to give meaning as used in the highway and, way, in this exception entirely unresponsive opinion. response This lack of is remarkable for reasons, several not the least of which is that in the undisputed lower courts it was the Trail was a “trailway,” and still plaintiff herself maintains that this Opinion of the Court is so. This lack of also response highlights the critical flaw the dissent’s approach highway exception. To our differing approaches why understand we —and believe ours is the better one—we with one begin point agreement between our opinions. agree We both that “the resolution of this case hinges on the *13 ‘highway’....” Post 232. Recognizing this, at both opin- ions also quote defining which in “high- way” plainly “trailways.” includes both “roads” and We dissent, part ways however, with the with our altogether give routine determination that we must to all meaning statutory 691.1401(e) specifically, terms MCL to both — “road” and “trailway.”5
In accordance
approach
interpretation,
with this
to
we
plaintiffs
consider
belated
challenge
the lower courts’
the
rulings
“trailway.”
that
Little Manistee Trail was a
argues
Plaintiff now
in the alternative that the Trail
ais
“road,”
“trailway,”
“road.” Because
like
is not defined in
GTLA,
the
it “shall be construed and understood accord-
ing
usage
to the common and
of the lan-
approved
____”MCL
guage
“trailway,” however,
8.3a. Unlike
the
meaning of “road” is
in any
well understood
is found
dictionary. Its
is
meaning
captured sufficiently,
our
judgment, by this definition: a
“a
“road” is
leveled or
paved surface, made
traveling by
motor vehicle ....”
(1997).
Random House
College Dictionary
Webster’s
Although the Little Manistee Trail
“a
is
leveled
surface,” it does not fall within the common definition
principles
interpretation
approach.
People
First
of
mandate this
See
(2010) (“When
Jackson,
791;
considering
487 Mich
of “road” because Rather, according expert’s to the DNR uncon- vehicle.” testimony, primary purpose troverted its use is vehicles, purpose eclipses recreational and this limited use of the Trail motor vehicles.6 highly totally defining of the Trail is so recreational use why no in the easily party we can understand lower might even considered that the Trail be courts i.e., surface, “a made for paved leveled “road” — Thus, motor when traveling by comparing vehicle.” “trailway,” specifically the definition of which refers defining capacity to the Trail’s characteristic —its variety “accommodate a recreation uses”— “road,” clearly and the definition of which does not any way defining refer in to the Trail’s characteristic trail, apparent as recreational the Little Trail is characterized a “trail- properly Manistee way,” not a “road.” “road,”
The dissent’s conclusion that the Trail ais considering which it reaches without even “trailway,” violates principles interpre- *14 tation, in grounded faulty logic, is and contravenes the Legislature’s drafting manifest intent in MCL 6 Although challenges accuracy testimony, post the dissent the of this at 231, herself, who, course, plaintiff using the Trail was for recreation injured use, purposes quite when she was and thus is familiar with its did challenge by calling not it. The dissent next errs this evidence “immate claiming statutory distinguishing that rial” and there is “no basis for primary secondary between and uses of a road.” Post at 231. The dissent statutory analysis abruptly sees no such basis because it cuts short its give meaning MCL and does not even seek to to the term “trailway.” interpreted entirety, had If the dissent the statute its and given “trailway,” recognize reasonable to the term it would that distinguishes trailways what roads and at their core is that the former primarily primarily are are used motor vehicles and the latter used for Thus, properly recreation. order to determine whether the Trail is better, precisely, trailway, and more characterized as a road or a we must actually consider how it is used. Duffy v 215 Opinion of the Court 691.1401(e).7 “every [in It is axiomatic that word the given meaning, be and we should avoid statute] should any part a that would render statute construction Peltola, People nugatory.” surplusage or (2011) (citations 181; 803 140 and marks quotation NW2d omitted). also that con- It is axiomatic “where a statute a general provision specific provision, tains a and O’Rourke, specific provision controls.” Gebhardt v (1994). 535, 542-543; Mich the dissent 510 NW2d Yet does not effect attempt give even to the narrower provision “trailway,” though Legislature’s even use both “road” accord each “trailway” demands that we term its proper meaning apply precisely more Indeed, pertinent interpretive term.8 the dissent’s ap- proach Court, question: Why raises the obvious would this any court, when offered the choice applying between choose the less two resolving dispute, terms applicable term?9 interpretive approach “straightfor its dissent extols because it ward,” “simple,” 225, 225, easy and leads to an resolution. Post at 178. We if, dissent, do not doubt that our task made would also be easier like the we attempt Legislature did not even to ascertain what the intended when it “trailway” highway added exception. might We too find to be a statutory interpretation resolved,” “vanilla easily case of that is if afforded luxuiy. However, required interpret Post at 220. we are statutes in entirety possible. their in the most reasonable manner 8 Further, considering of MCL structure is evident “trailway” specific First, is a more or limited term than “road.” there many transportational ways, are thoroughfares, more that fall within indeed, “trailway”; “road” virtually every than within term contained street, crosswalk, within the exception highway, bridge, — many culvert —will under fall circumstances within the definition of Second, 691.1401(e), every “road.” under road travel “highway,” is a while included within if it actually highway.” “on the question” big The dissent is correct that “the in this case is whether ‘trailway’ [is] “the Trail or a the statute!.]” ‘road’ within the intent of this, Recognizing
Post at 234.
how can the dissent think that
it has
*15
properly
question
addressed
when
nowhere even considers the
The is that our response dissent’s the definition of “road.” Post at “surplusage” renders of the response illogic 233. This reveals dissent’s illustrates, “trailway” i.e., a a approach. As this case — a broad trail capable “land corridor that features recreation uses”— accommodating variety a will often fall within the broad definition of “road”— i.e., surface, made for paved traveling by “a leveled motor vehicle.” But the converse does not hold true. is, “trailway” “road,” That a will often be a a while Thus, only infrequently “trailway.” “road” will be a one that the Trail consequence dissent’s conclusion essentially “road” is that “road” would consume “trailway” genuinely in MCL render There “trailway” “surplusage.” equivalent is no risk concluding “trailway” the Trail is a that “road” Indeed, rendered nullity. opinion could be our accords meaning “trailway.” full to both “road” and It defines terms, it ultimately both characterizes the Trail as a “trailway” specific because the latter is the more term, term. To define first the broader as the dissent does, in no way dispenses with need also to define term; contrast, defining the narrower the narrower term dispense does with the need also to define the sum, broader term.10 In our interpretation does not any part surplusage. render of MCL “trailway”? Essentially, requires this case determine us to entity whether an A B. The better characterized as dissent avoids any B, analysis merely peremptorily whatsoever of asserts about the entity, “It is A.” discussion, approach previous virtue of this is illustrated precise in which we conclude that the term constitutes a more characterizing fit in the Trail than does the term “road.” a matter As logic, cases, what is true in this case would seem to hold true in almost all wit, specific term the narrower and more will constitute better general fit than the broader and more term. *16 Opinion of the Court Finally, the dissent justifies its avoidance “trail- way” by reasoning that “even if the Trail is not a trailway,’ majority concludes, ‘covered as the it cer- tainly is, is a road.” Post at 233. That the Trail can still “road,” be a and a if “highway,” thus even it is a “trailway,” not a “trailway highway.” but on the How- ever, this directly Legislature contradicts what 691.1401(e). stated MCL Under that provision, there are two sets of terms that fall “highway.” First, within roads, there are highways, streets are for public travel. These always are “highways.” Second, there are structures that are “included” as highways “bridges, sidewalks, trailways, crosswalks, — highway.” and culverts on the In order to be “included” as a a highway, trailway particular must be on the if highway and, not, it is that trailway is not highway. a language organization MCL plain, make this yet the dissent would contravene the statute and a transform not trailway on a highway thus a is not highway by —and —into road, calling it a all without first considering whether Trail best, at issue is and most precisely, character- sum, ized as a In trailway. the Legislature determined that roads and are trailways not the same purposes of the highway exception, in the sense that certain trailways would be deemed highways. Thus, once this Trail has been precisely most accurately classified as a trailway, cannot be road.
Plaintiff posits argument one more challenge our conclusion that the is a trailway. urges Trail She us to supplement perhaps more accurately, supplant— —or the common understanding of “road” with a definition NREPA, of “forest road” arguing that the Trail ais “forest road” or “road” under this definition. NREPA defines road” “a road, gravel “forest hard surfaced road, dirt capable or other route of travel a 2-wheel Opinion of the Court designed high- conventional vehicle
drive, 4-wheel high- interstate, state, county use, an except way 324.81101(f).11 reliance on Plaintiffs way.” begin reasons. To unavailing for several definition is to this definition because unnecessary turn with, it is It is difficult to and familiar word. is a common “road” easily “understood accord- a word that is more think of of the lan- usage and approved the common ing to of NREPA’s invocation ....” MCL 8.3a. Plaintiffs guage principles to first contrary road” runs definition “forest (1) nothing “common” there because interpretation of “forest specific definition NREPA’s technical and about *17 (2) is unrelated definition relying road” and on this light commonplace in of more defini- avoidable altogether Grimes, Mich at 85.12 tions. 475 Further, looking problem, this threshold past even of the definition “forest persuaded we are not that exception. MCL highway applicable road” is 324.81101(f) road,” a while the GTLA defines “forest “roads,” and only “highway” encompass defines of within the definition “roads” have been included 691.1402(1) in the GTLA was since suggest in 1964. these facts that Together, first enacted enacted the GTLA and included Legislature that could not have highway exception within the “road” road” would be intended that the definition of “forest by distinguished a of A road” is from “forest trail” the width “forest 324.81101(g), which a that can on it. See MCL defines vehicle travel by path way designated capable travel a “forest trail” “a than inches in width.” vehicle less relying highlight the on NREPA’s These factors differences between “trailway” is no other alternative definitions of and “forest road.” There “trailway,” easily yet of “road” definition of the definition available Further, general provides the definition of ascertained. meaning, insight the definition of “forest road” into its common while specific, provides insight into the little common technical meaning of “road.” Duffy Dep’t Opinion of the Court to give “road,” used meaning to because that definition did not even exist when “road” incorporated was into the GTLA. Conversely, would seem odd that Legislature that enacted the specific definition “for- est road” would have intended it to apply generally to all “roads” in Michigan, including all “roads” refer- highway enced exception.
However, we need engage speculation not about this, Legislature because the affirmatively foreclosed the possibility that the definition road” of “forest could be into the imported highway exception crafting that definition distinguish between “forest roads” and those that come “highways” scope within the highway exception. Again, MCL 324.81101(f) defines “forest road” as “a road, hard surfaced or dirt gravel road, or other route capable drive, travel 2-wheel use, 4-wheel conventional vehicle designed interstate, state, an except county highway.” (Empha- added.) sis and county highways State struc- —those tures transportation indisputably are most within the highway exception expressly excluded —are from definition of Thus, “forest roads.” the Legis- reasonably lature and clearly indicated “forest typical “road,” road” is not a merely a conclusion that underscores the obvious fact that NREPA defines road,” while definition of “forest *18 speaks only GTLA of “roads.” In we summary, have difficulty little concluding that the Little Manistee Trail is properly a “trailway,” characterized as a not “road,” under highway the exception.13 support interpretation, As further of our we take note of the complete support plaintiffs argument absence of caselaw in a that purposes highway exception. recreational trail is a road for of the We are single person injured riding unaware of a case in a which while an OR.V on a theory state-owned trail has ever the sued state on the that the state duty repair highway had a to exception maintain the trail under the 490 Mich Opinion the Court A “TRAILWAY”
B. TRAIL NOT COVERED Trail classified properly that the concluding After is “trail- “trailway,” next address whether this as a we “highway” MCL way” within the definition falls 691.1401(e) is, public highway, it is a “a whether —that and includes road, is travel or street that crosswalks, sidewalks, and culverts bridges, trailways, it is not. This We conclude that highway.” on the trail- scope its all definition does not include within are “on only “trailways” that ways, but includes those “on” the The Little Manistee Trail not highway.” the fact, “adjacent highway; and it not to” the highway, a away any Therefore, is not highway. it is miles from a and thus not covered MCL exception purposes highway immunity. governmental the clause of interpretation compelled by
This final which, highway,” prop- “on the when “high- clear that the definition of erly makes applied, sidewalks, trailways, cross- way” “bridges, includes walks, “bridges, culverts,” those but crosswalks, are sidewalks, and culverts” that trailways, limiting “on In clause highway.” applying the the defini- entire list of installations within preceding exception tion of we the established “highway,” follow as the rule construction known general the This, certainty despite a the near that others because it was “road.” riding plaintiff injured have been an on state before also while ORV trail, previous fact there definition of and the that has never been offering precluded persons have those from that would argument plaintiff underscores that does. The absence of caselaw same under fact the state has never been held to have permit repair exception to trails that maintain recreational changes pertinent It also underscores that ORVs and snowmobiles. explain why highway exception are the this case is before us now “trailway” to GTLA. 1999 amendments that added *19 Opinion of the Court ‘last antecedent’ rule. This “rule of statutory construc- provides tion that a modifying restrictive word or clause contained a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding antecedent, clause last unless something requires the statute interpreta- different Creek, tion.” Stanton v Battle 466 Mich 616; 647 (2002) added). NW2d 508 In (emphasis 691.1401(e), there are two indications that different interpretation is required, and both direct us to follow exception rather than rule and general apply the restrictive clause each the preceding terms. 691.1401(e)
First, the structure and context of MCL indicate interpretation different required. As discussed, previously there are two sets of terms that fall within its definition of “highway.” There are “public roads, or highways, streets that are open for public travel.” And there are those terms that are “include[d]” as highways “bridges, sidewalks, trailways, cross- — walks, and culverts on the highway.” While there is nothing surprising about including first class terms in the definition “highway,” the average reader might expect well not to find the terms listed in the However, second class. the context of the sentence why makes clear these latter terms are considered within the scope of “highways.” Namely, all the terms listed in this second class bear some relationship to the highway. modifying clause, “on the highway,” es- tablishes this relationship. give Accordingly, proper 691.1401(e) meaning to MCL gleaned from its struc- context, ture and the clause highway” “on the be must all applied to the terms that are “include[d]” within the second class of highways “bridges, sidewalks, trail- — ways, crosswalks, and culverts.”
The second reason to follow the exception to the last-antecedent rule in interpreting MCL Opinion of the Court by applying general interpretation reached that the is, incorrect. That when be grammatically rule would *20 to highway” “on is applied clause the the restrictive “culvert,” an awkward antecedent, last only its no there are results because reading unreasonable by not “Culvert” is defined highway. “on” the culverts “a drain or chan- statute, definition is but its common sidewalk, etc; sewer, con- road, a crossing nel under Dictionary College House duit.” Random Webster’s added). (1997) the However, “on” not while (emphasis to a “cul- apply correct to grammatically preposition “included” in the definition vert,” other terms listed as are “bridges,” as “crosswalks” and “highway,” such highway. to “on” the normally understood be lan- the apply are to “[constrained We Nawrocki, . .” as written . . possible as best as guage by case, at In this the constraints created 463 Mich 171. 691.1401(e) re- of MCL drafting the highly imperfect the highway” clause “on modifying us to quire apply and, “highways,” as “included” to all the terms listed as so, grammatical these words effect. doing give proper Ward, 237; 596 Valley Co v See Sun Foods (1999) “statutory (stating language NW2d con- grammatical be read and understood its must text”). it anoma- Accordingly, grammatically because “culvert,” “sidewalk,” say to that a lous that more highway,14 prepositions precisely “on” the must relationship these areas’ to describes mean- grammatical sentence give proper be used to sense, imprecise grammatical Legislature’s “on” use of in a While communicating legislative that all the sense in a intention makes some Legislature highway. relationship had If the terms listed bear some only “culvert,” highway” have apply it would not intended “on the accurately “on,” given preposition that “under” is chosen type specific relationship and the between that of structure describes highway. Opinion of the Court Thus, a ing. “highway,” as defined MCL highway; includes “culvert” “under” the a “sidewalk” “adjacent highway; to” the importantly, “trail- way” “adjacent to” the highway. conclusion,
In in drafting the statutory definition in MCL 691.1401(e), the Legislature created two classes of are “highways”— terms that considered (1) se, those terms that are “highways” per i.e., “public road, highway, or street that is (2) travel,” and those terms “included” highways, as sidewalks, such “bridges, crosswalks, culverts,” if but are “on they highway.” Notably, when the Legislature amended the definition of add “trailways,” added this term to the second category structures, covered each which is modified “on the highway.” If the Legislature had *21 intended trailways that all matter they where are —no located and irrespective of relationship their highway be considered highways, it would —should have added “trailways” to the category first of covered structures. But it did not.
By “on the including highway” MCL Legislature the limited the “bridges, universe of side- walks, crosswalks, trailways, and culverts” are considered “highways” for of purposes highway the exception. This limitation is perfectly reasonable be- cause it would be odd if a sidewalk in the middle of a meadow or a trailway in the middle forest, a neither of of which is a anywhere near highway, bona fide were considered a “highway” of purposes governmental immunity. Therefore, it is important to to give effect clause, this essential limiting no matter inartfully how worded.15 15 Appeals result, Court The of reached the same albeit on different
grounds. “trailway” The Court reasoned that the Trail was Mich 490 198 Opinion the of Court
V CONCLUSION presented interpretation of questions and, many impression of as with case are first in this to exception governmental the involving highway cases drafting due to the challenges immunity, some present 691.1401(e) 691.1402(1). However, by MCL MCL and of and the following of construction traditional tools using immu- previous governmental of Court’s this guidance the as best we interpret we statute nity jurisprudence, the reasonable and what we believe is most can reach so, the Little In we conclude that interpretation. doing purposes Trail is not a Manistee the state was MCL but determined under 691.1402(1). Although liability trailways by exempted for all from that the Trail is not rest our decision on threshold determination we “highway,” opportunity make clear that the Court of we take this to 691.1402(1) interpretation was nonetheless correct. Appeals’ of MCL liability consistently exemptions from has treated the Our caselaw 691.1402(1) county provided road in MCL and commissions the state Sutiles, at a case in Court In which as absolute. pre-1999 of the statute before the reference version construed added, “trailways” that were cat- we identified three installations was “(1) liability: egorically from the state’s and the counties’ excluded (3) (2) sidewalks, crosswalks, any other installation outside designed portion highway improved for vehicular travel.” See also (“[T]he Nawrocki, not Mich at limited does extend ‘sidewalks, crosswalks, any improved installation of the other outside Robinson, ”), portion designed of the for vehicular travel.’ approach treating (employing as absolute the Mich at 7 the same duty). In from the state’s accordance with exclusion sidewalks 691.1402(1) Suttles, interpretation fourth sentence of MCL Robinson, Nawrocki, properly Appeals determined that the Court simply specific added a fourth the addition of to the statute county categorically road that is excluded from the state’s and area *22 amendments, is, liability. after the 1999 in which That commissions’ “crosswalk,” “trailway” and added “sidewalk” state’s was between exception specific four does not extend to limited under the (1) (2) (3) (4) crosswalks, sidewalks, trailways, any and all all all areas: improved highway designed portion of outside the other installation vehicular travel. Natural Resources Dissenting Opinion by Marilyn Kelly, J. governmental immunity. The Trail properly is classified as a within the distinct word that in Michigan’s statutory law, and, because it a is not ... on the “trailway highway,” it is not a “trail- covered 691.1401(e). way” under MCL Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court Appeals. Mary Kelly C.J., JJ.,
Young, Beth Zahra, J. MARKMAN, concurred with (dissenting). poet J. As James Whit- Kelly,
MARILYN Riley comb is said to remarked, have “When I bird see a that like a walks duck and swims like duck and quacks duck, like I call that bird a Riley’s duck.” quip I apropos this case: thoroughfare when see a that looks like a road and signage has like a road and is used by the as a I road, call thoroughfare that a road.
Resolution of is straightforward. this case At issue (the Trail) whether the Little Manistee Trail is a more pointedly, road —for purposes —or (GTLA).1 the governmental liability tort act If Trail is a “highway” as defined then state under a duty to maintain it in repair. reasonable If it is not a highway, the state no such has duty. majority holds the Trail is not a highway and that defendants are entitled summary disposi- tion. they It concludes liability have no to plaintiff the highway exception because to governmental immu- nity not apply. reaching conclusion, does In majority injects confusion into what should simple be a I analysis. dissent I because believe that all signs, figurative literal, indicate that the Little Manistee Trail is a “highway” under the GTLA. MCL 691.1401 et seq. *23 198 490 MICH Marilyn Opinion by Dissenting Kelly, J. BACKGROUND
FACTUAL in Plaintiff was dispute. The this case are not facts of (ORV) on the Manistee Little riding an off-road vehicle exposed when ran over some County Trail in Lake she portion in the traveled partially buried boards a tree against her ORV roadway. She was thrown from trunk, paralysis. and resulting spinal injuries plaintiffs accident
The of the Trail on which portion route,” that designated an “ORV occurred State can Secretary motor licensed any vehicle include, but on The there permitted it. vehicles operate to, trucks, sport cars, not are limited conventional ORVs, vehicles, motorcycles, vehicles, all-terrain utility Fur- snowmobiles, semi-trucks, and tractor-trailers. thermore, myriad signs guide Trail has that two-way- Among stop signs, them are direct traffic. signs, weight-limit signs, mixed-traffic signs, traffic designations.2 curve/turn injured, filed plaintiff against After was she suit (DNR) and the state of Department of Natural Resources adequately that had failed to Michigan, alleging they that, under the Trail. theorized maintain Plaintiff governmental immunity, to defendants highway exception duty repair.3 had a to maintain the Trail reasonable for summary disposition, arguing moved Defendants they have no “highway” that the Trail is not motion, to maintain it. trial court denied the duty Trail under the GTLA. It ruling that the specifi- act’s of “highway” reasoned that the definition it is “trailways.” undisputed includes Because cally trailway, Trail defendants were the Little Manistee is a repair. maintain it in reasonable under opinion; plaintiffs appendix filed Appendix to this see also See appeal, pp 14-19. 691.1402(1). Dissenting Opinion by Marilyn Kelly, J. The Court of reversed the trial court.4 It Appeals that, although concluded the Trail falls within the definition of in MCL the limited afforded liability highway exception govern- immunity Thus, mental to all it held applies trailways. highway exception that the does not apply plaintiffs suit.5 *24 for granted plaintiffs application appeal.6
We leave to STANDARDOF REVIEWAND LEGALBACKGROUND de ruling We review novo a trial court’s on a motion for summary disposition.7 This case involves a question statutory interpretation, which we also review de novo.8
The GTLA
for
provides immunity
governmental agen-
691.1407,
cies. Under MCL
are
governmental agencies9
generally
liability
immune from tort
while
engaged
discharge
governmental
the exercise or
of a
function
an exception
general
unless
to this
rule applies.10
4 Duffy
Resources,
unpublished opinion per
v
Natural
curiam of
(Docket
289644).
Appeals,
the Court of
issued March
2010
No.
5 Id. at 3.
6
(2010).
Duffy Dep’t
Resources,
v
Natural
The 691.1402, provides which MCL highway exception, pertinent part:
(1). agency having jurisdiction governmental [E]ach .. highway highway shall maintain reasonable over reasonably repair it is safe and convenient for so that bodily injury public person travel. A who sustains damage property by of failure of a to his or her reason jurisdic- governmental agency keep highway under its reasonably repair safe tion in reasonable and in condition damages may suffered him and fit for travel recover governmental agency. her from if Thus, plaintiff it is to determine was important her on a as that term is defined driving ORV 691.1401(e): at provides in the GTLA. The act road, “Highway” public highway, means a or street that is sidewalks, public bridges, trail- travel includes crosswalks, ways, highway. term and culverts on the trees, alleys, utility poles. does not include However, this defines neither “road” nor provision may travel.” We therefore consult a “open *25 dictionary for a further of this lan- understanding guage.11 College Dictionary
Random House Webster’s defines “road” as “a narrow stretch a leveled or long, with vehicle, surface, traveling by made for motor paved carriage, etc.; highway.”12 street or With respect travel,” as, phrase public “open” it defines “open among things, other “without restrictions as who 11 Charlevoix, City 289, 304; Klooster v 488 Mich 795 578 NW2d (2011). 8.3a, provides phrases “[a]ll See also MCL which words according ap shall be construed and understood to the common and proved usage language ....” of the 12 (2001). Dictionary College Random House Webster’s 229 Dissenting Opinion Marilyn Kelly, J. “Public” may available[.]”13 accessible or participate^] “of, to, a pertaining affecting population is defined as whole[;] a to all community open persons[.]”14 or a as comport definitions with the common dictionary These of a as used understanding road, otherwise, is, a that is paved by everyone. available for use
ANALYSIS goal The is to primary interpretation intent, effect to the on the give Legislature’s focusing “ in the The ‘the language language provides statute.15 ” Legislature’s intent,16 most reliable evidence’ statute, construing and when a court must read the language it as whole.17 rules,
Considering these as well as our traditional I statutory interpretation, canons of conclude that the Little Manistee Trail is a intent “highway” within the First, the GTLA. it is a road that understanding travel. It fits within the common of a “road” because it is a leveled surface for travel designed by motor vehicles and maintained so as to be suitable for vehicular although travel.18 And the Trail is not paved, a road need not be covered with concrete or road, asphalt qualify given that the definition of 13Id.
14Id.
Valley
Ward,
230, 236;
Sun
Foods Co v
460 Mich
596 NW2d
(1999).
16Id., quoting
Turkette,
576, 593;
United States v
452 US
101 S Ct
(1981).
2524;
L69 Ed 246
(2010).
Jackson,
783, 791;
People v
“road” includes “a leveled or surface . . . .”19 Furthermore, it undisputed any is motor vehicle properly by Secretary licensed of State permitted is Trail, to travel on subject to the applicable weight posted signs. Thus, limitations marked on the Trail satisfies the definition of “road” it because is thor- oughfare “made for traveling by motor vehicle . . . etc.[.]”20
I strong take exception majority’s claim that the Trail is not “made traveling by for motor ve- hicle [s].”21One need the photographs consider the Appendix opinion to this to see that the Trail was designed for extensive use by motor vehicles. The signage alerts Trail presence ORVs, users to the automobiles, 5-, 9-, and 15-ton trucks.
Second, the Trail open public It beyond travel. question open year-round. that it is During spring, sum- mer, months, and fall it is used motorcycles, ORVs and by cars, trucks, as well as sport utility vehicles, and large semi-trucks. During months, winter is also used snowmobiles motor vehicles to the extent weather conditions permit. No statutory prohibition limits its use to certain seasons or to a particular type of use. Conse- quently, the Little Manistee Trail is accessible to the general public travel.
The majority asserts that the “primary Trail’s pur- pose and use is for recreational vehicles, and this purpose eclipses highly limited use of the Trail by motor vehicles.”22It also claims that “[t]he recreational use of the Trail totally is so defining that we can easily 19Random, (2001) College Dictionary (emphasis House Webster’s added).
20 Id.
21 Ante at 213-214.
22Ante at 214. Duffy Dep’t *27 231 Opinion by Marilyn Dissenting Kelly, J. . why party understand no .. considered that the Trail be a . .”23 might expert, ‘road’ . . But defendant’s on relies, testimony majority whose the stated that the Trail “is to and properly registered ORVs street vehicles.” testimony licensed This answers the question the qualifies whether Trail as a “road.” More impor- tantly, determining it is immaterial to the whether Trail if is a road it is used more frequently by semi-trucks, ORVs, Indeed, or pedestrians. there is no statutory basis for distinguishing primary secondary between uses of a road.24 Accordingly, majority imper- the has missibly Legislature’s overrun the “high- definition of way” in MCL it replaced judi- with a cially created “purpose of use” test.
Because the Trail is a “road” that is “open public travel,” necessarily it is a “highway” as that term is 691.1401(e). in defined MCL The ramifications this conclusion are clear: governmental agencies, in this case the DNR and the state of Michigan, have an affirmative in maintain it such reasonable repair as to make it safe and convenient for public travel. To the extent the Court of Appeals held other- wise, it erred.25
23Ante at 214. majority statutory distinguishing The indicates basis exists for primary secondary between the determining Trail’s uses when language whether it is a “road.” at 214 Ante n 6. But it fails to cite the on fact, statutory language which it relies. In there is no in MCL 691.1401(e); GTLA; the rest of the the Natural Resources and Environ (NREPA), any seq.; mental Protection Act MCL 324.101 et other act majority the allows to draw this distinction. 25 Contrary majority’s suggestion, I need not reach the issue of whether the Little Manistee Trail is a within the definition of 691.1401(e). clearly in MCL This is because Trail is so “open and, thus, highway. “road” that is travel” I not do application road,” consider NREPA’s definition of “forest see MCL 324.81101(f), for the same reason. n MICH Opinion by Marilyn Dissenting Kelly, J.
THE FLAWEDANALYSIS MAJORITY’S is flawed. majority’s interpretation analyzing in a statute is its step interpreting The first appears virtually every a maxim that language, dispute before statutory-interpretation-centric majority’s defining Yet attention Court.26 strays as used the GTLA from GTLA and travels to the Natural Resources and (NREPA), Environmental Protection Act And seq. engages expedition 324.101 et not to term properly apply “highway,” define or but apply “trailway.”27 define and the term It does this *28 notwithstanding the fact that the resolution of this hinges meaning “highway,” case on the not the “trailway.” meaning that, majority suggests defining “trailway,” ignore The I not the remarkable, position regard given
central issue in this case. Its
in this
is
argument
parties
that I have addressed an
raised
the
that the
—one
majority entirely ignores. The issue before us is not the definition of
“trailway”
NREPA,
but whether the Little Manistee Trail is a
“highway”
assuming arguendo
under the GTLA. Even
that the Trail is
trailway”
concludes,
and,
majority
thus,
not a “covered
as the
it
ais road
691.1401(e).
“highway”
under MCL
Furthermore,
majority’s preoccupation
with the fact that the
argued
parties
“trailway”
that the Trail
is
the lower courts is also
misplaced.
granting
appeal requested
This Court’s order
leave to
that the
parties
‘highway’
address “whether the Little Manistee Trail is a
within
691.1401(e).”
meaning
Duffy,
Thus,
of MCL
A second
maxim that
us is that
statutory interpretation
the Court must avoid a
any part
surplusage
would render
nugatory.28
of a statute
regard,
In this
the first clause of MCL
691.1401(e) provides
public
that a
is “a
highway,
open
public
road, or street
“high-
travel.
ways”
. . .” The next clause indicates that
“bridges,
trailways,
sidewalks,
include
cross-
highway.”
walks, and culverts on the
Hence, a
“high-
“road .
..
that is
travel” is a
way,”
“bridges,
[and]
and so too are
sidewalks,
trail-
ways
highway.”
Therefore,
... on
if
even the Trail
trailway,”
majority
is not a
concludes,
“covered
as the
certainly
majority’s statutory
it
is a road. The
inter-
pretation glosses
over
first clause of the statute
surplusage.
and, in fact,
renders
*29
majority
point
counters this
with the assertion
my analysis
“trailway” surplus-
that
renders the term
age.
argument
apparent
But the flaw in its
from the
trailway only
outset when it
that a
concedes
sometimes
28 See,
Detroit,
e.g.,
388, 399;
AFSCME v
falls within of a definition majority’s the fits within precisely majority’s defini- “trailway,” within “road.” It is a by motor vehicles. for travel tion, open public that mean- majority’s imported Thus, it at once satisfies agree upon both and the definition we ing “trailway” majority’s Trail satisfies the But because the of “road.” “road” majority renders “trailway,” definition mere surplusage. that are not trailways that agree majority
I with the motor vehicles are not roads. travel open the Trail is a “road” does not Hence, my conclusion that 691.1401(e). Nor does it “trailways” MCL consume “trailways” in that statute the inclusion of render surplusage. that the GTLA makes
Similarly, majority asserts trailways that certain will be considered clear alongside run highways,30 presumably those reasoning begs big question: But this Is highway. “road” the intent of “trailway” the Trail a or a within “road,” I If it as a as have qualifies the statute? concluded, alongside that it not run it is irrelevant does highway. I at- claims that “never even Finally, majority ” my and that give meaning ‘trailway’ tempt[] I “entirely unresponsive opinion.”31 [its] dissent purpose no useful to consider have noted that serves defined an the Trail is a whether trailways (stating fall within the broad Ante at 216 “will often road”). people hardly surprising. Most definition of This concession is hiking, biking “trailways,” yet walking, trails to he would consider they they are not would not be “roads” under the GTLA because by motor travel vehicles. 30Ante at 217.
31Ante at 212. *30 Duffy v 235 Dissenting Opinion by Marilyn J. Kelly, I unrelated act. invite the reader compare straightforward analysis forth in dissent with set the trail-to-nowhere of the approach majority opinion. It majority is the that of the language disdains indicating GTLA . . . is a “road that is open for travel.” public give This Court’s function is to statute, meaning majority to the words of a but the fails to apply that to the most principle meaning obvious application of Instead “highway.” clarifying law, the majority risks the Court the making “obfuscator of last resort.”32
CONCLUSION In sum, this is a vanilla case statutory interpreta tion easily that is resolved. MCL provides that a “highway” is a “road” that “open i travel.” The Little defin Manistee Trail satisfies this tion it is a because leveled surface designed vehicu lar travel that is always public. accessible to the The majority “swerves and dodges”33 language actual the statute and reaches an unsupportable conclusion to the contrary.34
I would reverse the judgment Court Appeals and hold that the Little Manistee Trail is a 691.1401(e). within of MCL Cavanagh Marilyn Hathaway, JJ., concurred with Kelly, J. 32 Bryant, Michigan 1168; 1143, US_,_; v 562 131 S Ct 179 L Ed (2011) 93, (Scalia, J., dissenting). 2d 121 33 (2008) People Maxson, 385, 403; See 482 Mich 817 NW2d (citation omitted). J., dissenting) quotation (Cavanagh, marks majority’s proclamation difficulty “[it] has little in conclud ” ing ‘road,’ [Trail] that the is . . . not a ante at is inconsistent with great lengths goes support analysis. which it its Marilyn Opinion Dissenting Kelly, J.
appendix *31 Duffy Dep’t Dissenting Opinion by Marilyn Kelly, J.
appendix *32 Kelly, J. by Marilyn Opinion Dissenting
appendix