First Hоme Savings Bank, S.L.A. brought suit on two promissory notes against the maker, Richmond Hill Venture, Inc. (RHV), an Alabama corporation registered to do business in Georgia, and six individual guarantors of the notes, all of whоm are Alabama residents. RHV filed for bankruptcy protection soon after suit was filed, and the individual defendants moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied their motion and granted the bank’s motion for summary judgment, and the individual defendants appeal.
The promissory notes were given in connection with construction and equipment financing extended by aрpellee to RHV for the con *715 struction of a motel in Bryan County, Georgia. Appellant Gerald Drennen, Sr. travelled to Georgia in 1985 to inspect and purchase the property on which thе motel later was built. Appellants formed RHV in 1986 to buy the tract from Drennen and develop the motel, and the first shareholders’ meeting was held in Georgia. All appellants were shareholders in RHV, and аppellants Gerald Drennen, Sr., Howard Culbreth, and Charles Bullard were elected officers and directors. RHV sought construction financing from an Alabama loan broker, who arranged for the loans from appellee, a New Jersey corporation. All negotiations concerning the corporate loans and the guarantees required of appellants were conducted between parties in Alabama and New Jersey. The loans were closed and the guarantees signed in Birmingham in 1987 and 1988, and subsequent payments were made to appellee’s New Jersey office.
Several of the appellants visited the motel site during the project construction, and all have travelled to the motel on various occasions in connection with their motel management and oversight responsibilities. On May 29, 1990, appellee notified RHV and each appellant that the loans were in default, and appellants Drennen, Sr. and Charles Bullard subsequently met at the motel with representatives of appellee to discuss the status of the loans and to consider workout options. Appellee filed this action on January 22, 1991.
1. Appellants contend the trial court erred by denying their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction made on the ground that they had no contacts with Georgia that would provide a basis for the exеrcise of jurisdiction in this action under OCGA § 9-10-91 (1). In order for a forum to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who transacts business in the forum, “(1) The nonresident must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of doing some act or consummating some transaction with or in the forum . . .; (2) The plaintiff must have a legal cause of action against the nonresident, which arises out of, or results from, the aсtivity or activities of the defendant within the forum; and (3) If (and only if) the requirements of Rules 1 and 2 are established, a ‘minimum contact’ between the nonresident and the forum exists; the assumption of jurisdiction must be found tо be consonant with the due process notions of ‘fair play’ and ‘substantial justice.’ ” (Footnotes omitted.)
Shellenberger v. Tanner,
Appellants maintain that this test cannot be met because their contacts with Georgia stemmed from the construction and management of the motel rather than the making of the notes and guarantees, and thus the instant cause of action does not arise out of their activities within the forum. The act giving rise to the instant suit against appellants fоr nonpayment of the loans was appellants’ execution of the guarantees,
Strickland v. Foundation Life Ins. Co.,
Having considered all the elements of the instant transaction, we hold that the trial court propеrly concluded appellants had purposefully transacted business within Georgia so as to establish legally sufficient contacts. Appellants executed the personal guarantees in order to induce appellee to make the notes to RHV, and the proceeds of those notes were used to construct and equip a motel in Georgia *717 owned and operated by RHV, a corporation registered to do business in Georgia. The loans were secured by real property and fixtures located in Georgia. Given that RHV was incorporated for the express purpose of constructing and operating the motel, the parties undoubtedly intended for the loan payments to be made from the proceeds of the motel’s Georgia operations. By constructing the motel in Georgia from the loan proceeds and by travelling to Georgia periodically to oversee its continued operation and to discuss thе loan defaults with appellee’s Georgia representatives, appellants established a continuing relationship with Georgia in connection with the guarantees. See White House, supra at 605; Barton, supra. Furthеrmore, the guarantees contained a Georgia choice of law clause, which, when combined with the ongoing relationship between the parties, reinforces appellаnts’ deliberate affiliation with Georgia and the reasonable foreseeability of litigation here. Burger King, supra at 482.
In
Lazzaro v. Charlevoix Lakes,
2. Appellants contend the grant of summary judgment to appellee on the merits of its claims under the guarantees was error because material fact questions remain concerning whether appellee properly gave notice of RHV’s default to appellants and allowed' them the contractually provided time to cure the default. We do nоt agree. The record shows that RHV was in default on the notes, that appellee gave notice of this default to appellants, that their partial payment failed to cure the dеfault, and that appellee brought suit well after the four-month period allowed for curing of the default. Appellants’ contention that the October notice of continued default was not sufficient because it was sent only to RHV is without merit, as appellants admit they received actual notice of this continued default and the guarantees do not provide that notice tо appellants be given in any specific manner in order to be effective. Compare
Orkin Exterminat
*718
ing Co. v. Stevens,
Judgment affirmed.