279 Pa. 443 | Pa. | 1924
Opinion by
The trustees of the estate of Eli Kirk Price, being the owners of two adjoining pieces of land in the City of Philadelphia, one at the southeast corner of 49th and Walnut streets, containing 100 feet on Walnut Street, 350 feet deep, and the other adjoining, having a front on Walnut Street of 115 feet, on January 2, 1911, conveyed the piece first named to Emanuel Kern subject to this restriction: “Upon condition that......the lot [shall be subdivided] into no more than twenty-three building lots, that each of said building lots shall be improved with a dwelling house at least three stories high, similar to and of no less value than those recently erected on Walnut Street between 49th and 51st streets, and that no portion of the said lots of ground or of the buildings to be erected thereon shall be used for the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors, or for any other industrial or commercial purpose.”
Kern, the grantee, by two deeds dated January 3, 1911, granted the property to Rogers subject to the restrictions and by mesne conveyances a portion of the lot at the corner of 49th and Walnut streets, containing in front on Walnut Street 40 feet and being 100 feet in depth, became vested in defendant; each deed in his chain of title is subject to the restrictions, and plaintiff, by virtue of intermediate conveyances, each likewise reciting the land as subject to the restrictions, became the owner of a lot fronting on 49th Street, part of the property purchased by Kern from the Price Estate, directly
In March, 1922, defendant began the erection of an apartment house on her lot at the corner of 49th and Walnut streets. There were two large rooms in the front part of the basement which on completion of the structure were rented for stores. Plaintiff filed this bill to restrain the occupation of part of the building for commercial purposes, invoicing in his behalf the restriction heretofore recited. After hearing, the court below entered a decree forbidding the store use of the premises, from which defendant brings this appeal.
The main contention of appellant is that the restrictions were placed in the deed to Kern for the benefit solely of the Price Estate and its retained land, and, therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to enforce them. We think this position is not tenable, as a consideration of the language shows. The grantors, who were the owners of other and adjoining lands, contemplated a building improvement on the property they were selling, and provided that it “shall be subdivided into no more than twenty-three building lots” and that each thereof “shall be improved” with a dwelling “similar to and of no less value than those recently erected on Walnut Street between 49th and 51st streets.” Appellant treats the situation as though the Price Estate had no other purpose to serve by the provision in the deed than to protect the adjoining lot which they still held, but the language of the restriction and the then existing circumstances show otherwise.
This is an entirely different case from those in which there has been a building restriction imposed by the alienor of land for the benefit of an adjoining property
The case might be different if this had not been manifestly a development project for the property or if the restrictions had not been carried into the subsequent deeds. We are not unmindful of the rule that “Where restrictions imposed are not as a part of a general scheme of improvement, but are for the benefit of land retained by the grantor, the grantees, in case there are more than one, cannot enforce such restrictions against each other, unless there is a showing that the restrictions are intended for their benefit as well as that of the grantors”: 18 Corpus Juris 396; but this rule plays no part in the decision of the pending case, because the restrictions here
At the time these restrictions were entered into, that part of West Philadelphia in which the property is located was rapidly developing into a residential neighborhood and they were placed in the deed for the purpose of continuing and guaranteeing its character. The accepted rule is that the language of a deed should be interpreted in the light of the apparent object or purpose of the parties and of the conditions existing when made: Rabinowitz v. Rosen, 269 Pa. 482; Murphy v. Ahlberg, 252 Pa. 267.
As to the question of laches, it is sufficient to say that plaintiff was not bound to anticipate defendant would violate the covenants of her deed until she actually did so. The stores were not opened, one of them until September 4th, and the other until September 14th. The bill was filed about a month thereafter, on October 19th. It would seem that appellee moved reasonably promptly to assert his rights. The case differs from Coates v. Young Women’s Christian Assn., 245 Pa. 426, where laches was imputed to the plaintiff for not sooner asserting her rights under a building restriction. There the mere erection of the building was violative of the
The assignments of error are overruled and the decree affirmed at appellant’s cost.