66 F. 637 | 2d Cir. | 1895
Lead Opinion
The complainant corporation is a citizen of Ohio, the demurring defendant corporation a citizen of Massachusetts, engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling watch movements, and having a place of business in the city of New York, state of New York. Of the nineteen other defendants, ten are individuals whose citizenship is not set forth in the complaint. It is averred that they are engaged in business, two -of them in New York City under one firm name, two others in
The complainant avers that plaintiff is a corporation duly created and existing under the laws of Ohio, and engaged in the business of manufacturing gold and silver watch cases. That at the times mentioned in the complaint it owned and operated an extensive factory at Newport, Ky., and subsequently at Canton, Ohio; that it maintained the same at great expense, and had the capacity to manufacture and offer for sale in the open market 25,000 watch cases per month. In the third paragraph it is averred “that prior to November 10, 1887, plaintiff had a ready market throughout the United States and Canada for all the goods it could manufacture, and in fact sold all of said goods to a great number of dealers therein throughout said territory, and thereby fully earned and realized to itself a substantial legitimate profit of at least $75,000 per an-num.” Next follow averments as to the incorporation and partnership of the several defendants, who, it is stated, are respectively engaged in the business of manufacturing or selling watches, watch cases, or watch movements. In the eighteenth paragraph it is averred that on or about November 16, 1887, the defendants, and others to plaintiff unknown, at and in the city of New York, mutually agreed together each for himself with all the others that “they would not thereafter sell any goods manufactured by them to any person, firm, association, or corporation whatsoever who thereafter should buy or sell any goods manufactured by this plaintiff.” ‘ It is further averred that thereafter defendants caused notice of this agreement or compact to be given to the many dealers in watches, watch cases, and watch movements throughout the United States and Canada; and gave said notices to “many of the then and thei-e-tofore purchasers and dealers in plaintiff’s goods manufactured as aforesaid”; whereupon a large number of such purchasers and dealers withdrew their patronage, and ceased thereupon entirely to purchase and deal in any wise in plaintiff’s goods. The complaint further alleges that after said November 16, 1887, defendants refused to sell their goods to purchasers of and dealers in plaintiff’s goods who had offered to buy defendants’ goods, stating as the reason for their refusal that said dealers also bought and sold and dealt in plaintiff’s watches, notifying such purchasers and dealers that if they would promise not to deal in plaintiff’s goods, then, and so long as they kept such promise, they might purchase the goods of the defendants or either of them; otherwise not. In the twenty-third paragraph it is alleged that prior to November 16, 1887, the defendants had agreed among themselves, “and which said agreement has been in operation and effect between them ever since, that they would agree upon and agree to maintain an arbitrary fixed price to the public for all the goods manufactured by them, and in pursuance of said agreement the said defendants had agreed
“Section 1. Every contract, combination in form o£ trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint o£ trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations is hereby decbired to be illegal.” [Then follow provisions declaring the act a misdemeanor, and providing for punishment.]
“See. 2. Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations shall be guilty oí a misdemeanor.” LThen follow provisions as to punishment therefor.]
“Sec. 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business by any other person or corporation by reason of anything' forbidden or declared unlawful in this act may sue therefor in any cdrcuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three fold the damages by him sustained and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”
This action is manifestly one under the act of July 2, 1890. It is brought in a district where neither the plaintiff nor the demurring defendant resides, but where the demurring defendant is found. In the face of a complaint so framed as to present a cause of action under the statute, a defendant, if “found” here, could not object to the jurisdiction. It is expressly given by the seventh section. It would be manifestly unfair to permit a plaintiff to bring a defendant into this court on a complaint declaring upon the statute, and thereafter, when such defendant has failed to question its jurisdiction under the statute, and has appeared generally in the case, to transform the cause of action into one at common law, and insist that defendant has waived any objection to the jurisdiction. Moreover, although the complaint contains allegations as to combinations and threats long .prior to the passage of the act of 1890, the averment of pecuniary damage to the plaintiff, which is specified in the twenty-seventh or concluding paragraph, is averred to have been sustained in consequence of the “renewed threats” of defendants (that is, those renewed after the passage of the act), which compelled dealers to refuse to purchase plaintiff's watch cases or to deal in any wise therein. Moreover, judgment is demanded, not for plaintiff’s actual damages, but for trebie damages, “under and by virtue of the statute.” The counsel for plaintiff in error asserts in his filed brief that “the action is founded solely upon the act of congress passed July 2, 1890, the [seventh] section whereof expressly provides that the circuit court of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of such action.” There are 28 separate assignments of error, in each and .ail of which it is contended that the facts charged in the complaint make out a case under the act of 1890. Therefore, unless the complaint sets forth a canse of action under the act of 1890, the demurrer should be sustained.
The only acts of defendants as to which plaintiff can in this action contend that they are “forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act” are those done after its passage. They are set forth in the twenty-seventh paragraph, and are as follows: (1) Defend
The question to be decided is whether these acts are within either the prohibition of the first section of the statute of 1890 as a contract or combination in “restraint of trade,” or within the prohibition of the second section as a “monopolizing” or as an “attempt to monopolize.” Whatever differences of opinion there may be as to the meaning of these words when used in this statute, there is and can be no dispute as to one qualification expressed in the act, — the trade or commerce restrained or monopolized or attempted to be monopolized must be interstate or international. The statute expressly so says, and, whatever its phraseology, it must be so construed if it is to stand, since it is only such trade and commerce that congress has authority to regulate. Rio monopolizing or attempt or combination or conspiracy to monopolize any part of such trade or commerce is set forth in the complaint. The several manufacturers defendant are charged with an attempt to secure to each of them a sale of his or its own produces to the exclusion of those of the plaintiff, but there is nothing to show' that each defendant does not sell his or its entire product in the very state where it is manufactured. The sale within a state of articles manufactured in the same state is no part of interstate trade or commerce. U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co. (Jan. 21, 1895) 15 Sup. Ct. 249. The circumstance that, after manufactured products are thus sold within the state, they may be again sold for introduction into another state, and thus become a subject of interstate commerce, does not change the situation, for it is only when' a commodity has begun to move as an article of trade from one state to another that commerce ,in that commodity between states has commenced. Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475. The complaint, therefore, fails to charge an offense against section 2 of the act of 1890.
The complaint alleges that the acts of defendants subsequent to July 2, 1890, have forced and compelled persons who theretofore dealt in plaintiff’s goods to refuse to purchase the same, and avers.that prior to, November 16, 1887, plaintiff sold its goods to a
It remains only to inquire whether the contract or combination set out in the complaint is in restraint of interstate or international trade in the sense in which the phrase- “restraint of trade” is used in the act of 1890. The first alleged unlawful action of defendants charged upon them subsequent to the passage of the act is a renewal and confirmation of an agreement among themselves to “maintain an arbitrary fixed price to the public for all the goods manufactured by them,” and a carrying out of such agreement by thus fixing and maintaining a price. The goods in question are not articles of prime necessity, as were the flour,, coal, and other staple commodities referred to in many of the cases cited upon the argument; nor were the manufacturing defendants engaged in any public or quasi public business, as were the railroads or the gaslighting companies referred to in other cases. Each one of the defendants had an undoubted right to determine for himself the price at which he would sell the goods he made, and he certainly does not lose that right by deciding to sell them at the same price at which a dozen or so of his competitors sell the goods which they make. Collectively the defendants owe no duty to any one of their competitors to regulate the price they fix for their goods so as not to interfere with the price he fixes for his own. And it is difficult to see how the public is injuriously affected by any such agreement between the combining manufacturers. If the price so fixed is the normal and usual one theretofore prevailing, certainly the public cannot complain; still less if the price be reduced. If a combination of the capital and business abilities and factory appliances of many different manufacturing establishments enables them to produce an equally good output at á reduced cost, so that they can sell such output cheaper than any single manufacturer could, surely the public does not suffer. If, on the contrary, the combining defendants fix the price too high, they restrain their own trade only; the public will buy the goods' it wants, not from them, but from their competitors. There are no averments in the 'complaint to show that the defendants are all, or even substantially all, of the manufacturers of watch cases in the United ¡States, or even in any single one of the different states wherein their manufactories are located. For aught that appears, they represent but a small part of the watch-case industry, and there is nothing to prevent the number of their competitors from increasing to whatever extent the public demand-for such goods may require. This is no such case as that presented in Arnot v. Coal Co., 68 N. Y. 558, where, as was said, “the region of the production of [anthracite coal] is known to be limited.” There is nothing in the complaint nor in common knowledge to show that the production of watch cases may not be practically unlimited. An agreement, therefore, between some of the makers of watch eases to sell their commodities at a uniform price, which they fix upon with regard only to their private emolu
The other contract or combination which, plaintiff contends to be unlawful is the agreement of defendants not to sell goods of their manufacture to any one who thereafter should buy or sell goods manufactured by the plaintiff. To the extent that such refusal to deal with those persons who dealt with plaintiff induced such persons to cease dealing with the plaintiff, and to buy watch cases from one or other of the defendants, the agreement did not operate in general restraint of trade, the total amount of purchases and sales remaining constant, so far as the complaint shows. It did, no doubt, operate in partial restraint of trade, viz. to restrain some part of plaintiffs trade in the watch cases it manufactured. But it does not follow that such restraint was unreasonable, nor heavier than the interest of the favored party required. An individual manufacturer or trader may surely buy from or sell to whom he pleases, and may equally refuse to buy from or to sell to any one with whom he thinks it will promote his business interests to refuse to trade. That is entirely a, matter of his private concern, with which governmental paternalism has not as yet sought to interfere, except when the property he owns is “devoted to a use in which the public has an interest”; and such public interest in the use has as vet been found to exist only in staple commodities of prime necessity. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468. It is a business device, probably as old ns business itself, to seek to increase the number of one’s customers, and the extent of their purchases, by treating more favorably those who become exclusive customers. Certainly there is nothing unlawful or unfair in the statement to the trade by the maker of any kind of merchandise, “My goods are for sale only to those who will buy from me exclusively, not to others.” And the case is in no way different if a half a dozen individuals combine info a partnership, or an hundred individuals combine into a corporation, and adopt the same method to enlarge their business. If this be so, — and no auihority to which we are referred holds to the contrary, it is difficult to see in what respect it is unlawful for a score of different manufacturers to enter into a like arrangement to push the sales of their own goods, or to secure some business benefit to themselves by increasing the number of their exclusive customers, when there is nothing to show that the parties so combining constitute substantially all, or even-a majority, of the manufacturers of such goods, even in the half dozen states where their factories are located, and when the field for manufacture is open to all. It is not an unlawful business enterprise for sellers to seek to secure the entire trade of individual buyers, and an agreement between sellers, who wish to confine their dealings to such buyers only, not to sell to others, is not an unfair or unreasonable measure of protection for such trade. Nor can it be claimed that such an agreement between sellers who represent but a part of the trade is injurious to the public, which has all the rest of the trade to deal
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring). I concur with Judge LACOMBE in tbe conclusion that the circuit court properly sustained tbe demurrer of the E. Howard Watch & Clock Company in tbe above-entitled cause. I am not now prepared to adopt, as a reason for that conclusion, what I understand to be Judge LACOMBE’S opinion, that tbe agreement and conduct of tbe combined defendants, which are set forth in tbe complaint, do not constitute a violation of the first or second sections of tbe act of July 2, 1890. My reason for regarding tbe complaint as demurra-ble is tbe more technical one that tbe allegations in regard to tbe acts which tbe defendants committed, or in regard to tbe facts which are charged to have existed, do not show that the defendants ‘restrained any interstate commerce, or monopolized any part of sucb trade or commerce. What tbe statute struck at was “combinations, contracts, and conspiracies to monopolize trade and commerce among the several states or with foreign nations” (U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co. [Jan. 21, 1895] 15 Sup. Ct. 249), but it will not be contended that section 7 of tbe statute gives a cause of action .to any person against another person who had merely planned to commit or unsuccessfully attempted to commit the prohibited acts. The illegal contract or attempted monopoly must have resulted in an injury of some sort to the plaintiff’s interstate business. It should therefore appear directly, and not by way of inference, that the acts of the defendants, or their attempts to monopolize interstate commerce, resulted in its restraint or monopoly, to the plaintiff’s injury. Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill, 104. “An action will not lie for the greatest conspiracy imaginable if nothing be put in execution, but, if the party be damaged, the action will lie. From whence it follows that the damage is the ground of the action.” Savile v. Roberts, 1 Ld. Raym. 378. The important allegations in regard to the conduct of the combined defendants and the results of the acts are that the complainant owned an extensive watch-case manufactory in Kentucky, and subsequently in Ohio, and had the capacity to manufacture and offer for sale 25,000 watch cases per month, and that before November 16, 1887, it sold all of said
It is next alleged that after the passage of the act of July 2, 1890, “all the former purchasers and dealers in said plaintiff’s watch cases and other dealers in watch cases were, as plaintiff is informed and verily believes, ready and willing to buy large quantities of said plaintiff’s goods, and this plaintiff would have at once regained all the business and the profits whereof it had been deprived by the acts aforesaid of the defendants, but that said defendants, after the pasage of the said act of congress, ratified, confirmed, renewed, and continued the contracts, agreements, and combinations hereinbefore alleged, and in like manner, and with the same intention as hereinbefore alleged, served notices of their said ratification, confirmation, renewal, and continuance of the said agreements and combinations upon all said dealers in plaintiff's watch cases, whereby said dealers have continued to this day. forced by said renewal threats of defendants, and compelled thereby, and not otherwise, to refuse to purchase plaintiff's watch cases, or to deal in any wise therein.” The allegation is that the former purchasers and dealers, who were intimidated by the previous notices, and who had stopped purchasing, continued, in consequence of the new notice, to be intimidated, and were forced by the renewed threats to refuse to purchase the plaintiff’s watch «•ases. The names of the states in which these intimidated pep-sons resided are not given. No new diversion of trade and no
I agree with the majority of the court that this action must be deemed to be founded upon the act of congress of July 2, 189.0, and that the demurrer to the complaint was well taken unless the complaint sets forth a cause of action given by that statute. I dissent, however, from the conclusion that the complaint does not set forth such a cause of action. Briefly stated, the averments of the complaint are that prior to the time of the enactment of the statute the plaintiff was engaged in manufacturing and selling watches in the states of Ohio and Kentucky, having a market therefor throughout the United States, and selling its goods to a great number of dealers in other states; that the defendants, also manufacturers of watches, had agreed among themselves to maintain an arbitrary fixed price for all their goods; that thereafter, in order to compel plaintiff to join them in that compact, and prevent it from selling its goods unless it did so, the defendants combined in an agreement not to sell any watches made by any of them to any dealers who should thereafter buy of the plaintiff, and notified the dealers in watches throughout the United States of the agreement; that thereafter the defendants did refuse to sell such dealers as had bought of plaintiff, and thereby they prevented a great number of dealers from buying of plaintiff, and effected a .complete boycott of its trade; and that, after the statute was passed, the same combinations and acts were renewed and continued by the defendants, with the malicious purpose, and with the result, of suppressing plaintiff’s trade. The complaint does not explicitly allege that this combination was entered into or these acts were done by the defendants for the purpose of preventing the plaintiff from selling to customers in other states; but from the facts alleged the conclusion is irresistible that this purpose was comprehended in the
Are the acts charged in restraint of trade ? The primary purpose of the conspiracy set forth was doubtless to compel the plaintiff to join in a compact with the other defendants to maintain an arbitrary price or scale of prices for their goods, or otherwise to drive the corporation out of business; but its legitimate and necessary result was to likewise deprive dealers in watches generally, carrying on their business in many states, of the untrammeled exercise of their right to buy from the plaintiff. The books are full of cases in which a covenant not to carry on a business or vocation has been depiared to be in restraint of trade, although the contract was only to restrict the covenantor. As is said in Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173: “The illegality of contracts affecting public trade appears in the books under many forms. The most frequent is that of contracts between individuals to restrain one of them from performing a business or employment.” So conspiracies aimed at the trade or occupation of a single person have not’ only been declared civilly actionable, but criminal, because affecting the public as well as the immediate individual. In the early case of Rex v. Eccles, 3 Doug. 337, the indictment alleged that the defendants had conspired to “deprive and hinder” one “from following ánd. exercising” his trade as a hatter; and Lord Ellenborough alluded to it as one for conspiracy “in restraint of trade, and so far a conspiracy to do an unlawful act affecting the public.” Rex v. Turner, 13 East, 228, 231. Doubtless, in prohibiting contracts or combinations in restraint of trade it was the intention of congress to prohibit only those which were previously recognized at common law as belonging to that category, and not to prohibit
“Without attempting to review and reconcile all the cases, we are of opinion that, as a general description, though perhaps not a precise and accurate definition. a conspiracy must he a combination of two or more persons by some concerted action to accomplish some criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful by criminal or un-la wfnl means. We use the terms ‘criminal or unlawful’ because it is manifest that many acts are unlawful which are not punishable by Indictment or other public prosecution; and yet there is no doubt, we think, that a combination by numbers to do them would be an unlawful conspiracy and punishable by indictment.”
The statute upon which this action is founded discriminates between combination and conspiracy, and it not only makes both
“Tile man. who owns an. article of trade or commerce is not obliged to sell it for any particular price, nor is the mechanic obliged by law to labor for any particular price. He may say that he will not make coarse boots for less than one dollar per pair, but he has no right to say that another mechanic shall not make them for less. The cloth merchant may say that he will not sell his goods for less than so much per yard, but has no right to say that another merchant shall not sell for a less price. If one individual does not possess such a right over the conduct of another, no number of individuals can possess such a right. All combinations, therefore, to effect such an object are injurious not only to the individual particularly oppressed, but to the public at large. * * * The interference of the defendants was unlawful. Its tendency is not only to individual oppression, but to public inconvenience and embarrassment.”
This language exactly fits the present case. For these reasons I think the complaint states a good cause of action, and the judgment sustaining the demurrer should be reversed.
