40 Barb. 556 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1863
This action was brought to recover the sum due upon a promissory note, dated at Hyde Park, May 1, 1861, for $500, payable to Isaac Allen, the plaintiffs’ intestate, or bearer, one year after date, with interest ; also a promissory note dated at the same place, June .25, 1861, for the sum of $100, payable t'o Isaac Allen or bearer, thirty days after date. The defendant, in his answer, did not deny the making and delivery of the two notes, but he set up in his answer, by way .of counter-claim or offset, in substance, that on the 19th day of November, 1860, the intestate was indebted to the defendant in various large sums of money, for money lent by the defendant to the intestate and for which the latter had given his promissory notes to the former; and also for money had and received by Allen for the defendant; and for part of a bond and mortgage sold
“$5000. One day after my death, for services rendered and value received, I promise to pay, and there shall be paid out of my estate to A. C. Baker or bearer, the sum of five thousand dollars. Hyde Park, November 19th, 1860.
Isaac Allen.”
It is of consequence to keep in mind that the defendant claims the note to have been given to him for the sum found due to him upon an account stated, which account consisted of money actually advanced and received, of goods and property sold, and services rendered, and that it is payable after the death of the maker, and without interest. There were some other items of set-off claimed in the answer, but no question arose upon them at the trial, and it is not worth while to notice them further. The question litigated was the genuineness and validity of the $5000 note.
Isaac Allen' died on the 20th day of January, 1862, at Hyde Park, where he had resided for many years, upon a farm of his own, the management and cultivation of which was his only business. He had neither wife nor children at the time of his decease, and no one resided with him, at and for some time before his death, but Mary E. Sarles, a woman of somewhat doubtful reputation. He was 80 years of age
The first class of objections were made to questions put to the witnesses in regard to the appearance of the $5000 note upon the trial. John F. Hull, the cashier of a bank, of 10 or 12 years standing, was asked by the plaintiffs' counsel if the signature and the body of the note were written with the same ink ? Also, “ Does there appear to have been an erasure on the note ?” Also, “Was the erasure made before or after the body of the note was written?” Also, “Are either of the edges of the note in question cut edges, or the ordinary foolscap edge?” These questions were severally objected to by the defendant’s counsel, and the objections overruled and exceptions taken. They all referred to the appearance of the $5000 note as it was exhibited at the trial. They were designed to elicit facts, not opinions. Whether the ink upon a written instrument is blue or black, whether the surface of the paper has been subject to abrasion, or the edges of the paper are cut smooth and even from end to end, as with the manufacturer’s instrument, or uneven and irregular, as with the scissors or a knife, are not matters of opinion ; they are facts, apparent and obvious, to which the attention of the witnesses might be directed, and to which they might testify. The plaintiffs had a right to prove them and put them into the case if they were material, as they certainly were. As to the writing upon the erasure, or whether made before or after the body of the note was written, if that rested in opinion, it was a question upon which the witness, who was a bank cashier, was qualified to speak as an expert.
The defendant deemed it important to prove that when the $5000 note was given there were two inkstands present with the intestate and himself at the house of the former. He was sworn in his own behalf and asked if he was in the habit of carrying an inkstand with him in 1860 and 1861. The evidence was objected to and rejected. The effect of this evidence was to show what took place at a transaction which the defendant had personally with the deceased, Isaac Allen. It was therefore within the prohibition of § 399 of the code, and properly overruled.
Another' of the defendant’s exceptions refers to the admissibility of questions put by the plaintiffs’ counsel to the defendant’s witness, Mary E. Sarles, on her cross-examination, touching the claim she made against Allen’s estate. She
Judgment should be entered on the verdict, for the plaintiffs.
Brown, Scrugham and Lott, Justices.]