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Duck River Electric Membership Corp. v. City of Manchester
529 S.W.2d 202
Tenn.
1975
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*1 ELECTRIC MEMBER RIVER DUCK CORPORATION, Appellant,

SHIP Tennessee, MANCHESTER, OF

CITY

Appellee. of Tennessee.

Supreme Court

Sept. 1975. *2 Merritt, Jr.,

Gilbert Gullett, S. Steele, Sanford, Merritt, Robinson & Nashville, Ed- Gordon, Bobo, ward F. Grissom, Gordon & Shelbyville, appellant. Griffith, III, E.

Charles Griffith & Nashville, Stokes, H. Parsons, Thomas City Manchester, Atty., for appellee. OPINION HENRY, Justice. actions,

These two civil consolidated for purposes appeal, raise questions, two viz:

1. City Does the of Manchester have the acquire, domain, eminent so much of the electric Duck River Electric Membership Cor- poration as is within the boundaries city? of the Assuming the 2. existence right, proper is the what measure of dam- ages?

I. first suit was instituted Manchester, seeking acquire, by emi- domain, certain nent owned Membership Corpora- River Electric Duck tion, corporate within the limits of located city used Duck River as a system. its electric distribution dismiss, insisting moved to being residents of the supplied Duck municipal corporation, “is city, electricity at the of Duck River. sufferance delegated and has been authorized orderly processes law While supply used to right to take prevent no doubt intervene to *3 Coopera- Electric darkness, under the thrown city being electric into the fact not, therefore, the and take Law arrangement fragile tive this remains that petition, in owned by the described property in lacking stability. and defendant, public non-profit electric mem- a city, circumstances the on Under these 4 pursuant to bership corporation organized 1974, Duck River’s after franchise had June Law, 65- T.C.A. Cooperative Electric § the its adopted 345, Ordinance expired, Number 2501, seq.” et declaring prosperity that “the the City overruled the trial motion to The materially will be Manchester retarded and dismiss, holding city authority that the had be detrimental the that would to welfare Duck River electric acquire so much of to and City inhabitants citizens of the system is located within the as distribution to continue to be Manchester [them] Municipal Electric Plant under the city, by Duck River Electric Member- served seq., T.C.A.). et of 1935 6-1501 Law Corporation”; they that bet- ship “be by municipally a owned electrical ter served by challenges ruling this as- appeal This system;” directing and that a distribution (1) that a which insist Tennessee signments suit filed. condemnation property municipality may condemn cooperative without demon- an electrical determination a The condemn need strating public purpose a or and ab- authority necessity for the ing taking judicial finding taking that sent judi for resolution question is not need, (2) and that a Tennessee such serves and, palpable absent a clear and ciary abuse condemn, is not municipality authorized fraudulent, arbitrary capri or or power, law, of an under action, it upon is conclusive courts. cious cooperative devoted use. electric Harper Housing Authority, v. Trenton 38 assignments being as fairly treat these 396, (1954); Tenn.App. City 274 S.W.2d 635 spec- controlling issue as summarized Heth, 321, of Knoxville 210 opinion. beginning of this at the ified (1948). 326 But of course the courts S.W.2d duty and have determine II. authority take, the existence existence Manchester, county seat public use legitimate ques and related municipal is a County, Tennessee of Coffee tions. organized existing under corporation T.C.A., part 6-1505 of the Mu- Section of the State of Tennessee. laws Law of Electric Plant in nicipal reads Corpo- Membership Electric Duck River as follows: pertinent part, electric mem- public non-profit ais ration municipality Any proceeding under the corporation organized existing bership 6-1501—6-1534 is autho- provisions §§ Law, Cooperative to the Electric pursuant empowered any condemn rized seq., et T.C.A. § as set forth land, rights-of-way, easement either granted a franchise to Duck city on, ground, any or above the under River, authorizing operation of an elec- necessary purposes all in connection for a fifteen city within the tric construction, operation January beginning 8 1958 and year period plant of an electric or im- maintenance January 1973. This franchise 8 expiring thereto. provements that, with the result not been renewed has this Duck River con- self-evident that statute practical proposition, It is a only to real estate. We assume that at its sufferance and applies serve tinues to judge, holding that the erty the trial Munici- already devoted to use anoth- Plant Law of pal cites, Electric 1935 authorized corporation, er in support of this along taking, law, with the Revenue Bond rule numerous cases from Law, jurisdictions. had in mind that the former law and and other We do not quoted generalized the above statute authorized the fault this as a correct statement and, only, land on of the law. his holding, we affirm as to the basis avail- v. Cemetery Co., Co. Railroad statute; however, of this ability in view of (1906) holds, Tenn. 94 S.W. 69 in sub 6-1304, utility questionable. its actual stance, to one public devoted 6-1304, T.C.A., a part of the Rev- lawfully cannot use be taken for another reads, in pertinent part: Bond Law enue express and inconsistent use ap without *4 plied legislative authority. powers to The inconsist In addition it which now public use was a ent have, right-of-way railroad any municipality power shall have vis-a-vis, cemetery. This case has chapter: par no this under application ticularized since the contemplat construct, acquire gift, (1) pur- To ed in the instant case use is not inconsistent chase, right or the exercise the for the further reason that § 6-1304 is domain, reconstruct, improve, eminent specific grant authority to municipali public works, any cr extend better within authorizing, does, as ties the condemna municipality, partially without the or or public (defined tion works to § 6-1302 without partially within or the municipal- plants electric and systems). include Elec acquire by ity, gift, purchase, and to or systems tric are privately seldom owned of the the exercise of eminent do- always public and are devoted to the use in main, rights in lands land or water practical the sense that they exist to serve in rights connection therewith. segments substantial public. the therefore, In the language clearest of this stat Legislature, knew that it was empowers to acquire by authorizing ute con Tennessee demnation, any public works, municipalities public and land or service type utility land, engaged in in rights operations connection in supplying therewith. electric public. complete current to the remedy. This is clear and It is necessary rely upon any other stat Railway Southern v. Memphis, 126 Tenn. provide It ute. does not for application 267, (1912) 148 S.W. 662 reaffirms Railroad general eminent domain statutes Cemetery Co. There the suit involved a 6-1501; seq.) et does how § taking of switch and yards terminal for ever, 23-1402 makes eminent § public park purposes, a wholly inconsistent section, statutes “a of every domain use. act, future, present or legislative which Railroad v. Mayor and Aldermen of Un condemnation”, grants power of such City, 491, ion 137 Tenn. (1917) 194 S.W. 572 expressly stated to the contrary. unless recognizes that devoted to public Therefore, this regard, in the acts are appropriated use to an inconsistent import. identical upon legislative use authorization. We that hold this condemnation ac Turnpike Co., Williamson Co. v. provisions must be sustained under the tion (1920) 228 S.W. 714 recognized the gen- 6-1304, Annotated, Tennessee Code permitted eral rule but the county to con- we affirm action the trial a turnpike company pursuant demn legis- holding. in so lative sanction. earnestly for Duck

Counsel jurisdictions Cases from other and text- urge upon proposition ably Court authority book follow the pat- same corporation may prop- that a condemn tern.

206 holding It compelling pose. permissible practice reasons for is

There but one pow- municipality give has recognition a Tennessee should foremost which of an electrical high obligation condemn service. er its boundaries. within cooperative Chumbley v. Duck Corp., In River Elec. (1958) 310 Tenn. S.W.2d 453 to the character of the two look first was confronted with an where- Court action entities. sought to Duck Riv- plaintiff compel in the Laski, (1872) Memphis v. Tenn. 511 him with electricity. er to furnish characterized Tennessee munici- Court very relief, properly holding denied Court thusly: palities duty electricity there was supply municipal corporation created A unless non-member and until he com- to a political purposes, government with the reasonable plied regula- rules powers with subordinate and local vested they (plaintiff insisted un- tions were most im- imperium is an legislation. It reasonable) Duck River. more be and can no embarrassed perio, department cityA electric can exact no governmental powers exercise of the membership requirement and must serve all invested which it is inhabitants, without discrimination and creating it. good, than can imposition of restrictions without *5 purpose general the of They exist for excepting those relating pay- to conditions of They agencies are arms or government. ment. exercise, a they by delegation, state and the no aspersions upon While cast these power public the sovereign of for portion freely recognize and and corporations fully Carrier, Tenn.App. Thornton 43 good. public service great they have rendered the (1957). 615, 208 311 S.W.2d and sparsely populated rural areas of our cooperatives, under membership Electric state, that they the fact remains are mani- law, general corpora- are welfare Tennessee low-grade, volunteer, festly public service T.C.A.). They organ- (§ 65-2503 tions. corporations, respects, inferior in all type to electricity their mem- distribute to ized to exist municipalities purpose which the for bers, agencies political and governmental general government. enjoy per- Cities of to non-members restricted subdivisions succession; there is provision petual (10%) of the number of mem- percent ten accompanied by a their dissolution division 65-2508). By appropriate by-laws bers. enjoy a They higher degree assets. of of membership and limitations qualification greater degree of permanency stabili- (§ 65-2514). imposed. may ty- expenses of certain payment After Ample authority supports the posi reserves, certain the reve- providing city that property tion of Duck year may be distributed in each fiscal nues However, use.” “public is not in refunds, patronage either as members to its legal context of technicalities and nice is in reductions, (§ 65- way of or both rate appraisal We think a fair the serv ties. 2516), upon among dissolution by electric membership corpo rendered ices (§ 65-2525). membership. demands conclusion that their rations corpora- distressing feature these A “public to are devoted use” in the facilities to power to refuse service is their tions Yet, proceedings. of condemnation context pre-eminent The customers. prospective legitimate can be no contention but there power, and of those public mission city distribution of electric current distribution, provide is to charged with its use. higher will be electricity maximum blessings to the adoption analysis, municipal member- And in the last extent. possible pur- has the exclusive to control the ity conditions tends frustrate ship

207 electricity within its distribution bounda- just right compensation is Elec., v. Mid. 1, ries. Franklin Tenn. 222 decreed Article 21 Con 182, (1968). 434 829 Tenn. S.W.2d This case of Tennessee which provides stitution inferentially city holds that take substance that no property man’s shall be property cooperative. of an electric just compensation. See taken without This at 833. 434 S.W.2d right compensation long existed before statutory scheme of condemnation came short, as between a Tennessee munici- being; right into therefore “such cannot be membership coopera- and an electric pality by any statutes, said to be created such tive, sovereign and supreme. because the latter are implemen enacted in Manchester condemn. It will hold tation the constitutional already acquired so general for the given.” Brooksbank v. Roane County, 207 benefit, with a higher larger Tenn. (1960). S.W.2d 570 scope of use and under a more stable and system. responsive Reference condem will nation statutes they reveal that con

III. only template the condemnation of land. personal No reference is made to suit was declaratory judg- The second yet constitutional prohibitions filed in aid ment action condemna- against taking private property without seeking suit and to have tion the Court just compensation applies with full force proper damages. declare measure of validity personal property. Zirkle v. 23-1414, T.C.A., The city insisted that § City Kingston, 396 S.W.2d statutes, (1965). applicable; whereas Duck River takes the This action seeks position that 6-320 T.C.A. is condemn land. applicable It *6 may may improved. or not be an It also since electric member- seeks personal to condemn ship corporation is involved. including conductors, anchors, poles, guy wires, light- The trial held that the damages arresters, transformers, ning street lights, by be determined con- and numerous other equipment items of statutes in demnation embraced 23-1401 § used in an electrical system. distribution seq. et Tennessee Code Annotated. Technically, some of may this be so at- appeal This ensued. part tached as to become a of its realty; however, we treat it personal property, IV. in with accordance the pleadings, for the phase purposes this of the controversy. provides, Section 23-1414 pertinent part: The condemnation statutes re- a estimating quiring jury view damages,

In jury shall “examine the give ground” apart by the value of the “set metes rights land taken deduction, bounds, a quantity sufficient without but for incidental benefits land purposes intended” T.C.A.) which result to the by owner reason are ludicrously inapplicable. (It improvement proposed of the tak- would be diffi- be guy a apart cult to set wire en into consideration in metes estimating inci- bounds). The damages. just standard measure of dental compensation, arrived at in the usual man- imprecise That this is a most statement ner, equally unacceptable. is damages the elements of there can doubt; however, through years 6-1301, down T.C.A. under which the courts have evolved rules for the deter- city’s sustained, condemn is is silent just compensation. damages. However, mination as to as heretofore out, general eminent domain power revenues pointed received from of all other are made stat- power consumers of electric with- statutes sales power area, conferring except the annexed consumers utes brings But large 23-1402 T.C.A. this us power greater industrial loads with unacceptable an measure of dam- kilowatts, during back than 300 the last twelve ages. preceding months the date of the (1) above, (ii) for in provided notice appro The courts have fashioned (50%) fifty per of the net centum reve damages speci measures without priate sales power revenues less (gross nues Legislature. from the We guidance fied including power cost of facili wholesale agree with the insistence of counsel for the charge) received from ties rental damages that “the determination of large consumers industrial sales legislative question.” not a judicial than greater 300 kilowatts power loads Memphis, supra, of Railroad v. old case The during the annexed area the last within question us that the suffi instructs (12) preceding months twelve date adequacy procedure ciency notice. aforesaid damages judicial ascertaining question to the courts. so hold. confided equi to be fair and We hold this determining just compensa method of table state, policy of our how as mandated our tion Constitution. ever, is formulated to a substantial extent this at arriving conclusion have Legislature, Home Beneficial by the Assn. necessary to determine whether found White, 585, 177 S.W.2d 545 “annexing Manchester is an City of (1944), positive and where it has made a meaning of municipality” within the 6-§ in an area of constitutional pronouncement the fact and we have not overlooked concern, carry we hesitate not to out its presently does own or that Manchester obvious intent. system. own electric In our operate its Legislature has arrived at formula not controlling view these considera- determining the fair market or method motivated the fact We are tions. just compensation paid to be value has found and Legislature determined involving acquisi- in these cases owner determining manner for proper to be a entities. tion compensation” or “fair value.” “just market *7 reads, 6-320 as follows: bring ourselves to believe We cannot would allow one measure of Legislature (2) Municipality purchase shall offer to for annexed utilities and an- compensation properties of the electric distribution acquired by for those condemnation. within other cooperative located the annexed we. area, would together with all of the Nor coopera- area, serve within rights to such tive’s probably ap- We realize we have which shall consist of cash consideration damages, but a liberal measure proved cost, reproduction (a) present-day entitled liberal think Duck new, being acquired, facilities less City of Manchester has consideration. computed straight-line on a depreciation beneficiary long its service for a been basis; (b) plus equal an amount River, doubt, time. Duck ex- period of constructing any necessary facili- cost its and facilities to accom- services tended coop- reintegrate the ties residents and their Manchester modate area after the annexed outside erative will have an adverse doubtless withdrawal sold; plus (c) portion detaching upon surcharges, rates reserves. effect amount, year payable each annual an (13094) is (10) years, equal to the This case reversed and ten period of (25%) twenty-five per centum with instructions to trial (i) remanded sum try the as if an judge LEECH, issues this were Special Justice, and COOPER suit, applying BROCK, JJ., inverse concurring. damages as above delineated.

measure jury partic- eliminate the of view in this HARBISON, J., participating. being unproductive inap- ular case

propriate. these appeals

The costs of will be borne parties.

equally by Court, accordance Rule of this of the Circuit Court

the costs Clerk to the

disallowed extent of du- unnecessary transcripts the two filed

plications in this The Clerk this Court will com-

Court. exceptions.

pute the al., Petitioners,

John Parker LAYNE et BROCK, JJ., LEECH, COOPER and Justice, concurring.

Special SPEIGHT, C. W. Commissioner of Highways of the State of FONES, JJ., partici- HARBISON Tennessee, Respondent. pating. Supreme Court Tennessee. ON PETITION TO REHEAR Oct. 1975. City of peti- Manchester has filed

tion to rehear and for clarification.

We held:

a. That the of Manchester has the

right to condemn. damages That the

b. would be deter-

mined in accordance with

T.C.A.

c. That on remand trial

try the as if this issues case were an suit,

inverse condemnation with the

jury view eliminated.

Condemnation had not been com *8 not so did hold. The

pleted

may proceed dismiss, with the may suit or it option. may its It

at construct its own it competing franchise a it

system, exercise numerous other

options alternatives. But if elects to

continue, of damages measure their

method of ascertainment are as herein

fixed. petition is

Overruled.

Case Details

Case Name: Duck River Electric Membership Corp. v. City of Manchester
Court Name: Tennessee Supreme Court
Date Published: Sep 15, 1975
Citation: 529 S.W.2d 202
Court Abbreviation: Tenn.
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