71 Ala. 529 | Ala. | 1882
Lead Opinion
The validity of tax sales must be governed by the law which is in force at the time of the sale. Oli/oer v. Robmson, 58 Ala. 46. The present sale took place in May, 1879, under a proceeding commenced before the probate judge of Dale county on the first of March of the same year. Its purpose was to enforce the collection of certain delinquent taxes due for the year 1878, and assessed against a certain tract of land, as the property of one Hargrove. The validity of the whole proceeding must therefore be tested by the act approved February 12, 1879, entitled “An Act to provide for the sale of land and other real estate for delinquent taxes, and the redemption thereof.” — Acts 1878-79, pp. 1-8.
It is insisted that the judgment of the probate court condemning the lands to sale, bearing date April 14, 1879, fails to show that this court had proper jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the party, and being a court of limited jurisdiction and of special statutory powers in this particular matter, the judgment of sale is void, because of this failure to recite
The probate court thus liad jurisdiction of both the subject-matter and of the person of the land-owner, according to the recitals in the record of the particular cause, and such being the fact, the rule in ordinary cases is, that although the record may abound with reversible irregularities, fatal on appeal, it is invulnerable to collateral attack, as is here attempted.—2 Brick.
It is no objection to the application of this principle that the present is a proceeding to enforce the collection of delinquent taxes. "While great accuracy is exacted in all such proceedings, and strict rules are applied for the protection of the tax-payer, this principle, forbidding the collateral assailment of judgments, has often been successfully invoked in actions of this nature. It has accordingly been decided that there is no sound reason why judicial proceedings for the enforcement of taxes should be exempted from its influence.—Burroughs on Tax. 285-6; Freeman on Judg., § 135; Wellshear v. Kelley, 69 Mo. 343; Fitel v. Foote, 39 Cal. 439.
The statute expressly provided that the judgment of condemnation should be rendered in such cases only where the tax-payer interposed no defense. It would certainly have constituted a full defense to the proceeding, if it had been shown on the trial that the tax-payer, or any one for him, had tendered to the collector the full amount of the delinquent taxes due by the owner; or that the owner had in his possession, in the county, a sufficient amount of visible personal property, out of which his unpaid taxes might have been realized by the tax collector.—Code, 1876, § 470. The act under consideration must have contemplated defenses of this nature, and the failure of the tax-payer to appear and interpose them on the trial, would be conclusive on him and liis privies in estate holding title under him. In such cases, where the record prima facie shows jurisdiction, the judgment of the probate court can not be collaterally attacked on any ground which could have been pleaded in defense on the trial.—Freeman on Judg. § 135; Cadmus v. Jackson, 52 Penn. St. 295. The court, for this reason, properly excluded from the jury proof of the fact that Har-grove, the owner of the land, possessed a suflicient amount of personal property in the county, out of which the taxes of the delinquent could have been collected. The contrary averment was recited in the judgment of the court, and was sustained by the sworn return of the tax collector, made as required by the statute, thus placing this particular fact beyond the pale of collateral contradiction. So there was no error in refusing to let the defendant prove the tender to the tax collector of “ the amount of taxes due on the said lemdf exclusive of the owner’s poll-tax and his delinquent taxes due on personal property. This alleged tender was not only incompetent evidence for the reason above mentioned — that it constituted a mere matter of defense to the rendition of the judgment' — but also very clearly for another reason. The State had a preferred lien on the property for the entire unpaid taxes of the delinquent, Har-
The alienation of the land by the owner, Iiargrove, although made prior to the date of sale, could not affect the lien of the State for delinquent taxes. The sale to Oates, made in October, 1878, was after this Uen had accrued, which, in point of time, is fixed by statute to be the first of January of the year for which the taxes were assessed.—Code, § 375. Such a lien overrides any title acquired by purchasers, whether with or without notice, and in however good faith it may have been made, and for whatever value. It follows the land in the hands of the vendee, all persons being chargeable with a knowledge of its existence. If any other rule were allowed to prevail, the State might be subjected to intolerable embarrassments in the prompt collection of its revenues, effected through the fraud and artifices of tax delinquents, making sales of their effects so as to evade the payment of their honest taxes.—Burroughs on Tax. 275-276; Gledney v. Deavors, 8 Ga. 479; Kahl v. Love, 37 N. J. (Law) 5; Dunlap v. Country of Gallatin, 15 Ill. 7.
The land in controversy is described in the assessment list and other subsequent proceedings as “two hundred acres of land, known as the lands of the late Israel Wiggins, deceased.” It is objected that this description is void for uncertainty, and that for this reason no title was conferred on the purchaser at the tax sale. The object of all description is designation and identification. The usual rule, therefore, is, that- the lands assessed must be described with such accuracy and certainty as to be capable of an easy identification. — Burroughs on Tax. 204-205. The statutory requirement is in substance the same, any description of a subdivision being sufficient by which it “may be known or identified.” — Code, §§ 362, 370.
We are of opinion that, under this rule, the description is sufficiently accurate. It presents the familiar case of a mere indefinite description, capable of being rendered certain, which is always open to more exact identification by the aid of parol evidence. From the earliest era of the common law, the grant of an estate, under the designation simply of “ Black-acre,” was always considered sufficiently definite. In Baucum v, George, 65 Ala. 259, the premises conveyed by deed were. considered by this court as described with sufficient accuracy under the name of “ The Douglas Gold Mine, in Talladega county, Alabama.” .In Macklem v. Blake, 19 Wise. 397, the following description of land in a tax deed was sustained, viz: Certain described premises lying in “Washington city, now called Port Washington.” The name in the recorded plat was shown to be “Wisconsin city,” but parol evidence was admitted
We discover no error in the rulings of the court, and its judgment must be affirmed.
On a subsequent day of the term an application for a rehearing was filed, the grounds of which are sufficiently stated in the following response:
Rehearing
We are of opinion that the application for a rehearing in this cause should be granted. The original opinion is based upon the assumption that the lands were described throughout the entire tax proceedings, as two hundred acres of land, known as the lands of the late Israel Wiggins, deceased.” The case was originally argued upon this theory.
A closer examination of the record discloses the fact that the lands were described in the assessment list, or “ docket ” filed with the probate judge, only as “ two Jumdred acres of land, hying in Dale county,” the more perfect description having been added in the progress of the subsequent proceedings.
It is true that the assessment books themselves are not in evidence, but the act approved February 12, 1879, requires the tax collector to “enter into a substantially bound book, in the manner usual in docketing causes for trial in the circuit courts,:” each parcel of real estate, “ describing it in the same manner it was assessed” with the amount of the unpaid taxes due. This book or docket the collector is required to deliver into the office of the probate judge by the first of March, and it is made the basis of all the subsequent proceedings. The notices to delinquents, the advertisements of sale, the certificates of purchase, and the tax deeds signed by the probate judge, all have antecedent reference to it. — Acts 1878-79, pp. 3 and 4, §§ 1 and 2.
Under the rules laid down in the opinion, and generally recognized by the authorities, the description given in the docket, or assessment list is clearly insufficient. It is impossible to locate these lands by a description so general and
The probate court, therefore, had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter. The assessment, which is the foundation of the' entire tax proceedings, being void, the proceedings themselves can not stand. This invalidity runs through and vitiates all these subsequent proceedings, including, of course, the tax sale itself.—Cooley on Tax. 258, 362; Yenda v. Wheeler, 9 Tex. 408. The sale was required to be according to the description given in the assessment list, or, what is the same thing, in the docket filed with the probate judge. No variance from this is permitted, the reason being, the authority or jurisdiction of the court to act in the premises depends upon the validity of this primary and fundamental proceeding. — Blackwell’s Tax Titles, *281, 282; Burrough’s on Tax. 281, 282.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.