93 Va. 408 | Va. | 1896
delivered the opinion of the court.
We have no statutory provision commanding courts of equity to require, in any case, a confession of judgment as a condition of equitable interference with legal proceedings. The terms upon which injunctions are awarded by courts of equity, except where they are controlled by statutory enactments, are, in each case, a question for the discretion of the chancellor. It is not, however, an arbitrary discretion, but a discretion, as was said by Judge Bouldin in Great Falls Manfg Co. v. Henry’s Admr., 25 Gratt. 575, 579, “to be exercised on well established principles of equity and law, so as to preserve, as far as practicable, the rights of the party restrained, and at the same time to inflict no wrong on the plaintiff in equity.”
If it be a general rule, as was claimed by counsel for the appellees, that, where a party seeks to restrain a plaintiff from prosecuting against him his suit at law, he will be required, as a condition of the injunction, to confess judg
In Warwick et ux. et al. v. Norvell, 1 Rob. 308, 320, Judge Allen said: “ No authority has been produced which establishes that a party haying a defence at law to an action brought against him, and a distinct- ground of equitable relief should his defence prove unavailing, must abandon his legal defence by confessing judgment or await the decision of the action at law before he can be entertained in a-court of equity.”
In Staples v. Turner’s Admr. 29 Gratt. 330, the bill was filed to correct errors in a certain settlement of accounts between the parties, in which were blended individual and executorial accounts, and to have the accounts separated, and a proper settlement made by the Chancery Court as the most appropriate tribunal for this purpose, so as to ascertain the amount for which the complainant was individually liable; and to restrain the plaintiff in two actions at law, which were founded on the erroneous settlement, from proceeding further to prosecute the same. The injunction was granted upon the condition that judgments were confessed in the suits at law. It was held by this court that “the case was not a proper one for requiring the confession of judgments in the suits at law as a condition upon which the injunction would be awarded.”
In Thornton v. Thornton, 31 Gratt. 212, the complainant'filed his bill in equity to restrain the plaintiff from proceeding in an action at law which he had brought to recover an alleged balance on account between them; and, denying wholly the justice of the claim asserted in the action at law, asked that the court settle and adjust the accounts between
In Great Falls Man’f'g. Co. v. Henry’s Admr. supra, the complainant in equity denied the right of the plaintiff in the action at law to recover his claim or any part of it in any tribunal, but did not lay claim to any strictly equitable defence to the claim at law. It merely sought to transfer the litigation to the equity side of the court, as the more appropriate tribunal, under all the circumstances of the case, to do justice between the parties. In that case, Judge Bouldin said: “The appellant came into equity, denying in toto the right of the appellee to recover at law or in equity, denying the existence of any indebtedness at all, and merely invoking, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the aid of the equity court in making his defence available. It is very evident that, in such case, if entertained in equity at all, the defendant at law could ‘ not safely confess a judgment,’ and therefore no such confession should have been required, but if required, it should certainly have been on terms of being ‘ dealt with as the court shall direct,’ so that it might retain control of the judgment. But the Circuit Court, as we have seen, in disregard of the principles above declared, required an unconditional confession of judgment as the price of the injunc
The principle to be deduced from these decisions is that, although a defendant in an action at law has a legal defence to the action, yet if he has also a distinct ground for equitable relief should bis defence at law prove unavailing, he is not compelled to abandon his legal defence by ■confessing judgment, or to wait the decision of the action at law, before he can be entertained in equity; nor where he denies any indebtedness whatever upon the claim sued on at law and the right to recover in any forum, either at law .or in equity, but invokes the aid of a court of chancery as the more appropriate tribunal, under all the circumstances •of the case, in which to conduct the litigation, is he required, if entertained at all in equity, to confess judgment in the •action at law as the price of an injunction to the proceedings at law. In such cases, it is not safe for him to confess •a judgment at law, and it is error for the chancellor to impose such condition upon him.
The appellants, who were the defendants in two actions at law brought on certain promissory notes executed by them to the Salem Development Company for the purchase of lots, alleged in their bill that the notes were procured from them by false and fraudulent representations of the said Company, and by reason thereof were wholly null and void; and that the plaintiff in the actions at law, and the persons through whom he claimed, had notice of such fraud before any transfer of the notes was made. They further alleged that the said notes, along with a number of other notes also given for the purchase of lots, all of which notes were secured by deeds of trust on the lots, and aggregating $27,392, were delivered by the Salem Development Company to the Farmers National Bank of Salem, to be held by it as eollat
The injunction as asked for was awarded upon proper bond being given, but upon a motion thereafter to dissolve it, the court decreed that unless the defendants, before the adjournment of the term of the court, confessed judgment, in the actions at law, the injunction should be dissolved. This they declined to do and obtained an appeal from this court.
It is manifest from the allegations of the bill that the de-fendants in the actions at law, denying any liability whatever on the notes sued on by reason of the fraud that infected them in the hands of the Salem Development Company, and notice thereof by the plaintiff before any transfer of
But even if the requirement of such condition had been a proper exercise, under the circumstances of the case, of the discretion vested in a court of equity, the confession should not have been left by it to be made unconditionally, but the court should have expressly provided in its order that the judgments so confessed were thereafter to be dealt with as the court of equity might direct. Thornton v. Thornton, supra; and Great Falls Man’f’g Co. v. Henry’s Admr., supra.
For the foregoing reasons, the decree of the Circuit Court must be reversed, and the injunction awarded in the cause continued in force, without a confession of judgment in the actions at law.
Reversed.