Drew v. State ex rel. NeilDrew v. State ex rel. Neil
OPINION.
Original Action in Habeas Corpus
Judgment of Court: Petition Denied
Date of Judgment Entry: September 9, 2020
L. Patrick Mulligan & Associates, LLC, and Brandon A. Moermond, for petitioner Geoffrey Drew.
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Alex S. Havlin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Respondent State of Ohio ex rel. Jim Neil,
{1} Indicted on nine counts of rape in August 2019 for conduct occurring decades ago, petitioner Geoffrey Drew challenged the staggering $5,000,000 bail set by the trial court at arraignment. He first requested that the trial court reduce the amount of the bail, but to no avail—the court denied his motion. This ultimately prompted Mr. Drew to seek relief from this court through the mechanism of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming excessive bail. The state, on behalf of respondent Hamilton County Sheriff Jim Neil, requested that we deny the petition, maintaining that the trial court acted within its discretion, and highlighting Mr. Drew‘s failure to meet his burden in order to establish entitlement to relief. Based on the record at hand, we agree with the state and deny the writ.
{2} In Ohio, appellate courts enjoy original jurisdiction over writs of habeas corpus and are empowered with the authority to grant such relief.
{3} We treat review of a claim of excessive bail brought in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus as presenting a type of “hybrid” standard of review. Smith v. Leis, 165 Ohio App.3d 581, 2006-Ohio-450, 847 N.E.2d 485, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.). As the action is akin to an appeal from the trial court, we afford “some weight” to the trial court‘s decision setting the bail, but we also recognize that habeas corpus is an original action which normally warrants independent review. Id. (finding that trial court abused its discretion when setting petitioner‘s bail); In re DeFronzo, 49 Ohio St.2d 271, 273, 361 N.E.2d 448 (1977) (noting an anomaly in original actions which seek habeas corpus relief for excessive bail, the effect of which is an appeal from the trial court, but as an original action permits hearings and findings of fact). Therefore, we first focus our examination on whether the trial court abused its discretion in setting the bail amount. Garcia v. Wasylyshyn, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-07-041, 2007-Ohio-3951, ¶ 6, citing Hardy v. McFaul, 103 Ohio St.3d 408, 2004-Ohio-5467, 816 N.E.2d 248, ¶ 7. And if we find an abuse of discretion, we may exercise our own independent judgment in resetting bail at a reasonable figure based on the evidence presented to us. Gallagher v. Johnson, 129 Ohio App.3d 775, 779, 719 N.E.2d 60 (11th Dist.1998), citing DeFronzo at 273. In other words, the petitioner bears the burden of showing “that appropriate grounds for independent review by this court exist.” Garcia at ¶ 9.
{4} In bringing a habeas corpus action, the petitioner must establish “(1) the person whose liberty is restrained, (2) the officer who is confining the prisoner, (3) the place where the person is imprisoned, and (4) a copy of the commitment or cause of detention.” Smith at ¶ 13;
{5} In reviewing a claim of excessive bail, we note that the purpose of bail is to ensure the accused‘s presence at trial, and therefore, the reasonableness of the bail amount “is a question for the exercise of sound discretion by the trial court * * * dependent upon all the facts and circumstances in each individual case.” Lazzerini, 2018-Ohio-1788, 111 N.E.3d 727, at ¶ 2, citing Bland v. Holden, 21 Ohio St.2d 238, 239, 257 N.E.2d 397 (1970); Sargent v. Leis, 159 Ohio App.3d 658, 2005-Ohio-526, 825 N.E.2d 178, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.), citing Jenkins v. Billy, 43 Ohio St.3d 84, 85, 538 N.E.2d 1045 (1989) (noting that amount of bail in within discretion of the trial court). In setting the amount of bail,
{6} Here, Mr. Drew maintains that the trial court improperly deemed him a flight risk, pointing to his age, finances, and familial and community ties to imply that the trial court misapplied the
{7} In original actions, one means of providing substantiation of certain factual matters is through the vehicle of the stipulated factual record. 1st Dist. Loc.R. 33.2 (“To facilitate the consideration and disposition of original actions, counsel, when possible, should submit an agreed statement of facts.“). While the parties did tender us a stipulated set of facts, these facts steer well clear of any of the considerations under
{8} Mr. Drew does tender a chart that he created reflecting bail amounts in other similar alleged offenses (including some claimed to be more serious offenses) that portrays his $5 million bail as an excessive outlier. We acknowledge this comparative evidence is troubling, to say the least, but standing alone, it cannot translate into a ticket to a writ. A petitioner must marshal a more powerful evidentiary record highlighting the problems inherent in the trial court‘s decision before triggering our independent review.
{9} As a last gasp, Mr. Drew concludes that the only rational explanation for the
{10} Therefore, while we recognize that this case involves an extremely high bail and one that might ordinarily give us pause, Mr. Drew has not made a proper showing of the excessiveness of bail under the circumstances of the case. See Lewis v. Telb, 26 Ohio App.3d 11, 12, 497 N.E.2d 1376 (6th Dist.1985) (noting that before relief may be afforded in petitions of this nature it must be clear that the amount of bail set was unreasonable and the necessary criteria under
{11} Based on the foregoing, we accordingly deny Mr. Drew‘s habeas corpus petition.
Petition denied.
WINKLER, J., concurs.
MOCK, P.J., concurs in judgment only.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry this date.