44 Fla. 264 | Fla. | 1902
This cause being reached in its regular order for final hearing, was referred by the court to its- commissioners, who report that the judgment from which the writ of error was taken ought to be affirmed. The court after due consideration reaches the same conclusion.
It appears that on December 2,1806, defendant in error by his attorneys began an action in assumpsit in the Circuit Court of Hamilton county against plaintiffs in error, Dudley and Jennings, who were sued a® late partners doing business under the firm name and style of F. J. Dudley & Co. Summons issued and was duly returned by the sheriff as having been personally -served upon Jennings in Hamilton county. On the second day of January, 1897. plaintiff filed his declaration,- declaring upon two promissory notes for $2,450 each. On the return day of the- summon®, January 4th, 1897, defendants filed their special appearance in the cause, and moved to- dismiss the suit upon four grounds, as follows: “1st. Because the court has n.o jurisdiction of defendants herein. 2nd. The cause of action did not accrue in Hamilton county.
The1 assignments of error complain that the court erred in the following particulars': 1st. Entering the default at February rules. 2nd. Denying the motion to vacate the default. 3rd. Denying the motion for leave to plead. 4th. Refusing to vacate the order denying the motion to vacate the uefault. bill. Entering final judgment.
The facts as stated are taken from the amended abstract filed'by'plaintiffs in error which has not been excepted to, and while some of the motions recite the fact that affidavits were filed in support thereof, none of the affidavits appear' in the abstrct.
The fifth assignment of error is not argued and must, therefore, be treated as abandoned. The other assignments are argued together, and under them the only questions presented in argument are that the default judgmnt is void because it bears teste in the name of the judge who was the plaintiff in the suit; that the clerk had no authority to enter the default pending the motion to dismiss ; that he had no authority to enter a default against Dudley because he had not been served with process and had not entered his appearance in the suit, and that the default should have been opened in order to permit defendant Jennings to plead.
1. The default was entered by the clerk in pursuance of the authority conferred on him by the statute which empowers him to enter defaults for failure to plead within the time required by law. It is true that' the judge was disqualified from making any orders in the case, be
II. Section 1030 Revised Statutes provides that the defendant shall file his plea or demurrer on the rule day .succeeding that upon which the declaration is filed, unless upon motion further time be given by the court, and Section 1032 provides that if the defendant shall fail to plead or demur at the time hereinbefore provided, or at the time fixed by the court upon motion as hereinbefore provided, the plaintiff may cause a default to be entered by the clerk against the defendant, and thereupon he may proceed to take final judgment, as hereinbefore provided. In this case no plea or demurrer was filed within the time required by the statute above referred to, but it is contended that the filing of the motion to dismiss operated to suspend the power of the clerk to enter a default for failure to plead or demur until such motion was disposed of by the order of a qualified judge. We do not find that this court has ever decided whether a motion of this character filed within the time allowed for pleading, suspends the power of the clerk to enter default for failure bo plead. In chancery causes it has been held that a paper purporting to be a pl'ea or demurrer filed within the time allowed
III. Dudley had not been served with process, but the motion to dismiss filed in his behalf amounted to a general appearance on his part. In Oppenheimer v. Guckenheimer, 34 Fla. 13, 15 South. Rep. 670, it is said that where a defendant appears specially for the purpose of presenting the question of the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he must restrict his motion to the grcund of such jurisdiction, apd must not include therein some other ground that recognizes the jurisdiction of the court over his person and amounts to an appearance in the cause by him; and we may now add that if he does so, the motion will be held to be a-general appearance, notwithstanding the fact that it is: made in pursuance of a special appearance. Handy v. Insurance Company, 37 Ohio St. 366; Elliot v. Lawhead, 43 Ohio St. 171, 1 N. E. Rep. 577; Burdette v. Corgan, 26 Kan. 102; Bucklin v. Strickler, 32 Neb. 602, 49 N. W. Rep. 371. The last three grounds of the motion filed in this case relate to the personal privileges of being sued in a particular county accorded by statute to defendants in certain cases:, and recognize the jurisdiction of the court over the persons of the defendants The motion, therefore, amounts to' a general appearance on behalf of Dudley, as well as Jennings.
IV. There is no error in the order refusing to permit the motion to vacate the default to be amended iso as to ask that the default he opened for the purpose of permfit
The judgment of the Circuit .Court will be'affirmed.