41 A.2d 407 | Pa. | 1944
Plaintiffs' decedent, Morris Drob, purchased some bonds which had been executed by Robert and Celia Marlowe to Land Title Bank and Trust Company as obligee, also a judgment of that Company against the Marlowes and several judgments against them of Utility Building and Loan Association. The question involved in the present equity proceedings was whether Drob made these purchases in order to use the claims as the basis of a contemplated attachment against Marlowe's stock in a corporation in which he and Drob each had a half interest, or whether he purchased these securities for Marlowe's benefit with the understanding that, upon reimbursement of the purchase price, he would assign them to Marlowe. *299
Drob bought the bonds and judgments for $900, although they were of a face value of several thousands of dollars. He took title to them in the name of Sydney E. Jaffe, Esq. Drob having died, the administrators of his estate brought a bill in equity praying that Jaffe be ordered to assign to them these bonds and judgments. They produced evidence to show that the relations between Drob and Marlowe were hostile and that Drob bought these securities for the purpose of using them as a weapon against Marlowe, while the testimony on the part of defendants was to the effect that Drob and Marlowe were friends and, when Marlowe became financially embarrassed, Drob purchased the claims in order to give him an opportunity, at some later time, to acquire them at the price which Drob paid for them. The Chancellor chose to believe Drob's witnesses and to disbelieve Marlowe's, and accordingly entered a decree in favor of plaintiffs. His conclusions, supported as they were by evidence and affirmed by the court en banc, have the effect of the verdict of a jury: Serventi v. Galli,
Marlowe objected to the testimony of David S. Malis, Esq., Drob's lawyer, who recounted conversations he had had with his client. The Chancellor eliminated these conversations except as they dealt with Drob's instructions to Malis in regard to the purchase of the securities (cf. Eaton v. New York LifeInsurance Co.,
Marlowe was a real estate operator and Drob a certified public accountant employed by Marlowe from time to time. Marlowe therefore insists that there was a confidential relationship between them which precluded Drob from purchasing these claims in an adverse capacity and for a hostile purpose. It is true that a confidential relationship is not limited to any particular association of parties but exists wherever one occupies toward another such a position of advisor or counsellor as reasonably to inspire confidence that he will act in good faith for the other's interest: Restatement, Trusts, sec. 44, comment (c); Metzger v. Metzger,
As far as Jaffe is concerned, plaintiffs introduced in evidence the allegation of their bill that the bonds and judgments had been placed in his name as a straw party for Drob. In his answer Jaffe denied this allegation "as stated", and averred that Drob was indebted to him in the sum of $500 for legal services which he had rendered to Drob in this and other matters, and that the assignments of the bonds and judgments were taken in his name as security for this indebtedness. The Chancellor accepted the allegation of the bill in evidence without requiring that these qualifying averments also be admitted; this the court en banc properly deemed to be *301
error: see Buehler v. United States Fashion Plate Co.,
Decree affirmed; costs to be paid by the appellants in each appeal. *302