OPINION
1. This is an unusual adoption case raising the issue of when, if ever, an adoption decree may be reopened after the statutory one-year deadline for attacking such decrees has passed. Some jurisdictions, such as Illinois, have cited public policy considerations favoring the stability of adoptions and have rejected virtually every attempt to find an exception to the applicable statute of limitations. Other jurisdictions have allowed for the possibility that under limited circumstances, the limitations period should not be applied to bar a birth parent’s attempt to reopen an adoption decree. We hold that this case is one in which the statute of limitations period should not be strictly applied. We affirm and remand.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2. The birth mother (Mother) and her daughter (the Child) lived with Mother’s parents (Grandparents) for a number of years following Mother’s divorce from the birth father. While Mother worked, Grandparents provided child care, but Mother’s position as the Child’s mother was not in doubt. According to Mother’s testimony, at some point Grandfather discovered that if Grandparents adopted the Child they could receive additional Social Security monies. Grandfather began to put pressure on Mother to allow such an adoption. At about the same time, Mother became very concerned about her health because a cancerous cyst had been discovered on her uterus. Mother believed her ex-husband had substance-abuse problems and would not be as good a caretaker for the Child as would her parents. Thus, she did not want the birth father to obtain custody of the Child if she should die. In part because of her father’s pressure and in part because of her fear that she might die soon, Mother agreed to the adoption, but only after being assured that nothing would change, that she would still be the Child’s mother, and that health permitting she would still raise the Child.
3. Mother signed a consent to adoption form which was deficient in several respects. First, the form recited that Mother had received independent counseling concerning the adoption, even though Mother had received no counseling. Second, the form was not signed in front of a judge, as in this case it should have been. See NMSA 1978, § 40-7-38 (Repl.Pamp.1989) (repealed 1993; for present comparable provisions, see NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-21 (Repl.Pamp.1995)). Despite the deficiencies, the adoption decree was entered on March 18,1992.
4. Following the adoption, nothing changed — Mother and the Child still lived with Grandparents; Mother for all practical purposes remained the Child’s mother; Grandparents still cared for the Child while Mother was at work; and Mother continued to provide health insurance, clothing, and groceries for the Child. Also, Grandparents began to receive approximately $400 per month in additional Social Security payments on behalf of the Child. This situation remained the same until Mother started dating a man of whom her parents did not approve. When Mother went on a week-long vacation with her boyfriend (now her husband), in May 1994, her parents told her to leave the family home without the Child. Within three months, Mother commenced this legal action to have the adoption declared void or otherwise reopened. Grandparents responded, maintaining that Mother’s action was barred because it had been filed more than a year after the adoption decree was entered. See NMSA 1978, § 40-7-5KF) (Repl.Pamp.1989) (repealed 1993; for present comparable provision, see NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-36(K) (Repl.Pamp.1995)) (“A final decree of adoption may not be attacked upon the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree[.]”).
5. After a trial on the merits, the district court determined that Grandparents had committed fraud upon the court by submitting a consent form with the deficiencies mentioned above, and that the adoption decree was therefore void. The court also ruled that Grandparents had made misrepresentations to Mother by assuring her that nothing would change after the adoption, and that the adoption decree should be reopened on this basis as well as on the fraud-on-the-court ground.
II. DISCUSSION
6. On appeal, Grandparents challenge the court’s determination that there was fraud on the court, characterizing the deficiencies in the consent as “sloppy paperwork.” Grandparents also argue that there was no evidence of fraud at the time of the initial statements to Mother, and that the only evidence is that Grandparents had no intention to have a change of heart about enforcing the adoption decree until the 1994 dispute between Mother and Grandparents that led to the current litigation. Finally, Grandparents contend that the district court was obligated to make a determination regarding the Child’s best interests, even if the court was correct in vacating the adoption decree. As we discuss below, we agree that there was no fraud on the court in this case. We also agree that the evidence of fraud against Mother was not clear and convincing. However, we believe the district court’s decision to reopen the adoption decree should be upheld on a different legal theory, given the facts of this case. Finally, we determine that the case should be remanded for a hearing concerning the Child’s best interests with respect to the custody determination.
7. There are two statutes of limitation in the version of the Adoption Act applicable to this case that concern consents and adoption decrees. Under Section 40-7-51(F), a final decree of adoption “may not be attacked” upon the expiration of one year from the entry of the decree. Also, Section 40-7-38(F) provides that a consent to an adoption may not be withdrawn prior to the entry of an adoption decree unless the consent was obtained by fraud. These two provisions, taken together, indicate that the only ground for revoking a consent prior to an adoption is fraud, and that any attack on an adoption decree must be made within one year after the decree is entered. See In re Kira M.,
A. Invalidity of the Consent/Fraud on the Court
8. As we pointed out above, one ground relied on by the district court in making its ruling was that the problems with the consent in this case, which included the fact that Mother had not received the required pre-consent counseling, made the consent and resultant adoption void. Since it was void, the court held, it could be reopened at any time. This theory does not appear to be supported by cases decided under similar circumstances. See, e.g., In re Joseph B.,
9. In this case, we see no reason why the result should be' different simply because the district court termed the deficiencies in the consent as fraud on the court. If there were true fraud on the court, under Rule 1-060(B) NMRA 1997, an independent action such as this could be maintained outside the time limitations of that Rule. We would then have to decide whether the statute of limitations of the Adoption Act would limit a claim based on fraud upon the court. The fraud-upon-the-court doctrine, however, is limited to extreme cases in which there is a concerted plan to defile the court itself. Jemez Properties, Inc. v. Lucero,
B. Fraud Against Mother
10. The second ground relied upon by the district court was Grandparents’ alleged fraud or misrepresentation in assuring Mother that nothing would change following the adoption. The court determined that j;his fraud warranted reopening the adoption decree. In doing so, the court necessarily decided that the statute of limitations in the Adoption Act did not begin to run until Mother discovered the fraud. It is not clear that this Rule, referred to as the discovery rule (codified in NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-7 (Repl.Pamp.1990)), applies in normal adoption cases. In Illinois, for example, the appellate courts have decided that the discovery rule does not apply in adoption cases because of the competing public-policy considerations supporting the stability and finality of adoptions and the adoptive relationship. See Street v. Hubert,
11. The elements of civil fraud include a representation that was not true as well as the intention to deceive the other party. See UJI 13-1633 NMRA 1997. There was little or no evidence in this case that tended to show that Grandparents, at the time they assured Mother nothing would change, had a secret intention to act otherwise. There was evidence that Mother signed the consent because Grandparents were pressuring her so that they could receive Social Security benefits on behalf of the Child. She also signed the consent because she was worried about her health and wanted to make sure the Child did not end up with the birth father. There was no evidence, and certainly no clear and convincing evidence, that Grandparents actually intended at the time of the adoption to use the decree to take the Child away from Mother. The fact that nothing changed in the relationships between the Child, Mother, and Grandparents for two years following the adoption undermines the argument that there was a secret scheme or plan. Instead, this appears to be a case in which Grandparents became angry at Mother, disapproved of the example she was setting for the Child, and decided to use the adoption decree to protect the Child from Mother’s bad influence, or to pressure Mother into acting “appropriately.” This after-the-fact change of intention does not qualify as fraud in the inducement, due to the lack of evidence that, at the time Grandparents made their statements, the statements were actually false and were intended to deceive Mother into acting.
C. Affirming the District Court Under Right-For-Wrong-Reason Doctrine
12. Despite the fact that the legal rationale used by the district court was erroneous, we may affirm the court’s decision if it is right for any reason and affirming on a different ground would not be unfair to the appellant. See State v. Franks,
1. Equitable Estoppel
13. The first legal principle that applies under the facts set out above is one of equitable estoppel. Under this theory, a party may be estopped from asserting a statute-of-limitations defense if that party’s conduct has caused the plaintiff to refrain from filing an action until after the limitations period has expired. See Molinar v. City of Carlsbad,
14. In this case, Grandparents’ conduct in assuring Mother that nothing would change, and then taking no action to change the situation until after the limitations period had expired, induced Mother to refrain from trying to reopen the adoption decree in a timely manner. While it is true that Grandparents may not have intended this result since there was no evidence that they planned all along to deprive Mother of actual custody and control over the Child, the effect of their assurances and lack of action was the same as if they had intended to induce Mother’s inaction. Therefore, it is appropriate to estop Grandparents from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. We caution, however, that this is not a theory to be used often in a normal adoption case. This ease is unusual because, while there was a legal adoption, there was never a change of living circumstances until after the statute of limitations had run. Thus, our holding is limited to quite unusual situations such as the one presented by this case.
2. Exceptional Circumstances
15. In the alternative, another theory under which the court’s decision may be upheld is a reopening of the adoption under Rule 1-060(B)(6). This is the “exceptional circumstances” provision of Rule 60(B), which allows a judgment to be reopened within a reasonable time if such circumstances are present. Many courts, including this Court and our Supreme Court, have held or assumed that attacks on adoption decrees are appropriately made pursuant to Rule 60(B). In re Kira M.,
16. In fact, in In re Kira M., our Supreme Court specifically endorsed the use of Rule 60(B)(6), in exceptional circumstances, to override a literal interpretation of the Adoption Act. The In re Kira M., Court held that a natural parent’s rights could be protected by a court, in appropriate cases, despite the fact that under the Act fraud is the only ground for revoking a consent to adoption once the consent has been accepted by the district court.
17. Under the facts most favorable to Mother, which were accepted by the district court, this is a clear case requiring, at a minimum, that the adoption decree be reopened to allow a best-interests-of-the-child analysis. This adoption was never meant to be a real adoption or to change Mother’s actual relationship with the Child. It did not, in fact, change that relationship until the statute of limitations had run on her ability to attack the adoption decree. It is difficult to think of more exceptional circumstances than these. This case does not involve the usual public-policy considerations favoring permanence and stability of adoptions, see In re Kira M.,
D. Remand or Outright Affirmance
18. As we noted above, one of Grandparents’ arguments is that the district court should not have immediately transferred custody to Mother, even if reopening the adoption decree was appropriate, without performing an analysis of the best interests of the Child. Mother concedes in her answer brief that such an analysis is necessary in cases such as this one. This concession is in accord with New Mexico law. See, e.g., Normand v. Ray,
19. Mother contends, however, that here the court did consider the Child’s best interests in returning the Child to Mother. We do not agree that it is clear that the Child’s best interests were a consideration in the court’s decision. In a pretrial hearing concerning discovery, the court indicated that the only issues it was going to consider at trial were the fraud issues — whether the consent was induced by fraud. The court rejected Mother’s suggestion that a court-appointed expert, see Rule 11-706 NMRA 1997, might be needed. At trial, there was initially some indication that the court might be changing its mind. Over Grandparents’ objection that the testimony had nothing to do with fraud, Mother elicited testimony concerning Grandfather’s depression, suicide attempts, and recent hospitalization. Mother’s response to the objection was to argue that this case might result in a custody determination, and that the evidence was relevant for that purpose. The court allowed the testimony to continue, without comment. Later, however, during cross-examination of Grandfather, Mother’s counsel attempted to ask questions about the suicide attempts, and opposing counsel objected again. Mother’s counsel again responded by arguing that the case might still involve the question of custody and Grandfather’s fitness as a parent, and that the suicide attempts were a proper line of inquiry. The court, in its only explicit comment on the issue, stated that “[t]hose matters can be dealt with at a later juncture,” and cut off the line of questioning. Nothing more was said about a fitness inquiry or a best-interests analysis.
20. While it is possible that the court did implicitly make a best-interests-of-the-child determination in reaching its decision, there are enough indicators to the contrary to give us pause. As we stressed above, in cases such as this the best interests of the child are the most important considerations, and where it is not clear that these interests formed a basis for the court’s decision, we believe remand is appropriate to allow a hearing to be held on that question. See In re Kira M,
III. CONCLUSION
21. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s determination that the adoption decree should be reopened. We remand, however, for a hearing concerning the best interests of the Child with regard to her custody and control.
22. IT IS SO ORDERED.