Plаintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s claim under § 2 of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (wpa), MCL 15.362; MSA 17.428(2). Plaintiff also contests the circuit *560 court’s subsequent order denying plaintiff’s motion for reinstatеment of a prior district court judgment. We affirm the circuit court’s order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition. We reverse, in part, the circuit court’s order denying plaintiff’s motion seeking reinstatement of the district court judgment.
This case is befоre this Court for the second time. In 1985, plaintiff was discharged from her employment with defendants. The facts underlying plaintiff’s discharge were set forth in this Court’s first opinion. See
Driver v Hanley,
After remand from this Court, plaintiff was left with only a wpa claim pending in the circuit court. Defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), arguing that plaintiff could not sustain a successful claim under the WPA under the facts as alleged and developed. In particular, defendants argued that plaintiff’s alleged report to the United States Department of Labor (usdl) was insufficient to support plaintiff’s claim, because the usdl did not constitute a “public body” within the meaning of the wpa. According to defendants, the wpa did not offer protection to employees discharged for reporting to federal agencies. The circuit court agreed and granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition. Plaintiff then moved for reinstatement of the original district court judgment, arguing that the dismissal of her other two claims had been predicated solely on the existence of a valid wpa claim against defendants. The circuit court denied plaintiff’s motion, reasоning that the wpa precluded plaintiff’s public policy and breach of contract claims despite being inapplicable to plaintiffs case.
Plaintiff first contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing her claim under the wpa. A trial cоurt’s
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determination regarding a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.
Atkinson v Detroit,
Plaintiff does not argue that the circuit court erred substantively in dismissing her wpa claim on the ground that the USDL was not a “рublic body.”
2
Accordingly, we will not address the issue whether an agency of the federal government constitutes a “public body” for purposes of the WPA.
Radtke v Everett,
Here, defendants suсcessfully argued to the circuit court (on appeal from the district court) and to this Court that the WPA provided plaintiffs exclusive remedy. Then, on remand to the circuit court, defendants argued that the wpa was inapplicable to the specific facts of plaintiffs case. Plaintiff contends that defendants’ “new” position, allegedly taken for the first time on remand, was wholly inconsistent with defendants’ prior position. We disagree. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, defendants’ position on remand regarding the applicability of the WPA to the specific facts of plaintiff’s case did not conflict with their prior arguments and was not a new position. Defendants first raised both arguments in their original (and ultimately unsuccessful) mоtions for summary disposition filed in 1986.
3
Moreover, at no time did defendants ever assert, unequivocally, that the wpa was applicable to the specific facts of plaintiffs case. After the initial district court judgment, defendants’ arguments did not аddress the applicability of the wpa to the specific facts of plaintiff’s case. Instead, defendants merely argued that, because plaintiff had alleged a violation of the wpa, she could not, as a matter of law, allege a cumulative breach of contract claim. Finally, we note that plaintiff failed to raise the issue of judicial estop-
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pel before the circuit court and therefore failed to preserve the issue for apрellate review.
Chilingirian v City of Fraser,
Plaintiff next argues, in the alternative, that because the circuit court dismissed her WPA claim, which had been deemed her “exclusive remedy,” it should have reinstated the judgment of the district court with respect to her public policy and breach of contract claims. A trial court on remand possesses the authority to take any action that is consistent with the opinion of the appellate court.
VanderWall v Midkiff
The law of the case doctrine provides that a ruling by an appellate court with regard to a particular issue binds thе appellate court and all lower tribunals with respect to that issue.
Reeves v Cincinnati, Inc (After Remand),
In deciding the first appeal in this case, this Court relied on the “well established” rule that “the wpa provides the exclusive remedy for an employee who has been discharged wrongfully from employment for reporting an employer’s violation of the law.” Driver, supra at 18. We then held that, because plaintiff’s breach of contract claim “was based solely on the fact that she reported defendants’ violations of the law,” the remedy provided by the wpa was exclusive. Id. This Court’s holding was expressly limited to the facts of thе case, and in reciting the facts, we incorrectly stated that plaintiff had “filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division.” Id. at 15, 18. On remand, the circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s wpa claim because plaintiff’s report was made to the usdl, a federal agency. Both parties agree that plaintiff’s report was made to the federal agency rather than a state agency. Accordingly, because the key fact upon which the circuit *566 court relied to dismiss plaintiff’s “exclusive remedy” was not among the facts apparently relied on by this Court, the law of the case doctrine was not applicable on remand and does not now bind this Court on the issue. CAF Investment, supra at 454.
As a general rule, remеdies provided by a statute for the violation of a right having no common-law counterpart are exclusive rather than cumulative.
Dudewicz v Norris Schmid, Inc,
Although plaintiff sought reinstatement (or relief from a prior circuit court order) with respect to both her public policy and breach of contract claims, only her breach of contract claim was dismissed on the *567 basis of the purported exclusivity of the wpa. Accordingly, plaintiff is not entitled to relief from the circuit court’s order regarding her public pоlicy claim. We therefore remand with instructions to the circuit court to (1) modify its prior order reversing the district court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff with regard to plaintiff’s breach of contract claim and to (2) reinstate the judgment of the district court with respect to that count only.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. No taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219, neither party having prevailed in full.
Notes
The circuit court construed plaintiffs public policy claim as bеing a claim for retaliatory discharge under the wages and fringe benefits act, MCL 408.471 et seq.; MSA 17.277(1) et seq.
In plaintiffs reply brief on appeal, she specifically states that the circuit court’s ruling regarding the applicability of the wpa “is not an issue in this appeal.”
In these motions, defendants argued (1) that the wpa was inapplicable because the usdl did not constitute a “public body” and (2) that plaintiffs public policy claim was excluded by the wpa.
Although plaintiffs motion was entitled “Motion For Rehearing/Reinstatement of Judgment,” she explained at the first hearing on the motion and in her supplemental brief in support of the motion that, procedurally, the motion was actually a motion seeking relief from the prior circuit court order.