294 N.W. 302 | Iowa | 1940
The plaintiff's petition, filed May 2, 1939, asserts that, on April 1, 1933, he became employed by the defendant City of Oskaloosa as city health officer for a term of 2 years expiring April 1, 1935, at an annual salary of $900 per year, to be paid in semimonthly installments, as fixed by a city ordinance; that, in violation of the ordinance, plaintiff was paid at the rate of $600 per year; he demanded judgment for the difference between the amount of his salary, as fixed by the ordinance, and the amount which was paid to him, with interest and costs.
The defendant filed a demurrer, which asserted, among other things, that all salary items, accruing between April 1, 1933, and May 2, 1934, did not accrue within 5 years preceding the commencement of this action and are barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff then filed an amendment to his petition, which asserted that, on March 15, 1938, he entered into a covenant with the City not to sue it for any unpaid salary in consideration for the City increasing his compensation in the sum of $12.50 per month, that the City failed to carry out the *111 agreement and, on May 1, 1939, plaintiff rescinded said agreement and then commenced this action on the following day; that, when the agreement of March 15, 1938, was made the statute had not run, plaintiff was lulled into security by said agreement and the city, by entering into the same, is estopped to plead the statute of limitations asserted in its demurrer. The court sustained the demurrer as to all items prior to May 2, 1934, and overruled it as to all items since May 2, 1934. Plaintiff elected to stand on the ruling and has appealed therefrom.
[1] I. Appellant concedes that the 5-year limitation prescribed by subparagraph 5 of section 11007 of the Code, 1931, is applicable to the controversy herein. His first contention is that the salary of a public officer does not accrue until the end of the term of office, that his term being from April 1, 1933, to April 1, 1935, the cause of action for his salary did not accrue until April 1, 1935, and this action having been commenced May 2, 1939, was within the 5-year limitation. We find no merit in this contention.
This court has repeatedly recognized that the amount of compensation and the time or times for payment thereof for a public officer are not determined from the contract of employment but solely from the legislative provisions applicable to the payment of such compensation. Broyles v. Mahaska County
Appellant relies upon our decision in the case of Griffin v. Clay County,
"We think the court was correct in holding that the excuses offered by the plaintiff for not filing his claims quarterly, as provided by statute, were not sufficient, and did not stay the running of the statute of limitations; and that the claims in this case are barred, except for the last two quarters of the year 1910. Code section 508; McCord v. Page County
The rule applied by us in the McCord case is analogous to that applied generally to a demand that is payable in installments. We have held that the statute commences to run as each installment becomes due. Boynton v. Salinger,
[2] II. Appellant's other proposition is that the amendment to the petition asserted a plea of estoppel which avoids the running of the statute and that the court erred in disregarding this plea of estoppel. We find no merit in this contention.
The plea of estoppel is based upon the claim that the defendant City violated the law by failing to pay the plaintiff the full salary due him under the ordinance applicable thereto and, on March 15, 1938, undertook to settle the controversy by making a new contract which was also contrary to provisions of such ordinance. We have held that a contract, which contemplates *113
the payment of more salary than that specified by law, is against public policy. Dodson v. McCurnin,
"It is a general principle that a municipal contract entered into in violation of a mandatory statute, or a contract in opposition to public policy is not merely voidable but void (Coggeshall v. Des Moines,
In the case of Welu v. City of Dubuque,
Since the assignments of error which appellant has presented for our decision are without merit, the order appealed from is affirmed. — Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE and all JUSTICES concur. *114