MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Presently before the Court is plaintiffs’ counsel’s application for costs and attorneys’ fees in light of the settlement agreement reached by the parties on February 28, 2014. (See PL’s Application for Costs and Fees, Mar. 31, 2014 [ECF No. 94] (“Application”).) Having considered this application, defendant’s opposition, (Resp. to Pl.’s App. for Costs and Fees, Apr. 17, 2014 [ECF No. 95] (“Opp.”)) and plaintiffs’ counsel’s reply, (Reply Mem. of Law in Support of PL’s Application for Costs and Fees, Apr. 28, 2014 [ECF No. 97] (“Reply”)) the Court will grant plaintiffs’ counsel’s request in part. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will award plaintiffs’ counsel $387,710.48 in fees and $13,510.42 in costs.
BACKGROUND
The material facts relevant to this case were described in detail in this Court’s two prior opinions. See Driscoll v. George Washington Univ.,
On April 27, 2012, David M. Driscoll sued his former employer George Washington University (“GWU”) on behalf of himself and other similarly situated employees. (See CompL, Apr. 27, 2012 [ECF No. 1].) In his complaint he alleged that he and other executive assistants, executive coordinators, and executive associates employed by GWU were unlawfully denied overtime pay to which they were legally entitled under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq. (“FLSA”), the D.C. Minimum Wage Act, D.C. Code §§ 32-1001, et seq. (“DCMWA”), and the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law, D.C. Code §§ 32-1301, et seq. (“DCWPCL”). See Driscoll I,
On April 5, 2013, the Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ DCWPCL claim. After noting that the question was one of first impression in this jurisdiction, the Court con-eluded that plaintiff could not bring a DCWPLA claim “based on the same facts as [an] [actionable] DCMWA claim.” Driscoll II,
The parties held their Rule 26(f) conference on May 1, 2013, and began exchanging discovery soon thereafter. (Decl. of Michael J.D. Sweeney in Support of Pl.’s Application for Costs and Fees, Mar. 31, 2014 [ECF No. 94-2] (“Sweeney Decl.”), at 16.) On or about August 22, 2013, the parties began to discuss the possibility of settlement. (Id. at ¶ 12.) After extensive discussions held in Washington, D.C. under the direction of mediator Nancy Lessor, the parties reached an initial settlement term sheet on December 7, 2013. Six weeks later the parties agreed to a final version of the Confidential Settlement Agreement. As part of this agreement, approved by the Court, defendant agreed to pay plaintiffs’ counsel “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as determined by this Court.” (Id. at ¶¶ 13-17.)
On March 31, 2014, plaintiffs’ counsel filed the present application for costs and fees. With it, plaintiffs’ counsel also provided the Court with detailed billing records and receipts for all purported costs.
ANALYSIS
1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Under the FLSA, the Court must “allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The purpose of this mandatory fee-shifting scheme is to “provide an adequate economic incentive for private attorneys to take employment discrimination cases, and thereby to ensure that plaintiffs would be able to obtain competent legal representation for the prosecution of legitimate claims.” See Laffey v. Nw. Airlines, Inc.,
II. PROPER METHOD FOR CALCULATING REASONABLE ATTORNEYS’ FEES
The first disputed issue in the case is the appropriate method for calculating plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs’ counsel advocates for the use of the so-called “lodestar approach,” which “as its name suggests, [has] become the guiding light of [the Supreme Court’s] fee-shifting jurisprudence.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex. rel. Winn,
The Court disagrees. As the Supreme Court held in Perdue, “the lodestar method yields a fee that is presumptively sufficient to achieve th[e] objective [of fee-shifting statutes].”
The lodestar approach has “emerged as the prevailing method of fee calculation” in fee-shifting cases for good reason. See id. at 1266. It compensates attorneys for their work, despite the reality that wage discrimination cases often result in small recoveries for a limited number of opt-in plaintiffs. To be sure, the use of the lodestar approach will, at
III. PLAINTIFF’S FEE REQUEST
Having concluded that plaintiffs’ counsel’s fees should be calculated based on the lodestar approach, the Court must now compute the two variables necessary to make this calculation: (1) the number of hours reasonably expended in the course of the litigation and (2) the reasonable hourly rate for these hours. See In re InPhonic,
A. The Reasonable Number of Hours Reasonably Expended in Litigation
The party seeking fees has the burden of establishing that the hours billed for the work are reasonable in light of the success achieved. See Hensley,
In total, plaintiffs’ counsel’s fee application seeks compensation for over 1,450 hours of work. Plaintiffs’ counsel voluntarily excluded from this figure 138.5 hours attributable to work done on their unsuccessful class certification motion and 9.6 hours attributable to attempts to reach a non-responsive opt-in class plaintiff.
Defendant nevertheless challenges the reasonableness of plaintiffs’ counsel’s calculation of compensable hours on the grounds that it is “clearly excessive” and is the “result[ ][of] egregious billing practices.” (Opp. at 8.) Specifically, defendant contends that plaintiffs’ compensable hours should be reduced on four grounds: (1) inefficient staffing, (2) inadequate documentation of work; (8) inclusion of non-compensable, non-legal work; and (4) inclusion of non-compensable work for plaintiffs’ motion to amend and plaintiffs’ opposition to defendants’ summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs’ counsel responds that defendant’s complaints about “virtually every aspect of [its] practice” are “baseless.” (Reply at 14.)
The Court will consider each of these challenges in turn. Ultimately, while it will conclude that the vast majority of the hours expended in the course of the litigation were reasonable (and therefore com-pensable), for the reasons discussed below the Court will reduce the number of com-pensable hours to account for (1) “clerical tasks” improperly included in the fee application and (2) work specifically done in support of plaintiffs’ unsuccessful effort to amend its complaint to bring a Rule 23 opt-out class action under the DCMWA.
1. Inefficient Staffing
Defendant argues that the Court should reduce the number of compensable hours on the grounds that plaintiffs’ counsel staffed the case inefficiently. (See Opp. at 11.) In support of this claim, defendant emphasizes that the fee application in-eludes hours worked by thirteen different employees of the firm and emphasizes that in other cases courts have deemed similar staffing patterns as “overkill .... [resulting from] inefficiency and overstaffing” such that a reduction in the number of compensable hours was justified. (See id. (citing Young v. Cooper Cameron Corp. 04-cv-5968, Opp. Ex. 3 (S.D.N.Y.2009)).)
However, a careful review of plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing records shows that plaintiffs’ counsel’s staffing pattern was not inefficient. Of the more roughly 1,450 hours identified in the fee application, more than 90% are attributable to work done by two lawyers — Michael Sweeney (a partner) and Lesley Tse (an associate) — and two paralegals — Tara Tayyabkhan and Monica Ayres (who replaced Ms. Tayyabkhan as the lead paralegal on the case when she left the firm). (Reply at 15.) Most of the work therefore was completed by a three-person team comprised of a single partner, a single associate, and a single paralegal. In the Court’s view this is hardly an inefficient staffing pattern. The remaining hours are attributable to three attorneys (less than ten hours), one IT, professional (less than twenty-five ■ hours), and five paralegals (less than fifty-five hours). Based on the extensive work required both prior to and during settlement, including the simultaneous representation of as many as twenty individual plaintiffs over a two-year period, the Court concludes that this limited assistance from other members of the firm was entirely reasonable. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fees will therefore not be reduced on this ground.
Next, defendant challenges the adequacy of plaintiffs’ counsel’s documentation of the work completed and alleges, as a result, that the lodestar should be reduced. (Opp. at 9 (citing Miller v. Holzmann,
Based on its own review of plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing records, the Court is satisfied that most of the relevant billing entries indicate what the attorney or staff member was doing with sufficient detail for the purpose of analyzing the propriety of tasks completed. Moreover, the Court notes that plaintiffs’ counsel employed task-based (not block) billing and calculated its work in tenth of an hour increments further demonstrating an effort to document their work in the most detailed way possible. As always, plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing records could certainly have given more detail. However, the Court is well-aware of the trade-off between efficiency of conducting relevant tasks and the effort required to keep overly detailed billing records. In the Court’s view, plaintiffs’ counsel in this case did more than enough to walk this fine line and adequately account for its hours. Additionally, the Court is satisfied that any insufficient documentation has been sufficiently accounted for by plaintiffs’ counsel’s voluntary reduction of the final lodestar figure by 5%. See Michigan v. EPA,
3. Clerical Work and Marketing Activities
Defendant also challenges the inclusion of non-legal work in its application for fees. (Opp. at 12.) Generally, “[a] prevailing party entitled to ‘reasonable’ attorneys’ fees may not recoup fees for time a professional spent on purely clerical tasks because such tasks ‘ought to be considered part of normal administrative overhead.’ ” Miller,
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fee application includes two types of allegedly “clerical work.” The first is identified as a separate line item in plaintiffs’ counsel’s fee application labeled “clerical work” charged at a rate of $75 per hour. (See Mot. at 18.) The Court will exclude this line item in its entirety because, by plaintiffs’ own assessment, these tasks were clerical. Such tasks are generally considered “normal administrative overhead” that are not com-pensable. See Lopez v. Dist. of Columbia,
The second set of entries that must be excluded from plaintiffs’ counsel’s compensable hours are tasks that despite being clerical were not labeled as such and were therefore included in the hours charged at the staff member or attorney’s normal hourly rate. Admittedly, the classification of certain tasks as “clerical” and others as “legal” is somewhat subjective. Yet, the parties have compelled the Court to calculate reasonable attorneys’ fees and therefore it has no choice but to engage in such analysis. In reviewing plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing records, the Court focused on identifying, purely clerical tasks that could be completed by “librarians, clerical personnel^] and other support staff’ from legal and factual tasks that were best completed by “law clerks and paralegals.” See Dickens v. Friendship-Edison P.C.S.,
4. Work Done on Plaintiffs Unsuccessful Claims
Defendant argues that “even a quick review of the time entries indicates that counsel are in fact seeking to recover for time spent on th[e] unsuccessful [class certification] motion as well as their closely related motion to amend the complaint, and opposition of GW’s motion for summary judgment.” (Opp. at 9-11,) In defendant’s view, these hours are not com-pensable on the grounds that they are connected with an unsuccessful claim. Plaintiffs’ counsel responds that it “excluded 138.5 hours attributable to Plaintiffs’ unsuccessful class certification motion and 9.6 hours attributable to attempting to contact Plaintiff Sheena King after she became unresponsive to communications,” but that its work in opposing defendant’s summary judgment motion is compensable on the grounds that the successful claims embodied in the settlement agreement were sufficiently related to the unsuccessful claim such that they are compensable. (See Reply at 18.)
While the parties agree on the relevant legal standard for analyzing this issue, they disagree on its application to this case. The Court of Appeals has consistently held that in fee-shifting cases plaintiffs’ counsel “may recover fees only for work related to the claim on which he prevailed, and the fees awarded on that claim must be reasonable in relation to the success achieved.” Williams,
In In re InPhonic, for example, a case brought under the D.C. private attorney general statute (DCCPPA) and settled by the parties, this Court faced the similar question of whether plaintiffs’ counsel was entitled to attorneys’ fees for work done on unsuccessful claims under other D.C. consumer protection statutes, RICO, and common law.
Plaintiff contends that this case is like In re InPhonic in that “[a]ll the claims against GWU involved a ‘common core of facts’ and ‘related legal theories’ ... [and the] legal theories were all intended to establish the illegality of the same conduct by GWU.... ” (Mot. at 17.) Therefore, in plaintiffs’ view, they are entitled to fees for the contested motion to amend its complaint to add Rule 28 claims under the DCMWA and opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment on its DCWPLA claim. Defendant responds, however, that unlike In re InPhonic, plaintiffs’ unsuccessful claims had “nothing to do with “what was at stake’ for the plaintiffs who ultimately recovered in this case” and instead only “tied to [plaintiffs’] efforts to oppose class certification.... ” (Opp. at 10 n.10.)
On the motion for summary judgment, the Court agrees with the plaintiff. Plaintiffs’ DCWPLA claim concerned the same fundamental allegation as its successful claims; namely, that defendant violated the law when it failed to pay employees sufficient overtime pay. Just as in In re Phonic, plaintiffs’ unsuccessful claim therefore should be classified as a “different legal claim based upon the same factual premise.” In fact, plaintiffs’ case is even stronger than the plaintiffs’ case in In re InPhonic because in dismissing plaintiffs’ DCWPLA claim at the motion for summary judgment stage, this Court expressly relied on the fact that the DCMWA claim and DCWPLA rested on “identical facts,” i.e., that the DCWPLA “claim is based on the same facts as his DCMWA claim,” and therefore was not actionable. Driscoll II,
On the motion to amend, however, the Court agrees with the defendant. In this motion plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to include an opt-out class action under the DCMWA in addition to the opt-in provisions provided by district law. Driscoll I,
B. The Reasonable Hourly Rate
The second variable that the Court must calculate to determine plaintiffs fees is the reasonable hourly rate for each of the relevant employees. The determination of a “reasonable hourly rate” requires an analysis of at least three elements: “the attorneys’ billing practices; the attorneys’ skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Covington v. Dist. of Columbia,
As a preliminary matter, the Court has already concluded in section III.A, supra, that plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing practices were reasonable. Additionally, despite defendant’s conclusory allegations that plaintiffs’ counsel has “not provided any evidence of their skill, experience, or reputation,” (Opp. at 14), the Court is satisfied that plaintiffs’ counsel has extensive experience based on the findings by “other district courts around the country [that] have recognized, [the firm’s] experience and skill in prosecuting wage-and-hour class litigation.” Brumley v. Camin Cargo Control Inc.,
The prevailing market rate is generally established either by the rate at which prior fee awards have been made or based on published surveys of prevailing rates in the community, such as the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s Laffey matrix. Id. at 1109. The parties agree that the appropriate rate to be applied is the one provided by the Laffey matrix. (Mot. at 8; Opp. at 15.) They disagree, however, on three related issues. First, they disagree on which jurisdiction’s Laffey matrix should be used to calculated plaintiffs’ counsel’s fees (the matrix for the District of Columbia where the case was tried or the matrix for the Northern District of New York where plaintiffs’ counsel’s firm is located). Second, they disagree on whether the 2014 Laffey matrix should be used for all of the work completed or whether the Laffey matrices in place at the time the work was actually completed should be used instead. Third, the parties disagree on how Ms. Tse’s experience should be classified for purposes of the Laffey matrix calculation.
1. The D.C. Laffey Matrix Should Be Used to Calculate the Reasonable Market Rate
In fee-shifting cases such as this one, the prevailing market rate is generally calculated based on the market rate in the forum jurisdiction. See Donnell v. United States,
2. Historical Rates, Not Present Rates Should Be Used
Plaintiffs argue that despite the fact that the work for this case was completed primarily in 2012 and 2013, the Court should calculate all of plaintiffs’ compensable fees based on the 2014 D.C. Lajfey matrix. In support of this position, plaintiffs’ counsel argues that “[t]he Supreme Court and lower courts have consistently held that where payment is delayed in fee-shifting cases, a court may compensate for the time value of money by either using historic billing rates plus interest or by using present-day rates.” (Mot. 11 (emphasis added).) While an accurate characterization of the law, it is of little help to plaintiffs’ counsel’s case. As this Court has previously explained — albeit in dicta — “a significant number of those [cases] ... dealt specifically with fee shifting ... in protracted civil rights litigation” such that the use of present-day rates was necessary to adequately compensate plaintiffs’ counsel. See In re LivingSocial Mktg. and Sales Practice Litig.,
The final issue upon which the parties disagree is the reasonable rate for the work done by Ms. Tse, the primary associate on the case. Ms. Tse graduated from law school in 2006. See “Attorneys & Paralegals,” http://getmcmsweeney. com/ attomeys-paralegals (last visited July 16, 2014). Plaintiffs’ counsel contends that this entitles the firm to calculate her hourly rate based on the fee for associates that have between eight and ten years’ experience. Defendant on the other hand argues that this only entitles plaintiffs’ counsel to charge for an associate with between five and seven years’ experience.
Part of this disagreement stems from the disagreement over the appropriate year’s Laffey matrix that should be used. Because the Court has already concluded that it will use the 2012 Laffey matrix fees for work done in 2012 and the 2013 Laffey matrix fees for work done in 2013, it is equally true that Ms. Tse’s rate should be calculated based on her experience in those relevant years. That said, even if the Court were to apply the 2014 Laffey matrix fees for the entirety of plaintiffs’ counsel’s work, as the Court is permitted to do in its discretion, it would make no sense whatsoever to also calculate Ms. Tse’s work as if she had eight-to-ten years of experience for years that she only had six or seven years of experience. The Court will therefore re-calculate Ms. Tse’s fees based on the level of experience she had in the year the work was performed. The Court will similarly account for the fact that Dan Getman’s experience for purposes of the Laffey matrix reached a new threshold in 2014.
C. Total Recoverable Fees
For the reasons discussed above, the Court is now able to calculate the appropriate fees to which plaintiff is reasonably entitled.
Non-Travel Related Fees
*Note 2 to the Lajfey matrix states that “experience refers to the years following the attorney’s graduation from law school. Mr. Getman graduate from law school in 1984, Mr. Sweeney in 1996, Ms. Tse in 2006, Mr. Dunn in 2003, and Ms. Marin in 2012. The rates in this chart correspond to the number of years of experience each individual had at the time the rate was calculated. See “Attorneys & Paralegals,” http://getmansweeney.com/attomeys-paralegals (last visited July 16, 2014)
In addition, plaintiffs’ counsel is entitled to travel costs at half their hourly rate. See Bucher v. District of Columbia,
Travel Costs (Charged at 50% rate)
Adding the total amounts from the above tables, the final amount to which plaintiffs’ counsel is entitled in fees is $387,710.48.
D. Costs
In addition to fees, plaintiffs’ application also seeks costs in the amount of $13,510.42. Plaintiffs’ provide the relevant invoices and receipts to justify this amount. (Mot.Ex. B.) Defendant only-challenges the inclusion of the costs plaintiffs incurred for the mediator. In defendant’s view, “[plaintiffs’ counsel seeks a $6,000 payment for the fees of the mediator, despite the fact that such fees were paid by GW[U]. Plaintiffs’ request for costs should be reduced by that amount.” (Opp. at 11 n. 11.) While plaintiffs failed to expressly rebut this claim in their reply, the “Advance Payment Invoice” included among plaintiffs’ documentation exhibit, indicates that the “invoice total [of $6000] is based upon the fee split agreed to by all parties.” (Mot. Ex. B. at 22 (emphasis added).) Moreover, this invoice expressly states that $6,000 is the amount owed by David Driscoll, et. al.” It is well-established in this Circuit that compensable costs include all “reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the attorney which are normally charged to a fee-paying client, in the course of providing legal services.” Laffey,
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, and for the reasons stated above, plaintiffs’ counsel’s application for costs and fees is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiffs’ counsel is awarded $387,710.48 in fees and $13,510.42 in costs, and such payment shall be made in accordance with the settlement agreement.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Upon the Court’s request, plaintiffs’ counsel also provided access to a digital file of the billing records on June 12, 2014.
. The reasons for low opt-in rates and small recoveries in FLSA cases are well-documented. See, e.g., Iliza Bershad, "Employing Arbitration: FLSA Collective Actions Post-Concepcion,” 34 Cardozo L. Rev. 359, 385 (2012) ("[S]tudies show that only 15.71% of potential plaintiffs consent to opt in to collective action classes under FLSA. These low opt-in rates are attributed to a number of factors, most of which are grounded in the demographic of the typical FLSA plaintiff. Low income individuals, who are most at risk of wage-hour violations, tend to be the most mobile and have the highest turnover rates, and thus they often do not receive notice of impending litigation when it is sent to them. Employees with low education levels, such as likely FLSA plaintiffs, are also less likely to understand
. Defendant argues that "even if the Court declines to use the percentage method per se, it unquestionably remains relevant as a crosscheck to the reasonableness of the Plaintiff's lodestar-based request.” (Opp. at 7 (citing Swedish Hosp.,
. Plaintiff does, however, include certain tasks only partially connected with the unsuccessful class certification motion — albeit at a 50% discount. The Court, has briefly reviewed these entries and sees no reason why they should not be excluded in their entirety because, as plaintiffs concede, they are not entitled to fees for the unsuccessful Rule 23 motion.
. Similarly, defendant alleges that legal work was not efficiently divided among team members, citing in particular legal research conducted by partner Michael Sweeney that could have been performed by an associate. While it is true that courts may reduce plaintiffs’ counsel’s fee award when legal research "could have been performed by a junior associate,” the Court does not conclude that research conducted by Mr. Sweeney in this case
. In this category the Court includes interviews and communications with potential witness and potential plaintiffs such as Joan Mitchell. Such interviews are part of reasonable preparation in an FLSA case. See, e.g., Cobell,
. Specifically, Aníbal Garcia’s compensable hours will be reduced by .5 hours in 2011-2012, 5.7 hours in 2012-2013, and .3 hours in 2013-2014; Carolyn Mow’s hours will be reduced by .5 hours for 2013-2014; Monica Ayres’s hours will be reduced by .4 hours for 2012-2013, and .4 hours in 2013-2014; and
. Additionally, defendant identifies a single line-item that it argues should have been excluded from plaintiffs' fee request because it is attributable to plaintiffs’ unsuccessful class certification motion. The line item in question is attributable to Leslie Tse for 1.1 hours of work completed on June 12, 2012. It reads, "reviewed/organized interview notes and client docs in preparation for drafting declaration for D. Driscoll for motion for class cert.” (See Opp. at 10.). The Court will exclude this 1.1 hours attributable to Ms. Tse in 2012-2013 from plaintiffs’ compensable hours as it applies to work done only on the unsuccessful class certification motion.
. It should be noted, however, that the Court finds plaintiffs’ counsel's second argument for using the D.C. Laffey matrix less convincing. Plaintiffs' counsel argues in its Reply that it is also entitled to the D.C. Laffey matrix fees because the fees it generally charges other clients exceeds those identified in the D.C. Laffey matrix. (Reply at 9.) Therefore, despite a significantly lower prevailing market rate in the Northern District of New York where its firm is located, counsel would not receive a windfall as a result of this Court applying the D.C. Laffey matrix. However, the nature of plaintiffs' counsel’s work is such that it rarely charges its clients by the hour and instead often works on a contingency basis or, as in this case, under a fee-shifting statute. The firm's published “hourly rates” are therefore of little value to the Court’s market rate analysis and the Court declines to rely on this reason for reaching its conclusion that the D.C. Laffey matrix should apply.
. Plaintiffs’ counsel created a rate for its IT professional, Michael Russo. While reasonable, the Court will account for his work in previous years by subtracting $5 per hour per year (2011-2012 rate: $185; 2012-2013 rate: $190; 2013-2014 rate: $195) consistent with other Laffey Matrix amounts.