44 Mo. App. 25 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1891
John Heckart is a resident of Howell county, Missouri. On the eighth day of December, 1888,
The point made and relied on by defendant’s counsel for a reversal of the judgment is, that there was no sufficient proof of the execution of the mortgage. It is insisted that the certificate of the justice in Greene county was no evidence that the mortgage was executed by Heckart; that, before it could be received in evidence, it was incumbent on the defendant to establish the genuineness of Heckart’s signature by some independent proof. This contention is predicated on section 5176 of the Revised Statutes, 1889, which requires chattel mortgages to be acknowledged in the same manner as conveyances of real estate. The argument is made that, as the property was situated in Howell county, and Heckart lived in that county, the acknowledgment by the justice in Greene county was a nullity.
Our trouble concerning this assignment is, that this particular objection to the mortgage as an item of evidence is made for the first time in this court. On the trial the plaintiff ’ s counsel made the following objections to the admission of the mortgage in evidence: First. “Because said instrument was not recorded in Howell county, Missouri, where the mortgagor lived, and kept the property in dispute, at the time the assignment was made.” Second.- “Because said instrument was never acknowledged in accordance to the statute, the same
In support of this view we find the following clause in a stipulation signed by the parties and read on the trial: “ First. That the property in controversy in this suit is the same as intended to be included in the mortgage from Heckart to Dickerson, and dated December 8, 1888.” Dickerson is the beneficiary in the mortgage to Drum. We have here at least a tacit admission that Heckart signed the mortgage. In the face of it, the plaintiff is precluded from urging the objection now made in this court. Clark v. Conway, 23 Mo. 438 ; Russell v. Glasser, 93 Mo. 353 ; Adler v. Lange, 21 Mo. App. 516. The reasons upon which this rule is founded are stated in a very satisfactory way in the case of Clark v. Conway, supra. The court used this language : “We will give no countenance, no ear, to an objection made for the first time in this court, when, if it had been made below, it could have been immediately obviated by proof. The decisions of this court, for many years, sustain this view. The party objecting to the admission of a deed, power of attorney or other instrument of writing, during the trial of a cause in the lower courts, must point out the specific objection ; ‘he must put his finger on it,’ in the language of some of the courts, so that the court below can at once see it, and the adverse party have the opportunity of obviating it by means in his power then present; and if such objection, specific and pointed, be not made below, it shall avail nothing
The objections that were really made to the mortgage on the trial cannot be sustained, and we understand from the brief of appellant’s counsel that they are not seriously urged in this court. The mortgage, although not acknowledged or recorded, was good between Heckart and the defendant. Johnson v. Jeffries, 30 Mo. 423. If good as to Heckart, it was good as to his assignee. The plaintiff, as to the mortgage, must stand in the shoes of Heckart. The latter could convey to the plaintiff as his assignee no greater title to the mortgaged property than he himself had. Jones on Chattel Mortgages [3 Ed.] sec. 363; Moser v. Claes, 23 Mo. App. 420; Heinrichs v. Woods, 7 Mo. App. 236 ; Tufts v. Thompson, 22 Mo. App. 564; J. I. Case Co. v. Campbell, 13 Pac. Rep. 324.
We are of the opinion that the case was fairly tried. The judgment will, therefore, be affirmed.