122 A.D. 314 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1907
Lead Opinion
The following is the opinion delivered at Special Term:
Application is made by William C. Duell, the relator above named, for an order granting a peremptory • writ of mandamus against Martin H. Glynn, as Comptroller of the State of Hew York, directing him to revoke the appointment of John D. Sullivan to the position of transfer tax assistant in the office of the surrogate of the county of Westchester and to appoint him to such position.
During the month of January, 1907, 1. Sumner Burnstine, the incumbent of that office, died, having been appointed to that position immediately after the enactment of chapter 173 of the Laws of 1901 containing section 234 of the Tax Law; and having continued to hold that position down to the time of his death.
After the death of Mr. Burnstine the State Board of Civil Service Commissioners caused an examination to be had for applicants for appointment to fill the vacancy caused by his death for the purpose of certifying an eligible list. The State Board of Civil Service Commissioners, as a result of that examination, certified an eligible list of three names, including that of Mr. Sullivan and the relator herein. Thereafter the surrogate of Westchester county recommended to the State Comptroller the appointment of relator. The State Comptroller did not appoint the relator, b.ut did appoint Sullivan, who had not been recommended for such appointment by the surrogate of the county of Westehester. The eligible list as certified by the State Board of Civil Service Commissioners contained three names, and upon that list Sullivan was graded the highest and relator the lowest.
“ 4. In Westchester county, a, transfer tax assistant, two thousand five hundred dollars.”
In the year 1896-the provisions of law relative to taxable transfers were incorporated in the general Tax Law of the State (Laws of 1896, chap. 908), and are there designated as article 10, and are embraced within the sections 220 to 242, inclusive.
By section 230 of that act power and authority was conferred upon, surrogates to appoint transfer tax appraisers.
The question, therefore, to be determined is, has the Comptroller the absolute ■ right to appoint or, in making his appointment or selection, must he name the person recommended to- him by the surrogate?
The meaning, force and effect of the term “appointment” when used in connection with appointment under the law, is defined in the case of People ex rel. Balcom v. Mosher (163 N. Y. 32). And at page 40 Judge Martin, in writing the opinion of the court, defines the term as follows: “ The decisions of this and other courts, State and Federal, as to the meaning of the Avord ‘appointment,’ and what constitutes an appointment under the law, are to the effect that the choice of a person to fill "an office constitutes the essence of the appointment; "that the selection must be the discretionary act of the officer or board clothed with the power of appointment; that while he or it may listen to the recommendation or advice of others, yet the selection must finally be his or its act, which has never been regarded or held to be ministerial.”
The power of appointment and removal is conferred upon the Comptroller, but the power of appointment can only be exercised upon the recommendation of the surrogate. The surrogate is to determine the necessity of the appointment, and if in his judgment no necessity exists for the appointment of a transfer tax assistant, then no authority or power is conferred upon the Comptroller to make such appointment.
Prior to the passage of the act, chapter 368 of the Laws of 1905, the Legislature had conferred authority and power upon the surrogate of Westchester county to appoint a transfer tax assistant.
The Comptroller is, therefore, not-limited in the appointment of a transfer tax assistant for the county of Westchester to the person recommended by the surrogate of that county.
The application of the relator is denied, with ten dollars costs.
An order can be entered accordingly.
Additional sections have since been added.— [Rep.
See, also, Laws of 1897, chap. 284; Laws of 1899, chap. 76, and Laws of 1900; chap. 658, amdg. said section,— [Rep.
See Tax Law, § 230, as amd. by Laws of 1901, chaps. 173, 493; Laws of 1902, chap. 496, and Laws of 1904, chap. 758, and renumbered § 229, and amd. by Laws of 1905, chap. 368; Laws of 1906, chap. 567, and Laws of 1907, chap. 709. See, also, Laws of 1901, chap. 173, § 18, as amd. by Laws of 1901, chap. 288.—[Rep.
See Tax Law, § 234, as amd. by Laws of 1901, chap. 173, and Laws of 1902, chap. 283.— [Rep.
Dissenting Opinion
For years before 1905 the transfer tax assistant was a known officer in the surrogate’s office of this and other counties. The surrogate appointed and removed him. The amendment of 1905 provided that the .Comptroller should appoint such assistant upon the recommendation of the surrogate and he was removable- at the pleasure of the Comptroller. This does not mean that the Comptroller was to make a personal appointment in the surrogate’s office and might select for the surrogate an assistant personally objectionable .to him. The recommendation of the surroo-ate means that he is to name the
person he Wants, not that he is to say whether he wants the office filled or not.. If the latter had been the intent,.it was easy to say that upon the surrogate’s requesting that such assistant be appointed, the Comptroller might make the appointment. The office existing, there was no necessity of a suggestion from the surrogate that it be filled. The act to be done by him is to recommend a person whom the Comptroller may or may not appoint. If he does not appoint him, the surrogate will continue to name persons until one is named who is satisfactory to the Comptroller. In this way the assistant is satisfactory to both officials who are interested in the duties of the office. Any other construction forces upon the surrogate an assistant he does not want and who might be personally objectionable to him.
The Comptroller has the sole power, of removal. The surrogate has the sole power to name the appointee in the first instance, but the Comptroller makes the appointment. I think the order should be reversed.
Smith,. P. J., concurred.