41 Conn. 517 | Conn. | 1874
We think it is clear, that Patrick Eagan is a de facto committee-man of the district. He received a plurality of all the votes cast at the meeting of the district, and was declared to be elected by the presiding officer, and on motion being made that the decision of the chair, declaring him elected, be sustained, the meeting almost unanimously voted to sustain it. It further appears that he entered upon the duties of the office of committee-man and is still exercising them, and during all the time that has intervened he has been recognized as a committee-man, duly elected, by the other members of the committee.
These facts, primá facie, seem to constitute him a committee-man of the district de jure. So far as third persons are concerned, they cannot discover the illegality of his election otherwise than by an examination of the records of the meeting. They will have to ascertain the' whole number of votes cast for all the candidates, and the number cast for him. Such being the case, he clearly has color of title to the office, and consequently is a de facto committee-man of the district.
Again, it is not only well settled, but everywhere held, that mandamus will "not lie when there is another adequate remedy ; and it is equally well settled that an information in the nature of quo warranto not only will lie to test the title of a party to an office claimed by another, but it is particularly adapted to determine such controversies.
For these reasons it seems to us clear that the relator, in this case, has mistaken his remedy.
We are aware that the law is held to be otherwise in the neighboring state of Massachusetts, and in the state of Maryland. In these states it has been held that mandamus will lie to determine the title to a disputed office, and to restore the relator thereto, even though quo warranto would also lie, on the ground that the latter remedy might prove inadequate by reason of delay, and that while judgment of ouster might be given against the incumbent, such judgment would not necessarily instate the claimant in the office, but he might afterwards be compelled to resort to a mandamus in order to accomplish this result.
The doctrine of these states seems mainly based upon the ground that parties may not heed the judgments of ouster in proceedings of quo warranto, and thereby may necessitate further proceedings by mandamus. This seems to us to be making provision for cases that will rarely occur. When the title of an incumbent of an office is fully heard and determined against him, there is no more reason to apprehend that he will refuse to acquiesce in the judgment of ouster, than there is that he will disregard the decisions of courts in any other class of cases, and it seems to us a departure from the ordinary course of judicial proceedings to make an exception in cases of quo warranto. Through all the course of the
We advise the Court of Common Pleas that the petition is insufficient.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.