| Mass. | Nov 25, 1935
These are actions of tort arising out of an accident which occurred October 29, 1928, on a public way in the town of Stonington in the State of Connecticut. The plaintiffs are husband and wife. The action of the wife is brought to recover for personal injuries. In the action brought by the husband he seeks to recover consequential damages resulting from the injuries received by his wife. In each case the first count alleged gross negligence and was waived by the plaintiff; the case was submitted to the jury on the second count which alleged negligence of the defendant in the operation of an automobile. It was agreed by the parties that the law of the State of Connecticut was to be applied in the trial of the actions. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff Ruth Drea in
It is recited in the bill of exceptions that there was sufficient evidence to warrant a finding that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due - care and that the defendant was negligent; that the plaintiff’s husband was not present at the time of the accident; that the only witness who testified at the trial, other than medical witnesses, was the plaintiff; and that it is agreed that the defendant and her cousin, Elizabeth Drea, would testify in substance as did the plaintiff. The trial judge entered verdicts for the defendant under leave reserved on the ground that upon all the evidence "the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover for ordinary negligence; and also upon the ground that upon all the evidence at the time of the accident there was no mutual benefit existing between the female plaintiff and the defendant by virtue of which the plaintiffs could recover for the ordinary negligence on the part of the defendant.”
The plaintiff testified, in substance, on direct examination that she lived in Waterford, Connecticut; that in August, 1928, she left her home and went to Hyde Park in this Commonwealth to stay for a period of time and was there two months or more before the accident; that while there she lived at the home of her husband’s mother; that there also lived at her mother-in-law’s home her husband’s sister, Elizabeth Drea, and her husband’s cousins, Mary and Katherine Drea, Mary Drea being the defendant in these actions; that on October 29, 1928, there was some conversation with the defendant about going to Connecticut, and the plaintiff told the family that she was going there to get her dog; that the defendant said that if she could get Elizabeth’s automobile “I will drive you down if you want me to,” and the plaintiff replied that she would be glad to have her do so; that the owner of the automobile agreed that the defendant might take it for that purpose;
It is provided by the law of Connecticut, Pub. Acts of 1927, c. 308 (now Gen. Sts. [1930] § 1628), as follows: “No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest without payment for such transportation shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of said owner or operator or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others. . . . [This act] shall not relieve a public carrier or any owner or operator of a motor vehicle while the same is being demonstrated to a prospective purchaser, of responsibility for any injuries sustained by a passenger being transported by such public carrier or by such owner or operator.” It appears from the facts shown by the record that no charge was made or intended to be made by the defendant to the plaintiff for her transportation, and that there was no relationship of master and servant, or employer and employee, between the plaintiff and the defendant. The parties were members of the same family, related by marriage, and intimate friends. There is nothing in the record which would warrant a finding that the plaintiff was to pay for the trip by having the defendant stay at her house in Connecticut in the event that they did not return to Hyde Park the same day. It is equally plain that the defendant did not expect
.The case at bar is governed by the cases above cited and by Leete v. Griswold Post, 114 Conn. 400" court="Conn." date_filed="1932-02-05" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/leete-v-griswold-post-3316581?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3316581">114 Conn. 400, Bradley v. Clarke, 118 Conn. 641" court="Conn." date_filed="1934-07-16" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/bradley-v-clarke-3319300?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3319300">118 Conn. 641, and Master v. Horowitz, 262 N.Y. 609" court="NY" date_filed="1933-07-11" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/master-v-horowitz-3580126?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="3580126">262 N. Y. 609. As was said of the evidence in Baker v. Hurwitch, 265 Mass. 360" court="Mass." date_filed="1928-12-13" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/baker-v-hurwitch-6438749?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6438749">265 Mass. 360, at page 361: “It is insufficient to indicate anything more than the friendly relations or the sense ' of mutual
As verdicts for the defendant were properly entered by the trial judge, the entry in each case must be
Exceptions overruled.