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Duckett v. State
966 P.2d 941
Wyo.
1998
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*1 Wayne DUCKETT, Appellant Steven

(Defendant), Wyoming,

The STATE of (Plaintiff).

Appellee

No. 97-54. Wyoming.

Supreme Court

Sept. Defender; Hackl,

Sylviа State Public L. Counsel; Domonkos, Appellate D. Donna Lozano, Appellate Coun- M. Assistant Diane sel, Appellant. General; Hill, Attorney Paul S.

William U. General; Rehurek, Attorney D. Mi- Deputy Attorney Pauling, Assistant chael Senior Tibbetts, General; Georgia L. Senior Assis- Lauer, General; É. Attorney Theodore tant Director, Program; Prosecution Assistance *2 Noonan, Director, forming jury and Krista L. Student for the that the State must Appellee. prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act self-defense? C.J., LEHMAN, THOMAS,

Before MACY, GOLDEN TAYLOR* JJ. II. FACTS 12, 1996, On June at about 10:00 11:00 TAYLOR, Justice. a.m., Duckett Mary went to the home of Convicted of for assault stab- (Carlson) bearing guitar Carlson his and a altercation, bing opponent appеllant his in an Duckett, 12-pack Carlson, of beer. and her refusing claims the district court erred in boyfriend, (Hetler), Mylo spent Hetler the jury instruct the on others as day drinking while Duckett and Carlson legal justification Appellant his for actions. played together. point, music At some compounded the court contends district tape Duckett and Carlson decided the by an improper response error instruction in daughter’s music on Carlson’s karoake ma- jury’s deliberations, inquiry, during early chine. After a short break in the eve- regarding lengths might the to which go one ning, Duckett returned to Carlson’s home Finding appellant defense of another. neighbor, with Sonny his wife. Carlson’s presented sufficient evidence to warrant an (Zentner), friend, Zentner and another Rod- instruction on his we re- (Miears), ney joined Miears them. All con- - verse and remand for a new trial. drinking, tinued while Duckett and Carlson “jam” in the garage. continued I. ISSUES on, eomradery As time went deterio- (Duck- Appellant, conjunction Wayne sobriety rated in Steven Duckett ett), presents participants. Eventually, three issues for Carlson review: and Duck- argued respective talents, ett about their I ISSUE culminated Carlson’s order that the appellant Whether the was denied his con- premises. Ducketts leave Duckett and rights process stitutional to due when the left, wife his but moments later returned in court B refused Defense Instruction re- tape order to retrieve the musical so garding defense of others. one steal uncopyrighted orig- could Duckett’s II ISSUE inal material. Whether trial court erred when it re- undisputed It is that after Duckett and his fused instruct the State wife garage, returned to the Carlson and beyond prove a reasonable doubt that engaged physical wife alterca- appellant did act in self-defense as tion, while at same time Hetler and per Defense A. Instruction struggled Duckett on the floor. It also III ISSUE during fight uncontested that between appellant Whether denied Hetler, Duckett and Duckett stabbed Hetler by jury by to a trial guaranteed as eight testimony times. con- Wyoming United States and Constitutions battles, why, flicts as to who initiated effectively

when the trial court directed еxtent of the violence. Because the issue appellant verdict its in this case is whether sufficient facts were response in Instruction 23. presented to warrant a instruction on Wyoming, appellee, phras- The State of others, the defense we recount the facts as es the issues as follows: at trial. Oien v. Duckett advanced (Wyo.1990). denying

I. Did err the district court appellant’s requested jury instruction Duckett testified that when his wife on others? tape, reached pushed for the musical Carlson II. Did refusing the district court err in away. her then reached

appellant’s proposed tape, stopped instruction in- musical when he heard his * expedited Chief Justice at time of conferenсe. Mylo. They let “I stab wouldn’t scream, ing, Duck- had to killing me.” “Help. She’s

wife motel help you.” proprietors top of his me turned, and saw Carlson ett and his who found Duckett officer wife, against the concrete slamming her head her, stated that running from the scene all help Hetler wife moved floor. When *3 assault- told them his wife had been As he Duckett tackled him. off the couch and jumped help off; ed, being and couldn’t floor, he was held down glasses flew he Duckett’s hit the wife, Duck- his assailant. but his so he stabbed clearly happening was not see what could during question- repeated statement ett this screaming. Hetler was hear his wife could station, adding that he police at struggled. Duck- they top of Duckett off, gеt to but that Hetler warned Hetler him Carlson to free because ett told Hetler * * him help “kept punching to killing his wife and he needed was stop help to him asked Hetler her. Duckett charged as- Duckett fought, men Duckett As the two Carlson. 15, jury on October sault and tried before help while he begging wife could hear his jury instruction confer- During hitting floor. her head continued to hear ence, refused Duckett’s the district court going he he “was to have Finally, told Hetler “defense of proposed regarding instruction pulled his knife and Duekett him[.]” to hurt others,” explaining and another instruction Hetler, Hetler an- it made stabbed but prove beyond a prosecution must until he continued to stab grier. Duckett that Duckett did not act reasonable doubt push him. As to Hetler off of was able evidence, At the close self-defense. wife, “[sjomebody get his Duekett tried on the jury was instructed ** * back shirt from the grabbed [his] jury After the retired for delib- self-defense. garage door.” they swung towards the [him] erations, judge sent several notes were wife, and “some- again He moved toward his instruction, including asking for further * * * and chased body had the baseball bat right force to questions regarding the to use out the door.” [him] objection, protect others. Over jury, further instructed the district court nothing more he could Realizing there was right abe wife, “For the ‘defense of others’ garage Duekett do to reach fled must have the Defendant lawful knocking on the street and “stumbled” dоwn person per- against the used doors, help. he knocked looking for When threatening someone else.” to be door, ceived propri- it on a motel office roused call Duekett told ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‍them to etors next door. returned, guilty After a verdict and he wife was assaulted 911 because his The district moved for a new trial. Duckett proprietors com- someone. The had stabbed motion, timely Duckett court denied briefly with the plied, spoke and Duekett appeal to this court. filed returning to his wife. When operator before area, he saw his wife got back to the REVIEW III. STANDARD OF Zentner’s, the house next door to leaving lati “given wide court district wife, grabbed his Duckett Carlson’s. long as jury; and as instructing tude awаy. ran then law and correctly state the instructions corrob- of Duckett’s version were Portions adequately cov charge jury the entire Carlson testified orated other witnesses. issues, will not be error reversible ers fight, Mrs. Duckett during State, P.2d v. Baier found.” banshee,” and that she like “scream[ed] instructions (Wyo.1995). look at all the We killing my saying, Duckett “She’s remembers charge to together to determine whether killing Mrs. Duckett my wife.” wife. She’s expressed properly the law jury her, pinned jumped on testified that Carlson State, (Wyo. Vigil 859 P.2d case. against the and beat her head her arms down 1993). screamed Duckett’s concrete floor. She duty of the trial court is times, “The out. or five then blacked name four the law present in the instruсtions they ran that as Mrs. Duekett also testified actually raised scene, applicable the issues say- she remembers from the Baier, 756; trial, evidence.” P.2d Hatha- At Duckett testified that he never be- State, way (Wyo.1981). danger, lieved he was imminent right A has the to have instruc- stabbed Hetler because he believed his wife case, theory tions on his of the or his defense was in imminent and that Hetler presented jury, if the instructions go suf- would not allow him to to her rescue. court, ficiently however, inform the of The district found that the competent defense and if evidence exists ap- “self-defense of others” supports expressed plicable the law in the in- in this case because Duckett used structions. Amin v. his own not his wife’s. (Wyo.1991) (citing Thom v. 792 P.2d The district court reasoned that “it stretches *4 192, (Wyo.1990)). things say 195 We the evidence may view to the Defendant use in light a favorable to the deadly accused and “the person force on a fourth in order to testimony accused’s must be taken as entire- of right utilize the self-defense.” Over Duck- ly true” to if objection, determine the evidence is com- ett’s the district court concluded Oien, petent. 797 P.2d at 549. Even if the theory justification that Duckett’s of weak, court to deems evidence be or must on rest self-defense than rather defense unworthy belief, of the instruction must be of others. given reasonably if could conclude the affirmatively The implement- district court supports position. evidence the defendant’s ruling response jury’s ed this in ques- to the State, 520, Stagner v. 842 (Wyo. P.2d right tion: a man legally “Does have the to 1992) State, (quoting Goodman v. necessary protect use whatever force is to

400, (Wyo.1977)). “The refusal to allow any individuals other than himself?” Over requested by an instruction the defendant objection, in- district court process requires when due the defendant’s jury: structed “For the ‘defense of oth- given instruction be per reversible error to a right ers’ be lawful Oien, se.” 797 P.2d at 549. necessary Defendant must have used person

against perceived to be threaten- ing someone else.” IV. DISCUSSION Thus, specific issue in this case is A. Instruction on Defense of Others inflicting whether harm person aon in applies “defense others” Duckett contends the district court erred рerson in situations which the harmed did denying opportunity to con- actually defended, person threaten the justi- sider whether his actions legally were actively prevented the rescuer fied under the of defense of others.1 reaching the assailant. Absent statute de- 379, In Leeper v. (Wyo. fining Wyoming, others we 1979), recognized we this common law de- rely expressed common law as fense: judicial pro- decisions. research asserting One of defense directly vides case law which decides this steps position of another into the specific issue. We gen- therefore turn to the person defended. Defense of another justifi- principles eral common law regarding takes its form and cоntent from defense of cation for the use of force to determine the self. The justified using defender is not scope of the defense. reasonably unless or she believes person defended is in immediate dan- Defense of another is an extension of harm, ger bodily of unlawful principles and that the Leeper, self-defense. pre- force is reasonable and P.2d at 383. The common law extends the vent that threat. right of against any self-defense to defend proposed person 1. Duckett’s justi- Instruction B is threatened with an attack that reads: reasonably necessary fies use of force as is right of self-defense of others exists under person circumstances to secure the other person grounds when a who has reasonable from the attack. believe, actually does believe that another assailants, argues that the extension of togeth- The State who number person a fourth of others” to serious “defense er, when implicitly rejected by the Penal Code.2 Model Foley, 128 W.Va. bodily harm. State provides: (1945). Code 3.05 Model Penal 85 S.E.2d for the Protection of Other Use of Force has been another] to defend [The Persons. if the defendant’s available even held be (1) Subject provisions of this Sec- directed act defense was not 3.09, the of force tion and of Section use against a directed actual but was upon of another is or toward who, particular circum- under the justifiable protect person when: a third stances, reasonably suspected be could (a) the actor would be under being a criminal confederate of time of 3.04[3] using such force Section assailant. the direct injury he protect himself Am.Jur.2d, Battery, § 63 at 58 Assault and to be threatened believes Ala.App. (citing Gafford protect; whom he seeks (1953)). See also 859-60 68 So.2d (b) ac- the circumstances as the under *5 (S.D. Huth, 485, 488 N.W.2d State be, person them to the tor believes 1983) (upholding stating the de instruction justi- protect he would be whom seeks upon an and honest “must have acted fendant force; protective and using fied in such necessity good and a conviction of reasonable (c) that his inter- the actor believes or [person harmed] the faith belief that protection of necessary for the vention is [person the acting in concert with someone person. such other seriously injury to kill or intended harmed] Pe- The that because Model State contends member].”) [family §§ and 3.05 make reference nal Code 3.04 correctly notes that the eases The State against anyone other than use of force the oth addressing the of force situations use applica- implicitly it limits the three-person “assail- than the common er “three of others the classic tion of defense in scenario contain facts anVvictim/rescuer” pattern. person” inwаs some dicating the additional assailant by this contention The State bolsters directly threatening the victim. See way also 3.09(3), § pointing Penal Code to Model 859-60; Gafford, at State v. How 68 So.2d which states: ard, (Mo.App.1995); 896 S.W.2d Sections When actor is under French, Pa. 611 A.2d Com. v. using upon force or toward 3.03 to 3.08 (1992); Howev Foley, 35 S.E.2d at 863. and recklessly but he or person of another er, between see no reasoned distinction we a risk of injures or creates negligently against an use force indi persons, the injury innocent fray approaching and the use vidual by Sections is unavailable afforded those guard knowingly standing against one force neg- for such recklessness prosecution case, prevent the assail rеscue. either persons. innocent ligence towards victim, danger to the purpose, and the ant’s section, argues that on the State Based by actions of the assailant’s is furthered against is not of others available confederate, danger to the victim and persons as Hetler. fourth such only by use of force may be alleviated Penal fail the limitation Model with the actu We to see acting in concert those by Noth- suggested § the State. Code 3.05 al assailant. 3.04(1) § use "the states that § 3. Model Penal Code reflects the codifica- 2. Model Penal Code 3.05 justifi- person adopted by many forty-one is upon of the states or toward another tion of force statutory provisions regulаting de- have which fense of others. Marco believes that such able actor when & T. F. Bendinelli James necessary purpose pro- immediately for the Edsall, Requirements, Origins, Others: tecting use of unlawful force Defense of himself Ramifications, Regent Limitations present by occasion." such other (1995). 154 n. 11 U.L.Rev. evidence, however, language in that refers to an assailant. The sufficient language implied, jury Even if such as one appellant to infer that knew what stated, scholar has doing, Wilson and Evans were and acted as a lookout for them. The State must why apparent “ag- is no reason an [t]here prove accessory that the knowl- some gressor,” purposes for the of the edge principals’ of the offenses. Dressel person directly should be limited (1972). * * * People, 178 Colo. threatening harm the defendant. Knowledge being that a crime commit- Admittedly, may be more difficult for it ted, coupled presence even when to demonstrate [defendant] scene, generally enough to con- against X—a distant source more * * aiding abetting. stitute To convict one *,. aggression —is abetting aiding the commission by posed justifi- threat X trigger should offense, prosecution substantive must cation for some action. prove the substantive offense was Robinson, Defenses, Criminal Law committed someone and that 131(b) (emphasis at 73 in original). charged as an aider and abettor associated distinguishing factor here is whether participated in the accom- himself ” Hetler was “innocent or whether plishment and success the criminal ven- * * * Carlson, he acting in concert with presented ture. From the evidence aggressor, to cause harm to Duckett’s wife. could have reason- We therefore determine whether suffi- ably Haight inferred that turned the victim presented cient facts were for the Haight over to Wilson and Evans and that reasonably conclude that Hetler was lookout, thereby acted as *6 in concert with Carlson. himself participated associated and in the accomplishment and of the success crimi- precedent equates acting Our “in concert” nal venture. concept with the aiding abetting and a State, activity. criminal In Borrego v. 423 Haight, (emphasis 654 P.2d at 1238 add- (Wyo.1967), P.2d 393 we considered the ex- ed). principles We expressed find the in tent to which the actions of three defendants applicable asserting these decisions when assault, in resulting in the death of the others as for a victim, constituted concerted action for the If person defendant’s actions. a fourth purpose holding responsible each for the himself participate[s] “associate^] in death. Addressing previous whether a accomplishment and success” of the as- agreement required was to show concerted assailant, sault on the victim the actual action, we stаted: being perpetrated the unlawful acts on the “concert [A] of action” does not necessi- imputed victim the assailant are compact tate actual words or written since accessory. Thus, Id. necessary * * * it persons well settled if [is] that two reasonable force to accessory subdue the engaged in such an assault aiding directly danger related to the imminent abetting they each in other what ado the victim. previous understanding necessary is not * ** We therefore a person hold that rais n render each of them or(jer fa the “defense of others” in for accountable for the other’s acts. injury to a other than the victim’s State, (quoting Id. at 395 Coca v. 423 P.2d actual assailant must show a reasonable be (Wyo.1967)). lief that the defended is in imminent State, harm, Haight bodily In v. 654 P.2d unlawful and a rea (Wyo.1982), we sonable belief that reviewed the role another associat defendant’s participating “lookout” while his ed and co-defendants commit- with the actual rape. ted a Finding any no evidence that used aggressor is actually victim, necessary assaulted the we prevent reasonable and said: harm. court erred in light Duckett claims the district in the

Viewing the evidence Duckett, find the evi refusing we instruct the that the State most favorable to warrant an instruction sufficient beyond dence prove reasonable doubt that initiated of others. Carlson sup In not act self-defense. ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‍Duckett did grabbed Mrs. Duckett and fight when she position, port of this Duckett cites Small intoxi was her to the floor. Carlson threw denied, (Wyo.1984), cert. cated, her victim. larger much than and was 1215,84 L.Ed.2d 356 469 U.S. S.Ct. prevent Duckett to Duckett attacked Hetler Scheikofsky v. interfering on Mrs. with the assault (Wyo.1981). Duckett, Hetler, presumably Duckett. beating Mrs. Duckett’s head instruction, saw Carlson The district court refused was floor. Mrs. Duckett concrete of the United States noting the decision Su- struggled, screaming as Duckett and Hetler Ohio, preme Court Martin U.S. Mrs. participants to hear and both continued (1987), where 107 S.Ct. 94 L.Ed.2d 267 Despite hitting head the cement. Supreme found no States Court the United pleas help rescuing for Duckett’s frantic statute process violation of due an Ohio wife, deliberately Duckett Hetler held placed proving the burden of self- It continued her assault. back while Carlson court, The district defense on defendant. that his knife to then Duckett used failing holding Wyo- clear find “a then, again Even Duckett was break free. prosecutors in ming Supreme that our Court assisting his wife. prevented from Left prove beyond a state must reasonable doubt choice, help. he fled for other self-defense,” act in that Defendants did not presenta- warrant While these facts of self-defense is not a reasoned absence jury’s tion of Duckett’s charge element consideration, say tes- we do not assault, the instruction was not and therefore timony contradicting Duckett’s version was appropriate.5 say we if unreasonable. Nor do believed, the amount of in Martin was based on a The decision Hetler justified. whether specific upholding legislative enactment. Carlson; concert with place *7 authority of a state to the burden the reasonably Duckett believed his whether prove to on the an affirmative defendant danger; and wheth- wife was in imminent evidence, the by preponderance of defense was reasonable and nec- er the force used Supreme recognized the United States Court essary prevent the to Mrs. majority “a of States have now assumed the Duckett, are all determinations which are disproving of affirmative defens- the burden jury’s province. within the The failure to es,” re- and South Carolina Ohio of others4 on give an instruction prove an affirmative quire the defendant limiting and the instruction this defense 236, Martin, 232, 107 480 U.S. at defense. to one who uses force on the actual solely 1889, early As in Trumble v. 1098. as S.Ct. opportunity Duckett the assailant denied 280, 1081, Territory, Wyo. 21 P. by the to have his defense considered (1889), rejected that the proposition we jury. We therefore reverse and remand proving of carries the burden defendant this case to district court. or charged justifiable excusable. conduct ON PROOF B. INSTRUCTION BURDENOF Trumble, following we found Scheikofsky, In a whole were sufficient the instructions as claim of Since Duckett’s seсond error place disproving of remand, burden self-defense on we address it here. likely to arise by approve Instruction No. 4. We do not of the instruction offered Wayne you in case without further instruc- Duckett the defense this If believe that Steven intentionally injures pursuant tion that if the defendant of himself acted in self defense instructions, than the actual assailant of the one other Wayne you must find Steven these defended, person injured being must be act- aggravated guilty of Duckett not of crime ing in concert with the assailant. assault. jury 5. instructed the as follows: The district court

beyond prima demonstrated, a reasonable doubt on the but Once a facie case specific prove legal justifi- stated inclusion of the state- State must “[t]he the absence of proof beyond Here, ment of burden of would have been cation a reasonable doubt. * * preferable Scheikofsky, 636 P.2d at district court failed to instruct on Small, 423, We, clearly 1112. In 689 P.2d at we defense submitted Duckett. therefore, properly stated: self-defense is “[W]hen reverse and remand for a new specifically raised in- should be trial.

structed that the state has burden to prove beyond absence of self-defense a rea- LEHMAN, Justice, concurring. sonable doubt.” majority I opinion concur with the case,

The fact this case compelled involved a court but feel to com- charge opinion. of dissenting assault rather than ment on the The dissent homicide, right and defense of others claim rather than asserts Duckett’s wife could not self-defense, of change does self-defense as to Hetler burden because Hetler “[njever, proof. any way The reason instruction threatened Duckett’s proof burden of any bodily injury.” when self-defense is raised is wife with serious Dis- sent, overlooks, equally applicable analysis to the defense of at This others.6 chooses proposition, ignore, As initial burden on Robinson, De- Ckiminal Law 131(b) charged (1984), with aggravated assault whether the full or fenses prima every section, to establish facie case ele truncated Relying version. on this was, alleged legal justification. majоrity’s ment his position See is that Hetler Amin, 260-61; effect, 811 P.2d at threatening Ramos v. Mrs. Duckett restrain- 822, (Wyo.1991); 806 P.2d Leeper, coming her her husband aid. words, 589 P.2d at 383. viewing once the defen other when evidence so, give dant does Duckett, the court the light instruction most favorable Hetler on the State’s negate burden to this defense and Carlson were concert. Just as beyond a reasonable See X Y aggressors hypothetical, doubt. State v. in the Acosta, 1081, 1087, were, 123 N.M. 939 P.2d Carlson and Hetler due to their con- granted actions, cert. 123 N.M. aggressors cert. certed Mrs. quashed 124 N.M. Duckett. She thus to defend (error If, in failure to instruct on state’s herself burden both. as the ac- dissent proof when knowledges, selfdefense steps or defense оth into the shoes raised; properly ers of aggravated others, element wife his claim of act). battery is “unlawfulness” of repel then Duckett was entitled to either

aggressor, Admittedly, Carlson or Hetler. *8 hypothetical posed by V. the Robinson CONCLUSION trea- tise intriguing perhaps is more and would of Defense others as for the adapt better a screenplay to than the drunk- infliction harm applicable of on another is not place en in garage. melee took Carlson’s only to an actual but also to those However, it sophisti- is hard to see how this acting in concert with the to assailant any cation makes difference. extent the necessary defensive force used is Also, and reasonable. The defendаnt has the bur- application Leeper dissent’s of of showing den the facts for (Wyo.1979) each misguided, is legal justification element of his if disingenuous. avows, for ac- not The dissent “If charged tions when with aggravated adopted by assault. the rule majority here were Wyo. (1997) show, provides, doubt, § Stat. beyond 6-2-502 in rele- The State a reasonable part: vant that the circumstances under which the defen- (a) person guilty A is assault and dant acted manifested an extreme to indifference battery he: if value of human life. If the finds that a (i) bodily injury Causes serious to another truly acted in self-defense or defense intentionally, knowingly recklessly or under others, then circumstances are not those manifesting circumstancеs ence to the value extreme indiffer- required statute. life[.] of human ease, consequently no there was law, have been this Leeper would then Mrs. to killing in district court perhaps ev- error the refusal justified shooting and in Judg- give instruction. The might attempted requested have to ery who in be dispatch Johann- ment and this case should with her effort Sentence interfere Dissent, Succinctly, nothing dis- is in this Two critical facts affirmed. there at 951. sen.” First, that Duckett’s wife Leeper persuades from the case at bar. record that me tinguish deadly justified using mutu- in were would have been Leeper’s husband Johannsen Hetler, against not if not her husband could force she would combatants. Since al that, self-defense, not has Leеper justified doing Mrs. could been in have assert present In the no a defense of others defense of others. better claim to invoke the favor, case, theory. in to a viewing the facts than she had self defense mutual Carlson were not Mrs. Duckett and acting in con- invoking In the fulcrum of aggressor. was the Carlson combatants. cert, majority opinion in mani- this case the self-defense, Duckett would thus assert Mrs. quotation The full disingenuity. fests permits to invoke in turn her husband 131(b) Defenses, Robinson, CRIMINALLaw of others. the defense (1984), persuasive less at 73 is far than Second, using deadly Johannsen was not proposed truncated version included Leeper’s husband. For this against force majority The full reads: opinion. version reаson, Leeper Mrs. us- (b) Triggering Conditions or ing deadly force Johannsen anyone with Jo- trig- concert force is defensive (1) true if hannsen. This is even Johannsen gered, as noted subsection case, aggressor. unjustifiably Carlson principle, aggressor been when an slamming into a any legally-protected Mrs. Duckett’s head threatens harm Thus, question floor. it becomes concrete interest. whether the use for (1) Aggressor. “aggressor,” An acting on Mrs. Duckett’s behalf someone triggering is used in the condition term necessary. Leeper,

reasonable might well principle, subsection majority’s Leeper at 383. The reliance any person be defined as who contributes sound. harm to the defendant. threat of Finally, the insists that de- “[t]he dissent why “ag- apparent There reason ” others should be limited fense defense of purposes of the gressor, for the situations which the be to those directly limited should be clearly claim of self- entitled rescued Sup- threatening harm defendant. Dissent, is precisely 951. This at defense.” ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‍leader, X, gang pose an underworld opinion majority endeavors do. what the Y, D underlings, to kill of his orders one in D n attempts important, majority More presence. Y both X and while aof difficult reach a workable resolution only X is vulnerable Suppose further that to n defensive battery homi- problem. Justifications (Y bulletproof D has a easily invoked. cide should not be vest) X is that Y act while will that, majority oрinion recognizes im- presents Y Although the more alive. *9 times, no choice but to come is left is as danger, dangerous X as and mediate one, stranger, of a loved or even a to the aid any other responsible the threat as for We must trust in need of assistance. Indeed, if D Y in self- aggressor. kills facts, of will be able to juries, as arbiters defense, to do mayX order someone else justified. when such actions determine D job, threat to will continue. and the self-defense, be able to claim D should THOMAS, Justice, dissenting, with whom then, Ad- as Y. against X as well MACY, Justice, joins. D to mittedly, may be more difficult for it more against X a that force majority opinion in this demonstrate I dissent from the is neces- aggression source of I hold that Duсkett was not distant case. would (c) of this sary, subsection of as described to a of defense others entitled 950

section, posed by but the threat X should The rule allows defense from unlawful attacks, trigger a for some action. and under the traditional was not coming defender Clearly, discussing the author was self-de- aggressor the defense of an one who fense, others, not defense of and the circum- rights initiated the battle. theAs of the sophisticated stances are much more than right defender are with the coterminous the combat between Duckett’s wife Carl- and self, the defense of as who initi one son. ated battle no self-defense abandonment, absent withdrawal or re majority position Thе fulcrum communicated, treat available or one who unsound, Wyoming authority and the lever of aggressor defends an so his or does her equally majority Leep- weak. The invokes State, peril. v. Crowder 76 Tenn. 669 State, (Wyo.1979), v. er 589 P.2d 379 (1881); State, 27, v.Wood 128 Ala. 29 So. simply proposition Wyoming for the has Turner, (1900); 598, v. 557 State 246 Mo. recognized the defense defense of others. (1912); Stanley 152 S.W. 313 v. Common ample A language more reference to the wealth, State, supra; Murphy v. 188 Tenn. Leeper demonstrates the limitations that are 583, (1949); Cook, 221 S.W.2d 812 State v. imposed upon of defense. State, supra; Ala.Cr.App., v. Mack 348 asserting One of de (1977). engage 524 So.2d Where two un steps position fense of another into the lawfully fight, ain mutual of whatever of an dеfended. Defense character, the law does not authorize other takes its form and content from anyone take sides and aid one to justi defense of self. The defender not adversary. Perkins, overcome his Crimi using fied in force unless he or she reason Law, Ed., 1969, 10, 5, 1020; p. § nal 2d Ch. ably believes is in defended Commonwealth, 723, Ky. Utterback v. 105 harm, bodily immediate of unlawful 479, 1515, Ky.L.R. 49 S.W. 20 88 Am.St. and that the force is reasonable neces (1899); State, Rep. 328 v. Adams 48 Tex. sary prevent that threat. The defender 452, (1906); Cr.R. 93 116 S.W. and cita can degree use that tions agree fight, above. Where both to reheve risk of harm. Common aggressors. Leeper both are Earl Martin, Mass., v. wealth [369 Mass. 640] mutually Johannsen agreed to settle their (1976); Adams, 341 N.E.2d 885 v. 2 State voluntarily differences combat. Both 282, 163 (1968); N.C.App. S.E.2d 1 State v. initially left bar. Which of the two Washington, 185 Neb. N.W.2d 620 gave appears the invitation to us immateri (1970); Hewitt, 207, v. addition, State 205 S.C. 31 al in such a case. Judith was (1944); Stanley S.E.2d 257 v. Common aware of consensual nature wealth, hence, 440, (1887); Ky. fight, 86 6 holding S.W. 155 we restrict our to this Mounkes, 193, situation, State distinguish v. 88 Kan. 127 P. 637 involv cases (1912); (1860); defender, People, ignorant Pond v. 8 Mich. 150 such State Fair, Cook, (1965). 77, State v. 78 45 N.J. 211 S.C. 862 A.2d 359 S.E. (1907); Ark., no Brockwell v. Judith made effort to dissuade the com [260 Ark. barroom, (1976); Alston, they batants. After 807] 545 S.W.2d 60 left the State v. she thought N.C.App. (1978); for two or three minutes without S.E.2d 523 rose, comment. Tex.Cr.R., Then she Morgan v. removed the 545 S.W.2d (1977); weapon purse ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‍her while still at the Meyer, State 96 Wash. battle, bar (1917); knowledge and without P. 926 Commonwealth v. Rus out the requested and walked dоor. She sogulo, (1919); 263 Pa. 106 A. 180 help did call for Procedure, assistance. Wharton Criminal Law and collected, (1957). She was calm and 218, p. gave her is of *10 warning fired. and origin, ancient application. and of uniform Blackstone, not, W. Leeper Commentaries *3-4. Judith was under these facts, justified This defense does not allow defender in using deadly force in to do more than the one defended. her defense of husband as he would to a claim of self-defense. There is justified. Earl was mutual entitled have been might nothing suggest that Duck- this record A difficult situation combatant. any danger agreed to use nondead ett’s wife was from Hetler. arise if the two Duckett, force, by testimony, ly had escalated the his own elimi- Johannsen Since facts, level, any a mortal but the as self-defense claim on his own be- battle to nated them, half, approach perceptive was do not of the trial entitled find support that Earl was on the court should be sustained. conclusion. down, face but Johannsen at the ground, Judgment Duckett’s and Sentence should not in attack.

time of the fatal shot was be rather than That is affirmed reversed. Afterward, standing him. He was over support. the resolution that I immediately with Earl arose Judith’s help attempted to revive All Johannsen. appeared Earl to have

witnesses testified injury, no no marks on his

suffered visible clothing. The was

person, or torn great Earl not in

entitled to believe harm, bodily

peril great of death by

deadly unjustified him or on killing unjustified, behalf. As PENDELTON, Nigel Andre all the evidence shows heat of (Defendant), Appellant on murder in passion, the conviction Indeed, degree appears Ju

second valid. that she Earl dead. dith testified believed Wyoming, The STATE of fact, believed, together If this she is be (Plaintiff). Appellee facts, with the other would indicate re No. 97-102. Indeed, vengeful the absence mind. such circum

passionate character under Supreme Wyoming. Court of as evi stances could have been considered Curtis, People v. dence of malice. Sept. (1884). Mich. N.W. 385 added). (emphasis Leeper, at 383 in- Leeper

If were to be followed in this

stance, it is clear that Duckett’s wife could as to

not have claimed self-defense suggest nothing

Hetler. There

ever, any way threatened wife If any bodily injury. the rule

with serious law, majority

adopted here were the Leeper

then Mrs. would have been shooting perhaps killing every person might attempted

who have to interfere dispatch I

her effort to Johannsen. submit dangerous this is ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌​​‍a doctrine to have situation, any clearly it is

available any

dangerous situation in excess

indulgence leads to combat. majority in result reached Wyoming precedent. contrary to our

case supported by the

It is not treatise upon. The defense of defense of oth-

relied be situations in

ers should limited those clearly

which the be rescued is

Case Details

Case Name: Duckett v. State
Court Name: Wyoming Supreme Court
Date Published: Sep 4, 1998
Citation: 966 P.2d 941
Docket Number: 97-54
Court Abbreviation: Wyo.
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